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Abstract 
This thesis examines the evolution of the role of the UN Secretary-General in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The objective is to examine the role played 
by the Secretary-General in the rejuvenation of the UN as the cold war came to a close. 
During this transitional phase in international relations it is argued that the Secretary- 
General's role in the maintenance of international peace and security developed within a 
conceptual 'partnership for peace' with the Security Council. The role of the Secretary- 
General in this 'partnership' was built on the opportunities which presented themselves as a 
result of Security Council paresis during the cold war. In section one, two periods in the 
evolution of the Secretary-General's role during the cold war are identified. The first period 
is one of, 'aggrandisement, ' which encompasses the tenures of Trygve Lie (1946-1952) 
and Dag HarnmarskJ61d (1952-1961). The second is a period of, 'consolidation, ' which 
encompasses the tenures of U Tbant (1961-1972) and Kurt Waldheirn (1972-1982). 
During these two periods it is argued that the conceptual and practical limits to the 
Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace and security were 
extended beyond the role envisaged by those who framed the Charter. It is argued that the 
Secretary-General's role as a diplomatic intermediary and peacekeeper developed on the 
basis of attributes specific to the cold war context, (impartiality, consent, and the non use of 
force). During the transitional period examined in section two, these attributes provided a 
compliment, foil, or alternative to the Security Council's political, economic, and military 
capacity to enforce decisions. The evolution of the Secretary-General's role since 1946, 
and the emergence of a 'partnership for peace' are explained at three levels of analysis: in 
terms of the prevailing systemic conditions and environmental trends; the functioning of the 
UN organisation; and the personality and approach of the incumbents. In the light of the 
findings reported in sections one and two, it is argued that the Secretary-General's role in 
the maintenance of international peace within a 'partnership for peace' provides a conceptual 
guide for the role of the Secretary-General 'in a transformed world. ' 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
This thesis sets out to explore the evolution of the role of the Secretary-General in the 
maintenance of international peace and security since 1946. The choice of subject stems 
from a statement made by the outgoing Secretary-General in his final report on the work of 
the Organisation. In September 1991, Perez de Cuellar attributed the revival of the UN to, 
"a remarkable co-ordination that had developed between the work of the Secretary-General 
and the Security Council. "' Previously, the rejuvenation of the UN had been attributed 
almost exclusively to the emergence of a post cold war working consensus in the Security 
Council. Implicit in such an assumption is the tradition of explaining the UN's record in 
the maintenance of international peace and security since 1946 almost exclusively in terms 
of Security Council paresis during the cold war. Perez de Cuellar's statement therefore 
provided the motive for exploring the role played by the Secretary-General in the 
rejuvenation of the UN, and for examining that role in its historical context. A brief review 
of the literature provides further justification for this study. 
A review of the contemporary literature highlights the gap in academic attention accorded 
the Secretary-General's role in the UN renaissance. A revival in UN fortunes stimulated 
renewed academic interest in the global ideals for which the UN Charter stands, and the 
ability of the UN to fulfil these lofty goals. The approach of the UN's 50th anniversary 
also encouraged a proliferation of articles, texts, and even new joumalS. 2 Initially, the 
attention of this new industry focused predominantly on the Security Council and its 
activities. Perez de Cuellar's initiatives were overshadowed by the remarkable turnabout in 
the relationship between the permanent members of the Security Council, and new 
departures in new and highly visible UN peacekeeping operations. Perez de Cuellar 
became a household name, but the role played by the Secretary-General in events unfolding 
around the globe received little systematic consideration. Geoff Berridge's 1991 study of 
UN Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts, 3 and Thomas Boudreau's analysis of the Secretary- 
I Perez de Cuellar, Javier, Anarchy or Order: Annual Reports 1982-1991, New York: United Nations, 1992), 
p. 328. 
2For example, Global Governance, published by Lynne Reinnax on behalf of the Academic Council on the 
United Nations System (ACUNS), first edition Winter 1995; International Peacekeeping, published by 
Frank Cass, first edition Spring 1994; and International Peacekeeping, published by Martinus Nlihoff, first 
edition, Jan. -Feb. 1994. 
313erridge, G. R. Return to the UN: UN Diploniacy in Regional Conflicts, (London: Macmillan, 199 1). 
General's preventive role, I were rare exceptions to this rule. Both, however, have been 
overtaken by events in the 1990s. Berridge's research was completed before Saddam 
Hussein invaded Kuwait, and Boudreau's text was with the publishers before the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Moreover, Boudreau's analysis is deliberately and explicitly 
limited to the role of the Secretary-General in preventing conflict and does not address the 
wider roles of the Secretary-General in the maintenance of international peace and secUrity. 2 
Conversely, Berridge is concerned with UN diplomacy in its entirety, not the Secretary- 
General's role per se. Otherwise, consideration of the Secretary-General's role has been 
limited to a handful of articles and a small number of chapters in UN textS. 3 Contemporary 
analysis of UN peacekeeping, 4and case studies of UN operations and diplomacy, 5alSo 
offer commentaries on the role of the Secretary-General but only as far as the remit of each 
work requires and permits. Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker's excellent study of, "the 
most impossible job in the world, ' '6has made a significant contribution to filling this void. 
Its range is extensive and the contributors distinguished, amongst them the new Secretary- 
General, Kofi Annan. As an edited text, however, its approach is by function or case study 
I Boudreau, T. E. Sheathing the Sword: The UN Secretary- General and the Prevention of International 
Conflict, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990). 
2Regarding the scope of this thesis see pp. I 1- 12. 
3Rivlm, Benjamin, 'The UN Secretary-General at Fifty, " in Bourantonis, Dimitris & Wienar, Jarrod, The 
United Nations in the New World Order: The World Organisation at Fifty, (London: Macmillan, 1995); 
Sutterlin, James, 'The S ec retary -General as Chief Administrator of a United Nations Under Challenge, " in 
Sutterlin, The United Nations and the Maintenance o International Peace and Security: A Challenge to be 
Met, (Westport: Connecticut: Praeger, 1995); Gordenker, Leon, 'The UN Secretary-General, Intellectual 
Leadership and Maintaining Peace, " International Spectator, Vol. 47, No. 11, Nov. 1993; Skellsbaek, Kjell, 
'The UN Secretary-General and the Mediation of International Disputes, " Journal of International Peace 
Research, Vol. 28, No. 1,1991; Szasz, Paul C., 'The Role of the UN Secretary -General: Some Legal 
Aspects, " New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1, Fall 1991; 
Sahovic, Milan, 'The UN and the New Secretary-General, " Review of International Affairs, Vol. X111,199 1, 
Franck, Thomas, & Nolte, Georg, "The Good Offices Function of the UN Secretary -General, " in Roberts, 
Adam, & Kingsbury, Benedict, (eds. ), United Nations Divided World: The UN's Roles in International 
Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 2nd edition, (see also I st edition, 1988); Bourolyannis, 
Christine M., "Fact-Finding by the Secretary-General of the UN, " New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, Vol. 22, No. 4, Summer 1990; Caminos, H. & Lavalle, R., "New 
Departures in the Exercise of inherent Powers by the UN and OAS Secretaries-General: The Central 
American Situation" American Journal of International Law, Vol. 83, No. 2, April 1989; Ramcharan, B. G., 
"Me History, Role and Organisation of the 'Cabinet' of the United Nations Secretary-General, " Nordic 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 59, No. 2/3,1990-, Ramcharan, "The Office of the United Nations 
Secretary-General, " Dalhhouise Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2,1990; Cordovez, Diego "Strengthening United 
Nations Diplomacy: The Role of the Secretary -General, " in UNITAR, The United Nations and the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987); Franck, T'homas, 
'The Role and Future Prospects of the Secretary-General, " in The Adaptation of Structures and Methods at 
the UN, Workshop, The Hague, 4-6 Nov. 1985, Dordrecht, Netherlands, (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986). 
4For example see: Durch, William J., (ed. ) The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and 
Comparative Analysis, (London: Macmillan, 1994); Diehl, Paul F., International Peacekeeping, (Baltimore, 
Maryland: 'Me John Hopkins University Press, 1993); & Jarries, Alan, Peacekeeping in International 
Politics, (London: Macmillan, 1990). 
5Particularly instructive are: Hume, Cameron, The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq, (Bloomington, 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994); Coleman, Christopher, The Salvadorean Peace Process: A 
Preliminary Inquiry, (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1993); Harrison, Selig, 'Inside the Afghan 
Talks, 'Foreign Policy, No. 72, Fall 1988; & Harrison, 'Cut a Regional Deal, ' Foreign Policy, No. 62, 
Spring 1986; see also the 'Blue Book Series' published by the UN Depatrrnent of Public Information. 
6Rivfin, Benjamin, & Gordenker, Leon, The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary- General: Making 'The 
Most Impossible Job in the World'Possible, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993). 
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and in tracing the evolution of the role of the Secretary-General it lacks continuity. 
Although published in 1993, it has also been rapidly dated by developments during a 
turbulent term for the UN and its sixth Secretary-General. These factors are not the focus 
of the thesis but are addressed in the concluding chapter. 
A review of the literature which is not limited by time scale highlights the sporadic and ad 
hoc nature of study in this field. When Perez de Cuellar left office a substantive study of 
the Secretary-General's role had not been undertaken since the early 1970s. Until then the 
creation of a new international organisation, the oscillating fortunes of the first two 
Secretaries-General, (Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskj6ld), the evolution of new concepts, 
(preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping), and the UN's 25th anniversary assured a steady 
flow of publications examining the role of the Secretary-General. ' For the next 20 years, 
however, the Secretary-General's role and development was accorded only meagre 
academic attention by a small number of UN die-hards. 2 Perhaps more so than other fields, 
the study of international organisation is hostage to the fortunes of the subject. The scope 
for the constitutional development of the Secretary-General's role had been exhausted 
during the UN's formative and adolescent years. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, (1962), a 
period of relative stability in global superpower relations ensued, and in 1972 U Thant was 
the first Secretary-General not to be 'forced' from office. It was not until the dramatic 
turnabout in fortunes during Perez de Cuellar's second term in office that the UN returned 
to favour as a field of study. 3 
ISchwebel, Stephen M., "The Origins and Development of Article 99 of the Charter, " The British Yearbook 
of International Law, 195 1; Schwebel, The Secretary- General of the United Nations: His Political Powers 
and Practice, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1952); Jackson, Elmore, "The Developing Role of the 
Secretary -General, " International Organisation, Vol. 11,1957; Abboushi, W. F., The Secretary- 
General of 
the Untied Nations: Constitutional Powers and Developments, University of Cincinnati PhD dissertation, 
1959; Bailey, Sydney D., The Secretariat of the United Nations, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964); Zacher 
Mark W., "The Secretary-General and the United Nations' Functions of Peaceful Settlement, " International 
Organisation, Vol. 20, No. 4, Autumn, 1966; Gordenker, Leon, The UN Secretary- General and the 
Maintenance of Peace, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Rovine, Arthur W., The First Fifýy 
Years: The Secretary- General in World Politics 1920-1970, (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1970); Gordenker, "The 
Secretary -General, " in Barros, James, (ed. ) The United Nations, Past Present and 
Future, (New York: The 
Free Press, 1972; Pechota, Vratislav, The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the 
United Nations Secretary- General in the Cause of Peace, (New York: UNITAR, 1972). 
2Jackson, William D. "The Political Role of the Secretary -General under U Thant and Kurt Waldheim: 
Development or Decline? " World Affairs, Vol. 140, Winter 1978; Jordan, R. S., Dag Hammarskj6ld 
Revisited: The UN Secretary- General as a Force in World Politics, (Durham, NC: Carolina Press, 1983)-, 
Ramcharan, B. G., Humanitarian Good Offices in International Law: The Good Offices of the Secretarv- 
General in the Field of Human Rights, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nij*hoff, 1983); Schwebel, Stephen M., 
"Authorising the Secretary-General of the UN to Request Advisory Opinions of the Court of Justice, " 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 78, Oct. 1984-, Jensen, Erik, "Me Secretary -Gene rat's Use of 
Good Offices and the Question of Bahrain, " Millennium, Vol. 14, Winter 1985; James, Alan, "The 
Secretary-General: a Comparative Analysis, " in Berridge, G. R., & Jennings, A., (eds. ), Diplomacly at the 
UN, (London: Macmillan, 1985). 
3See chapters 4 and 7. 
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With the exception of Perez de Cuellar, the individual tenures of the Secretaries-General 
have also attracted attention, ' none more than Hammarskj6ld. 2While excellent resources 
and valuable studies in themselves, the biographical and autobiographical approach has also 
contributed to a disjointed picture of the Secretary-General's evolution over the UN's first 
half century. By tracing the development of that role, this thesis sets out to provide that 
continuity, and place analysis of Perez de Cuellar's tenure of transition in its proper 
historical context. 
The Framework for Analysis. 
The framework for analysis mixes the, 'reflective, ' and, 'behaviouralist, ' traditions in 
international relations. A reflective approach permits the identification of trends and 
patterns in the development of the Secretary-General's role, and places each incumbent's 
contribution in its proper historical context. Or as Leon Gordenker put it in his 1967 study 
of the Secretary-General, "the historical investigation gives both depth and form to the 
present for the past holds the present partly in bondage. ' '3 Historical enquiry alone, 
however, does not insure explanation of developments in the Secretary -General's role on a 
systematic basis over time. For the behaviouralists, the central explanatory problem is not 
one of historical context and continuity, but the formulation of a framework that facilitates 
the methodological and analytical rigour of the natural sciences. 
The reflective and behaviouralist approaches are reconciled in the structure of the thesis. 
The development of the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace 
and security from the Charter base is divided between two sections determined by the two 
outstanding historical periods in post World War Two international relations. Section I 
examines the development of the Secretary -General's role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security during the cold war, and Section H examines the evolution 
this role during the transitional period in international relations in which the cold war came 
to a close. Each section is divided into three chapters which impose on the historical 
periods under consideration the first two requirements of an analytical model: description 
lHamilton, Thomas, "The UN & Trygve Lie, '' Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, Oct. 1950; Barros 0 
James, Trygve Lie and the Cold War, (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989; James, Alan, "U 
Thant and his Critics, " Yearbook of World Affairs, (London: Stevens & Sons, 1972); Nassif, Ramsis, U 
Thant in New York 1961-1971, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1988); James, Alan, "Diplomat's 
Diplomat, " Yearbook of World Affairs, (London: Stevens & Stevens, 1983), Finger, Seymour Maxwell & 
Saltzman, Arnold A., Bending With the Winds: Kurt Waldheim and the United Nations, (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 1990). 
21-ash, Joseph, Dag Harnmarskj6ld, (New York: Doubleday, 196 1); Lash, "Dag Hamma-rskj6ld's Conception 
of his Office, " International Organisation, Vol. 16,1962; Zacher, Mark W., Dag Hammarskjbld's United 
Nations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Urquhart, Brian, Hanitnarskjeild, (New York. 
W. W. Norton & Co., 1972); Goodrich Leland, ''Hammarskj6ld, the UN and the Office of the Secretary- 
General, " International Organisation, Vol. 28,1974; Jordan, R. S., Dag Hammarskj6ld Revisited- ne UN 
Secretary-General as a Force in World Politics, (Durham, NC: Carolina Press, 1983). 
3Gordenker, op. cit., P. xv. 
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and analysis. I The third requirement - prescription - is reserved for the conclusions. The 
first chapter of each section describes the development of the Secretary-General's role in the 
maintenance of international peace and security during the given period introducing, "the 
phenomenon under consideration. ' Q Analysis of this development takes two forms in the 
second and third chapters of the respective sections. The second chapter in each section, 
'explores, ' the development of the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. These chapters provide conceptual clarity and historical 
continuity. The third chapter of each section, 'explains, ' the conceptual models of the 
development of the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace and 
security by imposing on them analysis at three different but consistently applied levels. 
The origins of the, 'levels of analysis, ' approach lies in the efforts, inter alia, of Kenneth 
Waltz, 3 J. David Singer4 and Graham Allison, 5 to address the problem of multi-causality 
and introduce more positivist analysis into international relations. In Man, the State and 
War, Waltz identified three broad recurring explanatory themes for war. At the macro level, 
Waltz identified explanations formulated in terms of the structure of the international system 
of state relations. At two reductionist levels within that structure, Waltz identified 
explanations formulated in terms of the nature of the units that make up that system, and the 
nature of the individuals operating those units. Not until Man, the State and War, had the 
subject matter of international relations been addressed with such conceptual clarity. 
Singer identifies three similar levels of analysis: systen-fic, (the international system); sub- 
systemic, (the nation state); and phenomenological, (personality). For Singer the problem 
was not so much identifying the potential levels of analysis, but how to arrange the mix of 
levels available, and how to avoid the dangers of concentrating on one. Singer argues that 
what is learned from the research process depends on the starting assumptions which shape 
the research. In other words, 'what you see depends on where you stand. ' This is 
demonstrated empirically by Allison who uses the Cuban Missile Crisis to show how the 
I "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations, " in Rosenau, James N., (ed. ) International 
Politics and Foreign Policy, (Toronto, Ontario: Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1969), pp. 21-2. 
2ibid. 
3Waltz, Kenneth N., Man, the State and War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), Theory of 
International Politics, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); & "Reflections on Theory of International 
Politics, A Response to My Critics, '' in Keohane, Robert (ed. ) Neorealism and its Critics, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986). 
4Singer, J. David, ''International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis, " World Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3,19601 
"'Me Level of Ananlysis Problem in International Relations, " in Knorr, Klaus & Verba, Sydney, (eds. ), The 
International System: Theoretical Essays, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196 1 ); "Man and World 
Politics: The Psycho-Cultural Interface, " Journal of Social Issues, Vol. XXIV, No. 3,1968-, & "Me Level- 
of-Analysis Problem in International Relations, " in Rosenau, op. cit. 
5AIlison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1971). 
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adopted level of analysis, or, 'conceptual lens, ' can predetermine the interpretation of 
events. 
For Singer and Allison, the purpose of identifying those analytical categories in which 
explanations might be located is not to initiate a philosophical debate about the relative 
merits and explanatory power of 'competing' levels of analysis. As Welch argues, "Ex 
Cathedra, condemnations of one paradigm from within another are epistemologically sterile 
and have the unfortunate effect of obscuring the fact that light can be shed on the same 
object from many angles at once. " I The levels of analysis do not operate in isolation, but 
are abstracted from the whole to facilitate a more holistic understanding. 
These levels of analysis do not require much adaptation to examine the role of the Secretary- 
General. The assumption that underlies the adopted framework for analysis is that 
developments in the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace and 
security are a product of: (i) the prevailing international circumstances; (ii) the internal 
functioning of the UN System; and (iii) the personality and approach of incumbents. These 
are conceptualised as Systemic Conditions and Environmental Trends, Organisational 
Factors, and Idiosyncratic Variables, respectively. James has applied similar, though not 
identical criteria - circumstance, the nature of the office, and personality - in conducting a 
comparative analysis of Secretaries-General in different international organisationS. 2 The 
strongest advocacy of this approach, however, comes from Michael Schechter. Over a 
twenty year period Schechter compares the influence and impact of the heads of UNESCO, 
The World Bank Group, and the United Nations Development Fund before concluding, 
"these cases indicate that the rise and/or demise of an intergovernmental organisation is a 
product of a number of inter-related variables: systemic conditions, organisational 
provisions and practices, as well as the distinctive characteristics of its chief executive 
officer. 113 
Systemic Conditions and Environmental Trends. 
The units which make up the international system are predominantly nation-states, but also 
include a small number of international organisations, some of which, like the UN, are state 
constructs. Neither the UN nor the creators of the international organisation operate in a 
political vacuum. The actions of both are shaped by the very presence of other states, (or 
units), and the interactions between them. Systemic Conditions and Environmental Trends 
lWelch, David A., 'The Organisational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms- Retrospect and 
Prospect, " International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2, Fall 1992, p. 142. 
2James, Alan, "The Secretary-General: a Comparative Analysis, " in Berridge, G. R., & Jennings, A., (eds. ), 
Diplomacy at the UN, (London: Macmillan, 1985). 
3Schechter, Michael G., ''Leadership in International Organisations: Systemic, Organisational and 
Personality Factors, " Rei, iew of International Studies, Vol. 13,1987, p. 215. 
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are two analytical concepts by which the thesis attempts to account for the influence of this 
external setting. 
Systemic Conditions account for what Russett describes as, "the generalised context that 
conditions both the content and style of responses to specific conditions. "' This generalised 
context itself can be subdivided into two categories - structure and society. 
Since World War III the international system, (of which the UN is a product), has been 
structured by the alliance patterns between a small number of major powers. The 
importance of the structuralist approach is explained by Allen, 
"The so-called major powers in the international system have always exerted 
great influence over the conduct of relations between states. Their particular 
configurations form the basic structural framework within which all states 
[the UN and the Secretary-General inclusive] are forced to operate ... all the 
states [units] in the system accept, however reluctantly, that the larger 
powers have a particular role to play in the management of international 
relations. ' 12 
This approach is particularly important, given that these power configurations are reflected, 
though not perfectly, in the representative organs of the UN, and the Security Council in 
particular. The systemic structure not only sets the context within which the Secretary- 
General operates, but bears a direct impact on relations between the Secretary-General and 
the representative organs of the UN. 3 
While international relations between the major powers structure international relations 
generally, to study these relations alone is to overlook other fundamental features of the 
international system. To systernic structure, the concept of international society adds 
explanation in terms of the inherent nature of the international system. This includes the 
customs, conventions, and values on which the international system operates, and which 
apply to all the participants, not just the major powers. In a state-centric system these are 
described by Riggs and Plano as, "the persistent influence of government attitudes, 
preferences and control of resources that set limits on any initiative. 114 
I Russett, Bruce, "A Macro-scopic View-of International Politics, " in Rosenau, James N. et al (eds. ), The 
Analysis of International Politics, (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 115. 
2Allen, David, "Foreign Policy and the Contemporary International Environment, " in Clarke and White 
(eds. ) An Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis, (Orsmkirk: G. W. & A. Hesketh, 198 1), p. 95. 
3T'he relationships between the Secretary-General and the representative organs of the 
UN are institutional 
factors. That the different levels of analysis are so closely intertwined highlights the importance of t_ý 
distinguishing between them for epistemological and not ontological reasons. 
4Riggs & Piano, The UN, International Organisation and World Politics, (Pacific Grove, California: 
Brooks/Cole, 1988. ), p. 113, also see Bull, Hedley, An Anarchical Society, (London: Macmillan. 
1977). 
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Neither of these two conceptions of systemic conditions consider the impact of political 
trends in the wider international environment. The realm of the international environment is 
limited not by major power status, not by nation-state status, but only by the boundaries of 
the globe. The disputes and conflicts to which the UN responds arise from this 
environment. Whereas the systemic conditions shape the boundaries within which the UN 
and Secretary-General can respond, environmental trends - decolonisation, regional 
disputes, refugee crises, the implosion of nation-states - determine the type of conflicts 
which are brought before the UN. Different environmental trends have different 
envirorn-nental impacts which, as Riggs and Plano argue, "may frustrate organisational 
goals, or contrarily, offer new opportunity for initiative and constructive accomplishment. " 
Or as Alan James explains, "the Secretary-General cannot create situations which are 
suitable for intervention, but some historical periods are more likely than others to be 
encouraging or restricting. ' 12 
Environmental trends and systemic conditions provide the, "stimuli and the ball park 
boundary, ' '3 respectively, for the development of the Secretary-General's role in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. As Singer argues, in the first instance, 
analysis, "at this level and only this level, permits us to examine international relations in 
the whole, with a comprehensiveness that is of necessity is lost when our focus is shifted to 
a lower and more partial level. ' 14 
The Organisational Level of Analysis. 
To examine the role of the Secretary-General at the reductionist level is not to deny the 
influence of the international system as a whole on the activities of the UN. Rather, to 
study the UN as a component of the international system enriches the analysis by 
differentiating between the units which make up the international system. This level of 
analysis permits explanation of developments in the Secretary-General's role in terms of the 
internal functioning of the UN organisation, without which, as Allen argues, "all states 
[units] are regarded as being fundamentally captured by the imperatives of the system and 
thus their behaviour becomes entirely predictable. ' '5 
There are two senses in which the development of the Secretary -General's role can be 
considered as a product of the organisational. setting. For analytical purposes these are 
conceptualised as Bureaucratic and Institutional Factors respectively. In each, organisation 
takes on a specific meaning. 
I Riggs & Plano, op. cit., p. 113. ZI5 
2James, in Berridge, (1985), op. cit., p. 41. 
3Russett, op. cit., p. 115. 
4Singer, op. cit., (1969), p. 22. 
5AIlen, op. cit., p. 96. 
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At the bureaucratic level, Coombe's definition of organisation as, "a rationalised 
administrative instrument, "' applies. The generation and interpretation of information are 
the lifeblood of the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 2 The UN Secretariat, of which the Secretary-General is the chief administrative 
officer, is the UN organ charged with these responsibilities which structure the options 
available to the Secretary-General. Analysis at the bureaucratic level is an approach which 
accounts for the processes by which the Secretary-General becomes aware, processes and 
implements decisions. It is an adaptation of Allison's second model, in which, 
"Governments [Secretaries-General] perceive problems through 
organisational sensors; Governments [Secretaries-General] define 
alternatives and estimate consequences as their component organisations 
process information; Governments [Secretaries-General] act as these 
organisations enact routines. "3 (brackets added) 
The bureaucratic approach identifies the international civil service as an organisational level 
of analysis. The Secretariat and Secretary-General, however, are just one of the six 
principal UN organs that make up the larger UN Organisation. The Charter defines the role 
of the Secretary-General in the maintenance of international peace and security only 
implicitly, and in terms of the Secretary-General's relations to the member states and the 
other organs of the UN, particularly the Security Council. Analysis of institutional factors 
therefore accounts for the institutional relations between the Secretary-General and other 
organs, and the decision-making procedures in these organs which impact on the 
development of the Secretary-General's role. Analysis of these institutional arrangements is 
an adaptation of Robert Keohane's "Neo-Liberal Institutionalism. ' '4 Under scrutiny are, 
"the persistent and connected sets of rules, (formal and informal), that prescribe behavioural 
roles, constrain activity and shape expectations. ' '5 More simply defined as, "norms, values 
and conventions, ' '6 these institutional arrangements are not constant over time, but have an 
organic quality that is derived from the functioning and politics of the organisation. As 
such, and as Keohane argues, these institutional arrangements are themselves "constitutive 
of actors, as well as vice versa. 117 
lCoombes, David, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A Portrait of the Commission of 
the EEC, (London: George, Allen, & Unwin, 1970). p. 241. 
2See chapter 2. 
3A]Ilson, op. cit., pp. 67-68. 
4Keohane, Robert 0., International Institutions and State Power, (Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 
1989). 
ýibid_ p. 3. 
6ibid., p. 1. 
7ibid., p. 161. 
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Idiosyncratic Variables. 
It is also reasonable to assume that the way in which the Secretary-General's role is defiried 
is a factor not only of international and organisational settings, but the style and approach 
each incumbent brings to the office. Firstly, the role of the Secretary-General, as 
Gordenker asserts is borne out of, "the fundamental assumption that the international 
environment can be altered and the patterns of politics affected by deliberative actions. " 
Secondly, the office is held by a single individual, (as if it needs saying), who in theory is 
constitutionally independent of the member states. 2 Thirdly, a large part of the Secretary- 
General's role in the maintenance of international peace and security is derived from 
functions based on an opinion. 3 Fourthly, the Secretary-General's political acumen, 
diplomatic skill, and foreign policy player's perception of the above, are factors of the 
person. The office of the Secretary-General, "like any institution which has to respond to 
the complexity of human affairs, ' 4is endowed with what Gordenker describes as, "a 
distinct personal flavour. 115 
Of all the levels of analysis, however, the idiosyncratic is the most difficult to quantify. 
The dynamic nature of international politics, makes it impossible to test empirically whether 
ceteris paribus, the role of the Secretary-General would have developed differently given a 
different approach during any given period. With the benefit of hindsight, however, it is 
possible to attribute a particular style to each incumbent, and to compare and contrast the 
approaches of the different Secretaries-General. The difficulty lies in explaining style and 
approach in terms of personality factors. 
Hitler's love of cream cakes, or his relationship with his mother contribute nothing to an 
understanding of National Socialism. Equally, Hammarskjbld's alleged homosexuality, or 
Perez de Cuellar's meticulous preparation of Vermouth, do not enhance explanations of 
their conception of, and approach to, the role of the Secretary -General. As Benjamin Rivlin 
has argued, however, 
"each incumbent brings to the office a different cultural background, life 
experience, personality, intellectual acumen, ideology and mode of 
operation. These factors play an important role in deten-nining the manner in 
which a Secretary-General functions in any particular international climate. 116 
lGordenker, in Barros, op. cit., p. 104. 
2see Article 100 of the UN Charter. For commentary and analysis see chapter 2. 
3Art1cle 99 states, "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter 
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. " For explanation see 
chapter 2. 
4Perez de Cuellar, Javier, "The Role of the UN Secretary -General, '' The Cyril Foster Lecture, the 
Sheldoman Theatre, Oxford, 13 May 1986, reproduced in Roberts, Adam, & Kingsbury, Benedict, (eds. ), 
United Nations Divided World: The UN's Role in International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 199 1 
2nd edition, p. 126. 
5Gordenker, op. cit., (1967), p. xv. 
6Rivhn, Benjamin, "The International Political Climate and the Secretary-General, " in Rivfin and 
- 
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This is to interpret personality traits as a product of nurture rather than nature. In his 
studies of personality and politics, Greenstein asserts that an individual's predispositions 
are shaped largely by prior social experiences. I Greenstein's work focuses on personality 
and politics in the national environment where the heads of state, potential leaders, 
diplomats and other players have been subjected to, and are products of similar cultural and 
social bias. Even allowing for the influence of a'UN culture' the Secretaries-General have 
come from a diverse and rich array of national, political, social, and cultural backgroundS. 2 
If personality is taken to be a social rather than innate phenomenon, then the approach of a 
Secretary-General can be explained in terms of the incumbent's background. Factors like 
nationality, religion, politics, education, experience, and training can be considered relevant 
analytical variables. This is an adaptation of Allison's third model, which asserts, "each 
person comes to his position with baggage in tow. This baggage includes sensitivities to 
certain issues, commitments to various projects, and personal standing with and debts to 
groups in society. "3 Admittedly this approach is highly interpretative, but this is a 
methodological problem which as yet has gone unresolved. As Gordenker argues, "no 
student can be confident of an explanation of these human manifestations, but to omit 
observing them would leave as false a picture as would reading the Charter in attempting to 
understand the work of the UN. " 
Scope. 
The other preliminary issue that needs to be resolved is that of scope - what constitutes, 'the 
maintenance of international peace and securityT The problem of scope arises because the 
UN Charter outlines a multi-level/multi faceted approach to the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Peace and security can be based on social, economic, military, and 
political matters. The network of Specialised Agencies and Programs that fall under the 
direction of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, (ECOSOC), 
represent a 'functional' approach to peace which is concerned with the amelioration of 
disparities that can undermine 'friendly relations' and international co-operation between 
stateS. 5 In contrast, the Security Council is endowed with a wide array of procedures and 
powers for settling disputes, deterring and repelling acts of aggression and breaches of the 
Gordenker, op. cit., p. 6. 
'See Greenstein, Fred I., "Can Personality and Politics be Studies Systematically? " Political Psychology, 
Vol. 13, No. 1,1992; "The Need for Systematic Enquiry into Personality and Politics: Introduction and 
Overview, " Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. XXIV, No. 3,1968-, Personality and Politics: Problems of 
Evidence, Inference and Conceptual isation, " The American Behavioural Social Scientist, Vol. 11, No. 2, 
1967; & "Me Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush, " The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. LXI, No. 3,1967. 
2UN experience is not a pre-requisite for becoming the Secretary-General. 
3AIllson, op. cit., p. 186. 
4Gordenker, op. cit., (1967), p. xv. 
ýUN Charter Article 1 (2). 
peace. Unless military and political conflict is prevented or resolved the functional 
foundations of an enduring peace are jeopardised. As Jutte and Jutte argue, "viable and 
stable resolutions of conflicts are the pre-requisites for the stable conditions under which 
economic and social progress and development will become possible which the Charter 
asserts to form the basis of peaceful and friendly relations. "' This distinction is also made 
by the Charter which states as its first purpose, 
'To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective action for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means and in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment 
or settlement of international disputes which might lead to a breach of the 
peace. " 
The scope of this study is limited to this notion of the maintenance of international peace 
and security. The role of the Secretary-General under scrutiny is only that in the 
prevention, management, and resolution of conflict. In the interest of brevity, during the 
course of this thesis this will be referred to as the Secretary-General's role. 
Research Method. 
The research method has relied on a combination of documentary evidence, a series of 
open-ended sen-ii-structured interviews with UN personnel and those who interact with 
them, and the wider secondary UN and international relations literature. 
The UN reputation as a, 'paper factory, ' is well earned and the UN documentary resources 
are vast. With respect to the historical research, the UN Archives in New York, and the 
UN depositories at the UN Information Centre (London), the British Library, John Rylands 
University of Manchester Library, and Birmingham Library have been invaluable 
resources. At Loughborough, a full collection of UN Yearbooks has eased the 
documentary trawl considerably. Similarly, although incomplete the, UN Repertory of 
Practice, has provided a more than useful research tool. The contemporary research has 
been aided by the Dag Hammarskj6ld Library's first tentative steps towards the 21 st century 
by coming, 'on-line. ' The British International Studies Association UN Working Group 
has also established a'Web Site. ' These services are updated daily and provide immediate 
access to current and recent resolutions, voting records, press releases, reports and 
documents of all the major UN organs, and miscellaneous extra information. Gradually, 
the internet services are also being backdated. The UN Information Centre also provides a 
weekly news summary of developments. Given also the press coverage the UN has 
IJutte, Rudiger, & Jutte, Annemarie Grosse, The Future of International Organisation, (London: Frances 
Pinter, 1987), p. 179. 
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received in the 1990s, keeping abreast of current developments is constrained only by an 
information overload. 
As a rule documentary evidence has been sought on a case by case basis, and the collection 
is too lengthy to list fully. The bibliography therefore only provides a select list of those 
documents central to the analysis of developments in the Secretary -General's role. As the 
Secretary-General's role has evolved, the Annual Reports of the Secretary-General have 
been invaluable, particularly in recent years as the format has changed. In his first report, 
Perez de Cuellar departed from the passive and descriptive summaries of the UN's work 
that had become the norm under Waldheim. Like Hammarskj6ld, Perez de Cuellar adopted 
a more analytical approach and used the reports to articulate his conception of the UN's role 
and responsibilities. Under Boutros Ghali the reports became ever more detailed, and 
lengthy, as the work of the Organisation expanded. This trend reflected a new period of 
UN introspection, and the depth and detail of these reports provide an important insight into 
the debates and developments at the international organisation as it adapts to the 
uncertainties of the post cold war world. For Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskj6ld the 
annual reports have been supplemented by Cordier and Foote's voluminous publications of 
the Secretary-General's Public Papers. I In addition the UN Archives hold the declassified 
private papers of the Secretaries-General. The writings and memoirs of the incumbents 
have provided another primary resource, 2and read alongside Brian Urquhart's 
documentaries, 3provide high level, candid, if personalised insights into the functioning of 
the Secretary-Generalship. 
For the tenures of Perez de Cuellar and the concluding chapter on Boutros Ghali the 
documentary research has been supplemented by interviews with members of the UN 
diplomatic corps, the UN Secretariat, academics and other interested parties. Most 
interviewees requested the application of 'Chatham House rules, ' so comments and quotes 
Cordier, Andrew et al, Public Papers of the of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, 8 Volumes 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969-77); & Foote, WIlder, The Servant of the Peace: A Selection 
of the Speeches and Statements of the Dag Hammarskj6ld, Secreta ry- General of the United 
Nations, 1953- 
61, (London: The Bodley Head, 1962). 
2Lie, Trygve, IN the Cause of Peace: Seven Years at the United Nations, (London: Macmillan, 1954); U 
Thant, View From the UN, (London: David & Charles, 1978); Toward World Peace: Addresses and Public 
Statements, 1957-1963, (Thomas Yoselhoff, New York, 1964); Portfoliofor Peace: Excerptsfrom the 
Writings and Speeches of U Thant, 1961-68, (New York: United Nations, 1970); Hammarskj6ld, 
Dag 
Markings, (Faber, 1964), not memoir nor a UN text; Waldheim, Kurt, Building the Future Order, (New 
York; The Free Press, 1980); The Challenge of Peace, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980); In the E-ý, c 
of th Storm: The Memoirs of Kurt Waldheim, (London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 1985); Perez de Cuellar, 
Javier, "The UN and World Politics, " in Kegley & Wittkopf, The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives. 
(New York: Random House, 1984); "The Dynamics Of Peacekeeping, " World Marxist Review, April 19891 
"The Role of the Secretary -General, " ne Cyril Foster Lecture, The 
Sheldonian Theatre, 13 May 1986, 
reproduced in Roberts, Adam, & Kingsbury, Benedict, (eds. ) 
United Nations, Divided World: The UN's 
Roles in International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 
2nd edition. 
3Urquhart, Brian, A Life in Peace and War, (London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997); & Hammarskj5ld, 
(London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972). 
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are not attributed unless prior permission has been granted. I Most of the interviews were 
arranged and conducted in New York between October 1994 and January 1995 
supplemented by a return visit for one week in June 1995. The Academic Council on the 
UN System, (ACUNS), provided the network through which many of the interviews were 
arranged, and its annual conferences which bring together state representatives, 
international civil servants, academics, and journalists, have provided access to and advice 
from a much wider audience. 
Introducing the Secretary -General. 
The functioning of any part of the UN system cannot be fully understood without prior 
consideration of the principles and basis from which practice is derived. The substantive 
sections of the thesis are therefore preceded by a chapter outlining the system for the 
maintenance of international peace and security the framers of the Charter designed (thought 
they designed) for the UN, and the role of the Secretary-General in that system. 
la full list of interviewees is provided separately. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Charter Svstem for the Maintenance of International Peace 
and Securitv- 
The Failure of the League of Nations and World War H provoked a renewed commitment to 
international organisation to maintain international peace and security. After much war time 
deliberation between the countries that were to become the victorious allies, the United 
Nations Conference on International Organisation at San Francisco in April 1945, provided 
for the UN Charter ratified by China, France, the UK, US, and USSR on 24 October 
1945. This chapter outlines the system that this document provides for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and the role of the Secretary-General in that system. 
The development of the UN idea began in earnest after the Moscow Declaration, (30 March 
1943), continued with discussions at Dumbarton Oaks, August-September 1944), and 
Yalta, (February 1945), and was completed at the San Francisco Conference, where all the 
remaining signatories and adherents to the Atlantic Charter were able to contribute to the 
final drafting of the UN Charter. After San Francisco, how the Charter provisions would 
be put into effect became clearer in the reports of the Preparatory Commission, and the 
Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission. These last two documents go a long 
way to clarifying responsibility and authority in the UN and are important, "insofar as they 
provide the closest examination of the Charter as the founding nations saw it at this moment 
in time. "' Such is the process of international diplomacy, however, that international 
accords, treaties, covenants and charters often include phraseology intended to obscure 
discord on specific issues in the interest of a much wider agreement. The rich and diverse 
negotiating process that created the UN Charter provided for a document which in many 
respects is vague and ambiguous. To understand the Charter system for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and in particular the respective roles of the Security 
Council and Secretary -General requires more than just a reading of this constitutional 
document. To understand the Charter is also to understand the debates that shaped the 
Charter. It is to understand the prevailing international circumstances at the time of 
drafting, and to understand the expectations of the shape the future international system 
might take. Only then can meaning be given to the institutional provisions which the 
Charter makes for maintaining international peace and security. 
I Yearbook of the United Natiotis 1946-47, (New York: United Nations, 1947), p. 34 
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The Historical and Systemic Backdrop. 
The state system that dated back to the 17th Century was weakened by the first World War 
and during the second World War fell apart completely. League experiences between the 
two wars suggested that in a state-centric system, the maintenance of international order, 
peace, and security could only be guaranteed by the most powerful of these states. Firstly, 
membership of the League of Nations was not universal, and moreover, at no stage were all 
the major world powers members. I The US withdrew almost immediately never to return, 
Hitler's resurgent Germany departed in 1933, the USSR was expelled in 1939 for attacking 
Finland, and Japan, Italy, Spain and a host of middle ranking Latin American powers came 
and went almost at will. During the 1930s the League functioned almost exclusively on an 
Anglo-French axis. The capacity of those outside the League to dictate the course of 
international relations was far greater than those inside. Disenchanted UK and French 
Governments were also encouraged to pursue national interests outside the League 
framework. 2 Secondly, the League conception of collective security was fundamentally 
flawed. The objective was to replace the 19th century balance of power concerts with an all 
embracing universal alliance in which an attack on one member was an attack on all, and set 
in motion an immediate and punitive corrective response. The principled approach to peace, 
if not undermined by membership issues, was erroneously simple given the complexities of 
the international system. It failed to account for the different interests and alliances of the 
membership, the difficulties in distinguishing between victim and aggressor, and the 
reluctance of member states to fight someone else's war. Thirdly, and concomitantly, the 
League Council enjoyed only recommendatory powers and lacked the authority to compel 
action by its members. Membership entailed an open-ended commitment to unite against 
those responsible for breaching the peace, but the application of this commitment was not 
obligatory and rested entirely on the interests or benevolence of the individual members. 
These weaknesses were apparent in successive conflicts during the 1930s - Japan in 
Manchuria, (193 1), Italy in Ethiopia, (1935), Hitler's Anschluss, (1938), and annexation 
of Czechoslovakia, (1938). 
In attempting to remedy these defects, and the failure of the League to arrest the descent into 
world war, Roosevelt and Churchill briefly considered a decentralised system of major 
power responsibility for regional peace and security before settling on a great power concert 
that might collectively supervise and police the world. Accordingly, the victorious allies 
reserved for themselves, France, and China3permanent seats in the UN Security Council, 
IThe League of Nations was not formally wound up until the signing of the UN Charter but for all intents 
and purposes ceased to function with the outbreak of World War 11. 
2For instance in negotiating the Hoare-Lavalle Pact. 
3See Russell, Ruth B. & Murther, Jeanette E., A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the 
United States, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1958), p. 954, "To the US China was not merely a 
friend of long standing it was also the only independent ally in the Far East. It was thus the logical zn 
candidate for wartime leadership in the region, and American policy sought to strengthen the country 
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which was itself given greater powers to enforce its decisions. The powers accorded the 
Security Council and the prerogatives of its permanent members, however, were tempered 
by the compromises necessary to ensure the commitment of all the major powers to the new 
international organisation, and, by emerging divisions in the alliance. 
Like Woodrow Wilson nearly three decades earlier, Roosevelt was very much the godfather 
of the UN, and the process of drafting the UN was US driven. Eden in particular believed 
that allowing the US to take the initiative would prevent the US from resuming an 
isolationist position in world politics and abandoning the UN as it had done the League. As 
Claude explains, "America's influence was based upon the cogency of its proposals, the 
positive form of its diplomatic strength and the negative factor of its domestic political 
uncertainties. "' Conversely, Luard notes, "Stalin had no well defined plans and was happy 
to let them doSo. "2 Soviet participation, however, could not be guaranteed. At the end of 
the war the USSR filled the political and economic vacuum left by a vanquished Germany 
and for reasons of (in)security was not prepared to let go. 3 A universal general international 
organisation could not hope to preserve international peace and security without the 
participation of both the superpowers, as Russell explains, 
"The shape of the future depended more on Stalin than on Anglo-American 
desires, for the Soviet Union would be the only first rate military power on 
the continents of Europe and Asia after the war. If Stalin elected to co- 
operate, therefore, the foundations of a peaceful [international] society could 
be laid with confidence: if he chose otherwise the Western allies would be 
driven back on a'balance of power system. " 14 
Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State believed, that the USSR, "held a deciding Vote, "5 
on the future of any international organisation, and along with other prospective members, 
the US was willing to accommodate Soviet proposals most notably in reaching a 
6 
compromise on the voting procedure in the Security Council, and the admission of the 
Ukraine and Byelorussia following "Gromyko's electrifying proposal ... that the sixteen 
Republics be given separate membership in the projected international organisation. ' 17 
militarily and politically to fulfil the strategic role. " 
lClaude, Ims L. Jnr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organisation, 
(London: University of London Press Ltd., 1964), 3rd. Edition, p. 55. 
2Luard, Evan, A History of the United Nations Volume 1: The Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955, 
(London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), p. 24. 
3See Halle, Louis J., The Cold War as History, (London: Harper Row Publishers, 1975), Chapters I& 2-, 
& Walker, Martin, The Cold War and the Making of the Modern World, (London: Fourth Estate, 1993), p. 
16. 
4Russell, op. cit., p. 101. 
5 Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 1464. 
6See pp. 20-24. 
7Aspaturin, Vernon V., "The Union Republics and Soviet Diplomacy: Concepts, Institutions, and 
Practices" in Aspaturin (ed. ), Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 
197 1 ), p. 693. 
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Halle has studied the cold war, 'as history, ' and contends that recurrent violent clashes with 
its European neighbours fostered a state of perpetual insecurity and an inherently defensive 
foreign policy. I The insecurity that underlay Stalin's European foreign policy of "encircling 
back defences, ' '2is also evident in Charter negotiations. The UN offered protection against 
further incursions but at the same time was a dangerous place, especially in the General 
Assembly where the USSR and its allies were in the minority without a veto. The USSR, 
more than any other prospective permanent member, insisted on consolidating power in the 
Security Council where the veto applied, and, upon maximum discretion in the use of the 
veto. In this the USSR also sought to curb the Western hold over the UN. As Gromyko, 
explains, "the key task for Soviet diplomacy was to ensure that the organisation's activities 
... would not allow one group or group of powers to use the organisation for their selfish 
interests as a weapon against other states. ' '3 Albeit for different reasons, the US and USSR 
were united on the creation of a new international organisation and capitalised on war time 
unity to achieve this goal. Roosevelt's grand design for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, however, was qualified by the early dissipation of that unity and the 
different demands of the international organisation of the emergent superpowers. 
The Grand Deshin. 
While the basic structure of a Security Council, General Assembly, International Court of 
Justice and a Secretariat was carried over from the League of Nations 4 Significant changes 
in the prerogatives of the Security Council were made. In the Charter, the allied powers 
divided authority and responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security 
between the organs of the new international organisation, laid out prescriptions for the 
'pacific settlement of disputes, ' 'action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the 
peace, and acts of aggression, ' and bestowed upon the Security Council, 'primary 
responsibility, ' for the discharge of these functions. 
With respect to the pacific settlement of disputes, (Chapter VI), Article 33 authorises the 
Security Council to, 'call upon the parties to settle their differences by peaceful means. ' 
Article 34 permits the Security Council, 'to investigate any dispute or situation that might 
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. ' Article 36 enables the Security 
Council to, 'recommend appropriate procedures and methods of adjustment, ' and Article 37 
I See Halle, op. cIt., Chapter 2. 
2Fontiane, Andi-6, History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917-1950, 
(London: Secker & Warburg, 1968), English translation, p. 243. 
3Gromyko, A. A., and Ponomarev, B. N., (eds. ), Soviet Foreign Policy Volume 1: 1917-1945, (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1980), English translation 1981, p. 482. 
I 4See Goodrich, Leland, 'From League of Nations to United Nat, ons, " International Organisation, I (1947), 
N. B. at San Francisco an Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council were also made 
principle organs of the United Nations but did not have a direct role to play vis-a-vis the maintenance of 
international peace and security, see The United Nations Yearbook 1946-47, op. cit., p. 23. 
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entitles the Security Council to, 'recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider 
appropriate. ' The role of the Security Council in this context is to, 'bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of international law, adjustment or settlement 
of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. " In this 
respect the Security Council enjoys only recommendatory powers. At the same time, 
however, members are obliged to reconcile their differences without resort to violence, and 
the unilateral use of force is permitted only in self-defence. Chapter VI, therefore, provides 
the Security Council with the right to assist in the search for some common ground between 
disputants and legitimises a peaceful solution by throwing behind the peace process, and 
any settlement reached, the moral and political weight of the international community. 
If the Security Council determines that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression exists, it retains the right to make use of the progressively greater enforcement 
measures placed at its disposal under Chapter V1[[ to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. To give effect to its decisions Article 41 empowers the Security Council to 
impose, 'measures not involving the use of armed force, ' namely economic and diplomatic 
sanctions. And if these measures, 'would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, ' 
Article 42 empowers the Security Council to, 'take such action by air, sea or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. ' To this end 
Article 43 calls upon all member states to enter into agreements with the Security Council, 
making available at the call of the Security Council, armed forces and facilities to enact the 
decisions taken by the Security Council under Article 42. To assist and advise the Security 
Council, 'on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements, ' Article 
47 provides for a Military Staff Conu-nittee, (MSC), composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the 
pen-nanent members of the Security Council. It was not envisaged that the MSC would 
undertake direct command and control of UN enforcement action - individual commanders 
would be appointed on an ad hoc basis with the MSC assuming oversight and advisory 
functions. 2 The idea that the Secretary-General might one day exercise military command 
and control of enforcement action was never entertained at San Francisco, nor anywhere 
else in the formulation of the Charter. 
In Chapter VH the founding members equipped the Security Council with the teeth its 
League predecessor had lacked and conferred on it powers never before delegated to an 
international body. 3 The decisions of the Security Council are mandatory not 
recommendatory, and, where pacific settlement of disputes cannot be brokered, Article 42 
empowers the Security Council to use force in the cause of peace. Furthermore, as Luard 
I UN Charter, Article 1, "Principles and Purposes. " 
2See Russell, op. cit., p. 671. 
3See A Commentary on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposalsfor the Establishment of a General International 
Organisation, (London: H. M. S. O., 1944) Miscellaneous Paper No. 6 (1944), Cmd. 6560. 
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explains, the content of the articles addressing the Security Council's powers is, "less 
formal and judicial and more conducive to the discussion of conflicts that were political 
rather than legal. "' Finally, all the great powers became members of the Security Council. 
Their status and prerogatives were the most contentious issue in the drafting of the Charter. 
At San Francisco it was agreed that the Security Council should comprise eleven members, 
six to be elected by the General Assembly for a two year period. 2 The remaining five, 
China, France, the UK, the US and USSR were to be permanent members. After long 
drawn out discussions at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, and not without a little political 
bargaining, the US, USSR, and UK finally agreed on a voting formula that would govern 
Security Council decision-making: 
" Each member of the Security Council should have one vote; 
" Decisions on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members; 
" Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote 
of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, 
decisions under Chapter VI [pacific settlement of disputes by the Security Council], and 
under paragraph three of Article 52 [pacific settlement of disputes by regional agencies or 
arrangements] a party to a dispute shall abstain fTom voting. 3 
The political logic behind permanent membership and the veto is central to the Charter 
scheme for maintaining international peace and security. Implicit in the structure and 
powers of the Security Council was the grand ambition of President Roosevelt that the 
major powers of the world - the permanent members of the Security Council - would accept 
responsibility to act in concert to provide a collective security umbrella. 'All for one and 
one for all' the 'five musketeers' of the Security Council would be required to take 
responsibility for the security of other member states and police the international 
community. 4 These, "exceptional responsibilities, "5 reflected the fundamental reality that 
only certain nations possessed sufficient political and military power to enforce the 
maintenance of peace and security, and that these states were not prepared to place their 
I Luard, op. cit., p. 86. 
21n the first instance three of the elected states served only one year. T'hereafter all states were elected for a 
two year period requiring annual elections for three of the posts but ensuring continuity in the Security 
Council. 
3The UN Charter, Article 27. 
4See, Memorandum for the President, 29 December 1943, reproduced by US Department of State in, Post 
War Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, Publication 3580, General Foreign Policy Series 15, (1949), 
Appendix 33, pp. 576-577, "T'he major powers will pledge themselves and will consider themselves morally 
bound not to go to war against each other or against any other nation, and to co-operate with each other and 
with other peace-loving states in maintaining the peace; and that each of them will maintain adequate forces 
and will be willing to use such forces as circumstances require to prevent or suppress all cases of 
aggression. " Z: ) 5US Department of State, Memorandum for the President on Plan for the Establishment of an International 
Organisation for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 29 December 1943, reproduced in 
Publication 3580 as Appendix 33, pp. 576-581. 
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forces at the disposal of an international organisation the conduct of which was beyond their 
control. 
Furthermore, the great powers, were not expected to police each other. If a permanent 
member was responsible for a breach of the peace, as Edward Stettinius explained, "a 
major war would result, no matter what the membership and voting provisions of the 
Security Council might be. "' The great power veto, however, offered a defence against the 
escalation of disagreement in the Security Council. While the Security Council system for 
the maintenance of international peace and security was to rest on the assumption of great 
power unity there was no guarantee that the great powers would be in agreement over any 
given issue. If that agreement was not forthcoming the veto would ensure that, "no 
substantive action could be taken against a great power or any state allied to a great 
power. "2 As Claude notes, "the Council would be constitutionally disabled for service to 
either side in a clash of policy and purpose between the USA and USSR, " because, "it 
might disrupt the peace if it lent itself to the cause of one side or another in a conflict 
between the powers. "3 Claude continues, however, 
"This grant of extra decision-blocking competence to individual great 
powers testifies not to the conviction among the founding fathers that 
unanimity among the big-five was a reliable prospect but to their belief that 
dissension among these powers was a distinct possibility, and that such 
dissension when it occurred would have to be treated as the decisive element 
in a political situation. ' 14 
At the same time, on the insistence of the UK and the US, at Yalta and San Francisco 
important limits were placed on the veto. 'Me fon-nula agreed denied the permanent 
members a veto over matters of procedure, prevented the permanent members from 
obstructing discussion of any matter before the Security Council, and required the 
permanent members to abstain from voting on the pacific settlement of disputes to which 
they were a party. Originally the USSR demanded an all embracing veto. The USSR 
contended that the veto should apply to all substantive matters because of the possibility of 
a, 'chain of events, ' leading to enforcement action at a later date. The USSR argued that, 
"if a rift developed during the pacific settlement stages of a controversy such a cleavage 
would prejudice future unity of enforcement action [if required]. "5 In this respect the veto 
I Stettimus, Edward, in The Charter of the United Nations, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, 79th Congress, I st Session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1945), p. 216, quoted in Claude, op. cit., p. 140; see also Pasvolsky, Leo, "The United Nations in Action", 
Edmund J. James Lectures on Government, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 195 1), pp. 80-8 1. 
213arros, James, The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future, (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier 
Macmillan Ltd., 1972), p. 2. 
3CIaude, Ims L. Jnr., "The Security Council", in Luard, Evan, (ed. ), The Evolution of International 
Organisation, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1966), p. 72. 
4ibid. 
5Harriman, Yalta and Malta Documents, pp. 68-78, cited in Russell, op. cit., p. 504. 
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would be, "the safety valve that prevents the UN from undertaking commitments in the 
political field which it presently lacks the power to fulfil. "' The USSR viewed the UN as a 
useful defence mechanism, but as Harriman argues, 
"It seems doubtful whether they belied that it can be useful in settling disputes between them and other countries through mediatory or judicial 
processes. The court they believed was stacked against them. They appear therefore to be insisting upon the right of unilateral action in settling disputes of this character. ' Q 
Churchill and Roosevelt, however, were concerned that at San Francisco they might not 
secure the backing for such an extensive veto. Churchill was also adamant that with respect 
to the pacific settlement of disputes, a pennanent member should not be able to sit as judge 
and jury in its own case, and, in an 'Explanatory Memorandum, ' the US Department of 
State argued, 
"The requirement of unanimity among the states permanently represented on 
the Council in matters pertaining to the settlement of disputes is based upon 
the premise that the Council would have power to impose a settlement. If 
the compulsory aspect of a settlement is eliminated, except upon agreement 
of the parties thereto, and if the Council has power only to recommend a 
settlement and not to enforce it, the raison detre for the special position of 
the great powers in this respect disappears. ' '3 
Internally, however, the State Department was divided on whether the veto should apply to 
the pacific settlement of disputes, and at Yalta, Britain and America accepted the chain of 
events logic, but not unconditionally. The Western powers insisted that although the veto 
could apply to Security Council decisions in the pacific settlement of disputes provided a 
permanent member was not a party, the veto could not be used to prevent discussion of that 
dispute. The USSR succumbed to Western pressure, 4and Molotov announced that the 
USSR, "fully agreed with the President's proposals and withdrew any objections or 
amendments but would request that 3 or at least 2 of the Soviet Republics be given a chance 
to become equal members of the organisation. ' '5 No indication had been given that the 
USSR might be prepared to compromise acceptance in the voting procedure for a reduced 
membership of Soviet Republics in the UN but Roosevelt had hinted in private that such a 
deal might be struck. 6 Ulam believes that the USSR would have dropped its demands for 
the representation of any of its Republics had the US persevered with its objections. The 
I Viscount Robert Cecil, cited in Claude (1964), op. cit., p. 138. 
2Harriman, Malta and Yalta Documents, cited in Russell, op. cit., p. 501. 
3US Department of State, Explanatory Memorandum 14 August 1944, cited in Russell, op. cit., p. 405. 
4See Claude (1964), op. cit., p. 136, "This Soviet concession was registered in the Statement of 
Interpretation agreed to by the sponsoring powers and France at San Francisco. " 
51-larriman, Yalta and Documents, p. 712, cited in Russell, op. cit., p. 533. 
6See Russell, op. cit., p. 506; see also Harriman, Malta and Yalta Documents, pp. 85-88; Ulam argues that 
this bargaining is typical of the way in which Stalin approached negotiations in the formulation of the new 
interriational organisation, see Ulam, Adam, The Rivals, (London: Allen Lane, 197 1), pp. 38-39. 
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USSR was satisfied that although it could not veto those disputes in which it was party, the 
decisions of the Security Council in this field were only recommendatory and could not be 
imposed upon the USSR. Moreover, it retained a veto over the recommendations made by 
the Security Council with regard to any other substantive matters, including those involving 
its Republics, satellite states and allies. At San Francisco, however, the USSR denied that 
such an agreement had been reached. The Western Powers were not prepared to sign the 
Charter unless the USSR yielded on this issue. I The USSR capitulated and the Yalta 
agreement was adopted, behind which there lies an important, if optimistic, political logic. 
Discussion fosters the possibility that policy differences might be reconciled but a veto over 
discussions would have denied the opportunity to find common ground. As Claude 
explains, 
"The positive side is the prospect of veto should encourage serious 
diplomatic work on the problem of dissension. The exercise of the veto 
blocking action should instigate the negotiation of an agreed position ... The drafters of the Charter conceived of the Security Council as a vehicle for 
joint policy action in so far as a forum for negotiation in so far as they found 
themselves in disagreement. "2 
Gilbert Murray also argues that institutionalised contacts between the major powers have the 
additional value of insuring against war between them, 
"It is well to recall the great value of the concert of Europe in the 19th 
Century. It did not always attain or even aim at justice; but it managed to 
prevent war between the great powers. That is a very great thing; and as to 
the settlements it is possible that any agreed settlement will be better than a 
settlement by war. ' 13 
Once agreement had been secured, the major powers stood fast against demands from the 
lesser powers and smaller states at San Francisco for a greater say in the decision-making 
process. It was felt that the six seats allocated for non permanent members were sufficient 
to enfranchise the other states. Even if the major powers were in agreement the requirement 
of a majority of seven meant that Security Council decisions still required the support of at 
least two of the non permanent members. 4 It was thus concluded at San Francisco, 
"In general the delegates ... agreed that the voting provisions, while not 
perfect in theory, especially with reference to the procedures of pacific 
ISee Russell, op. cit., pp. 713-749. 
2Claude, (1966), op. cit., p. 72. 
3Murray, Gilbert, From League of Nations to United Nations, p. 16 1; see also Suedfeld, Peter & Tedock, 
Philip, "Integrative Complexity of Communications in International Crises, " Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 21,1 March 1977, discussed pp. 313-5. 
41f the other states refused to support the sponsoring powers on this the consequences were made abundantly 
clear in a theatrical performance by Senator Tom Conolly, "you may go home if you wish and report that 
you have defeated the veto. but you can also say 'we tore up the charter'. At that point I sweepingly ripped 
up the charter draft in my hands to shred and flung the scraps on the table, "4 cited in Russell, op. cit., p. 
542. 
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settlement, were probably necessary for purposes of enforcement action. 
The points raised that the voting procedure was consistent with political 
realities; that its acceptance in whole or part was a necessary condition for 
the creation of the organisation; and that the organisation would break down 
in the event enforcement action were taken against a permanent member. " I 
The functions and the voting procedures of the Security Council are indicative of the 
contradictory forces imposed on the formulation of the UN. On one hand, the powers 
accorded to the Security Council were based on the great hope that the alliance that defeated 
the axis might remain an entente overseeing the maintenance of international peace and 
security. The UN was designed to, "nip in the bud threats to world peace which might 
come from our enemies, mainly Germany and Japan. ' Q The Security Council was clearly 
intended to be a policeman first, (backed up by a police force), and a facilitator or convenor 
of pacific settlement of disputes second. For the latter the International Court of Justice, 
(ICJ), had been strengthened and the Security Council given the right to recommend that 
parties submit their dispute to the ICJ. In this respect the powers which the major powers 
accorded the Security Council over which they were to preside represented the belated 
design for an international organisation capable of preventing World War H. On the other 
hand, the application of the police powers, "given the world then at war, would ultimately 
rest on the continued co-operation of the major allies. ' '3 This the framers recognised in the 
structure and voting procedure of the Security Council, "in short they held that great power 
harmony was certainly necessary but not necessarily certain. ' '4 The Charter system for 
maintaining international peace and security therefore married the lofty goals of a system of 
collective security with existing political realities and in so doing institutionalised the 
balances of power and spheres of influence it had been the original intention the UN should 
replace. 
The Secretary-General. 
In his report to the President on the results of the San Francisco conference, the US 
Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, stated, 
"It was clearly intended by those who wrote the Charter that the Secretary- 
General should have a more important role than his counterpart in the 
League of Nations. ' '5 
I Minutes of Meeting 17 May 1945, UNCIO 11, p. 306. 
2Wilcox, Francis, "ne Yalta Voting Formula, '' American Political Science Review, Vol. 39, (1945), p. 
954. 
3Russell. op. cit., p. 949. 
4CIaude, (1966), op. cit., p. 71. 
5Stettmius, Edward, Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San 
Francisco Conference, United States Department of State Publication 2349,26 June 1945, p. 148. 
-24- 
From the preceding discussion, however, the supremacy of the Security Council in matters 
of international peace and security is also abundantly clear. In this context the role of the 
Secretary-General in the maintenance of international peace and security was to be ancillary. 
According to Bailey, the responsibilities of the Secretary-General are derived from four 
mains sources: the express provisions of the Charter; the Security Council Rules of 
Procedure; decisions of the Security Council and other main organs; and those which by 
[precedent], custom and usage are generally recognised as attaching to the office of the 
Secretary-General. I Given that the objective of this chapter is to outline the respective roles 
of the Security Council and the Secretary-General, and, the founding members expectations 
of these organs at the outset, this chapter is concerned only with the first 2 of Bailey's 
sources. 2 The express provisions of the Charter, however, are not self evident. The 
Preparatory Commission Report, which laid down in more detail the procedures by which 
each of the organs put into practice their Charter prerogatives, is therefore an additional 
source. The Charter provisions, the rules of procedure and the Preparatory Commission 
recommendations, however, cannot be fully understood without reference to the historical 
roots of the Secretary-General's role. 
The Historical Background. 
Gordenker states that a brief examination of the experiences of the UN Secretary-General's 
predecessors, "comprises essential material for the understanding of the office. ' 13 
Gordenker traces the roots of the Secretary-General's back to the ad hoc international 
conferences and to the subsequent formation of permanent international organisations and 
institutions during the nineteenth century. 4 The League of Nations, however, posed new 
challenges for international administration. In particular the League required a much larger 
staff than other international organisations such as the Universal Postal Union, (UPU), 
and, the raison d'etre of the League - to keep international peace - was overtly political. For 
the first time, the role befitting the executive head of a political international organisation 
came into question. Broadly speaking, at the beginning of the 20th Century, there emerged 
two schools of thought - one political and one administrative - concerning the stature, 
status, and role of the League's executive head. 
'Bailey, Sydney D., The Procedure of the UN Security Council, (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 
p. 7 3. 
2The decisions taken by the Security Council and other main organs, and, the precedents and customs which 
have become, 'generally recognised as attaching to the Office of the Secretary-General, ' are the subject of the 
rest of this thesis. 
3Gordenker, Leon, "The Secretary-General, " in Barros, James, The United Nations: Past Present & Future, 
(New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 109. 
4See Gordenker in Barros, op. cit., pp. 109-110. 
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Firstly, Lord Cecil advocated that there should be a Chancellor for the League of Nations, 
whose office should be, "an almost independent institution ... [of the] broadest political 
authority. "' Sir Eric Drummond, the first Secretary-General of the League, explains, "the 
first idea was to have an important and well known political statesman ... [and] he would 
have wide political powers. ' Q To this end Eleutherios Venizelos of Greece, an eminent 
statesman and political leader, was recruited for the post. The title and person sought out 
were indicative of aspirations for a politically active, innovative and influential executive 
head substantively involved in the policy processes of the new international organisation. 
A leadership function for the Secretary-General, however, was tied to the possibility of 
appointing a highly esteemed and respected statesman, and, as Drummond explains, "when 
they found they could not get the highest calibre man for the job, they had second thoughts 
about it. They decided they didn't want an international dictator. ' '3 Venizelos declined the 
post, a position which President Wilson also considered briefly, and the title Chancellor 
was replaced with that of Secretary-General. Article 6 of the League Covenant instead 
provided for an apolitical Secretary-General: 
(1) The first Secretary-General shall be the person named in the Annex; thereafter 
the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the 
majority of the Assembly. 
(2) The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary- 
General with the approval of the Council. 
(3) The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly. 
(4) In the case of war or threat of war the Secretary-General shall on the request of 
any member of the League forthwith summon a meeting. 
(5) The Secretary-General shall make all necessary arrangements for a full 
investigation and consideration of a dispute submitted to the Council which any 
party to the dispute sees likely to lead to a rupture. 
These functions were based on a 'realist' assessment of the potential for an individual to 
influence the politics of a state-centric system. As Gordenker explains, the League 
Secretary-General had, "neither the power nor the administrative trappings of a 
government, he had only a role as an aide to the governments that make up his organisation 
... main organ or not 
his Secretariat exists to prepare the way for decisions not make 
thern. ' '4 Nevertheless, some scope for initiative remained in the execution of these 
administrative duties, but how these functions would be put into effect would rest upon 
their interpretation by the first incumbent. Firstly, a liberal interpretation of the 
indeterminate phrase, 'act in that capacity, ' arguably provided the Secretary-General with 
considerable scope to participate in, and influence the decisions of the Council and/or 
Assembly. Secondly, the provisions of Article 6 (5) provide the informative basis on 
lViscount Cecil, A Great Experiment, (1941), p. 89 cited in Schwebel, op. cit., p. 4. According to 
Schwebel the clauses in the League Covenant conceming the Secretary-General originate 
from drafts by 
Viscount Cecil. 
21nterview with Schwebel quoted in Schwebel, op. cit., p. 4. 
3Drummond, Interview with Schwebel, op. cit., p. 4. 
4Gordenker in Barros, op. cit., P. 108. 
-26- 
which the Secretary-General might develop a diplomatic role. I Thirdly, the absence of a 
preparatory commission provided the first League Secretary-General with considerable 
freedom in setting up the Secretariat. Sir Maurice Hankey, who was first offered the post, 
conceived of a small multinational and politically minded body. Before declining the offer, 
Hankey drew up proposals for a, 'cabinet system, ' of nine Secretaries-General representing 
each of the Council members, and each with his/her own nationally recruited Staff. 2 
Instead, following the appointment of Eric Drummond, the League of Nations Secretariat 
was modelled on the British traditions and conventions of permanence, neutrality and 
anonymity. The new international civil servants were administrators, not political 
appointees, and loyal exclusively to the principle and purposes of the international 
organisation. Bennett argues, however, that Drummond's narrow and conservative 
interpretation of the League Secretary-General's prerogatives, "smoothed his relationships 
with representatives of governments in the Assembly and Council. ' '3 On this basis 
Drummond developed a diplomatic role'behind the scenes, ' in which, "he [Drummond] 
would advise if consulted and because his advise was good he was increasingly consulted. " 
Luard continues, however, "but he would not offer it [advice] uninvited. " Schwebel 
makes similar observations, 
"His political activity was subtle, indirect and inconspicuous - so much so 
that it not surprisingly gave the false impression of vacuity. In his formal 
relations with League organs, the Secretary-General was inarticulate in the 
extreme; in his public role he was retiring and uninspiring; it was only in his 
diplomatic 'behind the scenes' character that the Secretary-General of the 
League was a potent political force. "5 
Joseph Avenol, who succeeded Drummond continued in much the same vein despite 
confessing greater political ambitions for the Secretary-General. 6 The more circumspect 
approach reflected the growing ambivalence of the member states towards the League 
during the 1930s. With respect to Japanese aggression against Manchuria, (193 1), and 
Italian aggression against Ethiopia, (1934), neither Drummond nor Avenol were prepared to 
give public expression to an internationalist perspective, nevermind, "galvanise the 
organisation, '17 into action. The need to give political expression to an internationalist 
perspective underlay calls for a more assertive and authoritative Secretary-General in the 
I For expansion of this argument see, 711e Imphied Powers '17heory, " pp. 36-40. 
2Franck, Thomas M., Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the UN Drea"I and What the US Can Do 
About it, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), see "Hankey v Drummond, " pp. 96-8. 
3Bennett, op. ci . t., p. 386. 
4Lua-rd, op. cit., p. 12. 
5Schwebel, op. cit., p. 6; also see Rovine., Arthur, W., The First Fifty Years of the Secretary- General in 
World Politics, (Leyden: Netherlands, A. W, Sijthoff, 1970). 
6''1 favoured and active role for the Secretary -General like that of the Director of the ILO. My temperament 
pushed me towards the path of Albert Thomas. But there was the respected example of Sir Eric ... 
I could 
not easily change this tradition ... Once Sir Eric 
began in one way, it was difficult to take up another, " 
interview with Schwebel quoted in Schwebel, op. cit., p. 8, also see Rovine, ibid. 
7Luard, op. cit.. p. 12. 
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successor organisation, and was fuelled by the, 'galvanising, ' leadership of Albert Thomas 
in the International Labour Organisation, (ILO), I whom Bennett explains, 
11... was dynamic and outspoken and used his office to assert leadership on 
behalf of measures he personally advocated. Thomas was an activist who 
took the initiative in suggesting policy ... he suggested measures and programs to the ELO Conference Governing body and vigorously defended 
his initiatives. ' 12 
Just as the founders of the League had given consideration to the possibility of a League 
Chancellor, in the early discussions vis-a-vis the UN Secretary-General, Roosevelt envisaged 
the appointment of a, "well known and powerful personality to act as the'World's Moderator' 
who would play an active role, perhaps indeed be the dominant figure in world politiCS. "3 
Conversely, according to Russell, "it was argued by some that the powers and authority of the 
Council derived from the member states and no individual as such could have any function 
there. "4 Between these two extremes their emerged a consensus that a new international 
organisation with greater powers to maintain international peace and security required a 
Secretary-General, "more active and less discreet, more independent and less invisible, than the 
chief of the unhappy League had been. "5 Luard continues, 
"If the world organisation was itself to become a more powerful force in the 
world, then its chief executive too must be able to inject an international 
viewpoint into the bickerings of national governments; to assume the 
conscience of the world when international action was urgently needed; and 
to act as a watchdog always on the alert for situation where the peace could 
be threatened. ' '6 
Against this background, the founders of the UN did not set out to radically redefine the 
Secretary -General, but built onto the Drummond model, new, but ancillary powers 
in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
IThe relevance and salience of such a comparison, however, is dubious. Thomas was the head of a 
functional organisation operating in a specialised field which to the members governments was 
less 
contentious than the politics of keeping the peace. Furthermore, those involved in the 
decision-making 
process included not only governmental delegates but employees and employers. These circumstances were 
more conducive for the Director-General to exert his authority over the organisation, and, the governments 
of the member states were more prepared to let Thomas do so (they had less to lose by 
letting Thomas take 
initiatives). In the more controversial field of international relations, however, the members of the 
League 
"in all probability would not have tolerated an Albert Thomas as Secretary-General of the 
League. " Bennett, 
op. cit., p. 307. 
213ennett, op. cit., pp. 306-307. 
3Luard, op. cit., p. 12. 
4Russell, op. cit., p. 374. 
5Luard, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
6ibid. 
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The Secretary-General According to the Charter. 
The powers that the Charter accords the Secretary-General can be broadly categorised under 
two headings: Administrative and Facilitative. The Administrative role of the Secretary- 
General has two aspects. Firstly, according to Article 97 the Secretary-General was to be 
the chief administrative officer of the organisation. Secondly, in respect of the maintenance 
of international peace and security, Article 98 made the Secretary-General the executor of 
Security Council, (and General Assembly), decisions. New and facilitative independent 
prerogatives in the maintenance of international peace and security were implied by the 
provisions of Article 99. 
The Chief Administrative Officer. 
The full text of Article 97 reads, 
'The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the 
organisation may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the 
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He 
shall be the chief administrative officer of the organisation. " 
The nature of the Secretary-General's role as chief administrative officer of the UN is 
clarified by the specific duties assigned to the office by other articles in the Charter, the 
Report of the Preparatory Commission, and the rules of procedure for the other organs of 
the UN. These sources make the Secretary-General responsible for the provision of service 
functions to the deliberative organs of the UN, for the staffing and organisations of the 
Secretariat, and, hold the Secretary-General alone, "responsible to the other organs for the 
work of the Secretariat. "' As in the League, these administrative functions have a, "modest 
political potency, ' '2and a bearing on the role of the Secretary-General in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
Service Functions. 
The service functions include, inter alia; notifying members of Security Council meetings, 
(Security Council rule of procedure 25); preparation and circulation of agendas, (rule 15); 
preparation and circulation of documents required by the Council, (rule 26); the keeping of 
minutes, (rule 5 1); an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the 
organisation, (Article 98); acting as a channel of communication between members of the 
UN and the Security Council and between organs of the UN, (rule 6, Articles 12 & 20); 
and to providing technical assistance for instance in the preparation of the budget, (PC 
Chapter VII, section 2B, para. 14). These apparently purely administrative tasks, 
I Report of the Preparatory Commission of the UN, (London: HM Stationary Office, 1945), PC/20, 
23/12/45, p. 86. 
2Schwebel, op. cit., p. 42. 
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Schwebel observes, "constitute the frame of reference within which the delegations take 
decisions, inevitably exercises an independent influence upon those decisions. "' 
Article 98 adds that the Secretary-General acts, 'in that capacity, ' at all meetings of the 
Security Council, General Assembly and other principal organs of the UN. From the 
Charter, however, the precise meaning of this phrase is unclear. Article 98 was accorded 
minimal attention at San Francisco so the San Francisco discussions and the Preparatory 
Commission Report provide little help in understanding this vague and ambiguous phrase. 
If the Secretary-General acts, 'in that capacity, ' as the chief administrative officer, he acts 
purely as the manager of the international civil service. If, however, 'that capacity, ' refers 
to the Secretary-General's powers as a whole, including new prerogatives, then it is equally 
clear that the Secretary-General was expected to be more than just the chief administrative 
officer servicing the principal organs of the UN. In this respect clues to the expectations of 
the member states can be found in the rules of procedure of the UN's deliberative organs. 
The General Assembly and the Security Council rules of procedure demand specific 
administrative service tasks of the Secretary-General. Rules 9 and 48 of the General 
Assembly Provisional Rules of Procedure, however, authorise the Secretary-General to 
partake in discussion and place items on the General Assembly agenda. In the ECOSOC, 
the Secretary-General is empowered to draw up the agenda, (in consultation with the 
President), and include in it any issues which, "the Secretary -General deems necessary to 
put before the Council. "2 The Security Council Provisional Rules of Procedure were less 
generous. The right to partake in discussions in the Security Council was not automatic, 
even though Article 99 gave the Secretary-General the fight to, 'bring to the attention of the 
Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
international peace and security. ' The Secretary-General had to fight to assert the right to 
make written and oral statements to the Security Council and this fight was only belatedly 
included as Article 22 of the Security Council Rules of Procedure. 3 Regarding the agenda, 
Chapter H of the Security Council Rules of Procedure also placed important limitations 
upon what could and could not be included in the agenda, and determined the agenda 
required the Security Council President's approval. Schwebel also points out that the 
Secretary-General acts in that capacity at the meeting of only the principal organs. By 
implication, therefore, the Secretary -General has no role to play in the MSC. 
This serves to 
reinforce the view that while the Secretary -General may have been strengthened politically, 
the purpose had not been to make the Secretary -General the chief fireman putting out the 
fires himself but only the watchdog facilitating Security Council action. 
1 ibid. 
2ECOSOC Provisional Rules of Procedure, Rule 9, in Report of the Preparatory Commission of the UN, 
(London: HM Stationary Office, 1945), PC/20,23/12/45, p. 30. 
3Amended at Security Council 48th Meeting , 24 June 1946, see pp. 
47-50 
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Structure and Staffing of the Secretariat. 
As the chief administrative officer of the organisation the Secretary-General was made 
responsible for hiring and firing the Secretariat staff who would service the Security 
Council, General Assembly and other organs of the UN. Crucially, in respect of the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and as the Preparatory Commission 
recognised, "his choice of staff - more pertinently of the higher staff - and his leadership 
will determine the character and efficiency of the Secretariat as a whole. "' The efficient, 
effective and dispassionate execution of service functions, the mandates of the deliberative 
23 organs, and, an independent role in the maintenance of international peace and security, 
demanded the constitutional independence of the Secretariat. Equally, if the UN Secretary- 
General was to serve as the lone representative of the international perspective in a state- 
centric world - as the guardian of the charter - that was lacking in the League, the Secretariat 
and Secretary-General required constitutional safeguards against interference in their 
activities by member states. To this end the Charter was unusually specific, and in theory at 
least, quality was given precedence over political expediency. 
Article 100 requires the Secretary-General and staff, 'not to seek or receive instructions 
from any government or any other authority external to the organisation, ' and at the same 
time obliges the member states, 'not seek to influence them in the discharge of their 
responsibilities. ' Furthermore, on appointment, all staff are required to take an oath of 
office in which they, 
11 ... solemnly swear, (undertake, affirm, promise), to exercise 
in all loyalty, 
discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international 
civil servant of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate 
my conduct with the interests of the United Nations only on view, and not to 
seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from 
any government or authority external to the organisation. "4 
The objective of creating a Secretariat, 'truly international in character, ' which carries out its 
responsibilities objectively and independently Is complemented by Article 101. ArticlelOl 
subjects the appointment of staff to, 'securing the highest standards of efficiency, 
competence and integrity; ' and, 'the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a 
geographical basis as possible. ' The question of geographical representation at once 
reinforces and qualifies the concept of a truly international civil service. A balanced 
geographical representation of the member states is central to the realisation and perception 
of a neutral and independent international civil service. If the relationship between civil 
I ibid., Section 2B, para. 15, p. 112. 
2See discussion of Secretary-General as, "Executor of the Security Council Executor, " p. 34. 
3See discussion of the, "Facilitative Secretary-General, " pp. 34-6. 
4Staff Regulation 1.9 quoted in Bailey, Sydney D., The Secretariat of the United Nations, (London: Pal I 
Mail Press, 1962), p. 22. 
- 31 - 
servants and the organisation was to be a monogamous one, however, the question of 
geographical representation, created a fidelity problem. In the League, Drummond had 
made great advances in creating a Secretariat, "international in its composition and 
international in its responsibilities. "' The appointment of staff, however, had required the 
approval of the Council. The senior positions in the Secretariat, therefore, were often filled 
by political appointees. Similarly at Dumbarton Oaks it had been proposed that the Deputies 
to the Secretary-General of the UN, 2 should be appointed by the same process as the 
Secretary-General. The Deputies would be elected by the General Assembly on the 
recommendation of the Security Council. This system represented a thinly veiled front for 
appointing national delegates from the permanent members to the most senior positions in 
the Secretariat. The result would have been to extend the political control of the major 
powers over the UN to the Secretariat. The USSR was especially keen to secure key 
positions for its nationals but the small and middle ranking powers were vociferous in their 
opposition. They feared the permanent members of the Security Council already had too 
much influence over the organisation. Given the supremacy of the Security Council in the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the supremacy of the permanent 
members over the Council, and given that the permanent members were to have a veto on 
the choice of the Secretary-General, the concession of the major powers "represented a 
victory for the independence of the Secretary-General, "3reaffinned in the Preparatory 
Commission. In the Preparatory Conunission it was suggested that the appointment of 
Secretariat staff should be subject to the ratification of the government of the country of the 
candidate under consideration. This proposal was rejected because it too, "would impinge 
upon the exclusive responsibility of the Secretary-General under Article 100 of the Charter 
and threaten the freedom, independence and truly international character of the Secretariat. ' 14 
In the event, however, the first Secretary-General bowed to political pressure and 
henceforth, in accordance with a, 'gentleman's agreement, ' between the permanent 
members, five seats have been reserved for nationals of the big five. 
The Charter is specific in the responsibilities it accords the Secretary -General regarding the 
appointment of Secretariat staff. Many of the other administrative tasks of the Secretary- 
General, however, are only implicit in the Secretary -General's appointment as the chief 
administrative officer of the organisation. Structure and organisation have political 
implications and had to be the responsibility of the chief administrative officer if the 
objective of creating a truly international civil service was to be realised. The initial 
structure of the Secretariat, however, was determined by the members rather than the 
IBailey, The Secretariat of the United Nations, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), p. 9. 
2See "Selecting the Secretary -General, " pp. 42-4. C, 
3Schwebel, op. cit., p. 32. 
4Bailey (1962), op. cit., p. 24, see also PC Doc. PC/AB/66,22nd & 23rd meetings of Committee 
6,19& 
20 Dec. 1945. 
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incoming Secretary-General. On the recommendation of the Preparatory Commission, the 
General Assembly decreed that there should be eight Secretariat Departments. To assist the 
Secretary-General in the co-ordination of the work of the organisation and in his 
relationship with members, agencies, and organs of the UN, the Secretary-General was to 
have his own, 'Executive Office, ' comprising his senior advisors and including a separate 
department to serve the Security Council administratively and to assist the Secretary- 
General in his relations with the Security Council. Although the Preparatory Commission 
made extensive recommendations concerning the organisation and structure of the 
Secretariat, the Preparatory Commission was also concerned that the latitude accorded the 
Secretary-General vis-a-vis the structure, organisation and functioning of the Secretariat, 
"should not be restricted by too much detail. "' The member states recognised that 
ultimately, the Secretary-General was responsible for the structure, organisation, and 
administrative functioning of the Secretariat but the General Assembly took the lead during 
the initial stages in order to help get the UN up and running. Thereafter it was up to the 
Secretary-General to, "take whatever steps might be required, ' '2to co-ordinate the activities 
of the various departments and organs of the UN. 
If the Secretary-General was to be an independent force, (in the UN and in world politics), 
it was imperative that the international civil service on which the Secretary-General relied 
would come under the control of the Secretary-General alone. Accordingly, all lines of 
administrative authority, responsibility, and accountability pointed to the Secretary -General. 
Executor of the Security Council. 
The second administrative role of the Secretary-General is as an executor of Security 
Council decisions, or the decisions of the other principal organs of the UN. Article 98 
states the Secretary-General, "shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to hiM. "3 
These functions would not necessarily be purely adrmnistrative. The Security Council rules 
of procedure determine that the Security Council could appoint the Secretary-General as, 
'Rapporteur, ' for a specified question (rules 23 and 28). Article 98, therefore, enables the 
Security Council to entrust the Secretary-General with important, "diplomatic or 
operational, "4 tasks. Furthermore, the assignment of functions to the Secretary -General 
also entails conferring upon the Secretary-General some discretion in the fulfilment of 
mandates. Under Article 98 the Secretary-General cannot undertake functions beyond the 
'Commentary on the Report of the Preparatory Commission of the UN, (London: HM Stationary Office. 
1946), (Miscellaneous Paper No. 5,1946), Cmd. 6734, p. 10, & UN Yearbook 1946, op. cit., p. 40. 
2UN Yearbook 1946, op. cit., p. 614. 
3T'he full text of Article 98 reads, "The Secretary -General shall act in the capacity In all meetings of the 
General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship 
Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary- 
General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the organisation. '' 
413ailey (1975), op. cit., p. 95. 
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remit of the mandate. If the mandate is not explicit, however, or the remit broad, or the 
fulfilment of tasks overtaken by unforeseen developments, the fulfilment of the mandate is 
subject to the discretion of the Secretary-General. In this context the report of the 
Preparatory Commission made two extremely important acknowledgements. Firstly, 
"The Secretary-General 
... will undoubtedly be called upon from time to time in the exercise of his administrative duties to take decisions which may justly be called political. " I 
Secondly, the Preparatory Commission Report adds, 
'"While the responsibility for the framing and adoption of agreed 
international policies rest with the organs representative members ... the essential tasks of preparing the ground for those decisions and of executing 
them in co-operation with the members will devolve largely upon the 
Secretariat. 'Me manner in which the Secretariat performs these tasks will 
largely determine the degree in which the objectives of the Charter will be 
realised. "2 
Articles 97 and 98, therefore, make clear that the Secretary-General was first and foremost 
the chief administrative officer of the UN. Although the prospective members had 
undertaken to strengthen the role of the Secretary-General, they decided against replacing 
the Secretary-General with an administrative Director and political President. Any role in 
the maintenance of international peace and security would instead build on the 
administrative traditions of the League Secretary-General. 'Mus Schwebel argued, "while 
the Secretary-General is to be more than the organisation's first functionary, he is also to be 
that functionary. Its stress of the Secretary-General's administrative responsibility tends to 
put his political authority in more subdued perspective. ' 13 
The Facilitative Secretary -General. 
Article 99 is the key to an enhanced role for the Secretary-General of the UN. It makes the 
Secretary-General more than the manager of an international bureaucracy and more than the 
executor of decisions of organs of the UN. It is the constitutional base for a right of 
initiative and extensive implied powers In the maintenance of international peace and 
security but simply states, 
"The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council 
any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
international peace and security. " 
The origins of Article 99 can be found in proposals made by Britain and China at 
Dumbarton Oaks. Both states recommended empowering the Secretary -General with the 
lReport of the Preparatory Commission of the UN, op. cit., Chapter VIII, Section 2B, para. 16, p. 112. 
2ibid., Section 2A, para 1, p. 109. 
3Schwebel. op. cit., p. 44. 
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right to draw the attention of the Security Council to issues of international peace and 
security. This was a right not enjoyed by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. 
As Bailey explains, its purpose was, "to ensure that the Security Council shall have the 
opportunity of considering a matter within its competence, even if no state takes the formal 
step of requesting such consideration. "' The objective was to facilitate a response by the 
Security Council in the early stages of disputes or potential conflicts because of the inability 
of the League Council to address issues of peace and security at the formative stage, if at 
all. 2 
The British Commentary on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals argued that Article 99 
provided, "a very useful procedure when no member of the organisation wishes to take the 
initiative. "3 Similarly, the Czechoslovakian Government concluded that Article 99, "may 
be very useful in situations where Governments hesitate to take actions. "4 Furthermore, the 
official records of the San Francisco Conference state that, "Article 99 affords non member 
states and non states a mechanism through which they can bring to the attention of the 
Security Council threats to international peace and security. "5 By strengthening the role of 
the Secretary-General the founders of the UN were strengthening the ability of the Security 
Council to maintain international peace and security. Article 99 made the Secretary-General 
the facilitator of Security Council action, which as Lie argued, was in itself, "something 
new to the world. The concept of a spokesman for world interest is in many ways far 
ahead of our times. ' '6 Gordenker argues this prerogative existed, "primarily for use in a 
crisis, 117 toinsure that the Security Council addressed a crisis if no member state was 
prepared to request a meeting of the Security Council. Article 99, however, also meant 
much more than that. As Schwebel explains, 
"Article 99 is more important as the prime and unmistakable affirmation of 
the political character of the Secretary-General. The power it confers, taken 
together with his strategic position as the chief pen-nanent officer of the 
United Nations ... constitutes, particularly when 
blended with Article 98, 
the broad legal base for the Secretary-General's political personality. 118 
Yet at San Francisco little discussion was accorded to the powers Article 99 confers upon 
the Secretary-General. The discussions that did take place centred on whether: Article 99 
I Bailey (1962), op. cit., p. 21. 
2See Russell, op. cit., p. 430. 
3A Commentary on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposalsfor the Establishment of a General International 
Organisation, (London, H. M. S. O., 1944), Miscellaneous Paper No. 6 (1944), Cmd 657 1, p. II- 
4"Observation of the Czechoslovak Government on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals", UNCIO Documents, 
Vol. 3, p. 470, Doc. 2 G/ I 4b, May 1 1945, p. 5. 
5UNCIO Documents, Vol. 17, p. 373, (Doc. WD 440/CO/204, p. 1). 
61-ie, Trygve, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations, (New York: Macmillan, 1954), t171 
p. 8 8. 
7Gordenker, The UN Secretar 
, y-General and 
the Maintenance of Peace, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1967), pp. 137-138. 
8Schwebel, op. cit., p. 24. 
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should be a right or a prescription of duty; a Venezuelan proposal that Article 99 should 
apply to the General Assembly as well as the Security Council; and a Uruguayan proposal 
that Article 99 should apply to 'any matter which constitutes an infringement or violation of 
the principles of the Charter. ' The resolution of these questions, and the implied powers of 
Article 99 not discussed at San Francisco, are central to extending the responsibilities of the 
Secretary-General beyond merely the ability to convene the Security Council. Article 99 
was the basis of new and enhanced responsibilities, which the Preparatory Commission 
acknowledged, as yet were not fully appreciated or understood, 
"Under Article 99 ... the Secretary-General has been given a quite special right which goes beyond any power previously accorded to the head of an international organisation ... It is impossible to foresee how this Article will be applied; but the responsibility it confers upon the Secretary-General will 
require the exercise of the highest qualities of political judgement, tact and integrity. " I 
The Role of the Secretary -General: The Implied Powers Theory. 
The development of the Secretary-General's role, in particular the Secretary-General's good 
offices rests in large part on the powers implied in Article 99, and can only be understood 
by looking in detail at the wording and implications of the Article. 
'in his opinion. ' 
By giving the Secretary-General the right to have an opinion on matters of international 
peace and security, Article 99 immediately implies a role for the Secretary-General in this 
state-centric field. 'Me purpose of providing for the expression of an opinion by a non- 
deliberative organ of the UN was to guarantee representation of Charter principles and 
purposes uncoloured by the vagaries of state-centric politics. In Article 99 the Secretary- 
General was empowered with the right to make dispassionate judgements on matters of 
international peace and security. 
It is also logical to assume that from the fight to make a judgement on whether a matter 
required Security Council attention, follows the fight to make recommendations on how that 
matter might best be resolved. This implied right of the Secretary -General rests on the 
assumption that the Secretary -General must be well informed in order to make a decision to 
convene the Security Council. If the Secretary-General is well informed he is therefore in a 
strong position to provide advice and make recommendations to the Security Council. The 
right to do so was fon-nally acknowledged in the first session of the General Assembly, 
"We need not await its full implementation to recognise that the power of the 
Secretary -General to study conditions which in his opinion threaten the 
peaceful relations of the UN, and to make recommendations based on these 
I Report of the PC, op. cit., Chapter VIII, Section 2B, para., 16, p. 112. 
-36- 
findings, represent a significant departure form the usual concepts of international organisation and national sovereignty. "' 
Taken in conjunction with the discretionary phraseology of Article 99, these implied rights 
are the basis of a much greater role. 
'shall' versus 'may. ' 
The use of 'may' in Article 99 is important in that it endows the Secretary-General with a 
choice 'to convene or not to convene' a meeting of the Security Council. Furthermore, it 
implies that if the Secretary-General chooses not to convene the Security Council it is 
because in the opinion of the Secretary-General the matter under consideration is not a threat 
to international peace and security, or, can be resolved without recourse to the Security 
Council. This argument is endorsed by the conscious decision taken at San Francisco not 
to make Article 99 a, "prescription of duty, ' '2by replacing, 'may, ' with, 'shall. ' The 
discretionary element of Article 99 opens the door to independent initiatives 
by the Secretary-General in the maintenance of international peace and 
security. In other words, the Secretary-General was afforded a choice in which he might 
consider a given issue best resolved by an impartial intermediary such as the Secretary- 
General. Boudreau argues this option is more than an implied discretionary choice but a 
prerogative. Boudreau draws attention to the French transcription of Article 99 and the use 
of pouvoir as the verb corresponding to may. 3 The emphasis of pouvoir is much stronger 
than the English, 'may, ' and means the Secretary-General is empowered or has the 
authority to convene the Security Council. The more authoritative French transcript, 
therefore, also means the Secretary-General is empowered or has the authority to exercise 
independent discretionary initiatives in the maintenance of international peace and security 
rather than convene the Security Council. 
These initiatives flow in large part from the requirement of the Secretary -General to be well 
informed of potential threats to the peace if he is to be in a position to make a judgement as 
to whether a given issue warrants Security Council attention or not. If the Secretary- 
General has the power to convene a meeting of the Security Council, it follows that the 
Secretary -General enjoys the concomitant right to make such enquiries and investigations as 
necessary to ascertain whether a political situation requires action by the Council. Kurt 
Waldheim explained, this watchdog brief entails, "an obligation to keep in touch with 
governments and events having a bearing on international peace and security, ' '4 (emphasis 
I Official Records of the 2nd Part of the I st Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, p. 902, 
quoted in Schwebel, op. cit., p. 235. 
2Schwebel, op. cit., p. 19; see UNCIO Documents, Vol. 17, p. 371, Doc. 1155 1/2/74(2), 22 June 1945, 
p. 6. 
3Boudreau, op. cit., p. 10. 
4Waldheim, Kurt. Dag Hammarskj6ld and the Office of the Secretary-General, " in Jordan, Robert S., Dag Z: ý i 
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added). It is then but a short step to a third party role in the maintenance of international 
peace and security, to which Schwebel adds, "the essential character of the office provides a 
more general basis. "' That'essential character, 'was defined by the Preparatory 
Commission, 
'The Secretary-General more than anyone else will stand for the UN as a 
whole. In the eyes of the world, no less than in the eyes of his own staff, 
he must embody the principles and ideals of the Charter to which the 
Organisation seeks to give effect. ' 12 
In this respect the Secretary-General is endowed with a moral quasi-reverent authority 
which, in conjunction with his constitutional independence from the member states is 
central to a discretionary independent role for the Secretary-General in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Also central to that role is Article 33 which states, 
'The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a 
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement , resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means of their own choice. " (emphasis added). 
In other words, Article 33 empowers the member states to make use of the Secretary- 
General in the pacific settlement of their disputes -a role which the Secretary-General is 
well placed to undertake given the independent investigative powers provided for by Article 
99. The Report of the Preparatory Commission acknowledged that the Secretary-General, 
"may have an important role to play as a mediator and as an informal advisor of many 
govemments. "3 The context in which this statement was made, however, suggested such a 
role came only within the remit of Article 98. The next sentence states that the Secretary- 
General, "will undoubtedly be called upon from time to time in the exercise of his 
administrative duties to take decisions which may justly be called political. "4 
The "Doctrine of Implied Powers, "5 read in conjunction with Article 33, indicates, "a right 
which may seem only procedural in character, ' '6opens up new possibilities in the peace and 
security field independent of the UN's deliberative organs. The precise nature of these 
activities did not become clear until the Secretary -General used Article 99 to justify 
independent initiatives. The Preparatory Commission recognised that, "it would be 
impossible to see how this Article would be applied, ' '7but the limited discussion indicates 
Hammarskj5ld Revisited, (Durham N. C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1983). pp. 15-25. 
ISchwebel, op. cit., p. 23. 
2Report of the PC., op. cit., Chapter VIII, Section 213, para 17, p. 112. 
3ibid, para., 16, p. 112. 
4ibid. 
513oudreau, op. cit., p. 11 
613ailey (1975), op. cit., p. 77. 
7Report of the PC, op. cit., Chapter VIII, Section 213, para., 16, p. 112. 
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that the extent of the Secretary-General's capabilities emanating from Article 99 was not 
fully appreciated. That is not to say that the nations present at San Francisco did not 
recognise that the office of the Secretary-General carried enormous potential. If the role of 
the Secretary-General was not to be significant then the method of selecting the Secretary- 
General would not have been such a contentious issue. ' Rather, limited time and resources 
prevented a detailed analysis of the Secretary-General's role, and in any case the Security 
Council commanded a much higher priority. The Security Council was to be the organ with 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and with 
respect to the Security Council the role of the Secretary-General was to be facilitative. Any 
additional powers would be ancillary to the powers, role, and pre-eminence of the Security 
Council. The areas in which the Secretary-General was expected to fulfil this facilitative 
and ancillary role, however, were extensive. 
'any matter. ' 
The phrase 'any matter' makes it clear that the remit of Article 99 is broad. The Secretary- 
General is obliged to be informed of and has the right to investigate any issues in any field 
that could possibly result in a threat to or breach of international peace and security. 
Furthermore, the threat of a breach of the peace need not be imminent. So long as in the 
opinion of the Secretary-General a threat may exist the Secretary-General has every right to 
investigate, and enjoys the discretion whether to convene the Security Council or make 
available his own diplomatic services. If a threat is perceived, therefore, the Secretary- 
General's role in the prevention and resolution of conflict could extend beyond military and 
political issues to include the social, economic, and humanitarian fields. Even if the issue at 
question is within the domestic jurisdiction of a member state, if the Secretary-General 
considers that a potential threat to international peace and security exists, he could still make 
use of the prerogatives that exist under Article 99. 
The broad rem-it of Article 99 did not just mean that the Secretary-General could exercise a 
discretionary independent role in any area as long as, 'in his opinion, ' a threat to 
international peace and security existed. Article 99 also made the Secretary-General an 
essential link between the other organs and agencies of the UN and the Security Council, 
between the members of the UN and the Security Council and even between non members 
and the Security Council because he could report to the Security Council on any matter of 
"political consequence. ' 12 
So far, this chapter has taken the UN Charter as the starting point and expanded on the role 
and fights of the Secretary-General from that base. It is equally important, however, to 
I See, "Selecting the Secretary-General, " pp. 41-4. 
2Schwebel, op. cit., p. 24. 
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recognise that the Charter also places limits on that expansion. 'Me first of those limits 
should already be apparent. The fact that a threat to international peace and security may 
exist is a pre-requisite for the Secretary-General's powers under Article 99. At San 
Francisco, Uruguay, (backed by Egypt and Iran), proposed the limits of Article 99 should 
be extended to, "any matters which constitute an infTingement or violation of the principles 
of the Charter. "' This would have permitted the Secretary-General to report on matters 
within the domestic jurisdiction of member states that were not related to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. It would also have required the Secretary-General to report 
any violation to the most appropriate organ, not necessarily the Security Council. For the 
LJK, Canada and New Zealand this recommendation was taking the powers of the 
Secretary-General too far. The proposal, however, was only narrowly defeated indicating 
considerable support for a more extensive and wide-ranging role for the Secretary-General. 
At Dumbarton Oaks it was also suggested by the US that the fight to convene the Security 
Council should be extended to include the General Assembly. This suggestion was not 
discussed at Dumbarton Oaks but was repeated by Venezuela at San FranCiSCO. 2 The 
purpose was to keep the General Assembly informed of issues of peace and security that 
were under the consideration of the Security Council. This function, however, was catered 
for elsewhere, namely, the requirement from Article 98 of an Annual Report on the Work of 
the organisation, and rule 47 of the General Assembly Rules of Procedure which state, 
"The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall 
notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters related to the 
maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with 
by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or 
the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in 
session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters. " 
The Venezuelan proposal would also have empowered the Secretary -General to choose 
between the Security Council and the General Assembly, even though the Security Council 
was to be the organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. This proposal was a necessary complement to that made by Uruguay, but 
would have made the Secretary-General a pawn in any Inter- institutional battle between the 
two main deliberative organs. It was rejected along with the Uruguayan proposal. 
The most significant limýit on the discretionary powers of the Secretary -General is the chain 
of events for which Article 99 provides. Firstly, a role for the Secretary -General in the 
pacific settlement of disputes flows from the discretion to choose whether to convene the 
I ibid. 
2See UNCIO Documents, Vol. 7, pp. 162-3, Doc. 732 1/250,1 June 1945, pp. 2-3; & UNCIO 
Documents, Vol. 7, p. 168, Doc. 762 1/2/53,2 June 1945, p. 1. 
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Security Council or pursue independent initiatives. Once a meeting of the Security Council 
has been called the discretion to choose which way the Article might be best applied no 
longer exists. Henceforth the discretion to take independent initiatives ceases to exist. A 
third party role is then exclusively at the discretion of the Security Council and its members. 
Secondly, the exercise of independent discretionary rights is limited to the pacific settlement 
of disputes. As Boudreau points out, in Chapter VI and VII the Charter makes a, 'clear 
distinction, ' between maintenance and enforcement of international peace and security 
respectively. I Chapter VH is the exclusive domain of the Security Council, (hence the 
exclusion of the Secretary-General's from the Military Staff Committee). In this respect 
any role relating to the enforcement of international peace and security can stem only from 
functions delegated to the Secretary-General under Article 98. 
Selecting the S ecre ta ry -General. 
While the founders of the UN might not have been able to foresee how the role of the 
Secretary-General would develop they recognised that the potential of the Secretary-General 
could be extensive. Nowhere is this more evident than in the wrangling over the terms of 
appointment for the Secretary-General. The main controversy at San Francisco regarding 
the Secretary-General was not to do with his role but how the Secretary-General should be 
selected and how long he should remain in office. 
The smaller powers had wanted the Secretary-General to be elected by the General 
Assembly alone, as had been the case in the League. It was imperative, however, that the 
Secretary-General should have the support of the Security Council and the permanent 
members especially. The Secretary-General was at the very least an executor of Security 
Council decisions and a facilitator of Security Council meetings. In this respect the UN 
required a workable relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council, 
especially its key members. With respect to the second, the political authority of the 
Secretary-General would be severely undermined if the incumbent did not enjoy the support 
of the most important players in the international system. As the Czechoslovakian 
Representative explained at San Francisco, 
"The unanimity of the great powers on the question was essential in order to 
reduce to a minimum the possibility of friction between them. Moreover, 
the position of the Secretary-General would be greatly enhanced if he were 
nommated with the concurrence of the five permanent members. "2 
I Boudreau, op. cit., p. 12. 
2UNCIO Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 569-70, Doc. 984 111/1,, '52,14 June 1945, pp. 2-3. 
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The major powers were adamant that the Security Council should recommend a candidate to 
the General Assembly upon whom the General Assembly would then vote. Belgium and 
Canada had proposed that the Security Council nomination should not be subject to the 
veto. The major powers, however, were united in the position they had adopted at 
Dumbarton Oaks. They were determined that the selection of the Secretary-General should 
be considered a substantive matter, not a procedural issue, and therefore required the assent 
of all the pennanent members. 
Various other proposals, too numerous to cover here, were also put forward directed at 
reducing the control of the Security Council over the appointment of the Secretary -General. 
The Netherlands was particularly outspoken against the application of the veto to the 
selection of the Secretary-General and was supported by Canada, Belgium and Australia in 
fears that, 
"Subjecting the choice of the Secretary-General to the veto would compel the 
permanent members to reach a compromise and this might result in the 
appointment of the 'lowest common denominator. ' Furthermore, the 
Secretary-General would work in the knowledge that his chances of re- 
election would be small if he were to incur the displeasure of the permanent 
members. "2 
In reply the UK reiterated the importance of Security Council support for an incumbent and 
the US added that, "although the Security Council was to nominate the Secretary-General 
the General Assembly could still exercise a veto over the choice. "3 The US also considered 
that the involvement of both the General Assembly and the Security Council in the 
appointment of the Secretary-General, "was a highly desirable arrangement because the 
Secretary-General should have the confidence of both, " but, "it was more important that he 
be acceptable to the latter, since he had to work closely with this continuous body. "4 
In this context the phraseology of Article 97 is interesting. Article 97 states that the 
Secretary-General shall be appointed, (as opposed to elected), by the General Assembly 
upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The General Assembly has only the 
power to accept or reject a candidate proffered by the Security Council, not the right to 
choose a Secretary-General. This so called veto, however, is of dubious significance. 
Firstly, it is unlikely that the General Assembly would reject a candidate upon whom the 
permanent members had agreed. Secondly the Preparatory Commission Report reasserted 
the pre-emMience of the Security Council in this matter by stating, 
I See UNCIO Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 691-3, and Urquhart, B. and Childers, E., A World in Need of 
Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations, (Uppsala, Sweden: The Dag Hammarskjbld Foundation, 1990). 
2UNCIO Documents, Vol. 2, p. 546, Doc. 957 IIIT50,14 June 1945, p. 5. 
3ibid., pp. 569-70, Doc. 984 IIIJ1152,14 June 1945, pp. 2-3. 
41bid. 
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"It would be desirable for the Security Council to proffer one candidate only 
for the consideration of the General Assembly, and for debate on the 
nomination in the General Assembly to be avoided. "' 
Nevertheless, with this veto the Assembly has the ability to influence selection and the 
potential to confront the Security Council on the appointment of a Secretary-General. 
The wording of Article 97 is also significant in a second sense. The, 'appointment, ' of the 
Secretary-General as opposed to the, 'election, ' of the Secretary-General emphasises the 
administrative responsibilities of the office over the role of the Secretary-General in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The wording of Article 97 was changed to 
this effect on the initiative of the Netherlands, even though the Secretary-General is in fact 
elected. 2 
Finally, a Secretary-General from one of the permanent members is a highly unlikely 
proposition. The Charter does not preclude this possibility but given the difficulty that 
would arise in securing agreement from all the permanent members, and given the 
difficulties that Secretary-General could be confronted with in his relations with the other 
permanent members it was recognised that, "the Secretary-General should, if possible, not 
be a national of one of the Big Five; he should be chosen because of his qualificationS. "3 
Having won an important victory on the selection of the Secretary-General the major 
powers were then prepared to make concessions on the tenure of the Secretary-General and 
proposals that the deputies to the Secretary-General should be elected by the same process 
rather than appointed by the Secretary-General. 
The debate surrounding the tenure of the office was equally hard fought. The USSR 
proposed that the Secretary -General should be elected for a two year period, that the 
incumbent could not be re-elected, and that the same rules apply to the Secretary -General's 
deputies. These proposals would have prevented the Secretary-General from fulfilling the 
responsibilities of the office independently and impartially and would have prevented the 
development of a third party role for the Secretary-General. Instead at Dumbarton Oaks the 
major powers agreed on a three year term of office. At San Francisco, however, the small 
powers were concerned by the hold of the Security Council over the Secretary -General. 
Given the Security Council veto and a short terin of office it was feared that, "there was a 
danger that the Secretary-General would have to show such tact toward the permanent 
members that common sense, courage and integrity would be sacrificed. ' 14 Other proposals 
IReport of the PC, op. cit., Chapter VIII, Section 2B, para. 21, p. 113. 
2UNCIO Documents, Vol. 7, p. 389, also see Schwebel, op. cit., p. 34. 
3US State Department Memorandum, quoted in Urquhart and Childers, op. cit., p. 16 
4UNCIO Documents, Vol. 2, p. 546, Doc. 957 111/1/50,14 June 1945, p. 5. 
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such as a seven to ten year tenure were therefore put forward. The problem was not 
resolved at San Francisco and the major powers agreed to leave the issue to the Preparatory 
Commission, which recommended that, 
'The first Secretary-General should be appointed for five years, the 
appointment being open to renewal for a further five year term. There being 
no stipulation on the subject in the Charter, the General Assembly and the 
Security Council are free to modify the term of office of future Secretaries- 
General in the light of experience" I 
This measure went some way to protecting the independence of the office. Its resolution 
was part of a much wider debate concerning the terms of appointment of the Secretary- 
General. The prospect of a more significant role in the maintenance of international peace 
and security, coupled with considerable uncertainty on how that role might develop are 
reflected in the major powers insistence on a veto, and the smaller power determination to 
protect the Secretary-General's independence. 
Concluding Comments. 
If the UN was to play a significant role in the post war world it was imperative that it 
should be capable of adapting to changing conditions and developing its activities 
accordingly. Written constitutions are often inflexible and require formal amendment in 
order to adapt to change. Although the Charter "sought to provide a comprehensive set of 
prescriptions for conflict resolution and the use of force, "2 the framers of the Charter also 
"wrote much flexibility intolt. 1 '3 This flexibility has given the UN an organic quality 
enabling the organisation to develop and survive. The framers of the Charter deliberately 
left some questions open for the UN organs to resolve themselves by adaptation and 
application to events and circumstances. This was partly due to recognition of the 
constraints the legalistic Covenant placed on the functioning of the League of Nations. For 
the most part the UN Charter reflects the wide and varied processes of consultation from 
which the Charter emerged and the difficulty in securing agreement between the members to 
be. 'Me rich and diverse process of negotiation behind the creation of the Charter resulted 
in a document which in many respects is vague and ambiguous. In the first UN Yearbook 
it is acknowledged that many questions were left to be resolved by the organs themselves 
and by putting the principles of the Charter into practical effect, 
"The Preparatory Commission's recommendations regarding the Security 
Council were less detailed than those dealing with other organs of the UN, 
lReport of the PC, op. cit., Chapter Vill, Section 213, para. 18, p. 112. 
2Higgins, Rosalyn, "The New United Nations and the Former Yugoslavia", International Affairs, Volume 
69, Number 3, July 1993, p. 466. 
3See Riggs and Piano, op. ci . t., p. 2 2. 
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partly because it was felt that the Council would meet continuously and 
would be able to develop its own organisation and program of work. "' 
The members of the Security Council had to agree on a set of rules of procedure and this 
left room for flexibility and development, (which was to have important implications for the 
Secretary-General). Equally the role of the Secretary-General was left in large part to the 
discretion and interpretation of the incumbents. By contrast, however, this was because 
discussion of the Secretary-General's role was almost non-existent. At Dumbarton Oaks, 
Committee H, accorded considerable attention to the relationship between the General 
Assembly with respect to the Security Council, 2 but no such consideration was made by 
any other committee to either the role of the Secretary-General, or the Secretary-General's 
relations with the Security Council. This lack of deliberation is also reflected in many of the 
early texts on the UN. Examination of how the UN was to fulfil the lofty goals of the 
Charter concentrates predominantly on the Security Council and the methods outlined in 
Chapters VI and VII. Very little attention is accorded to the role of the Secretary-General 
in the maintenance of international peace and security. Consequently, as Gordenker 
observes, "the precise role of the Secretary-General remained somewhat undefined. "3 The 
Secretary-General was undoubtedly to be accorded a more significant role than his League 
predecessor, but it is not clear that the seemingly procedural and innocuous Article 99 was 
recognised at the time as the gateway to a substantial discretionary and independent role, or 
how the role of the Secretary-General in the maintenance of international peace and security 
would evolve. 
I The Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-47, (New York: United Nations, 1947), p. 38. 
2UN Yearbook 1946, op. cit., p. 23. 
3Gordenker in Barros, op. cit., p. 114. 
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SECTION I 
The Evolution of the Role of the Secretary-General in the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security During the 
Cold War, 1946-1982. 
Just as the functioning of any part of the UN cannot be fully understood without prior 
consideration of the purposes, principles and basis from which that practice has been 
derived, a reading of the Charter on its own is inadequate for understanding and analysing 
UN practice(s). It is only by responding to the challenges of the post war world that flesh 
has been added to the Charter skeleton. As Goodrich asserts, "any constitutional document 
only becomes a living instrument through practice and application to a series of actual 
events and circumstances. "' In three chapters this section traces, explores, and explains the 
development of the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace and 
security during the cold war. Chapter three provides a descriptive account of the evolution 
of this role under Trygve Lie, Dag Hammarskjbld, U Thant, and Kurt Waldheim. This 
chapter only considers those cases in which the Secretary-General's actions are precedent 
setting, or which demonstrate qualitative changes in the Secretary-General's evolving role. 
The focus on the development of the Secretary-General's role per se results in an imbalance 
between the attention accorded Waldheim's decade in office and the tenures of Lie, 
Hammarskj6ld, and U Thant. Waldheim was an active exponent of the Secretary -General's 
role in the maintenance of international peace and security but did not advance this role. 
Under his stewardship qualitative changes in this role were limited to the peacekeeping 
field. 'Me resultant imbalance is redressed in chapter four which seeks to substitute 
conceptual clarity for description and detail. This chapter provides a thematic exploration of 
the evolution of this role during the cold war. Chapter five examines the conceptual themes 
identified in Chapter four, and, offers explanations at three levels of analysis in accordance 
with the framework set out in the introductory chapter. 
I Goodrich, Leland, The United Nations, (London: Steven and Sons Ltd, 1960), p. 62. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Role of the Secretary-General in the the Cold War 
Descibed. 
This chapter introduces the evolving role of the Secretary-General in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. It identifies those cases which are significant in the 
evolution of this role. It provides historical continuity and provides the basis on which the 
evolution of this role can be explored and explained in chapters four and five respectively. 
Iran, and the Right to Say. 
On 16 April 1946, Trygve Lie submitted to the Security Council a legal memorandum 
regarding the withdrawal of the Iranian question from the Security Council agenda. This 
seemingly innocuous step was the Secretary-General's first political initiative, and as an 
assertion of the Secretary-General's rights of participation in Security Council proceedings 
was central to the subsequent development of his role in the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 
During World War II, British and Soviet troops had been called upon to protect Lend Lease 
routes through Iran and into the USSR. The Tripartite Treaty of 1942 required Britain and 
the USSR to withdraw when the war came to a close. Britain complied, but by the Treaty 
deadline of 2 March 1946, the USSR had not. Concerned by the Soviet presence, and by 
support for a militant uprising in Azerbaijhan, I Iran brought the matter before the Security 
Council on 18 March. Lie feared that public posturing in the Security Council would isolate 
the USSR and polarise international opinion. The Secretary -General argued that private 
negotiations would be more productive and offered his services as an intermediary. This in 
itself would have been a first. The USSR, however, had already agreed to withdraw and 
insisted that the Iranian complaint should be dropped from the Security Council agenda. 
Backed by the majority of the Security Council, the US contested that the complaint could 
only be withdrawn with the consent of Iran. Accordingly, on 15 April Iran withdrew its 
complaint, but in its proposal to strike the issue from the agenda was supported only by the 
USSR, Poland, and France. At this point, for the first time, the Secretary -General 
intervened in Security Council proceedings on his own initiative. In accordance with 
Article 98 and the Security Council rules of procedure his earlier contributions had either 
been at the request of the Security Council as a whole, a member state, or the Security 
1A northem province of Iran, not the Soviet Socialist Republic. 
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Council President. In association with his legal counsel, Abraham Feller, Lie drafted a 
memorandum which stated, 
"Unless the Council votes on an investigation or recommends methods of 
adjustment, a request by both parties to a dispute for withdrawal of the 
complaint from the agenda should result in an automatic Council decision to 
drop the item in question. "' 
It was initially only Lie's intention to forestall the unnecessary cold war escalation of a 
dispute which had already been resolved. 2 The Secretary-General, however, only notified 
Tai Chai, (President of the Security Council), of his legal memorandum as they entered 
Security Council chambers. Tai-Chai rejected Lie's approach. It was only at this point that 
Lie realised the full significance of his submission, 
"As I sat down a latent aspect of my intervention came to mind: the status of 
the Secretary-General. I believed that Article 99, which empowered him to 
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion 
might threaten international peace and security, was more than enough 
authority for intervening in the proceedings of the Council in this fashion; in 
fact, I felt that it was the intent of the Charter that the Secretary-General 
should have not merely the right to submit legal opinions to the President, of 
which the latter would take notice, but that he should be able to address the 
Council on any issue which it might like to consider. "3 
Lie passed the memorandum to one of the President's aides and resolved to present it 
himself if rebuked again. This time the President accepted Lie's submission and 
recommended its referral to the Committee of Experts. To the consternation of the Oscar 
Lange (the Polish Permanent Representative), however, Tai Chai then called for a vote on 
the issue before the Committee had even considered the Secretary-General's memorandum. 
Lange responded by stating, 
"The Secretary-General has submitted to us a legal opinion ... and then we 
went on discussing the matter quite disregarding the Secretary-General's 
opinion. I submit to the attention of this Council that the Secretary-General 
is an important official of the United Nations, invested by the Charter with 
special and important powers, and that we cannot vote now as if his opinion 
did not count or exist. ' 14 
In reply the President drew attention to Article 97 of the Charter and emphasised that the 
Secretary-General was the chief administrative officer of the organisation but agreed that the 
ISummarised by Murphy, The United Nations and the Control of International Violence (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1983), p. 17. For full memorandum see Cordier & Foote, op. ci . t., pp. 42-43, 
and SCOR, First Year, Ist Series, 33rd meeting, April 16,1946. ZD 
2See Lie, Trygve, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years at the United Nations: (New York: Macmillan, 1954), 
p. 8 0. 
3ibid., p. 83. 
4SCOR, 33rd meeting, April 16,1946. 
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Security Council should wait for the Committee's report before voting. ' The President's 
remarks also prompted support from the Andrei Gromyko, (the Soviet permanent 
representative), who stated, 
"Since we have decided that the memorandum prepared by the Secretary- 
General should be referred to the Committee of Experts, how can we vote or 
take a decision? As regards the functions of the Secretary-General -a 
question which has arisen in passing - these are, of course, more serious 
and more weighty than was just indicated now. It is sufficient to recall one 
Article of the Charter to realise the responsibilities incumbent upon the 
Secretary-General. Article 99 states: 'The Secretary-General may bring to 
the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may 
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. ' Thus the 
Secretary-General has all the more right, and an even greater obligation, to 
make statements on various aspects of the questions considered by the 
Security Council. ' Q 
On the substance of the matter Lie was defeated, 3but the Secretary-General forced 
recognition of deficiencies in Security Council rules of procedure, and instigated a wider 
debate on the rights of the Secretary-General's participation in the various organs of the 
UN. It was incongruous that the Charter provided the Secretary-General with the right to 
convene the Security Council but the rules of procedure failed to provide the Secretary- 
General with the automatic and commensurate fight to participate in Security Council 
proceedings. The Security Council Committee of Experts met again in May, inter alia, to 
remedy this anomaly. Representing Lie, Assistant Secretary -General Arkady Sobolev, 
recommended that the Security Council adopt the corresponding rule from the General 
Assembly and ECOSOC. In these organs the Secretary-General participated, 'upon the 
invitation of the President. ' In the General Assembly, however, the President had twice 
withheld consent for the Secretary-General to address the Assembly's Steering Committee. 
In the Security Council, where the Presidency rotates between the members, this 
requirement could have empowered a national delegate to silence the Secretary-General. 
Privately, therefore, Lie believed the right of the Secretary-General's intervention should be 
unlimited, and, at his own discretion. In this Lie was again supported by the USSR. The 
US and China remained unconvinced but when the British came on board the Committee 
unanimously agreed that the Secretary-General's fights of intervention should be 
unrestricted. Accordingly, the Security Council rules of procedure were amended such 
that, 
1 ibid. 
2ibid. 
3The Committee of Experts is an advisory committee comprised of representatives of the members of the 
Security Council. The divisions in the Security Council, therefore, were simply transferred across to the 
Committee of Experts. 
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'The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either 
oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question 
under consideration by it. " I 
The General Assembly followed suit by amending its rules of procedure shortly afterwards. 
Lie's legal memorandum set an important precedent at the procedural level from which 
further prerogatives would develop. 
The Committee of Experts also confirmed that the Secretary-General could be delegated 
diplomatic and intermediary functions. While considering the Secretary-General's rights of 
intervention the Committee also volunteered that the Secretary-General could be appointed 
as, "Rapporteur ... for the practical task of reconciling two divergent views. "2 The 
proposal was made by the US, and amended to accommodate British concerns that the 
Secretary-General should not be required to undertake duties which might bring into 
question his impartiality and utility as an intermediary. A proviso was therefore included 
permitting the Secretary-General to decline a request from the Security Council to serve as a 
Rapporteur. 3 The Committee had reiterated the expectations of the Preparatory Commission 
that the Secretary-General would function as an intermediary in international disputes, but 
only in the context of Article 98. Unwittingly, however, the British amendment left the 
door open for the Secretary-General to provide intermediary functions independently of the 
deliberative organs. As Cordier and Foote noted, therefore, Lie's intervention was "a bold 
assertion of his independent position, "4and the basis from which discretionary independent 
third party functions would develop. 
reece, and the Right to Know. 
In the case of the Greek-Albania dispute Lie asserted the Secretary-General's right to 
conduct investigations independently of UN organs. In late August 1946 the Secretary- 
General received from the Ukraine a telegram alleging that in skirmishes on its Albanian 
border the Greek authonties were provoking a conflict, "which would serve as a pretext for 
the wrestling of the Southern part of Albania in favour of Greece. "5 According to the 
telegram, British troops and British interference in the internal affairs of Greece were 
behind the Greek provocation. The USSR had lodged a similar complaint in January 1946, 
(before the Secretary -General was appointed), and as then, the allegations were 
unsubstantiated. That there had been violent border clashes was not in dispute, but it was 
'See UN Docs: SCOR first series, Suppl. No. 2, pp. 39-40, annex I f(S/71); Report of the Coninlittee of 
Experts, S/Procedure/ 103-, The United Nations Repertory of Practice, UNST(02)R3, Article 92-111, paras. 
114-125; also see Lie, op. cit., p. 88. 
2See SCOR 51 st meeting, Report of the Committee of Experts, S/Procedure/ 106. C) 
317or practical Implications see pp. 68-70. 
4Cordier, A. W., & Foote, W., Public Papers of the Secreta-ries-General of the United Nation: Volume 1, 
Trygve Lie, 1946-1953, (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 40. 
5ibid. 
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by no means clear that the Greek Government was the responsible party. To establish the 
facts the US proposed the creation of an investigating committee, at which point Lie 
intervened, 
"Just a few words to make clear my own position as Secretary-General and 
the right of this office under the Charter. Should the proposal of the United 
States representative not be carried I hope that the Council will understand 
that the Secretary-General must reserve his right to make such enquiries or 
investigations as he may think necessary, in order to determine whether or 
not he should consider bringing any aspect of this matter to the attention of 
the Council under the provisions of the Charter. "' 
Once more Lie was supported by Gromyko, (then Security Council President), who 
added., 
"I think that Mr. Lie was right in raising the question of his rights. It seems 
to me that in this case, as in all other cases, the Secretary-General must act. 
I have no doubt that he will do so in accordance with the rights and powers 
of the Secretary-General as defined in the Charter of the United Nations. ' Q 
On this occasion Lie fully recognised the significance of his actions, and intervened with the 
sole purpose of asserting the rights of the Secretary-General. Lie argued that the logic of 
Article 99 demanded that if empowered to convene a meeting of the Security Council on the 
basis of an opinion, the Secretary-General must have the information and means by which 
to form such an opinion. As Schwebel argues, the acceptance of the Secretary-General's 
statement represented more than just an affirmation of the Secretary-General's right to 
make investigations, 
"It claimed ... the right to 
initiate such investigations even in cases where the 
Security Council had decided not to look into the matter. The importance of 
this possibility is increased by the fact that a proposal to the Council to 
investigate a dispute or a situation seems to be subject to the veto. "3 
The conduct of independent investigations without the prior consent of another UN organ, 
however, still required the consent of the host state(s), in accordance with Article 33. A 
Fact-Finding Mission without that consent would constitute a violation of Article 2(7), 
which upholds the principle of national sovereignty. Although the substantive issue went 
unresolved, Lie had laid the foundations for the evolution of a discretionary independent 
role in the maintenance of international peace and security. 
'SCOR, First Year, 70th Meeting , 
September 20,1946. Reproduced in Cordier & Foote, op. cit., pp. 46- 
47. 
2ibid. 
3Schwebel, op. cit.. p. 89. 
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Palestine 1947-49 
In the case of Palestine Lie developed the Secretary-General's quiet diplomacy, and in his 
work behind the scenes laid the practical foundations for the later development of the 
Secretary-General's good-offices. Furthermore, Lie played an integral role in the creation 
of the first UN Observer Mission which laid the foundations for the first peacekeeping 
force. 
Quiet Diplomacy. 
In 1922 the League of Nations had passed responsibility to the UK for establishing a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine. Britain, however, found it impossible to reconcile Jewish 
nationalist demands with Arab opposition and in 1947 passed the Palestine mandate to the 
UN General Assembly. The General Assembly Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP) concluded that the conflicting demands of the Jews and Arabs were equally 
valid, and proposed a partition plan and economic union, "to give each nationality 
expression. "' To assume administrative responsibility from Britain and oversee the transfer 
of that administration to two new states the General Assembly created the Palestine 
Commission. 2 Only the Security Council, however, had the authority to impose partition. 
In the countdown to British withdrawal Lie combined quiet diplomacy, with some less 
subtle tactics, in pursuit of a Security Council conunitment to implement the plan. 
Lie began by informing the Palestine Commission, 
"You are entitled to be confident that in the event it should prove necessary, 
the Security Council will assume its full measure of responsibility in 
implementation of the Assembly's resolution. You have every right to 
assume, as I assume, that in such a situation the Security Council will not 
fail to exercise to the fullest without exception, every necessary power 
entrusted to it by the Charter in order to assist you in fulfilling your 
mission. ' 13 
Acting in accordance with the intent of Article 99, Lie was attempting to spark a Security 
Council response to the threat of conflict. In his memoirs Lie explains, I prodded the 
Security Council so openly not because I was confident that it would act but because I 
feared that it might not. ' '4 Lie's fears were justified. The UK, USSR and US all 
supported the partition plan but only the USSR was willing to commit the Security Council 
5 to creating an international force to implement partition. 
I Lie, (1954), op. cit., p. 163; see also GAOR, Plenary, 128th meeting, 19 November, 1947. 
2GA Res. 181 (11), 29 November, 1947. 
3UN Press Release PAL/ 100 reproduced in Cordier & Foote, op. cit., p. 108- 10. 
4Lie, (1954), op. cit., p. 163. 
5For the USSR the plan involved the removal of British influence from the region. As the former mandate C, 
holder the UK did not want to take sides, and like the US feared a Soviet military presence in the region. 
The US was also reluctant to antagonise the oil powerful Arab political elites-, see Rovine, op. cit., pp. 
218-20. 
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The Secretary-General continued this facilitative role following a Security Council 
resolution in March 1948 which called upon the permanent members to consult and provide 
guidance on how the UN should progress in Palestine. I Private discussions were often 
conducted in the Secretary-General's office and sometimes informally at Lie's private 
residence. In this forum Lie pressed for the international force he and the Palestine 
Commission were convinced would forestall a conflict that could engulf the whole region. 
The Security Council responded, however, with a toothless resolution calling for a 
reduction of violence in the region. 2 
The Secretary -General and Palestine Commission also provided the Security Council and its 
members with reports, working papers and letters outlining the situation in the field, 
presenting the arguments for an international force and beseeching the Council to make that 
commitment. 3 The Secretary-General even initiated, 'in-house, ' studies into the feasibility 
and logistics of putting together an international force, and made informal approaches to 
possible troop contributors. 4 These initiatives were largely in anticipation of responsibilities 
that might be delegated to the Secretary-General under Article 98, but also included a 
significant facilitative element. Lie hoped that presenting the Security Council with an 
operation plan would coax the permanent members into implementing Partition. To this end 
the Secretary-General prepared a memorandum which stated, 
"That despite the disagreement between East and West on providing the UN 
with armed forces, a sufficient degree of agreement has been reached for the 
establishment of a UN Land Force - an emergency international force 
composed of those minimum units which the big five were committed to 
placing at the Security Council's disposal. Such a force would be more than 
adequate to cope with the Palestine challenge. ' '5 
The Secretary -General's preliminary preparation and memorandum were never placed 
before the Security Council because the possibility of agreement between the members 
never emerged. US prevarication was largely responsible and culnuinated in a proposal 
abandoning the partition plan in favour of Trusteeship Status for Palestine, (previously 
rejected by UNSCOP). 
Exasperated and infuriated, Lie's last and most desperate measure was to tender his 
resignation in private. Lie had thrown the moral weight of the Secretary -General ship 
behind the Partition Plan and feared the UN was heading the way of the League of Nations 
1SC Res. 42,5 March 1948. 
2SC Res. 43,1 April 1948. 
3See UN Doc. A/AC. 21/13,9 February 1948; Report of the Palestine Commission to the Security 
Council, 16 February, 1948, UN Doc. no. n/a; & Cordier & Foote, op. cIt., pp. 105- 107. 
4Cordier & Foote, op cit., p. 105. 
-'Lie, op. cit., p. 166. 
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at the first real test of its authority. Lie's bluff was rejected by Gromyko and Austin, and 
did not have the desired effect of forcing an American about-face. On 15 May the British 
mandate expired. The Provisional Government of Israel declared independence and the 
forces of five Arab nations invaded. The US now gave diplomatic recognition to the newly 
created state of Israel, as did the USSR. Partition had taken effect in international law, but 
the Jews had been left to defend their territory alone. The General Assembly replaced the 
Palestine Commission with a Mediator, appointed by the Security Council, to negotiate a 
cease-fire and a political settlement. I 
While the UN mediator in the field, Count Bernadotte, worked tirelessly to bring the 
adversaries together, Lie continued to seek some common ground between the pennanent 
members, and between the UK and US in particular. 2 Under-Secretaries-General Cordier 
and Jackson were sent to Washington and London respectively. During the course of these 
discussions the US indicated a willingness to impose sanctions to enforce a cease-fire. A 
change in the US position, continued fighting, and the Secretary-General's quiet diplomacy 
eventually forced a shift in British policy. On 29 May the Security Council agreed a 
resolution demanding a four week cease-fire and threatening resort to ChapterVII. 3 The 
resolution also called upon Bernadotte, with the assistance of the Truce Comi-nission to 
negotiate the ten-ns and implementation of the truce. 4 One month later the Arabs refused to 
extend the truce and the Security Council invoked Chapter VII for the first time. 5 The 
Security Council demanded acceptance of an indefinite cease-fire and ordered all parties to 
co-operate with the UN Mediator. Without the Secretary-General and Mediator, however, 
this resolution would not have been passed. After refusing to extend the cease-fire King 
Abdullah of Jordan had the following conversation with Bemadotte: 6 
Abdutlah: Why did you let the cease-fire end? 
Bernadotte: I am surprised you ask me that question. For a week I have pleaded with the 
Arabs to extend it, including your representative. In fact he was one of the strongest in 
refusing. 
Abdullah: Yes, I know that. 
Bernadotte: Then why do you speak to me like that? 
Abdullah: You must force us. 
Bernadotte: I have no power to force you, I can only appeal to you. 
Jordan had only enough am-munition to last a week and required a face-saving exit from the 
conflict. Ceding to the Mediator would have been a humiliating climbdown but submitting 
IGA Res. 186 (S-2), 14 May 1948. 
2For a detailed account see Barros, op. cit., pp. 194-213. 
3SC Res. 50,29 May 1948. 
4The Truce Commission was established by SC Res. 46,23 May 1948. Its membership comprised the 
representatives of those nations maintaining diplomatic corps in the region: Belgium, France, 
Syria, and the 
us. 
5SC Res. 54,15 July 1948. 
61nterview with UN Secretariat official reproduced in Rovine, op. cit., p. 
222. 
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to the threats of the international community minimised the loss of face. The Secretary- 
General was able to relay this information to the Security Council where the members were 
prepared to apply Chapter VU safe in the knowledge that they would not have to enforce 
their threats. An indefinite cease-fire was agreed and Bernadotte continued the search for a 
settlement until he was brutally assassinated. Ralph Bunche, (who had worked closely 
with Bernadotte and Lie), took over as the UN Mediator, and backed up by the first UN 
Military Observers, secured An-nistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt, and the other 
Arab nations concerned. 
The UN diplomatic process had been a two pronged attack throughout. Lie's quiet 
diplomacy followed by, and coupled with, the mediation of Bemadone and Bunche 
provided a potent combination. Schwebel even argues, 
"It is not to much to say that the UN effort in Palestine was a joint field-HQ 
endeavour in which the Mediator and Secretary-General collaborated in an 
indispensable interdependent fashion, its successful results belonging as 
much to one as the other. "' 
In this respect the Secretary-General had alerted the UN membership to the intermediary 
potential of the Secretary-General and taken the first practical, (as opposed to procedural), 
steps towards the development of the Secretary -General's good-offices, either at the behest 
or independently of the UN organs, and including the use of personal or special 
representatives. 
The First Observer Mission. 
When fighting came to halt on II June, Bernadotte requested from Lie a team of UN 
Observers to supervise the cease-fire. For personnel Lie approached the nations on the 
Truce Commission - France, Belgium and the US. Each nation provided twenty-one 
observers from which thirty-six were deployed immediately. They were unarmed and wore 
a blue ann band to denote their UN status. They were stationed in the capitals of Israel and 
the Arab states, protecting personnel and resources, and along the cease-fire line in 
Palestine. As such the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, (UNTSO), 
represented the earliest form of UN peacekeeping, but it was not deployed without 
Soviet 
objections. 
The USSR claimed the Secretary -General had no authority to provide military observers, a 
matter which Lie refuted in a statement before the Security Council on 
7 July 1948.2 Lie 
argued that General Assembly Resolution 186 authorised the Secretary -General, 
"to provide 
ISchwebel, op. cit., P. 116. 
2Read on Lie's behalf by Assistant Secretary-General Victor Hoo. 
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the Mediator with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the 
Mediator by the General Assembly. "' Lie explained that provision for UN Observers had 
been made in SCR 50,2 and emphasised his responsibilities under Articles 97 and 98.3 
Given that the Mediator had been appointed by the Secretary-General and was acting on a 
mandate from the General Assembly, the Secretary-General was fulfilling both these 
criteria. At the Secretary-General's request, however, a proposal was included in SCR 54 
stating, 
"The Secretary-General is to provide the Mediator with the necessary staff 
and facilities to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to him under the 
resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May and under this resolution. ' 14 
The USSR abstained from the vote. Its complaint was a reaction against the exclusion of 
Soviet personnel from the Observer Mission, but did not prevent UNTSO from completing 
observation, truce supervision, negotiation, and buffer functions. 
The Secretary-General's UN Guard. 
Palestine witnessed the creation of the first UN peacekeeping operation, but in his memoirs 
Lie laments, "how different things in Palestine could have been had the UN had an 
international force at its disposal. ' '5 The MSC, however, was unable to provide the 
Security Council with the contingents envisaged in Article 43 of the Charter, and such was 
the reluctance of the U`K and US to enforce partition, the Security Council was unable to 
agree on the dispatch of an ad hoc force. Against this background Lie put forward 
proposals for a UN Guard, "which could be placed by the Secretary-General at the disposal 
of the Security Council, "6 but which would remain, "distinct from the anned forces 
intended under Article 43 for enforcement purposes. ' '7 Lie expanded on the size, role, and 
functions of his UN Guard in a press conference on 16 June 1948, and in his third annual 
report on the work of the organisation. The Secretary-General anticipated a force of 1000- 
5000 men which he explained, 
11... would not be used as a substitute for the forces contemplated in Article 
42 and 43. It would not be a striking force but purely a Guard Force. It 
could be used for guard duty with UN missions, in the conduct of 
plebiscites under the supervision of the UN and in the administration of 
truce terms. It would be used as a constabulary under the Security Council 
or the Trusteeship Council in cities like Jerusalem and Trieste during the 
IGA Res. 186 (S-2), 14 May 1948. 
2SC Res. 50,29 May 1948. 
3-17he Secretary -General is required 
by Article 97 to provide the UN with such staff as the Organisation may 
require, and by Article 98 to perform such other functions as are entrusted to 
him by the organs of the UN. 
4S COR, 338th Meeting, 15 July 1948. 
'Lie, (1954), op. cit., p. 63. 
6ibid. 
7Lie, Trygve, Call For A United Nations Guard Force, 'Me Commencement Address, Harvard LIniversity, 10 
June 1948, Press Release M/446, reproduced in Cordier & Foote, op. cit., pp. 132-135. 
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establishment of international regimes. It might also be called upon by the 
Security Council under Article 40 of the Charter, which provides for 
provisional measures to prevent the aggression of a situation threatening the 
peace. " I 
The timing and logic underlying the Secretary-General's proposals made them inseparable 
from UNTSO. Soviet opposition to UNTSO went hand in hand with Soviet opposition to a 
UN Guard, and was registered in Security Council discussion of the UNTSO mandate, 
"If the Secretariat intends to include a guard force numbering 50,100, or 
500 men under the general heading of 'staff used in the proposal before us, 
the USSR delegation will be unable to support that proposal. Such a 
proposal would not merely fail to conform to the Charter, but would in fact 
directly contravene it. The constitution of an armed force for the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the execution of all 
duties connected with that task are the prerogative of the Security Council 
under Article 43 of the Charter... It would be inconsistent with the Charter 
to entertain the fantastic notion of creating some sort of armed force from 
within the United Nations Secretariat ... The functions that is proposed to lay upon the Secretariat guards are essentially duties connected with the 
maintenance of international peace and security. No such duties are 
envisaged for the Secretariat under the Charter, and to impose them on the 
Secretariat would be irregular and legally unfounded ... In accordance with the established practice and the General Assembly's previous decisions in 
such cases, the Secretariat should confine itself to the dispatch of clerical, 
technical and subsidiary staff, but not of sentries or armed guards. "2 
Lie responded with a report to the General Assembly in which he detailed the legal basis of 
such a force, the functions it would undertake, and the standard operating procedures by 
which it would be governed. 3 Once more Lie argued that Articles 97 and 98 provided the 
Secretary-General with the authority to create and maintain a UN Guard, providing 
recruitment was in accordance with Articles 100 and 101, and funding was approved by 
the General Assembly. The Secretary-General also drew attention to General Assembly 
Resolution 13 which called on the Secretary -General to establish, 
"The administrative organisation that will permit the effective discharge of 
his administrative and general responsibilities under the Charter, and the 
efficient performance of those functions and services required to meet the 
needs of the several organs of the UN. ' 14 
Lie clearly felt that the establishment of a UN Guard could be legally justified as improving 
the, 'effective discharge, ' and, 'efficient performance, ' of those, 'administrative 
responsibilities, ' that the Secretary -General might be charged by other organs of the 
UN. 
'Lie, Introduction to the Third Annual Report to the General Assembly on the Work of the Organisation, 
G 
AOR, Supp. No. I A/565,5 July 1948. Also reproduced In Cordler and Foote, op. cit., pp. 137-157. 
2SCOR 338th Meeting, 15 July, 1948, reproduced in Cordier and Foote, op. cit., p. 162. 
31-ie, Trygve, A United Nations Guard - Report to the General Assembly, 
GAOR, Tlilrd Session, Part 2, 
Annexes, Doc. A/656,28 September 1948, reproduced in Cordier and Foote, pp. 166-177. 
4GA Res. 13 (1), 13 February, 1948. 
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In recommending a UN Guard of only eight hundred, the Secretary-General had also 
watered down his proposals considerably. Moreover, only three hundred were to be placed 
on permanent standby, at UNHQ or in Europe. The remaining five hundred were to forrn 
a, 'reserve cadre, ' on call from the member states. The Secretary-General envisaged the 
principle duties of the Guard to include the protection of UN personnel and property in the 
field, and the provision of technical functions such as transportation, communications and 
supply. The Guard was also to, "patrol points or guard objectives neutralised under truce 
or cease-fire order of the United Nations ... [and] exercise supervisory and observation 
functions at polling points during the conduct of referenda conducted under United Nations 
auspices. "' These functions, however, would require specific authorisation. Under no 
circumstances, could the Guard be used, "for enforcement purposes as envisaged under the 
Charter, or for the purpose of maintaining law and order in an area. ' 12 These concessions to 
Soviet demands were also emphasised in the Standard Operating Procedures outlined in the 
report. Firstly, the Guard required the consent of the government upon whose territory it 
would be operating. It required further and specific consent for those functions which 
extended beyond the protection of UN personnel and property and the provision of service 
functions, namely truce supervision and observer functions. Secondly, the Guards were 
only to carry side arms for use in self defence. They were to have no authority to use force, 
and would not enjoy powers of arrest. 
Despite the Secretary-General's modifications and the clear distinction between the powers 
of the Secretary-General's UN Guard and the forces envisaged under Article 43 the USSR 
continued to insist that anything other than a force under the sole command and control of 
the Security Council was unacceptable. Lie was therefore forced to amend his proposals 
even further. Lie requested that the General Assembly create a Special Committee to 
consider revisions to his original report, and on 29 April 1949 he also made a statement 
before the General Assembly emphasising the administrative nature of his proposals and 
their distinction from the provisions of Article 43. The full extent of the revisions became 
clear in a memorandum presented on 16 June 1949.3 
The proposals for a UN Guard were downgraded to a UN Field Service comprising just 
three hundred men trained and based at UN HQ. This Field Service was to be backed up 
by a listed panel of qualified personnel .4 Notably, Lie explained, 
"the Field Service would 
'Lie, A United Nations Guard, op. ct . t. 
21bid. 
3Lie, Revised Proposal for Establishment of a United Nations Field Service and Field Reserve Panel, UN 
Special Committee on a United Nations Guard, Doc. A/AC. 29/1,16 June 1949, reproduced in Cordier ýtnd 
Foote, op. cit., pp. 189-92. 
4ibid. 
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not have any functions of observation of truce terms, of protecting places neutralised during 
a truce or supply lines incidental to a truce, or of supervising polling places during a 
plebiscite. "' Furthermore, in a statement to the Ad Hoc Political Comrnittee, Lie explained 
the functions of the Field Service would be limited to, "only such services as are already 
performed in a less systematic fashion by the Secretariat. It is in no sense an armed guard 
and would not regularly be supplied with arms of any kind. ' Q The USSR remained 
unimpressed, but the doubts of many other members had been eased and this plan was 
passed on 22 November 1949. 
The Secretary-General had not really rectified the deficiencies in the UN system which he 
set out to correct. 'Me UN still did not have the international force which might be 
interjected as a buffer between disputing nations, observe a cease-fire, and reinforce 
mediation. Though Lie will not have realised it, however, the Secretary-General's 
proposals represented a major advance in the development of UN peacekeeping. Lie's 
proposals for a UN force, even when watered down, were an assertion of the Secretary- 
General's potential and were a precursor to the first UN peacekeeping force. When 
Hammarskj6ld and Pearson proposed and began putting together the United Nations 
Emergency Force it was not the first time that UN members had been presented with 
proposals for a UN force under the command of the Secretary -General. 
The Korean War (1950-53 
The Korean War presented and an entirely different situation to the conflict in Palestine. At 
the end of World War H Japanese forces in Korea surrendered to Soviet and American 
forces North and South of the 38th parallel respectively. When foreign troops withdrew the 
38th parallel became a dejacto demarcation line between two Korean states, both of which 
laid claim to the administration and territory of the other. The General Assembly recognised 
only the National Assembly of the South as the lawful government of the Republic of 
Korea, and set up the UN Commission on Korea to bring about a peaceful unification. 3 
On 24 June 1950, however, the Commission's mandate was superseded by North Korea's 
invasion of South Korea. For such an unambiguous act of aggression Chapter V[l states 
that it is the responsibility of the Security Council to enforce a return to the status quo ante. 
Necessarily, the role of the Secretary -General's role would be marginal and behind the 
scenes. With regard to the evolution of the Secretary -General's role, however, Lie's 
actions highlighted an inherent contradiction in the Secretary -General's responsibilities, the 
clash of which brought to an end his effectiveness as Secretary -General. Furthermore, the 
1 ibid. 
2Lie, Statement by the Secretar v-General on the United Nations Field Service before the Ad Hoc Political 
Committee, 25 October, 1949, reproduced in Cordier and Foote, op. cit., pp. 193-4. 
3GA Res. 195 (11), 12 December 1948. UN Supervised elections had gone ahead in the South. The UN was 
denied entry to the North where elections were supervised by the USSR. 
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Uniting for Peace Resolution passed during the Korean War altered the institutional balance 
between the Security Council, General Assembly and the Secretary-General, and was a 
precursor to the development of peacekeeping. I But first, in Korea Lie claimed the first full 
invocation of Article 99. 
Lie first considered invocation of Article 99 during the Berlin blockade in 1948, but 
bilaterally stepped back from the brink in view of Soviet opposition and superpower 
preferences to address the issues. In Korea, Lie claimed to christen this prerogative. 2 At 
midnight on 24 June, 1950, Lie received a telephone call from John Hickerson, US 
Assistant Secretary of State for UN Affairs, reporting the North Korean invasion. 
Hickerson requested the Secretary-General arrange an emergency meeting of the Security 
Council for the following day. Lie clarified the situation with the UN Commission on 
Korea, and at the emergency meeting of the Security Council he was the first speak, 
"It is plain to see that military actions have been undertaken by North 
Korean forces. These actions are a clear violation of the resolution of the 
General Assembly as well as a violation of the principles of the Charter. 
The present situation is a serious one, and it is a threat to the international 
peace. The Security Council is, in my opinion, the competent organ to deal 
with it. I consider it the clear duty of the Security Council to take the steps 
necessary to re-establish peace in Korea. "3 
In this statement the Secretary-General invoked the language and intent of Article 99. As a 
matter of semantics, it might be argued that the North Korean aggression prompted the first 
formal invocation of Article 99. In fact, however, it is patently clear that the Security 
Council was convened by the US, not the Secretary-General. 
When news reached the Security Council of the North Korean invasion the USSR was 
boycotting the Security Council because of the Western majority's refusal to recognise the 
Communist Chinese Government as the rightful holder of the Chinese Security Council 
seat. In the absence of the USSR the Security Council responded swiftly. 4 The Security 
Council deterrruned that a breach of the peace had occurred, demanded an immediate 
cessation of fighting, and the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. 
5 Two 
days later the UN Commission on Korea reported to the Security Council that none of its 
demands had been adhered to, and warned that North Korea would, "neither heed the 
Security Council's resolution, nor accept the Commission's good offices. "6 In response 
'See, "The Uniting for Peace Resolution, " pp. 66-7. 
2GAOR, 289th meeting I refer to my statement to the Security Council on 
25 June last concerning the 
Korean conflict, when for the first time I enclosed Article 99 of the 
Charter. " 
3SCOR, 473rd Meeting, 25 June 1950. See also Cordier and Foote, op. cit., pp. 313-315. 1-ý 4U SSR was boycotting the Security Council because of the Western majorities refusal 
to recogni'lle 
: 71 -- Communist Chinese Government as the rightful holder of the Chinese Security Council seat. 
5SC Res. 82,25 June 1950. 
6SCOR, 474th Meeting, 27 June 1950, see also Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950, pp. 
222-3. 
Z: ) 
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the Security Council recommended that, "the members of the UN furnish such assistance to 
the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore 
international peace and security to the area. "' On 29 June the Secretary-General 
communicated the resolution to all the UN members and replies of support were 
forthcoming from fifty states. On the 30 June the US reported to the Security Council that 
the President had authorised air strikes on selected military targets and a total naval 
blockade. 2 The Security Council then recommended that, "all members providing military 
forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make 
such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under theUS. "3 The 
Security Council requested that the US appoint a commander of the Unified Command, and 
authorised that the operation be conducted under the UN flag. 4 
From the outset it was evident the UN response would ostensibly be a US action, but Lie 
was determined the UN should not be hijacked, or at least not appear to have been hi- 
jacked by the US. In his memoirs Lie recounts, 
"Without the slightest doubt about the legality and the imperative wisdom of 
the Security Council's resolutions I was concerned with the 'solo' role 
which at once was left to and armed by the US. It was obvious that the US 
would have to make the major contributions to the UN effort in Korea - 
military experiences compelled this; but I wanted our response to aggression 
to be as genuinely international as possible and was determined that other 
members should assume a meaningful proportion of the burden and that the 
contributions of the many countries should be effectively co-ordinated. "5 
With typical candour, Lie responded to this threat in the New York Times by lamenting the 
failure of the MSC to conclude Article 43 agreements, I believe it could use those military 
forces in this situation if the order to cease-fire was not obeyed. "6 Lie also followed up 
SCR 84 by cabling a request for further assistance to those states which had responded to 
his communique vis-a-vis SCR 83. Both enquiries were drafted in close consultation with 
the US, South Korea, and the Security Council, and Schwebel argues, "this partnership 
proved to be of considerable importance in assuring that the forces implementing the 
Security Council's decisions would be a United Nations force in some sense as well as 
spirit. "7 Schwebel, however, arguably overplays the influence of the Secretary -General in 
intemationalising and legitimising the actions of a Security Council dominated 
by the US. 
I SC Res. 83,27 June 1950. 
2SC Res. 84,7 July 1950. 
3SC Res. 85,31 July 1950. 
4General McArthur was the appointed Commander. 
51-ie, op. cit., p. 336. 
61-ie, The New York Times, 27 June 1950, quoted in Schwebel, op. cit., p. 
7Schwebel, op. cit., p. 105. 
-61 - 
Firstly, on 3 July, Lie put together a draft resolution, the content of which was broadly 
reproduced in SCR 84, except in one important respect. Lie suggested the creation of a 
Committee of Co-ordination to, "stimulate and co-ordinate offers of assistance, "' and to 
which the Secretary-General would serve as Rapporteur. The US, however, was not 
prepared to relinquish any control over the Unified Command which might, "seriously 
interfere with the strategic and tactical control of operations. "2 SCR 84, therefore, merely 
requested the US to, "provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the 
course of action taken under the Unified Command. "3 As Murphy explains, "in view of the 
US monopoly over available anned forces the Council had no choice but to accept the 
American decision. ' 
Secondly, Lie's subsequent efforts to cloak the Unified Command in UN authority were 
not entirely of his own initiative. The US was unwilling to relinquish command and control 
of the Unified Command, but reluctant to carry the whole military burden and keen for 
international legitimacy. To these ends the US Ambassador to the UN, Warren Austin, 
suggested that the Secretary-General follow up SCR 84 with a request for further 
assistance. 5 Austin also indicated, however, that for security reasons any offers of 
assistance should be communicated to the Secretary-General in the vaguest terms and that 
detailed arrangements should be concluded with the Unified Command bilaterally. This had 
the additional benefit of preventing the UN, and the Secretary-General especially, from 
assuming a more prominent and influential role. 
Such was the free hand assumed by/accorded to the US, that when North Korean troops 
were forced back to the 38th parallel, President Truman authorised General McArthur to 
enter North Korea and seek the destruction or surrender of Northern forces, provided there 
was no threat of Russian or Chinese intervention. Continuing in his supporting role Lie 
controversially agreed that the aggressor should not be allowed to regroup, rearrn and 
revenge. The Secretary -General suggested the enforced surrender of North Korean 
authorities should be followed by UN supervised elections to unite the country. The US, 
however, had already begun unilateral action to this end, which was only belatedly 
endorsed by the General Assembly, on 7 October 1950.6 
The Secretary -General's attempts to promote a cease-fire at various stages of the conflict for 
the most part proved fruitless. In mid November Lie suggested that he be appointed as a 
I Lie, (1954), op. cit., p. 334. 
2Barros, op. ci . t., p. 280. 
3SCOR, 476th Meeting,, 7 July 
4Murphy, op. cIt., p. 23. 
5See Barros, op. cit., p. 282. 
6Lie, op. cit., p. 345. See also 
1950, see also Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950, p. 230. 
Yearbook of the United Nations. 1950, pp. 257-266. 
-62- 
Security Council Rapporteur. No doubt recalling the success of the UN Mediators in 
Palestine, Lie argued that, 'lone man could do a quicker better job, " I than the United 
Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). 2 No reply 
to this suggestion was received from the US, and instead, on 14 December a Cease-fire 
Committee was established by the General Assembly. 3 Lie's exclusion from the Cease-fire 
Committee demonstrated the lack of US support for the Secretary-General's proposal. 
Nevertheless, behind the scenes Lie remained active. On 29 November, Chinese 
'Volunteer Corps' had entered the war and the Unified Command immediately found itself 
overextended. China rejected an invitation from the Security Council to discuss the Chinese 
involvemment in Korea, but in December sent a delegation to New York to discuss the 
question of Formosa and Chinese representation in the Security Council. Repeatedly Lie 
attempted to broach the Korean question with Ambassador Wu but the Chinese had come 
with very specific instructions, a very strict remit, and were not prepared to accept the 
Secretary-General's quiet diplomacy, except maybe for one brief moment. 
On 9 December, stating that his Government wanted peace, Wu requested from Lie the UN 
and US terms and conditions for a cease-fire. While the Secretary-General followed up this 
request, the Chinese delegation announced it was returning home. In his memoirs Lie 
speculates that Moscow was behind this U-turn. Events on 14 December give credence to 
Lie's suspicions. Wu rejected the advances of the Cease-fire Committee and stated that the 
preconditions for a cease-fire had already been outlined on 13 December by Jacob Malik, 
(the Soviet Permanent Representaitve - the resolution of the Formosa question and the issue 
of Chinese representation in the Security Council were now at stake). Chinese 
intransigence was also fostered by developments on the battlefield. During the winter the 
UN front was forced back over the 38th parallel and while such advances continued, the 
Chinese had nothing to gain at the negotiating table. By March, however, the tables had 
turned once more and the UN began to drive the aggressors back. With Chinese forces 
retreating to the 38th parallel, the Korean War came full circle and progress towards a 
cease-fire began on the basis of a proposal put forward by the Secretary -General. 
In a speech to the UN Association of Canada on I June 195 1, Lie separated the military 
and political objectives of the UN and the means of achieving these objectives. 4 If a cease 
fire came into effect at the 38th parallel neither side would have lost any ground militarily, 
lAustin to the Secretary of State, No. 898,29 November, 1950, File 795 B. 5/11-2950 RG 59, NA. quoted 
in Barros, op. ci . t., pp. 291-2. 
2UNCURK was created by GA Res. 376 (V), 7 October 1950, and replaced the UN Commission on Korea. 
3GA Res. 384, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 195 1, p. 207. 
4 Lie, speech to UNA Canada, Ottawa, I June, 195 1, see UN Press Release SG/ 180,31 May, 195 1, see 
United Nations Bulletin, Vol. X., No. 12,15 June, 195 1 -, and see Cordier and Foote, op. cit., pp. 394-5, 
N. B. this proposal was in stark contrast to the Secretary-General earlier backing for the unilateral decision ot 
the Unified Command to enforce political unification. 
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and the UN would have satisfied its primary goal of repelling the original North Korean 
aggression. At the same time, proposing the pursuit of Korean unification and 
democratisation by peaceful means enabled the North Koreans and Chinese to exit the war 
without making any political sacrifices. This recipe for a cease-fire had the additional 
advantage of separating the question of Formosa and Chinese representation from the 
conditions for a cease-fire. Lie had originally floated his ideas behind the scenes during the 
Spring. On 7 June they were given the go ahead by the US Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson. Lie immediately put his proposal into effect by communicating to the UN 
delegations a confidential memorandum suggesting that, "the UN Commander might 
address a public proposal to the North Korean command for discussions of military 
arrangements for a cease-fire, leaving aside all political questions, " I (emphasis added). Ile 
jigsaw was completed when Malik announced Soviet support in a radio broadcast on 23 
June, 1951.2 
Lie's quiet diplomacy was largely ineffective, but in this single proposal, the Secretary- 
General identified the conditions for a cease-fire, the negotiation of which began on 10 July 
and was completed over two years later on 27 July 1953. The negotiations, as Lie 
suggested, were undertaken by the Unified Command and further attempts by the 
Secretary-General to assist were rejected. Lie's relentless public diplomacy, in conjunction 
with his support for the Unified Command, had highlighted a contradiction in the two roles 
undertaken by the Secretary-General in Korea. 
To have adopted a neutral position might well have satisfied the USSR, but in the US 
would have been considered tantamount to appeasement. Attempts to mediate the conflict, 
and the relative silence of the Secretary -General in failing to fully endorse the actions of the 
UN, could have been interpreted as giving credence to Soviet claims that the US and UN 
were acting without justification and illegally. Furthermore, this course of action would 
have fuelled fears in some US quarters that the Secretary -General was 'under the Soviet 
thumb. ' As Rovine explains, "it may well be that no matter what Lie's response in this case 
his personal position would have been destroyed. "3 The US was going ahead in Korea 
with or without the UN. The US had the backing of the majority of the Security Council, 
its position was justified in international law by the UN Charter, the USSR was absent, and 
the Peking Government excluded from the Security Council. If the Secretary -General sh 1 p, 
and more importantly, the UN were going to emerge from the Korean crisis with any 
credibility it was imperative that the Secretary-General act with conviction and try, wherever 
possible, to exercise initiative and provide leadership. The Secretary -General's support 
Ine memorandum was entitled, ''Ideas Concerning a Cease-fire in Korea, " UN Doc. n/a, see Cordier and 
Foote, op. cit., p. 393, see also Lie, op. c1t., p. 363. 
2Mal1k, "The Price of Peace, " 23 June, 195 1, see Lie. op. cit., p. 363. 
3Lie, op. cit., p. 249. 
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provided some semblance of international and UN legitimacy to what was otherwise little 
more than US action under a UN veil. The Charter framers, however, never intended that 
the UN would enforce decisions against the will of the permanent members. It was never 
intended that the Secretary-General should have to take sides against a permanent member. 
When Lie did so, not only did he become unacceptable as an intermediary, but his 
individual position became untenable. 
Protecting the Secretary-General's Independence. 
Lie was constantly charged in Soviet and communist quarters with being an American 
accomplice. The Secretary -General, however, took his stance in the full knowledge that his 
actions would incur the wrath of the USSR and probably spell the end of his effectiveness 
as a Secretary-General. As the end of his term in office approached Lie turned his attention 
to protecting the independence of the office for future incumbents. 
On 16 December 1949 Lie had announced his intention to retire at the end of his five year 
appointment, but renounced his decision in the face of Soviet opposition. Lie explains in 
his memoirs, 
"If I left office either by my own choice or by that of the member nations, 
would the Soviet Union interpret it as a victory, and correspondingly as a 
defeat for the stand I has come to represent? I did not care to be used as 
football in a struggle between the great powers. On the other hand I did not 
want to leave office as a man punished by the Soviet Union for my stand in 
Korea. "' 
Article 97 determines that, "the Secretary-General should be appointed by the General 
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council, " but the Security Council 
could not agree on Lie or a successor. The US had responded to the inevitable Soviet veto 
of Lie's candidacy with a threat to veto any other candidate. Despite Soviet opposition the 
Security Council informed the General Assembly of its inability to agree a 
recommendation, 2 responsibility for selecting the Secretary-General was passed to the 
General Assembly. Such a manoeuvre was of dubious legality. The Charter, rules of 
procedure, and the Preparatory Commission, made no provision for the inability of the 
Security Council to make a recommendation, no provision for passing responsibility for the 
Secretary-General's selection to the General Assembly, but equally did not preclude such an 
eventuality. The General Assembly took up the issue on 30 October and Malik warned, "if 
the appointment of Lie is imposed, the USSR will not take Mr. Lie into account and will not 
consider him as Secretary -General of the United Nations. "' The selection of 
Lie's 
11bid., p. 382. 
2The selection of the Secretary -General is a substantive matter subject to the veto. 
A letter to the General 
Assembly is a procedural matter and as such not subject to the veto. 
3Lie, op. ct . t., p. 382. 
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successor thus become a battle for the Secretary-General's independence. After two days 
of heated debate the General Assembly voted forty-six against five, (with eight 
abstentions), to extend the Secretary-General's term for three years. 'Me Western majority 
in the UN had engineered a victory for Lie, who was immediately declared persona non 
grata by the USSR. From this point forward Lie was effectively disbarred from developing 
the Secretary-General's role any further. Soviet policy eventually forced Lie's resignation 
on 10 November 1952. The timing of Lie's resignation, however, was crucial in protecting 
the independence of the Secretary-Generalship. Firstly, cease-fire negotiations were 
underway on the basis of the Secretary -General's proposal and the Soviet boycott and Lie's 
exit would not result in a change of policy. Secondly, the incoming Secretary-General 
could address the political division of Korea untarnished by involvement in the military 
battle for the country. And thirdly, the selection of a new Secretary-General would not be 
conducted in quite the hostile environment that surrounded Lie's reappointment. Lie had 
accepted a personal defeat to ensure his successor could use, and develop further, the role 
and potential of the Secretary-General in the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Further advances in the Secretary-General's role post Lie, began with the Uniting 
for Peace Resolution while Lie was still in office. 
The Unitine for Peace Resolution. 
The USSR returned to the UN to take up its Presidency of the Security Council on I 
August, 1950. The Soviet return brought an end to the Western monopoly over Security 
Council proceedings and prevented any further experiments with the collective security 
concept. To circumnavigate Security Council paralysis the US instigated the so called 
'Acheson Plan. ' The subsequent, 'Uniting for Peace Resolution, ' transferred responsibility 
and authority for maintaining international pace and security to the General Assembly, 
(where the US enjoyed a pro-Western majority) when the Security Council was seized on a 
given issue. I If, because of the veto, the Security Council was unable to respond to a threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, a special emergency session of the 
General Assembly could be called at 24 hours notice, "with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to members for Collective measures ... including the use of 
force when 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. ' Q The authority to command the use 
of force, however, was not passed to the General Assembly with the matter under 
consideration. 'Me General Assembly still enjoyed only non-bmding recommendatory 
powers. The decision to pass a matter to the General Assembly could be taken by seven 
members of the Security Council or a majority of the General Assembly if the Security 
Council was seized. This decision was a procedural matter and therefore the veto did not 
apply. Furthermore, if the Security Council was blocked it would not be enough for a 
IGA Res. 377,3 November, 1950. 
2ibid., previously a Special Session of the General Assembly could only be convened at 14 day-, notice. 
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matter to be retained on the Security Council agenda to prevent it from being passed to the 
General Assembly. When the USSR returned to the Security Council, this resolution 
enabled the US to maintain continued UN support for the Unified Command through the 
General Assembly. In the longer term the General Assembly's new found powers would 
accelerate the development of the Secretary-General's role over the next ten years, and 
facilitate the creation of the first UN peacekeeping force in the Suez in 1956. 
The First Good Offices Mission and the Tekingy Formula. ' 
Before becoming entangled in the cold war, Lie had laid the foundations for a discretionary 
third party role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Under Dag 
Hammarskj6ld, Lie's constitution-building came to practical fruition. The role played by 
the new Secretary-General in securing the release of eleven American airmen captured and 
imprisoned by the People's Republic of China during the Korean War was the first exercise 
of the Secretary -General's good offices. 
In December 1954 the General Assembly condemned the continued imprisonment of 
American prisoners of war and called upon the Secretary-General to seek their release. I 
Hammarskj6ld was closely consulted in the drafting of the resolution and advised against 
the delegation of intermediary responsibilities to the Dutch President of the General 
Assembly, whom he doubted would be acceptable to the Chinese. If presiding over the 
passing of SCR 906 did not make him unacceptable, Dutch membership of NATO and 
sponsorship of the resolution surely would. Equally, Hammarskj6ld feared that the 
People's Republic would not accept the good offices of the Secretary-General if acting 
under the direction of a damning and inflammatory General Assembly mandate. Although 
unable to persuade the Western majority in the General Assembly to exercise restraint in the 
wording of the resolution, Hammarskj6ld won a small but important victory in the phrasing 
of the Secretary -General's responsibilities - Hammarskj6ld was asked to assist, 
"by the 
means most appropriate in his judgement. ' Q Hammarskj6ld exploited this wide margin of 
discretion by offering his intennediary services not as the representative of the General 
Assembly, but as the Secretary -General of the UN. 3 This subtle but important 
distinction 
distanced the Secretary -General from the General Assembly mandate, and enabled 
the 
authorities of the People's Republic to negotiate without accepting the resolution, and 
without bowing to the threats of an international organisation which not only condemned its 
actions, but refused its quite legitimate claims to the Chinese seats in UN organs. This 
method of protecting the Secretary-General's impartiality has henceforth been known as the 
'Peking Formula. 
IGA Res. 906,10 December 1954. 
2ibid. 
3UN Doc. A/2888,17 December, 1954. 
4For further discussion see Boudreau, Thomas E., Sheathing the Sword: The UN Secretary-Gelieral and thc 
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The Peking Formula rests on a liberal interpretation of Article 99, in conjunction with 
Article 33 and the willingness of those party to a dispute to engage the Secretary-General. 
With the consent of both parties, 2Hammarskjbld flew to Peking to hold discussions with 
the Communist Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai. As if to emphasise the independence of this 
initiative, discussions between 5 and II January, and communications between Peking and 
the Secretary-General thereafter, covered wider issues of peace and security than those 
mandated by the General Assembly. 3 Although Hammarskj6ld was careful to construct a 
broad base of support for this initiative, and continued to take soundings from the wider 
membership, the Secretary-General's Peking visit was the first discretionary exercise of 
good-offices by the UN Secretary-General. 
The Secretary -General's good offices were not immediately productive. Progress 
floundered as public emotion in both countries ran high, fuelled by clashes in the Taiwan 
Strait, the Formosa question, cold war and media propaganda. Hammarskj6ld, however, 
had re-opened communications between the two powers and for the next eight months 
referreed a game of 'Chinese whispers' which was complicated by the interjections of other 
interested parties. The Secretary-General repeatedly clarified issues, arguments, and 
positions until on 25 July the US agreed to discuss face-to-face the differences between 
Washington and Peking. Six days later the airmen were released in honour of Dag 
Hammarskj6ld's birthday. 4 
The airmen's release must be viewed as a goodwill gesture to the US prior to talks that 
would address, inter alia, Chinese representation in the UN. This does not detract from the 
role played by the Secretary-General, however. Hammarskj6ld's involvement first 
prevented the further escalation of differences and eventually brought the two powers closer 
together. Secondly, Ham-marskjbld provided the medium through which the airmen could 
be released - the Secretary-General's independent presence did not require China to kotow 
either to the General Assembly or the US. Hammarskjbld had highlighted the value of an 
independent and impartial intermediary, and was widely acclaimed for the success of his 
first good offices mission. 
Prevention of International Conflict, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 41-44-, Lash, Joseph "Dag 
Hammarskj6ld's Conception of his Office, " International Organisation, No. 16,1962, pp. 349-50; Urquhart, 
Brian, Hamniarskj5ld, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972), pp. 105,185-, & Zacher, Mark W., Dag 
Haniniarskjbld's United Nations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 129. 
'See pp. 36-42-, Hammarskj6ld and Lash also cite the purposes and principles of the Charter as a more 
general legal basis for an independent role in the maintenance fo international peace and security; see Article 
I of the UN Charter & Lash, Joseph "Dag Hammarskj6ld's Conception of his Office, " International 
Organisation, No. 16,1962. 
2Before drafting of resooution had begun the US had asked the Secretary-General to assist the release of the 
American airmen, see UN Doc. AJ2830 4 December 1954. 
3 On content of discussions see Urquhart, (1987) op. cit., pp. 104-12. 
4 UN Doc. SG/434, I August 1955. 
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UNEF: The First Peacekeeping Force. 
In the UN response to the Suez crisis, the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security entered a new realm at the head of the first UN 
peacekeeping force, (as opposed to Observer Mission). Like the Secretary-General's good 
offices, peacekeeping was not a method of conflict prevention and management envisaged 
by the UN Charter. Equally, however, peacekeeping was not prohibited, and because 
never considered, nor was the Secretary-General's command of a military force. 
On 26 July 1956, the Egyptian Prime Minister, Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser, nationalised 
the Suez Canal. Over the next three months Hammarskj6ld extended the Secretary- 
General's good offices in an effort to resolve the ongoing international dispute over the 
status and fights of access to the thoroughfare. Responding to a request from the UK, I the 
Secretary -General undertook, "explanatory conversations, ' '2with the Foreign Ministers of 
Egypt, France, and the UK. On the basis of these conversations six 
principles/requirements governing the settlement of the Suez question were agreed and were 
the only part of a draft resolution of 13 October 1956 on which the Security Council 
members could agree. 3 The remainder of the draft was rejected by Egypt and vetoed by the 
USSR, as was obviously the intention, given the plans being engineered behind the scenes 
by Israel, France and the UK to secure international access to the Suez. On 29 October 
Israel invaded Egypt and further draft resolutions calling for an immediate cease-fire and 
Israeli withdrawal were vetoed by France and the UK. On 31 October, British and French 
forces launched aerial attacks on Egyptian military targets. The British and French 
representatives in New York had been kept in the dark, and in a rare public display of 
frustration Hammarskjbld expressed his indignation against the, 'policy of expediency, '4 of 
their respective governments. French and UK vetoes prevented Security Council action to 
address the crisis and on 31 October the matter was passed to the General Assembly under 
the Uniting for Peace Resolution. 5 
fn the General Assembly the idea of a UN force enabling Isreal, France, and the UK to 
disengage and enabling renewal of the diplomatic search for a settlement was first mooted 
by the Canadian Assembly President, Lester Pearson. Hammarskjbld, initially at least, 
remained sceptical. This pairing fon-ned a potent combination in the development of the 
United Nations Emergency Force, (UNEF). Pearson's optimism was infective, and 
I SCOR, II th Year, 743rd meeting, para. 33. 
2Secretariat Repertory of Practice, Supplement 1, Vo 
3See UN Docs. S/367 1, S/3675, & SCOR, II th year, 
4 SG/514,31 October 1956. 
5 SC Res. 119,31 October 1956. 
- 2, New York 
1958, pp. 476, para. 286. 
743rd meeting, para. 105. z 
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enhanced by Hammarskjbld's political acumen and commitment to legal principles. I On 2 
November General Assembly Resolution 997 called for an immediate cease-fire and 
requested the Secretary-General to assist the parties in arranging that cease-fire. Pearson 
later commented, "I would have liked to see provision in this resolution ... authorising the 
Secretary-General to begin making arrangements with member states for a United Nations 
force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being 
worked oUt. "2 Pearson's wish was granted two days later when the General Assembly 
passed his draft resolution requesting the Secretary-General submit within 48 hours a plan 
for an emergency international United Nations Force, 'to secure and supervise the cessation 
of hostilities. '3 
Two subsequent reports from the Secretary-General established, interalia, the command 
structure, the guiding principles, functions, organisation and composition of UNEF which 
were adopted by General Assembly Resolutions 1000 and 1001.4 General Bums was 
seconded from UNTSO as Chief of the new Command, but ultimate command and control 
rested with the Secretary-General, who was authorised, "to issue all regulations and 
instructions which may be essential to the functioning of the force ... and to take all other 
necessary administrative and executive action. ' '5 To assist the Secretary-General in this 
respect, resolution 1001 also created an Advisory Conu-nittee of troop contributing and 
member states. The Secretary-General was made chair of this committee ensuring the lines 
of command were not confused. 
The first of six thousand troops under the Secretary -General's command began arriving in 
Egypt on 14 November and successfully oversaw the withdrawal of French, British, and 
Israeli forces before being redeployed along the Israeli -Egyptian border as a buffer between 
the two nations. 6 UNEF helped reduce tensions in historically volatile areas, deterred 
isolated skirmishes and confrontations which might easily escalate, and returned a 
semblance of stability to the region. As such UNEF was not an end in itself. Its acceptance 
indicated the willingness of the parties to resolve the cnsis and remaining differences 
peacefully, and the functions fulfilled by UNEF supported and reinforced those undertaken 
by the Secretary-General (its commander in chief) in the exercise of his good offices. It 
was Hammarskj6ld who undertook the negotiations for a cease-fire, 7 compliance with the 
I For instance Hammarskj6ld rejected Pearson's first proposal that multinational UN forces operate alongside 
Franch and British contingents already present in the region. On Hain marskJ61d's approach see pp. 201-8. 
2GA (ES- 1), 562 meeting, para. 307. 
3 GA Res. 998,4 November 1956. 
4 UN Docs. A/3289 4 November 1956, & A/3302 6 November 1956. For discussion see pp. 115-119. 
5GA Res. 1001,6 November, 1956. 
6General Assembly Resolution 1125,2 February, 1957. 
7 See UN Docs. A/3375; & A/3943,9 October, 1958. 
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broken armistice agreements, I and the deployment of the first UN peacekeeping force. 2 
'nie cease-fire came into effect on 7 November 1956. The withdrawal of British and 
French forces was negotiated by the Secretary-General and completed under UNEF 
Supervision by 22 December. Negotiating Israel's withdrawal from the Sinal Peninsula, 
Sharm el Sheik and the Gaza strip was a more protracted business, but completed by 12 
March 1957.3 
The UN Observer Group in the Lebanon. 
Hammarskjbld's executive decision to expand the United Nations Observer Group in 
Lebanon, (UNOGIL), in 1958 demonstrated the extent of the Secretary-General's 
command over a peacekeeping operation, and therefore, the imperative that peacekeeping 
principles follow closely those of the Secretary-General's good offCeS. 4 
On 22 May 1958 the Lebanese Government lodged with the Security Council allegations of 
intervention by the United Arab Republic, (UAR - Egypt and Syria), in its internal affairS. 5 
The stability of the Lebanese State rested on a combination of mutual tolerance between 
delicately balanced Muslim and Christian populations, and a constitution carefully 
constructed to protect and maintain that balance. 6 That balance was threatened by President 
Chamnaun's consideration of constitutional reform. and his alignment with the West and 
the conservative Arab states. Domestic unrest was compounded by wider developments in 
the Middle East. The establishment of the UAR, countered by the formation of an Arab 
Union by the monarchical and pro Western states of Iraq and Jordan, created region-wide 
Arab competition. The possibility that this dispute might be played out between Lebanese 
Muslims, aided and abetted by outside interference threatened an insecure Lebanese 
Government. In response to the Lebanese complaint, the Security Council established an 
Observer Group, "to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of 
arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders, "7 and authorised the Secretary- 
General, "to take the necessary steps to that end. "8 To assuage UAR concerns 
Hammarskj6ld made it clear that the UN observers had no mandate to intervene in the 
internal affairs of Lebanon, and to this end the observers operated only in border areas. 
IGA Res. 999,4 November 1956. 
2See pp. 10 1 -4. 30n negotiation of British, French and Israeli withdrawal, see Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., 
Ch. 8; Ghali 
Mona, "The United Nations Emergency Force I, " in Durch William J., (ed. ), The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 
129-48; James, 
Alan, Peacekeeping In International Politics, (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 210-220; & Secretariat 
Repertory Of Practice, Supp. 2, Vol. 3, New York 1959, pp. 440-5 1. 
4 See pp. 115-9. 
5 UN Doc. S/4007,22 May 1958. 
6See James, op. cit., p. 284; Ghall, op. cit., pp. 164-7; & Luard, 
Evan A History of the United Nations 
Volume 2: The Age of Decolonisation 1955-1965, (London: Macmillan, 
1989), pp. 144-6. 
7S C Res. 128,11 June 1958. 
81'bid. 
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Moreover, Hammarskjbld was careful to distinguish between observer Mission functions 
and those of a peacekeeping force like that in the Suez, or a Chapter VII style 'police 
action. " The functions of LJNOGIL were to observe and report. The very presence of 
observers also served as a deterrent to infiltration by the UAR which could have escalated 
into a wider conflict. In this respect UNOGEL must be viewed as a forerunner of the 
preventive deployment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Macedonia 
in 1992.2 As Urquhart explains, the main objective at this stage was, "to isolate the internal 
struggle from external influences. "3 The UN presence, however, also released pressure on 
the US from non Arab quarters to intervene, and the very real fisk of a superpower 
confrontation in the Nfiddle East that entailed. 
Despite the deployment of 133 Observers, 4the situation remained fraught and the question 
of interference remained vexed: Hammarskj6ld had negotiated with Nasser a commitment, 
of which he could not be certain, to stay out of Lebanon; Chamnoun continued to allege 
and provide unverified evidence of UAR infiltration; and UNOGEL reports could not 
substantiate Chamnoun's allegations, but neither did they have access to border areas 
controlled by the opposition. Events turned dramatically on 14 July when a revolutionary 
coup d'etat in neighbouring Iraq deposed the Monarchy and ousted the conservative pro- 
Western government. The Iraqi situation, in conjunction with developments in Jordan, (see 
below), fuelled US fears of a Soviet/Arab expansionist conspiracy in the Middle East. 
Overnight US policy changed from one of, 'wait and see. ' to, 'act first ask questions later. ' 
The first of 14000 troops were despatched on 15 July. The Security Council was now 
racked with disagreements over the future role of UNOGIL and how to facilitate US 
withdrawal. Four successive draft resolutions were vetoed: Sweden proposed the 
suspension of UNOGIL; 5 the US proposed expanding the UNOGIL mandate to protect the 
territorial integrity of Lebanon and strengthening its presence accordingly; 6 the USSR called 
on the US and UK to withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan respectively; 7 and Japan 
proposed broadening the Secretary-General's mandate to create the conditions under which 
the US could withdraw. 8 The first three were rejected on 18 July and the last vetoed by the 
USSR on 22 July, after which the Secretary -General stepped in. 
1SCOR 13th year, 827th meeting, para. 64. 
2See p. 376. 
3Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 272. 
4UN Doc. S/4038,28 June 1958. 
5UN Doc. S/4054,15 July 1958. 
6UN Doc. S/4050 Rev. 1,15 July 1958. 
7 UN Doc. S/4047,15 July 1958. 
8UN Doc. S/4055/Rev. 1,18 July 1958. 
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Recalling his statement during the Suez crisis that the Secretary-General's role, "must not 
degenerate into a policy of expediency, "' and recalling the statement made on his re- 
election, 2 Hammarskj6ld took it upon himself to fill the vaccuum created by the paralysis of 
the Security Council, and declared his intention to enlarge UNOGIL, "so as to give it all the 
significance it can have, consistent with its basic character as determined by the Security 
Council in its resolution of June 11 1958. "3 Hammarskj6ld's executive decision was 
founded on an extremely liberal interpretation of his mandate under that resolution, and, 
was an unprecedented assertion of the Secretary-General's political command over a 
peacekeeping operation. In these unknown waters the Secretary-Geneal had the consent of 
the Lebanese Government, but could not be certain the Security Council members would 
share his interpretation of his UNOGEL mandate -'to that end take the necessary steps. ' In 
this latter respect Hammarskj6ld was careful to assure the Security Council members that he 
would be, "guided by the views expressed around this table, " and, "the Security Council 
would, of course be kept fully informed on the steps taken. Were you to disapprove of the 
way these intentions were to be translated by me into practical steps, I would of course 
accept the consequence of your judgement. ' '4 To insure dialogue and insure the maximum 
support for his initiative Harrunarskj6ld also set up an advisory body based on the Suez 
model. UNOGIL was doubled in size, and the issue passed to the General Assembly under 
the Uniting for Peace Procedure. Here the Secretary-General cultivated further political 
support and a legal veil for his independent actions under a Security Council mandate. On 
21 August the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General, 'make ... such 
practical arrangements as would ... facilitate the early withdrawal of 
foreign troops from the 
two countries. '5 From the Lebanese Government, Hammarskj6ld then obtained agreement 
that UNOGIL, 'presented such a practical arrangement. '6 If the Secretary-General's first 
expansion of UNOGIL might have been considered ultra vires, Hammarskj6ld had assured 
subsequent expansions could not be easily challenged. By 17 November UNOGIL 
observers totalled 591 but by this time circumstances had changed dramatically. Firstly, 
Chamnaun had retracted his proposals to reform the constitution and had stepped down. 
He was succeeded by General Chebab, whose election, in conjunction with the appointment 
of Chamnoun's former adversary, Rashid Karame as Prime Minister, was greeted with near 
universal approval inside and outside Lebanon. Secondly, as the facts surrounding the 
Iraqi revolution emerged, US fears of the twin evils of Nasser's Arab nationalism and 
Soviet communism receded. Some semblance of stability returned to Lebanon and the 
Middle East generally, which with a larger UN presence, (as the US had originally 
1 UN Doc. SG/514,31 October, 1956. 
2Hammarskj6ld, Dag, "Statement on Re-election to a Second Term, " 26 September 1957, reproduced in 
Foote, op. cit., pp. 148-50. 
3UN Doc. S/4023,22 July 1958. 
4SCOR, l3th Year, 837th meeting, paras. 15-17. 
5GA Res. 1237 21 August 1958. C7. 
6UN Doc. S/3934, Rev. 1,29 September 1958. 
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desired), provided the conditions for an America withdrawal, completed by 25 October 
1958. UNOGIL was disbanded during December after the Lebanese Government 
withdrew its original complaint against the UAR. I 
Jordan: The First UN Presence. and the First Special Representative. 
The repercussions of the Iraqi revolution were also felt in Jordan. King Hussein's cousin 
had been killed in the coup, and his position in Jordan was equally precarious. On the 17 
July 1958, Hussein's Government, like Chamnoun a month earlier, alleged intervention by 
the UAR in its internal affairs. 2 On the same day the first of 3000 British troops requested 
by Hussein began arriving in Amman. From this point forward, the situation in Jordan was 
considered jointly with the situation in Lebanon in both the Security Council and the 
General Assembly, and the Secretary-General's mandate under Assembly resolution 1237 
applied as much to the withdrawal of British troops from Jordan as it did to the withdrawal 
of US troops from Lebanon. 
On 18 August the UK announced its intention to withdraw, provided the UN took action to 
safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of Jordan. US withdrawal, (announced 
simultaneously), was an implicit dismissal of the perceived Soviet/Arab threat that had 
prompted the deployment of US troops just a month earlier. Hussein, however, remained 
vulnerable and rejected a UN force like that in Suez, or an observer mission like UNOGIL. 3 
Too strong a UN presence would only highlight Hussein's domestic weakness, but, the 
threat of domestic unrest which might escalate into a wider regional conflict involving the 
superpowers required some kind of presence. Between 26 and 30 August Hammarskjbld 
visited Amman to make those, 'practical arrangements, ' mandated by the General 
Assembly. Hammarskj6ld proposed, and found Jordan willing to accept a, 'UN Presence, ' 
headed by a special representative. Piero Spinelli, the Head of the UN Office in Geneva, 
was appointed the first special representative of the Secretary-General, and arrived in 
Amman on 27 September. Ralphe Bunche described this innovation as, 
"The establishment of some sort of UN arrangement on the spot with a 
purpose ofmatching local developments, holding a finger on the pulse and 
keeping UNHQ fully infonned about developments in that area. For the 
most part those who constitute and lead the 'presence' operation, whatever 
its form, are expected to play their role pretty much by ear, to give well 
considered advice where needed and requested, to intervene as necessary, 
but always delicately and diplomatically, and to keep constantly in 
consultation with the Secretary -General for advice and guidance. ' 14 
'UN Doc. S/4113,25 November 1958. 
2UN Doc. S/4053,17 July 1958. 
3GAOR (ES-111), plen., 735th meeting, para 5 1-, 738th meeting para. 8; see also the Sec re tary -General's 
report In consultation with Hussein, UN Doc. A/3934 Rev. 1,29 September 1958. 
413unche Ralphe, in a speech to the 9th General Assembly of the International Press Institute, Tokyo, 25 
March 1960, quote by Urquhart, op. cit., pp. 294-5. 
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The special representative, however, was not delegated good offices functions. 
Hammarskj6ld did not believe that resolution 1237 mandated intermediary responsibilities. 
The UN Presence and special representative were a practical not political arrangement, 
though with obvious political implications. The functions of the special representative 
were, in this sense, extending the reach of the Secretary -General's eyes, ears, and quiet 
diplomacy. To emphasise the limits of this remit, at Headquarters Hammarskj6ld held in 
reserve a second special representative who would undertake, "negotiations and 
consultations, 112on issues arising from Spinelli's reports. This was a concession to a 
suggestion by Jordan that a UN Presence should be established in other Arab capitals, but 
which extended beyond the Secretary-General's mandate. Nevertheless, the relationship 
between the Secretary-General and his special representative was constitutionally closer 
than that between the Secretary-General and the General Assembly Mediator in Palestine. 
The good offices potential of the special representative was self evident, and a precursor to 
the use of a personal representative undertaking such duties between Cambodia and 
Thailand. Equally, the development of a UN Presence under a General Assembly mandate 
was a precursor to the deployment in Laos of a UN Presence within the the purview of the 
Secretary -General's independent powers, as opposed to at the direction of one of the 
deliberative UN organs. 
Cambodia and Thailand: The First Personal Representative. 
In the development of the Peking Forrnula, Hammarskjbld asserted the Secretary -General's 
independent rights to an intermediary role. In this instance the Secretary-General had 
already been asked to provide his good offices by the General Assembly. In the 1958 
dispute between Cambodia and Thailand over the ownership of the Temple of Preah Vihear, 
for the first time the Secretary -General undertook good-offices functions without a prior 
formal request from either the General Assembly or Security Council. On this occasion 
Hammarskj6ld operated exclusively on the basis of the discretionary rights provided for by 
Articles 99 and 33. 
Diplomatic relations between the two countries had already broken off when Cambodia 
complained to the Secretary -General about Thai military deployments at their 
border. 3 
These charges were refuted by T'hailand. 4 In New York, Hammarskjbld proposed to the 
permanent representatives of the two nations that he send a representative to assist the 
resumption of dialogue. Cambodia and Thailand accepted, and the Swedish diplomat, 
Baron Johan Beck-Ffiis was despatched as the Secretary -General's first personal 
ISee UN Doc. A/3934 Rev. 1, para. 12. 
2ibid. 
3UN Doc. S/4121,2 December 1958. 
4UN Doc. S/2146,8 December 1958. 
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representative. ammarskj6ld had adapted, and expanded, the idea of a special 
representative, for use under his own authority. The representative's mandate came solely 
from the Secretary-General, Cambodia, and Thailand, not from a UN deliberative organ. It 
was only in Laos that the Secretary-General formally distinguished between personal and 
special representatives. Before visiting, Vientiane Hammarskj6ld informed Security 
Council members, 
"It may be noted that an individual stationed in Vientiane as my personal 
representative would be under the exclusive authority of the Secretary- 
General; constitutionally, he would, thus, be in a position different from the 
one held by the United Nations missions, as, for example, the special 
representative stationed in Amman under a resolution approved by the 
General Assembly, or the Observation Group in Lebanon the mandate of 
which has been decided by the Security Council. The legal basis for a 
decision to leave a personal representative in Laos, apart from the consent of 
the Government of Laos, would be the general responsibilities of the 
Secretary-General regarding developments which may threaten peace and 
security, combined with his administrative authority under the Charter"' 
Accordingly, Beck-Ffiis was the Secretary-General's personal rather than special 
representative. 2 Beck-Ffiis' diplomacy facilitated the resumption of normal diplomatic 
protocols between Cambodia and Thailand and in so doing Hammarskj6ld later stated, 
"broke new ground for fruitful UN assistance to member countries. "3 To encourage the 
further use of the Secretary-General's good offices and personal representatives, the 
normally self-effacing Hammarskj6ld indulged in a rare self congratulatory public 
statement: 
"You can see how much more effective and smooth-working such a 
technique is than the regular one, which involves all the meetings and so on. 
That is a good case in point to demonstrate how, pragmatically, we can find 
better ways to do the job, without at all departing from the Charter, but so to 
speak, adjusting the procedures so as to meet a concrete situation as 
conveniently and efficiently as possible. ' '4 
Convening the Security Council and Fact-Finding in Laos. 
Laos was one of three newly independent states created by the 1954 Geneva Agreements 
following the collapse of French rule in Indochina. These Agreements stipulated that Laos 
should remain neutral, although Urquhart argues that the assumption that Laos might 
become a stable neutral buffer between Western friendly 'I'hailand and communist North 
Korea was flawed by the demographics of an ethnically divided population. 5 Attempts to 
reconcile Western and communist demands in a coalition government were undermined by 
I Unpublished letter quoted in Urquhart, op. cit., p. 352. 
20n this distinction see pp. 120- 1. 
3UN Doc. SG/797,16 March 1959. 
4Press Conference, 5 February, 1959, excerpts reproduced in Foote, op. cit., p. 264. 
5Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 329. 
-76- 
outside interference which exposed these divisions and promoted intolerance rather than 
compromise. Hammarskj6ld's intervention produced two further innovations. 
The Informal Invocation of Article 99. 
On 20 August 1959 Hammarskjbld received from the Laos Government a request that the 
Secretary-General suggest, "such procedures or such measures as he might consider 
designed to achieve a peaceful settlement of the difficulties at present being experienced by 
Laos. "' This was followed on 4 September by a request for a UN Force to halt and 
prevent alleged aggression by North Korean forces in support of the communist Pathat 
Lao. 2 The first request included the possibility of a good-offices role for the Secretary- 
General - Hammarskj6ld had been encouraging the parties to take up this option since 
February. The second request could only be considered by the Security Council, (unless 
passed to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure), but the issue had 
not yet been placed before the Security Council. Harnmarskj6ld was concerned that if the 
Western powers brought the Laos situation to the Security Council's attention, its 
consideration would immediately become snared in cold war politics. Invoking Article 99, 
however, risked compromising any possibility of a third party role for the Secretary- 
General. The Secretary-General's independent third party role arises out of the discretion 
implied by Article 99 whether to convene or not to convene the Security Council. If the 
Secretary-General convenes the Security Council, he relinquishes that discretion. The 
matter passes to the Security Council and any third party role thereafter can only come from 
a Security Council mandate. Furthennore, the information available was sketchy and 
unverified. Convening the Security Council solely on the basis of allegations by the Prime 
Minister, risked embroiling the Secretary-General in the conflict between the Government 
and Pathat Lao and in the wider conflict between East and West. The Secretary-General 
and the Security Council would both be paralysed unless Hammarskj6ld could find a way 
to invoke Article 99 without invoking Article 99 (sic. ). 
Hammarskjbld's solution was an "ingenious, "3 if politically risky procedural innovation. 
'Me Secretary-General asked the President of the Security Council to convene a meeting of 
the Security Council, 4at which he spoke first. Under an agenda item entitled, 'Report of 
the Secretary-General on the letter received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Royal Govemment of Laos, ' Hanunarskjbld stated, 
"I have asked for an opportunity to report to the Council ... the request is 
not based on the explicit rights granted to the Secretary -General under 
'UN Doc. SG/842,20 August 1959. 
2UN Doc. S/4212,4 September 1959. 
3Dixon (U-K permanent representative) to Lodge (US permanent representative), quoted in 
Urquhart, (1972), 
op. cit., p. 340. 
4UN Doc. S/4213,6 September 1959. 
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Article 99 of the Charter. If it had been so based, the Council, under Rule 3 
of the Provisional Rules of Procedure, would not have been free to refuse 
the Secretary-General to address it - as it is now free to do - and it would have meant the inscription by the Secretary-General of a substantive issue on 
the agenda. In this latter respect it would necessarily have involved a judgement as to facts for which, in the present situation, I have not sufficient 
basis. "' 
Hammarskj6ld's statement complied with the procedural responsibility of the Secretary- 
General to bring before the Security Council, 'all communications from states... 
concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council. '2 Accordingly, in title 
and content, the Secretary-General emphasised the procedural character, rather than the 
substantive objective of his statement. Hammarskj6ld's inventive method of placing the 
Laotion situation before the Security Council would have been legally foolproof but for an 
American proposal to place a Security Council fact-finding sub-committee in Laos. The 
American draft resolution was circulated shortly after the President, (at the Secretary- 
General's request), called a meeting of the Security Council, and its presentation was 
scheduled to follow the Secretary -General's statement. The association of the Secretary- 
General's statement with the substance of the American draft eroded the cogency of the 
Secretary-General's rule six defence. If the Secretary-General was acting in a substantive 
rather than a procedural capacity, as Sobolev, (USSR permanent representative), now 
alleged, he had no right to report without invoking Article 99 - Lie had secured rights of 
intervention in Security Council proceedings only in matters already under Security Council 
consideration. The deferential character of HammarskJ61d's opening statement reflected the 
Secretary-General's vulnerability in this respect. 
Soviet objections to the right of the Secretary-General to make his statement reflected 
objections to the substance of the US draft resolution rather than the procedural rights of the 
Secretary -General per se. The USSR feared a Security Council 
fact-finding sub-committee 
was a UN veil for extending Western influence in Laos. Herein lay the answer to the 
Secretary-General's predicament. Firstly, Hammarskjbld stated, 
"As I think it is clear from my initial statement I do not request the right to 
make a statement to the Security Council until and unless the Security 
Council has decided to take up the question I raised for consideration. "' 
Hammarskj6ld's defence was a masterpiece of diplomatic double talk. The Secretary- 
General stated, that with respect to Laos, he intended to state that he did not want to make a 
statement, only to reserve the right to make a statement. The USSR could not object to 
what he had to say, only his right to say it. 
ISCOR, 847th meeting, 7 September 1959, paras. 11-12. 
2Rule 6, Security Council Provisional Rules of Procedure. 
3SCOR 847th meeting, 7 September 1959, para. 26. 
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Secondly, Hammarskj6ld proposed that the Security Council take a provisional vote on the 
adoption of the agenda, (and thereby the Secretary-General's right to make his statement). 
The adoption of an agenda is a procedural matter in which the veto does not apply. The 
USSR would therefore be able to register its objections formally without preventing the 
Secretary-General from making a statement. Moreover, a Soviet vote against the American 
draft was a certainty and a vote on the agenda, item by item, would have forced from the 
USSR either a humiliating climbdown or an explicit rejection of the Secretary-General's 
procedural rights. A vote against the agenda as a whole, therefore, could be considered 
only an implicit rejection, or even a tacit acceptance of the Secretary-General's rights. 
Hammarskjbld was thus able to bring the situation in Laos to the Security Council's 
attention before the US, and, without making, "a judgement as to facts, for which, in the 
present situation, I have not sufficient basis. ' Q Hammarskjbld's informal invocation of 
Article 99 was an innovative procedure for convening the Security Council without 
sacrificing the Secretary-General's ability to assist in the prevention and resolution of a 
given conflict, and, because the Secretary-General remained available as an independent 
impartial intermediary in Laos, further developments in the Secretary-General's 
discretionary powers followed. 
Fact-Finding in Laos: the Secretary -General's UN Presence. 
Hammarskj6ld replied to the first Laos request for assistance on 27 August with a statement 
on the principles governing political fact-finding and good offices. The Secretary-General 
noted the recent developments in Lebanon and Jordan, (implicitly), and in Cambodia and 
Thailand, (explicitly), before stating, 
"The sending of a representative to Laos for fact-finding purposes would be 
in line with the Secretary-General's attitude in similar cases, and would be 
arranged by him provided the legal situation were to develop so as to make it 
constitutionally possible for him to act. ' 13 
In this statement the Secretary -General's was engaged in the, "intensified availability '114 of 
his good offices, to which the Laos authorities eventually replied on 7 November with a 
request for the Secretary-General to visit Vientiane. 5 The delay was significant, for in the 
meantime the Security Council had considered and established the sub-conu-nittee proposed 
by the US. The US and USSR disagreed as to whether the appointment of a sub-committee 
was a procedural matter, (veto does not apply), or a substantive matter, (veto does apply). 
The Great Power Declaration at San Francisco determined that such questions should be 
IThe Security Council voted 10 against I (USSR) to adopt the agenda. 
2ibid., para. 12. 
3UN Doc. SG/849,27 August 1959. 
4Press Conference 26 February, 1959, note no. 1947. 
5UN Doc. SG/868,8 November, 1959. 
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resolved by a vote in which the veto applies - the so called double veto. On 8 September 
the Security Council voted ten against one that the American draft was a procedural matter. 
The dissenting vote was cast by the USSR and would have constituted a veto but for a 
flagrant abuse of Security Council procedure by the Western members. The Italian Security 
Council President ignored the Great Power Declaration and declared the appointment of the 
sub-committee a procedural matter. The Security Council then proceeded to a vote on its 
creation in which the Soviet veto was nullified. The sub-committee was tainted by the 
method of it's creation. Urquhart also argues that in order to win support from the wider 
Security Council membership, "the Western representatives ... were forced to define the 
tasks of the sub-committee in [procedural] terms that would rob it of its practical 
usefulness. "' In respect of the Secretary-General, Rovine therefore contends that, "a UN 
Presence, neutrality in East[West conflicts, and initiation of both a series of talks between 
the Laotian Government leaders and the Secretary-General held far more promise than the 
cold war manoeuvring of a fact-finding sub-committee opposed by the USSR. ' 12 
Hammarskj6ld accepted the Laotian request and before departing for Vientiane infonned the 
Security Council members that the purpose of his visit was, "to infon-n myself about the 
present problems of the country. ' '3 The Secretary-General was acting in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 99 and this phraseology was important in delineating the 
constitutional basis for this visit and subsequent actions. The Secretary-General continued, 
"were my experiences to indicate such an arrangement would be warranted - and this seems 
probable [provisional approval from the parties concerned had already been secured behind 
the scenes] -I would temporarily stage a personal representative inNientiane through whom 
I could maintain contact after my departure. "4When that consent was formalised, Sakari 
Tuomioja was appointed to head the first UN Presence established by the Secretary-General 
exclusively. 
As a forerunner to developments in Laos, James' description of the UN Presence in Jordan 
as, "a sort of listening poSt'15 is instructive. Tuornioja was instructed inter alia to, follow up 
the discussions initiated by the Secretary-General, and provide him with that infon-nation 
relevant to a judgement regarding the assistance he might most appropriately render. 6 'Me 
mandate for the Laos Presence, however, came not from a Security Council or General 
Assembly resolution. Like the Secretary-General's good offices Mission to Cambodia and 
Thailand, the Laos Presence was constitutionally rooted In the Secretary-General's 
I Urquhart, ( 1972), op. cit., p. 344. 
2RovIne, Arthur W., The First Fifty Years of the Secretary- Genera I in World Politics, (Leyden, Netherlands: 
A. W. Sijthoff, 1970), p. 307. 
3Unpublished letter quoted in Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 352. 
4ibid. 
5James op. ci . t., p. 289. 
6UN Doc. SG/871,15 November 1959. 
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independent discretionary rights. But for the informal invocation of Article 99 the 
discretion to make independent inquiries would have been restricted. 
If the development of the Secretary-General's independent political role followed the 
implied powers theory, ' the Secretary-General's first fact-finding mission would have 
preceded the first good offices mission. In 1946 Lie had reserved the fight to make 
independent inquifies, 2 but it was not until Laos that this prerogative was belatedly tested. 
As a fact-finding mission the Secretary-General's UN Presence was in this sense less 
noteworthy than the development of the Secretary -General's good offices, but it must also 
be viewed as reaching beyond the Secretary-General's good offices - it's proximity to the 
conflict endowed the UN Presence with secondary quasi -peacekeeping attributes. The UN 
Presence was not a buffer between the disputing Laos factions and did not involve the 
deployment of military personnel to observe a cease-fire or deter the resumption or outbreak 
of conflict. Events in Laos, however, would no longer continue apace in splendid 
isolation. With the Secretary-General's representatives observing developments, the Laos 
authorities and the Pathat Lao were less able to conduct or make inflammatory manoeuvres 
or accusations respectively. It was in this respect that the location of the Secretary- 
General's personal representative and staff had a moderating influence akin to that of 
peacekeeping operations. In particular, Hammarskjbld hoped the UN Presence would, 
"head off and discourage extreme right wing militancy moves sponsored by the Vientiane 
Government and its supporters. 113 
Finally, additional functions delegated to Tuomioja also indicated an expanding concept of 
peace and security. In Lebanon, Jordan, Laos and then in the Congo the UN was 
increasingly becoming involved in matters of international peace and security arising out of 
disputes within rather than between member states. According to Urquhart, Hammarskj6ld 
returned from Laos with a far greater appreciation of the competition for limited social and 
economic resources which creates tensions and reinforces the divisions between groups of 
different ethnicity, creed, colour, and religion. In the UN Presence, therefore, 
Hammarskj6ld also brought together UNESCO and the World Health Organisation, 
(Vv'HO), to instigate short and long term projects and programs that might make the 
difference between war and peace. 4 A Marshall Plan for Laos and a UN Presence were 
ultimately unsuccessful in halting the descent into a cold war proxy civil war. Edourd 
Zellweger succeeded Tuomiqja on 18 February 1960, and following the August coup 
dWat, (the second in a year), was delegated an expanded mediatory role. By this time, 
though, Hammarskj6ld and the UN were embroiled in the Congo and the Secretary- 
I See pp. 36-41. 
2See pp. 50-5 1. 
3Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 35 1. 
41bid., pp. 354-5. 
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General's productive career was nearing an end. Nevertheless two more extremely useful 
precedents had been set. 
Constitutional Crises in the Congo and New York. 
Congo's accession to independence is a defining moment in UN history, none more so than 
with respect to the role of the Secretary-General. As such the literature on this subject is 
extensive, and includes articles and texts by a large number of the personalities involved. I 
That history is covered here only in as far as it concerns the evolution of the Secretary- 
General's role. 
In the Congo, for the first time a Secretary-General fully invoked Article 99 and convened a 
meeting of the Security Council. Thereafter the combination of Hammarskj6ld's 'executive 
action' and the UN's first experience of 'mission slippage' precipitated a constitutional 
crisis which at its worst threatened the role and future of the Secretary-General and 
peacekeeping, and at the least brought a virtual halt to expansion in the Secretary-General's 
role. 
The First Invocation of Article 99. 
The problems in the Congo, like those in Laos, were a product of the difficult transition 
from colonial rule to independent statehood. Anticipating difficulties, Hammarskj6ld sent 
Ralph Bunche to the Congo as his personal representative in May 1960. Belgium had 
convened a conference in January 1960 to discuss Congo's independence. A time-table of 
only six months was agreed, along with a political system which placed the three most 
prominent leaders in central positions. The first elections took place in May, and on 24 
June, Joseph Kasavubu became the inaugural President, Patrice Lumumba the Prime 
Minister, and Moise Tshombe the President of Katanga - the province richest in natural 
resources. Approximately 100,000 Belgian civilians and a small military presence stayed 
on to assist in transition - the combination of Belgian governance and the insular values of a 
fractured and dispersed tribal population had prevented the emergence and training of a 
Congolese administrative elite. Herein lay the seeds of the state's implosion within days of 
independence. 
On 5 July the An-nee Nationale Conglais, (ANC), mutinied against their Belgian officers. 
Deep-seated resentments against Belgian colonialism and exploitation were expressed in 
'See for example, Dayal, Rajeshwar, Mission for Haniniarskjeild: The Congo Crisis, (Princeton: 
Prin ceton 
University Press, 1976); King, Gordon United Nations in the Congo: A Questfor Peace, (New York. 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962); Legum, Colin, Congo Disaster, (Baltimore: Penguin Z-71 r-- 
Books, 1961); Lefever, Ernest W., Crisis in the Congo: A UN Force in Action, (Washington: Brookings 
Institution, 1965); O'Brien, Connor Cruise, To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History, (New York: Simon 
and Shuster, 1962); Urquhart, chs. 15-2 1; and any text on UN peacekeeping. 
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attacks on the Belgian civilians and army personnel still resident and working in Congo. 
On 10 July Belgian forces arrived to reassert law and order and to protect their own. The 
Belgian return was easily construed by a new and insecure goverrunent as neo-colonialism. 
The beating, rape, and killing of Belgian civilians, and their subsequent departure, created a 
problem of another kind. The technical skills and leadership of Belgian officials were to 
provide the glue that would hold together the infant nation. Their exodus triggered the 
collapse of the administrative system exposing latent divisions between competing 
Congolese factions and their respective political leaders. On II July Tshombe announced 
the secession of Katanga and very quickly the gap between Kasavubu and Lumumba began 
to widen. The descent into civil war with an international, (Belgian), dimension was 
further compounded by the interests of the great powers. Although they both supported 
decolonisation, cold war competition was manifest in Soviet and American support for 
Lumumba and Kasavubu respectively. France backed Belgium interests in Katanga. With 
significant financial and trade interests in the Belgian mining conglomerate Union Miniere 
du Haute Katanga, the LJK also backed Tshombe, though the status of nearby British 
colonies tempered their support. 
The internal and external complexities of the Congo quagmire meant that Hammarskjbld 
could not possibly contemplate independent action. This was a matter for the Security 
Council. On 10 July Bunche had advised him to expect a request for technical assistance in 
the military field. ' That assistance Bunche explained, was to enable the ANC to restore law 
and order. Hammarskj6ld made arrangements to convene the Security Council informally 
on 13 July, but this plan was superseded by developments over the next seventy-two 
hours. The arrival of Belgian troops and the Katanga secession thrust Belgian forces into a 
direct confrontation with the national government, which now requested a military 
presence. Further correspondence confirmed that this request was not for internal 
assistance but for a UN Force to remove the Belgian presence. Requests to Ghana and the 
USSR for assistance added to the urgency for a neutral UN force. A lesser UN Presence 
would not be sufficient to deter escalation and the total collapse of the new state. For the 
first time Hammarskj6ld called a meeting of the Security Council, "to bring to the attention 
of the Security Council a matter, which in my opinion, may threaten international peace and 
" The lunch time meeting which had already been informally arranged enabled security. "- 
Hammarskj6ld to make a preliminary report and proposals, and provided time for the 
permanent representatives to liaise with national governments before the formal evening 
session. The Secretary -General had formally convened the 
Security Council for the first 
time. In so doing the possibility of any responsibilities derived from Article 99 had been 
'Unpublished communiqu6 cited by Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 394. 2UN Doc. S/4381,13 July 1960. 
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forsaken. This point would be of critical importance to the justification of executive action 
in the administration of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, (ONUC). I 
Executive Action and Mission Slippage. 
Based on Hammarskj6ld's recommendations, the Security Council adopted Resolution 143 
which, inter alia, called upon Belgium to withdraw and authorised the Secretary-General to 
provide the Congolese Government with, "such military assistance as may be necessary 
until through the efforts of the Congolese government with the technical assistance of the 
United Nations the National Security Forces may be able, in the opinion of the government, 
to meet fully their tasks. ' Q In total the tasks assigned to ONUC were threefold: 3 
- to arrange the withdrawal of Belgian forces and thereby remove the threat to international 
peace and security; 
- to assist the Congolese Government to restore law and order, including the training and 
organisation of the army; 
- to assist the Congolese Government to restore and run essential services. 
In these respects the Secretary-General's mandate had a significant internal as well as 
external dimension and was an early fore-runner to the multi-component peacekeeping 
operations which since the late 1980s have been the rule rather than the exception. 4 The 
civilian and technical functions, however, were quickly subsumed by developments at the 
military politico-level. The first troops began arriving on 15 July and by 18 July 3,500 
troops were stationed in the Congo. 5 By September the departure of Belgian troops was 
well underway. In this respect ONUC was relatively successful. 
The Secretary-General's problems began during August with the gradual polarisation of 
competing factions in the Congolese Government, each supported by a great power. On 5 
September constitutional government collapsed completely. Kasavubu held Lumumba 
personally responsible for the collapse of law and order, and on national radio announced 
that he had deposed the Prime Minister, as was his constitutional right, and invited Joseph 
Ileo to form a new Government. Lumumba replied in kind by announcing that he deposed 
Kasavubu. If this was not his de jure constitutional right his actions had an unmistakable 
defacto constitutional and political significance, and created a political vaccuum both in the 
Congo and at the international level. 
10p6rations Nations Unies pour le Congo. 
2SC Res. 143,14 July 1960. 
3The following summary is provided by Rykhe, Inda-r Jit, 
cit., p. 97. 
4See pp. 262-67. 
5UN Doc. S/4389,18 July 1960. 
"Hammarskjbld and Peacekeeprig. '' ,n Jordan op. 
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The Katanga secession had already exposed a fundamental contradiction in the ONUC 
mandate. In principle ONUC was a neutral and impartial force designed to provide 
assistance to the Government and forestall civil war and superpower intrusion. The 
Katanga secession, however, thmst ONUC into a direct confrontation with Tshombe. The 
Katanga secession was maintained in the short term by the presence of Belgian troops, and 
over the longer term by the European officers and mercenaries in the Katanga administration 
and Gendarmerie who were employed by the Western industrialists running Union 
Miniere. I ONUC was committed to the removal of both, and was therefore in conflict with 
Tshombe, even if the Secretary-General was impartial between the Government and 
Tshombe on the unresolved issues between them that led to the secession. To emphasise 
this subtle distinction, at Hammarskj6ld's request, the Security Council confirmed that SCR 
143 applied equally to Katanga and the rest of the Congo, but also that, "the UN Force will 
not try to influence the outcome of any internal conflict' Q If a clash with Tshombe was 
inevitable, managing the Secretary-General's neutrality was not an impossibility until the 
collapse of the Government itSelf. 3 
The Secretary-General's mandate had been conceived in the vaguest terms to accommodate 
the diversity of interests in the Security Council - Britain, France and China had abstained. 
This fragile consensus rapidly dissipated as the Congolese Govenu-nent collapsed and the 
USSR and US took sides. 4 The Security Council's value as an advisory body was 
nullified, exposing the Secretary-General's management of ONUC. Against this 
background On 21 August 1960 Hammarskj6ld stated, "I have a right to expect guidance, 
but it should be obvious that if the Security Council says nothing I have no choice but to 
follow my convictions. ' '5 This statement was followed by an, 'irresponsible observation, ' 
made in private communications with his representatives. 6 In the event of a political 
vaccuum at both the national and international levels, and given the, "imminent threat of 
large scale violence, "7Hammarskj6ld stated that, "responsible people on the spot might 
commit themselves to what the Secretary-General could not justify doing himself - taking 
the risk of being disowned when it no longer mattered. ' '8 
With these guidelines in mind, on 6 September 1960, Andrew Cordler, (who had replaced 
Bunche), closed down the Leopoldville transmitters and moved to close all airfields 
ITshombe was essentially a black front for protecting Western interests in Katanga. Z71 
2SC Res. 146,9 August 1960. 
30n Hammarskj6ld's conception of neutrality see the Oxford lecture discussed pp. 89-90 
& 174-5. 
40n 14 September a coup d'ýtat led by Colonel Mobutu "neutrallsed" the 2 rival goverriments 
but did not Z-71 
resolve the issue as to whom ONUC was to fumish assistance because of intemational support 
for the 
different factions. 
5UN Doc. SG/952,21 August 1960. 
6Unpublished communication cited in Urquhart, op. cit., p. 444. 
7Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 444. 
8ibid. 
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throughout the Congo. Cordier did not consult the Secretary-General. The intention was to 
prevent the propaganda war that was being conducted on the airwaves from escalating. 
Similarly, closing the airports was designed to prevent the movement of troops and military 
equipment about the Congo. Kasavubu, however, had access to powerful transmitters in 
Brazzaville, and, only Lumumba was engaged in moving military personnel and equipment 
about. Inadvertently Cordier had tipped the internal balance in Kasavubu's favour, and the 
external balance against the USSR. The Secretary-General stood by Cordier's decision 
and was immediately damned by the USSR. In the General Assembly Khruschev launched 
a massive attack on the Secretary -General and proposed that he be replaced by a, 'troika, ' 
of regionally representative Secretary-Generals. ' 
In a similar situation almost a year later, 'mission slippage, ' rather than the Secretary- 
General's, 'irresponsible observation, ' resulted in enforcement action. The process of 
mission slippage began in February 196 1. The failure of ONUC to prevent the capture and 
death of Patrice Lumumba, in conjunction with the increasing regularity and intensity of 
attacks on UN personnel prompted Hammarskj6ld to request from the Security Council a 
strengthened mandate for ONUC. ONUC was authorised, inter alia, "to prevent the 
occurrence of civil war including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all operations, 
the prevention of clashes, and the use offorce, if necessary in the last resort, " (emphasis 
added). 2 The foundations of ONUC had slipped into the reaches of Chapter VIL Although 
the Secretary-General was not mentioned in the resolution, (to avoid a Soviet veto), he had 
been authorised, albeit in the last resort, to command the use of force. 
Hammarskj6ld held these limited powers of enforcement in reserve until August, by when it 
seemed his patience was being rewarded. On I August the reconvened national Assembly 
elected Cyrille Adoula as the, 'formateur, ' of a coalition government. That Government 
was recognised by both the US and the USSR as the legitimate national Government. The 
main obstacle to national reconciliation remained the continued presence of European 
officers and mercenaries in the Katanga Provincial Government and Gendarmenie. The 
May election of a more moderate Belgian Government under the leadership of the, 'UN- 
phile, ' Paul Henri-Spaak, (former General Assembly President), tightened the net around 
Tshombe and further enhanced the possibility more authontative UN action. A limited 
military operation was launched on 28 August. The radio transmitters were closed down 
once more, and an isolated Tshombe quickly complied with the Secretary -General's 
demands for the removal of foreign nationals. O'Brien, (the Secretary -General's new 
representative in Katanga), however, conceded UN supervision for voluntary repatriation 
of Belgian nationals by Tshombe and the Belgian consulate. Tshombe reneged and only 
'See pp. 88-90. 
2SC Res. 161,21 February 1961. 
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three hundred of five hundred mercenaries returned to Europe. A hard-core remained, and 
on 31 August a defector revealed their resistance plans which targeted UN personnel and 
high-ranking officials. In the thick of an impending guerrilla war, O'Brien differed with 
Hammarskj6ld over the limits on the use of force permitted by SCR 161. On 26 August he 
had informed the press that the UN held in reserve the right to end the Katanga secession by 
force. I Hammarskjbld promptly rebuked O'Brien for this public interpretation in a cable to 
Sture Linn6r, (the Secretary-General's officer in charge in the field). 2 Increasingly wary of 
the head strong O'Brien, and the consequences of his 'irresponsible observation' 
Hammarskjbld also informed Linner, 
'While he fully understood the pressures and the impossible circumstances 
under which his representatives in Katanga were working, he must without 
fail be kept informed in advance of important proposals, moves and plans, 
so that he could communicate his views and directives in advance. ' '3 
The Secretary-General also prepared and forwarded a ten point plan on the principles 
governing the use of force and the extent of interference in Congo internal affairs that SCR 
161 permitted. 4 O'Brien had also been at work and provided a plan for the Secretary- 
General of progressively more assertive measures culminating in another radio take-over, 
the arrest of mercenaries, action to prevent the interference in UN action by Katanga 
Gendarmerie and placing Katanga under the governance of a Congolese Commisaire d'etat. 
For Hanu-narskj6ld the plan hinged on Tshombe's agreement and bringing the Gendarmerie 
on-side. The Secretary-General agreed in principle to a non violent take-over but also 
directed the UN representatives not to act until after he had spoken with Aduola in 
Leopoldville. This was not the instruction that O'Brien received from Khiary, (Secretary- 
General's representative in charge of Civilian Operations). 5 O'Brien believed he had been 
given the go ahead for his more authoritative interpretation of the ONUC mandate, and 
while Hammarskj6ld was en route to Leopoldville he instructed UN troops to retake the 
radio transmission facilities and begin rounding up European mercenaries for expulsion 
from the Congo. Tshombe, however, was not available to, 'voluntarily, ' hand over the 
reigns to the Commisaire, and the Gendarmefie had not been brought on-side. Rather, in 
anticipation of a third radio black-out the Gendarmerie were ready and waiting for the 
ONUC troops who immediately become embroiled in a battle for the control of Katanga. 
O'Brien had made, 'Irresponsible observations, ' and taken executive action in the 
Secretary -General's name. Without authorisation from the Secretary-General or the 
Security Council ONUC had slipped in to an enforcement action and provoked a 
ISee Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 555. 
2ibid. 
3Unpublished communiqu& cited by Urquhart, op. cit., p. 558. 
4For summary, see Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 561. 
5For O'Brien's version of events see, O'Brien, Connor Cruise, To Katanga and Back, (New York- Simon and 
Schuster, 1962). 
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constitutional crisis at Headquarters over, "who decides and how. "' That crisis took two 
forms: Khruschev's proposal for a 'Troika' of Secretaries-General accountable to the first, 
second and third worlds respectively; and a fiscal crisis induced by the Soviet, (and 
French), refusal to pay for UNEF and ONUC. 2 
Khruschev's Troika. 
The isolation of Lumumba by the radio black out in September 1960 provoked a vicious 
assault on the Secretary-General and the Secretary-Generalship by Nikita Khruschev. 
When the General Assembly opened for its fifteenth session the Soviet Premier embarked 
on a lengthy diatribe in which he deplored the misuse of the Secretary-General and his staff 
by the US and the colonialists for conducting their, 'dirty work, ' and lambasted the 
Secretary-General for his succour. 3 In the Secretary-General's place Khruschev proposed, 
'a collective executive organ, ' of three equally ranked Secretaries-General representative of 
the Eastern, Western, and neutral regions of the world. This troika, Khruschev reasoned, 
"would provide a definite guarantee that the work of the UN executive would not be carried 
on to the detriment of any one of these group of states. ' '4 Khruschev's proposal was an 
unadulterated attempt to extend the Soviet veto to the functioning of the Secretariat. 
Khruschev's resolve was strengthened by the death of Lumumba and the alleged failure of 
ONUC to provided the former Prime Minister in the Congo with adequate protection, and 
Hammarskj6ld's death provided a second opportunity for the Soviet Premier to revive his 
proposals. 5 
The Soviet Premier had raised some fundamental questions regarding the very basis on 
which a role for the Secretary-General in the maintenance of international peace and security 
was conceived at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco. In this respect comments made to 
Walter Lippmann of the Washington Post are instructive and insightful: "while there are 
neutral countries, there are no neutral men. '16 In the General Assembly Khruschev also 
stated, "let those who believe in saints hold to their opinion: we do not credit such taleS. "7 
Lippmann argued that the Soviets believed, "there can be no such thing as an impartial civil 
servant III this deeply divided world, and that the kind of political celibacy which the British 
theory of the civil servant calls for, is in international affairs a fiction. " The Secretary- 
'Schachter, Oscar, "The International Civil Servant: Neutrality and Responsibility, " in Jordan, Robert S., 
Dag Hatnniarskj6ld Revisited: The UN Secretary- General as a Force in World Politics, (Durham, N. C.: 
Carolina Academic Press, 1983), p. 45. 
2Troika is the Russian term for a carriage drawn by three horses. 
3GAOR 87 1 st meeting, 23 September 1960. 
41bid. 
50n Hammarskjb Id's death see pp. 124-6. 
6Lippmann, cited by Hammarskj6ld in, "The International Civil Servant in 
Law and Fact, " lecture delivered 
in the Sheldonian Theatre at Oxford University, 30 May 1961, reproduced in 
Foote, op. cit., p. 329. This 
lecture is widely regarded as the most comprehensive defence of the Secretary-General's neutrality. 
7GAOR 882nd meeting, 3 October 1960. 
8 Lippmann, cited by Hammarskj6ld in, "The International Civil Servant In 
Lavv and Fact, '' lecture delivered 
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General's first line of defence was a firm, but dignified rebuttal of Khruschev's proposals 
in the General Assembly on 26 September and on 3 October. This was complemented by an 
academic exposition of his concept of neutrality, most notably at Oxford in May 1961. 
In the General Assembly Hammarskj6ld observed that, "strict impartiality at any stage can 
become an obstacle for those who work for certain political aims which would be better 
served or more easily achieved if the Secretary-General compromised with this attitude. ", 
He then stated, "I would rather see the office break on strict adherence to the principle of 
independence, impartiality and objectivity than drift on the basis of compromise. ' Q Finally, 
Hammarskj6ld added, "it is not the Soviet Union, nor indeed any other great power who 
needs the UN for their protection; it is all the others. In this sense the organisation is first 
of all their organisation, and I deeply believe in the wisdom with which they will be able to 
use it and guide it. I shall remain in my post during the term of my office as a servant of the 
organisation in the interests of all other nations, as long as they wish me to do So. "3 For 
this statement Hanimarskj6ld received a standing ovation and an overwhelming and 
unprecedented vote of confidence. Khruschev's proposals found little support outside the 
East European caucus, but the accusations of partiality struck a chord outside the Eastern 
bloc. 4 These rumblings of discontent prompted Hammarskj6ld's clarification of the 
Secretary-General's neutrality in his Oxford speech. Hammarskjbld conceded to 
Khruschev that there are no neutral men, but refused to accept that individuals of different 
national, political, ideological, cultural, racial, or religious backgrounds could not apply the 
Charter neutrally. 
I would say there is no neutral man, but there is, if you have integrity, 
neutral action ... 
What is meant by 'neutrality' in this kind of debate, is of 
course, neutrality in relation to interests; and there I do claim that there is no 
insurmountable difficulty for anybody with the proper kind of guiding 
principles in carrying through such neutrality 100%. 115 
In his lecture Hammarskj6ld outlined three sources of those, 'guiding principles. ' 
Firstly, the principles and purposes of the Charter in conjunction with international law, 
UN resolutions, precedents and conventions. In this respect the provisions of Articles 97, 
100 and 101 explicitly aim to secure the independence and neutrality of the Secretary- 
General and his staff. Secondly, the UN Members themselves, to whom the Secretary- 
General has constant personal private access in New York, - "there must be a link between 
in the Sheldonian T'heatre at Oxford University, 30 May 1961, reproduced in Foote, op. cit., p. 
329. 
1 GAOR, 87 1 st meeting 26 September, 1960, also reproduced in Foote, op. cit., p. 316. 
2ibid. 
3GAOR, 882nd meeting, 3 October 1960, also reproduced in Foote, op. cit., p. 3 19. 
4See introduction to Oxford lecture, op. cit., pp. 329 & 346 - in the Congo, ''almost any 
decision he made Z: ) 
as to the composition of the Force or its role would have been contrary to the attitudes of some members. 
" 
5Comment in reply to press conference question on lecture, 12 June 196 1, reproduced in 
Foote, op. cit., p. 
351. 
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the judgement of the executive and the consensus of the political bodies. " I And thirdly, the 
more abstract concept of personal integrity - "this is not unique. Is not every judge under 
the same obligation. "2 
Each of these Hammarskjbld argued, is a check on an individual's socially and culturally 
received bias, and guarantees for the Secretary-General and his staff an international 
outlook independent of national interests. It is on this concept of neutrality that the 
Secretary-General's role as an honest broker and peacekeeper developed. This concept of 
neutrality, however, does not guarantee impartiality between nations at the expense of 
Charter principles. "I am not neutral in terms of the Charter' '3Hammarskj6ld stated. Lie, 
was clearly not impartial between North Korea and South Korea when North Korea 
invaded the South. To insure the Secretary-General remained silent where a clash existed 
between a member states national interest and the international interest as represented in the 
Charter, Khruschev was prepared to sacrifice the Secretary -General's good-offices. 
Hammarskj6ld won the philosophical battle for the soul of the Secretary-Generalship, but 
not without also having to face down practical attempts to make the higher echelons of the 
Secretariat an intergovernmental rather than international body. 4 
Hammarskjbld thus won a famous victory which Jordan contends, "illustrated how firmly 
established was the notion that there should be a politically independent officer at the top of 
the UN structure, supported by an international Secretariat modelled after the British civil 
servant tradition. ' '5 For a second time an incumbent was successful in protecting the 
Secretary-General's independence. The Secretary -General's potential as an intermediary 
was undiminished, and the basis for his administration of peacekeeping operations secured. 
What had really been at issue, however, was how to control or influence the executive 
decisions of the Secretary-General in the administration of those mandates conferred on 
him. The solution was not a troika, but clearer, and if necessary, more restrictive 
mandates. For this the Security Council had to retain greater control over UN action in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. This was the outcome of the crisis over the 
financing of peacekeeping. 
Financing Peacekeeping. 
The General Assembly controls the UN purse-strings and between 1960 and 1964 
authorised $408m for ONUC. 6 These expenses were apportioned between the member 
'Oxford Lecture, op. cit., pp. 346-7. 
2ibid., p. 348. 
3Press comment, op. cit., p. 351. 
4 See pp. 174-5. 
ýJordan, op. cit., p. 3 
6ibid. 
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states in accordance with the formula for calculating contributions to the regular budget. 
France and the USSR and a small number of other countries, however, refused to pay their 
assessed contribution and by 1964 the UN was virtually bankrupt. I The issue at stake was 
not the finance of ONUC per se, but an institutional battle over the control of peacekeeping 
operations. ONUC had been created by the Security Council with an open-ended timetable 
for withdrawal. When in Soviet eyes the operation began to go awry there existed no means 
by which Moscow could pull the plug. Firstly, a draft resolution in the Security Council 
proposing the withdrawal of ONUC was subject to the permanent member veto, (if ONUC 
had been given a renewable mandate, that mandate would have been subject to the Soviet 
veto). Secondly, such is the voting procedure in the General Assembly, that the USSR has 
no veto, requires a two-thirds majority to cancel a mandate, and one-third of the vote plus 
one to prevent further expansions in an operation's mandate. 2 
Just as Khruschev's proposals for a troika were an attempt to extend the veto into the 
Secretariat, so budgetary withholdings were an attempt to exercise a veto in the General 
Assembly, "by other means. "3 The issue came to a head at the end of 1961 with a General 
Assembly Resolution, initiated by the US, requesting an advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) as to whether, "expenditures authorised in General 
Assembly Resolutions ... constitute 'expenses of the Organisation' within the meaning of 
Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the UNT '4 'Me ICJ ruled that General Assembly 
had acted constitutionally in the apportionment of expenses, and added that the General 
Assembly could enforce payment, even if, "the action was carried out by the wrong organ 
... [or] in a manner not in conformity with the division of functions among the several 
organs which the Charter prescribes. "5 Irrespective of the disputed legality of the 
Secretary-General's actions, the General Assembly could compel the USSR and France to 
pay-up by applying Article 19 of the Charter. 6 The Court's ruling was endorsed by the 
General Assembly, 7but France and the USSR refused to pay for an operation which 
contradicted their perceived national interests - after all, this was the very basis on which the 
'On finance of ONUC see Durch, op. cit., pp. 329-331. 
2Art1cle 18 (2) states, "Decisions of the General Assembly on important question shall be made by a 2/3 
majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations on matters of 
international peace and security ... 
" N. B. SC Res. 157,17 September 1960 invoked the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution and passed responsibility for the ONUC mandate to the General Assembly. 
317ranck, Thomas M., Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the UN Drearn and What the US Can Do 
About It, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 83. 
4GA Res. 173 1,20 December 196 1. Article 17 (2) states, "the expenses of the organisation shall be borne C) II 
by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly. " 
5Certain Expense of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 163. 
6Article 19 states, "A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its contributions 
to the Organisation shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds 
the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding 2 full years 
7GA Res. 1854,19 December 1962. 
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Security Council structure and veto was conceived. By 1964, such were their debts that 
Article 19 was applicable, but as Franck explains was not applied for four key reasons: I 
- the US was not convinced this bluff would work - France and the USSR might simply 
stop participating in the organisation rather than be force to pay; 
- the US was not certain that the General Assembly President, Alex Quaison-Sackey 
(Ghana), would uphold Article 19, (recall abuse of Security Council rules by the West in 
Laos); 
- the US was not certain the majority would uphold Article 19, given that the non-aligned 
required Soviet help for their own anti-colonial and anti-South African agenda; 
- the US was no longer certain that the short term gains outweighed the long term costs of 
empowering the General Assembly - the US now had an interest in measures of control 
over the General Assembly. 
In 1965, a Special Committee on peacekeeping operations was established by the General 
Assembly to find a workable compromise. 2 By 1965, with General Assembly membership 
continuing to rise, and the non-aligned majority wresting the balance of power away from 
the Western majority, the US decided not to pursue the Article 19 option. The committee 
agreed that the Assembly should, "take into account any strong political objections which 
might have been voiced by a permanent member of the Security Council. "3 Henceforth the 
ICJ ruling and the Uniting for Peace procedure were for all intents and purposes redundant. 
The US had been a prime mover in expanding the General Assembly's role in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. With both the US and USSR now 
unwilling to apply the Acheson plan, de facto, peacekeeping belonged to the Security 
Council. In respect of the Secretary-General the ramifications became apparent in Cyprus 
(1964), in the controversial withdrawal of UNEF from the Middle East in (1967), and in 
the creation of the second UN Emergency Force (1973). Before both, however, the new 
Secretary -General provided his good offices to the superpowers 
for the first time. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis (1961). 
The Cuban Missile Crisis was a conflict at two levels. It was a clash between Cuba and the 
US, which escalated into a direct confrontation between the US and USSR. Relations 
between Cuba and the US declined steadily after the establishment of Fidel Castro's 
revolutionary Government in January 1959. At this level the US preferred the 
Organisation 
of American States, (OAS), to UN assistance but under American influence the 
OAS 
became a party to the dispute rather than an organisation through which Cuba and the 
US 
might resolve their differences. 4 In respect of the clash that subsequently arose 
between the 
US and USSR, however, for the first time the Secretary-General's good offices were made 
available to, and utilised in a dispute between the superpowers. The 
Secretary-General was 
never involved directly in the negotiations but the role he played m averting a nuclear 
Tranck, op. cit., p. 85. 
2GA Res. 2006 XIX- 
3Franck, op. cit., p. 85-, see also UN Yearbook, 1965, p. 4. 
40n build up to Cuban Missile Crisis see U Thant, op. cit., pp. 158-161. 
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confrontation is still described by his former colleague, Ramsis Nassif, as U Thant's, 
"greatest achievement. "' 
During October 1962, US surveillance revealed uncompleted Soviet missile installations in 
Cuba. President Kennedy immediately demanded the withdrawal of Soviet missiles, 
announced an air and naval quarantine around Cuba to prevent the arrival of further 
shipments, and that Khruschev, "move the world back from the abyss of destruction. "2 
With Soviet shipments already bound for Cuba the superpowers now stood, "eyeball to 
eyeball, ' '3 in a stand-off at sea, in which one false move or mistake threatened a nuclear 
confrontation. Encouraged by forty-five member states U Thant intervened by sending 
identical messages to Khruschev and Kennedy. 4 The Secretary-General: 
" proposed 'voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba; ' 
" proposed 'voluntary suspension of quarantine measure involving searching ships bound 
for Cuba; ' 
" offered his office, 'for whatever services I might be able to perform; ' 
" recalled a statement made by Castro before the General Assembly on 26 September, in 
which the Cuban leader stated, were the US to give us proof, by word and deed that it 
would not carry out aggression against our country, then, we declare solemnly before you 
our weapons would be unnecessary and our army redundant. ' 
The Secretary-General's initiative was welcomed by Khruschev, but Kennedy was less 
forthcoming. On 26 October the Secretary-General made a second appeal for calm and 
moderation. U Thant requested of Kennedy that, "US vessels in the Caribbean do 
everything possible to avoid a direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in 
order to minimise the risks of any untoward incident. "5 And from Khruschev, U Thant 
requested that, "Soviet ships on the way to Cuba stay away from the interception area. 116 
The Secretary-General hoped these measures would, 'permit discussion of the modalities of 
a possible agreement. 117 
Soviet overtures indicated a willingness to exchange the removal of Soviet weapons 
systems for withdrawal of Cuban quarantine measures, and American guarantees of Cuban 
sovereignty, (the Secretary -General's proposals). The USSR also suggested 
UN 
verification of any Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. On 26 and 27 October the momentary 
threat of a further escalation severely tested the leaders commitment to the private 
dialogue 
which had opened up, and eventually gave impetus towards a negotiated solution. 
On 26 
I Nassif, Ramses, U Thant in New York 1961-1971 
Hurst & Co., 1988), p. 25. 
2Quoted in Nassif, op. cit., p. 26. 
3Nassif, op. cit., p. 25. 
4See SCOR 1024th meeting, 24 October 1962. 
5UN Doc. SG/ 1358,26 October 1962. 
6UN Doc. SG/ 1357,26 October 1962. 
7ibid. 
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October the US Navy intercepted, boarded, and inspected The Marucla in quarantined 
waters. The cargo ship was Panamanian owned, but under Soviet charter. According to 
Robert Kennedy it was specifically chosen, "because it was not a Soviet-owned vessel, it 
did not present a direct affront to the Soviets, requiring a response from them. It gave them 
more time, but simultaneously demonstrated that the US meant business. "' Then on 27 
October an American U-2 surveillance plane was shot down over Cuba. At the same time 
reports in the Soviet press were proposing linking a Soviet withdrawal from Cuba to the 
removal of American warheads from Turkey. Against this background Kennedy accepted 
the Soviet proposals and an agreement was struck, which Kennedy stated was, "greatly 
facilitated, ' '2by U Thant. 
The only problem in this agreement was the failure to consult Castro, who refused to accept 
a UN presence to verify the dismantling of Soviet equipment. On 30 October U Thant 
visited Havana to negotiate with Castro in person, but was successful only in securing the 
return of the body of the American pilot shot down three days earlier. While in Havana, 
however, U Thant was informed by the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba that dismantling and 
withdrawal of Soviet military installations had already begun. Castro was upset by his 
ally's failure to consult with him, and dissatisfied with American assurances of non- 
intervention, but the superpowers were moving ahead without him. In return for UN 
verification Castro was prepared to trade reciprocal inspection of American bases on the 
American east coast. U Thant explored this avenue tentatively but was rebuffed by the US. 
Instead negotiations between the US and USSR continued at the UN in the Secretary- 
General's conference room. The Secretary-General was not involved in these substantive 
deliberations but on 13 November, a 14 point draft protocol was agreed to which Cuba, the 
US, USSR, and Secretary -General were signatories. 3 This agreement provided 
for UN 
verification, but in practice the US, USSR, and Cuba agreed an alternative arrangement 
whereby Cuba would turn a blind eye to violations of its airspace by American surveillance 
aircraft. On 26 November the quarantine was lifted and on 7 January the Secretary -General 
received a joint demarch6 from the US and USSR thanking him for his efforts and 
requesting the withdrawal of the issue from the Security Council agenda. A number of 
differences remained vis-a-vis Cuban security rights but the direct confrontation between 
the superpowers had been successfully resolved. 
Oran Young argues that the Secretary -General played a peripheral role which 
demonstrated, 
"significant weaknesses in the resources of the Secretafiat from the point of view of 
potential interventions in Soviet-Amencan crises. ' '4 Young is cfitical of the Secretary- 
'Cited in Boudreau, op. cit., p. 82. 
2UN Files cited in U Thant, op. cit., p. 177. 
31bid., p. 190. 
4y ýersit\ Press. oung, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, (Princeton: 
Princeton Ljnl I, 
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General's apparent, "lack of knowledge, "' and inability to, "assess accurately what the 
effect of the steps he proposed would be on the military balance in the situation. " 2 Certainly 
U Thant had no independent means of verifying the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. 
In this respect the Secretary -General's initial communications, which accepted the accuracy 
of American information, might easily have thrown the Secretary-General into a 
confrontation with the USSR. This line of argument is borne out by the initial response of 
the Soviet permanent representative, himself in the dark as to Soviet policy in Cuba. At the 
first meeting of the Security Council to consider the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Secretary- 
General appealed for restraint and recited the letters he had cabled to Khruschev and 
Kennedy. The following morning, the Soviet representative met with the Secretary-General 
to protest against the Secretary-General's failure to condemn the US quarantine. Much to 
his embarrassment Khruschev accepted U Thant's proposals that afternoon. 
Young's assessment assumes that the superpowers' actions in the escalation of the conflict, 
the management of the conflict, and the means of managing the conflict, are shaped only by 
a 'realist' assessment of politics among nations. 3 This assessment underestimates the value 
of the Secretary-General as a non state actor. It is significant that the means by which the 
superpowers managed the conflict and the basis for an agreement both originated in the 
Secretary-General's proposals made at the outset of the crisis. The Secretary-General 
offered a detached and face-saving outlet for proposals on which the superpowers would 
have found it more difficult to agree had they been put forwardby a state in either of the 
respective camps. U Thant identified, "salient escalation controlS, "4facilitating 
negotiations, which themselves were based on proposals posted by the Secretary-General. 
The 3 8th floor also served as a, 'sorting office, ' and neutral meeting place for the US and 
USSR. The expansion of the Secretary-General's negotiating remit in the realm of 
superpower relations was confirmed in 1987 by Dean Rusk's revelation that at the height of 
the crisis Kennedy made emergency arrangements for involving the Secretary-General 
directly in the negotiations between the US and USSR. 5 
The setting of this precedent, which involved the establishment of a trusting and working 
rapport with U Thant, enhanced the possibility of greater involvement by the Secretary- 
General in superpower relations. Returning to Young's assessment, however, the 
Secretary -General was not in any sense empowered to intervene on a regular 
basis. The 
prerogative to utilise the Secretary-General's good offices, as in any dispute, remained 
1967), p. 287. 
1 Ibid. 
21bid. 
3Morgenthau, Politics Aniong Nations, (New York: Knopf, 1948). 
4Boudreau, op. cit., p. 67. 
an Missile Crisis, "Nelv )ork 5See, Lukas, J. Anthony, "Class Reunion: Kennedy's Men Relve the Cub 
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firmly in the hands of the parties to that dispute, and their assessment of whether the 
Secretary-General's assistance was in their interest or not. 
Good Offices Experiments: Arbitration. 
On three separate occasions during his tenure, U Thant's good offices were utilised not for 
negotiating or mediating a diplomatic impasse but to arbitrate one. I On the first occasion U 
Thant responded to a request from Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, to ascertain the 
wishes of the People of Sabah (Borneo) and Sarawak regarding their future status. 2Malaya 
had gained independence from the UK in 1957, but the UK had retained governance over 
Sabah and Sarawak. In 1963, Indonesia and the Philippines objected to a Malayan 
proposal for a Federation of Malaysia incorporating these two territories. The request for 
the Secretary-General's assistance entailed a fact-finding mission but also much more than 
that. The three Governments had asked the Secretary-General to make a political judgement 
on the basis of his findings. U Thant accepted this role, but only on the condition that the 
parties accept his findings as binding. As such, U Thant undertook the first case of 
arbitration by a Secretary-General. U Thant reported on 14 September that the people of 
both territories were overwhelmingly in favour of a Malaysian Federation, which came into 
effect on 16 September. The Secretary-General's conclusions were disputed by Indonesia 
and the Philippines but given legal status by the admission of the Federation to the UN. In 
protest Indonesia promptly withdrew from the UN but returned two years later. 
Similar functions were delegated to a tribunal chaired by a professional arbitrator under the 
Secretary-General's auspices in the dispute between India and Pakistan over the Rann of 
Kutch. 3 At the beginning of 1965 fighting had broken out between Indian and Pakistani 
forces in the disputed border area. India alleged violation of its territorial integrity and 
attacks on its outposts by Pakistan, who in turn charged India with interfering with its 
border patrols. U Thant's quiet diplomacy encouraged a cease-fire agreement between the 
two states', which also required them to submit their dispute to arbitration by an independent 
three man tribunal appointed by the Secretary -General. UThant appointed as Chairman, 
Gunnar Karl Lagergren, a Stockholm Court of Appeal Judge, "and an able arbitrator of 
long experience. ' '4 The Tribunal's findings were published in February 1968 and extended 
by 350 square miles the Pakistani border into the Rann. Despite tremendous domestic 
pressure the Indian Pri me- Minister, Indira Ghandi, accepted the findings and in July 1969 
India and Pakistan signed agreements formally demarcating their boundary line. As in the 
'Compare these three cases with the dispute over the Rainbow Warrior in 1986, pp. 
287-9. 
2UN Doc. SG/ 1583 13 September 1963. 
3The facts, but not their interpretation rely heavily on U Thant's version of events, see 
U Thant. op. cit., 
pp. 397-8. 
4ibid. 
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Malyan case, U Thant had insisted on a prior agreement on the unconditional acceptance of 
the recommendations and in his memoirs praises Ghandi for honouring this commitment. 
The third case of arbitration under the Secretary-General's auspices occurred in the dispute 
between Iran and the UK over the identity of Bahrain in 1970. While Iran claimed 
jurisdiction over the territory, the UK contended Bahrain was a separate Arab state in its 
own right. In early 1970 extensive quiet diplomacy on U Thant's part paved the way for an 
Iranian request, (endorsed by the UK), for the Secretary-General's good offices, in which 
U Thant asserts that, "for the first time in UN history the parties ... gave a prior pledge to 
accept without reservation the finding or conclusion of his personal representative, provided 
the conclusions were endorsed by the Security Council, "' (emphasis added). The prior 
agreement of the parties to abide by the Secretary-General's findings and recommendations 
is the feature which distinguishes between fact-finding and arbitration under the Secretary- 
General's auspices. The Secretary-General's good offices are thus given a greater moral 
clout and a deceptive legalistic quality - in practical terms the Secretary -General has no 
authority to impose his findings, and their acceptance is no more or less binding on the 
parties. Subjecting the parties commitment to Security Council endorsement of the 
Secretary -General's findings, however, made acceptance of those findings obligatory. 2 U 
Thant sent Vittorio Winspeare Guiccardi as his personal representative to Bahrain and on 30 
April was able to report the Bahrainian desire for independence and self determination. 3 
Their wish was duly endorsed by SCR 278 on 11 May 1970. 
Peacekeeping in Cyprus: Back to Basics. 
The deteriorating situation in Cyprus was brought to the attention of the Security Council in 
the midst of the financial and constitutional crisis over peacekeeping at the UN. The issues 
surrounding the institutional confrontation at headquarters were played out in the creation 
and management of the UN force In Cyprus. 
Cyprus was granted independence on 16 August 1960. The Greek and Turkish 
communities were united only in their opposition to British colonial rule. British 
governance, in conjunction with Turkish and Greek support for their Cypriot compatriots 
had created a bitter and secular society. 4 In the new constitution complicated power-sharing 
arrangements were designed to protect the political, social, economic and civil liberties of 
1 ffices and the 1U Thant, op. ci . t., p. 5 1; see also Jensen, Erik, "The Secretary- General's use of Good 01 
Question of Bahrain, " Millenium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, Winter 1985. 
2ThIs proviso Is not foolproof. As a veto-wielder the UK retained a trump card In Security 
Council 
approval of the Secretary -General findings 3UN Doc. S/9772,30 April 1970.0 
4 On history of the conflict and British colonialism see, Norton, Augustus, R., "The Roots of the 
Conflict 
in Cyprus" in Skellsbaek, Kjell, (ed. ), The Cyprus Conflict and the Role of the UN, NUPI 
Report 122 
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the minority Turkish population. The constitutional safeguards were tested to their limits by 
the two communities, and rather than fostering unity and trust, emphasised the divisions 
between them. On 30 November 1963, the Greek Cypriot President, Archbishop 
Markorios, proposed abolition of the Turkish constitutional special status. The proposals 
were sold as an attempt to purge the constitution of its divisive elements. The Turkish 
Cypriots, however, feared the purge was of them, not the constitution. Fighting broke out 
on 21 December 1963, and in accordance with obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee 
which accompanied the treaties establishing Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey combined 
to provide a peacekeeping force until a settlement could be reached. A peacekeeping force 
comprising Greek and Turkish contingents, however, was just as likely to implode with the 
situation in Cyprus as stabilise it. Given the legacy of British rule, I the UK was not well 
suited to a dominant peacekeeping role either and did not relish the prospect of being caught 
between two NATO allies. On 15 February, 1964, the Security Council authorised the 
Secretary-General to establish a UN Force in Cyprus with a mandate to, "use their best 
efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and, as necessary, to contribute to the 
maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions. "2 
In this mandate, it seems none of the lessons of the Congo were applied. Three 
fundamental questions were left unanswered: What were the limits to, 'best effortsT What 
constituted, 'as necessaryT And what were, 'normal conditionsT The latter in particular 
was open to question, and over the next decade was repeatedly disputed by both sides. 
Conversely, this lack of clarity helped maintain the impression of impartiality. The 
operation had not been asked to assist the Government and could be interpreted to suit the 
Turkish and Cypriot positions. The answers to the other two questions were provided by 
U Thant in an aide memoire to the British Government emphasising the difference between 
3 UN and NATO or unilateral operations, and in his first report to the Security Council on 
the situation in the CypruS. 4 In these U Thant provided an authoritative definition of 
UNFICYP's functions and operating procedures, which, given the environment at the UN 
were remarkably assertive. Closer examination, however, reveals that the Secretary- 
General's command was in practice far more constrained. In this respect U Thant's actions 
must be viewed as an assertion of the Secretary -General's role in the command of 
peacekeeping in view of ongoing discussion regarding this role in the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping. 
ibid. 
2SC Res. 186,4 March 1964. 
3CIted in Luard, Evan, A History of the United Nations 
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The Secretary-General's report provided for a programme of short term and long term 
measures which were highly intrusive in the domestic jurisdiction of a member state, but, 
critically, were endorsed by the Cypriot authorities and accepted by the two communities. 
Short term confidence and stabilising functions included inter alia: the return of refugees; 
removal of fortifications; replacement of the local police with UN police; joint UN, Greek 
and Turkish patrols; and the resumption of contacts between the communities. In the longer 
term the Secretary-General envisaged inter alia: the disarming of civilians; evacuation and 
removal of fortified positions; reintegration of the police; normal functioning of the 
judiciary; the return to public office of Turkish Cypriots; and security measures to facilitate 
the normal functioning of social and economic relations. I In the execution of these 
functions, UNFICYP had only a Chapter VI mandate and the UNEF principles applied. 
The only exception was the participation of British troops. Otherwise U Thant emphasised 
that, "no action was to be taken by UN troops which was likely to bring them into a direct 
conflict with either community, except where members of the force were compelled to act in 
self defence. "2 Like Hammarskj6ld before him, U Thant also delegated emergency 
discretionary powers, 
"Troops might be authorised to use force in the event of attempts to compel 
them to withdraw from a position which they occupied under orders from 
their commanders, or attempts to infiltrate positions which their commanders 
thought it was necessary for them to hold. It was for local commanders to 
decide whether force was necessary, and in what degree, but should it be 
necessary to use arms, advance warning would be given wherever 
possible. "3 
In practice, U Thant's apparent wide margin of executive discretion was tempered by the 
circumstances in which this mandate was conferred. The USSR and France both objected 
to the draft proposals delegating to the Secretary-General responsibility for establishing the 
composition and size of the force, and this clause of SCR 186 was voted on separately. 4 In 
the event, the USSR and France did not veto the delegation of this executive authority to the 
Secretary-General, but registered their dissatisfaction by abstaining from the vote, and from 
the financial arrangements agreed f6rUJ,, MCY-P. 5 The force had been requested by the 
Cyprus Government. As the self-proclaimed vanguard of national sovereignty, 
decolonisation, and the rights of small and non-aligned nations, the USSR could hardly 
veto action requested by such a member state. Furthermore, a UN Force, whatever the 
I ibid. 
2Secretary-General's aide mernoire, cited in Luard, op. cit., p. 416. 
3ibid. 
4See SCOR meetings I 100,110 1,1102, on 2,3, &4 March 1964. 
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Secretary-General's role, was a far better alternative to the NATO intervention which was 
being considered by the UK and US. Thirdly, and critically, a compromise was reached 
whereby UNFICYP was given only a three month renewable mandate. ' The USSR, 
therefore, held in reserve the right to veto the continuation of UNFICYP. In this respect the 
Security Council retained greater sanction and control over the Secretary-General's 
command of UNFICYP. The Secretary-General's management of peacekeeping operations 
from this point forward would have to match much more closely the consensus in the 
Security Council on its operations, however fragile or chameleon that consensus. In 
practice, therefore, UNFICYP's mandate was limited to truce supervision, and expressed in 
negative tenns. As described by Urquhart: 2UNFICYP was not authorised to take over the 
functions of government; to disarm regular or irregular forces; or dictate or enforce 
solutions. Fulfilment of the functions outlined by the Secretary-General was entirely at the 
discretion of the Cypriots themselves. Peacekeeping in Cyprus had gone back to basics as 
a secondary activity intended to facilitate a solution, rather than impose one. 
In keeping with the temper of the crisis at UN headquarters, responsibility for negotiating a 
political settlement was delegated to a UN Mediator, appointed by the Secretary-General, 
rather than to the Secretary-General himself. 3 The role of the Secretary-General's special 
representative in Cyprus was therefore limited to political issues concerned with the 
UNFICYP mandate and the maintenance of law and order. In a matter of months, 
however, the role of the UN Mediator came unstuck on the intransigence, distrust, 
cynicism, and hatred which has characterised relations between the two communities. 
Invariably, Urquhart explains, "the side in Cyprus which, at any given time, regards itself 
as the underdog is unlikely to have the confidence to accept any permanent solution which 
is acceptable to the other side. ' '4 This meant acceptance of the Mediator's plan for 
reconciliation and national unity by the Greek Cypriots but its rejection by the Turkish 
Cypriots. Furthermore the Turks refused to deal with anyone else, and the Greeks replied 
in kind by refusing to deal with anyone other than Plaza Lasso. The thankless task of the 
now defunct UN Mediator thus returned to the Secretary -General's special representative. 
Over the next decade successive incumbents of this post enjoyed varying degrees of success 
in chairing mter-community talks but invariably one or other side balked whenever an 
agreement seemed close. That the Secretary -General's special representatives were able to 
continue in this role was due to the comparative success that UNFICYP enjoyed in the 
fulfilment of its mandate. If the two communities were agreed on anything, it was that they 
did not want to go to war. As the civilian commander of UNFICYP in the field, the special 
'Since SC Res. 206,15 June 1965, that mandate has been renewed every 6 months. 
2Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 200. 
3SC Res. 186,4 March 1964, first Sakari Tuomioja (remember Laos), and then Gala Plaza Lasso, former 
President of Ecuador with experience in UNOGIL and ONUC. 
4ibid. 
-100- 
representatives were bolstered by this success. If UNFICYP took sides, appeared to take 
sides, or attempted to impose a solution, it's role as an impartial buffer would evaporate and 
with it, confidence in the special representative. 
The Withdrawal of UNEF (1967). 
On 16 May, General Rikhye, the Commander of UNEF received from the UAR Chief of 
Staff a communique advising, for their own security that UN troops should be withdrawn. 
Rikhye did not have the authority to act on Nasser's request/demand, and forwarded the 
communique to U Thant. ' On 17 May, Egyptian troops occupied UN posts in the Sinai, 
and on 18 May an official request was made by Nasser to the Secretary-General for the 
withdrawal of UNEF. 2Without recourse to the General Assembly or the Secufity Council 
U Thant reluctantly complied. The Secretary-General's decision was at once an assertion of 
the executive authority conceived by Hammarskjbld, and, paradoxically, compliance with 
the objections raised to the assertion of that executive authority. The Secretary-General's 
decision, (compared with decisions taken in the Secretary-General's name), reduced rather 
than expanded the operation's mandate. UNEF was withdrawn rather than thrust into a 
conflict with Egypt, or between Egypt and Israel. As such U Thant's actions were an 
affirmation of the principle of consent and emphasised the return to peacekeeping basics 
demonstrated in Cyprus. 
Nasser's request was motivated by the perception of an inuninent Israeli attack on Syria. 
Bolstered by Soviet military supplies, and encouraged by his Arab peers, Nasser forced a 
confrontation with Israel. In the so called, 'Six Day War'Egypt, (and Jordan), suffered a 
massive military defeat and Israel won control of the West Bank, the Sinai, and the Golan 
Heights. Herein lay the issues of peace and security which would require two further 
peacekeeping operations, and still remains a thorn in the UN's side. In the West, U Thant 
was denounced for complying with Nasser's request and blamed for the Six Day war and 
its consequences. Legally and politically, however, U Thant had no real alternative. 3 
On 17 May U Thant chaired a meeting of the UNEF Advisory Committee of troop 
contributing countries, and informed them of his intention to withdraw if Nasser could not 
be persuaded to reconsider. The Committee was bitterly divided by the Secretary-General's 
proposal. India, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia considered that it was Nasser's prerogative to 
insist on the withdrawal of UNEF, and that the Secretary-General was within his rights to 
I UN Doc. A/6669,18 May 1967. 
2ibid. 
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take such action. Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, however) considered 
that such a decision could only be taken by the General Assembly as the mandating 
authority, and Canada, in particular, argued that UNEF should remain in place as a kind of 
occupation force. Such suggestions not only contravened the mandate and basis for the 
original deployment, but vastly overestimated the physical presence of UNEF. Over its ten 
year existence UNEF had been gradually depleted, largely due to budgetary constraints, and 
in 1967 only 1400 troops armed for self defence patrolled the three hundred mile armistice 
lines. 
Secondly, this was an issue of national sovereignty, and as such, Nasser's request found 
much wider support in a General Assembly burgeoning with newly independent states. For 
many of these states this was not a matter for conjecture, and Urquhart doubts whether U 
Thant could have mustered the requisite two thirds majority to place the matter back on the 
General Assembly agenda. I Furthermore, the General Assembly is not equipped for 
reaching speedy decisions. 
Thirdly, on 19 May U Thant reported to the Security Council, "that in my view the current 
situation in the Middle East is more menacing than at anytime since the Fall of 1956. "2 In 
so doing the Secretary-General had informally invoked Article 99 but the division in the 
wider membership was replicated in the Security Council. The Security Council was 
unable to provide guidance, nor was it entitled to. The General Assembly, not the Security 
Council was the mandating authority. The Security Council, however, could authorise or 
command complementary action bringing pressue to bear on Nasser to reconsider. 
Boudreau criticises U Thant for not invoking Article 99 fully, but none of the members 
were interested in placing the situation on the Security Council agenda. Convening the 
Security Council would only have highlighted in public the positions and differences held in 
private that prevented any concerted action. 'Me only possible benefit of convening the 
Security Council would have been to pass the buck of responsibility back to the Security 
Council. The failure to do so concentrated public attention on the Secretary-General's 
executive decision and as a result enabled the media and national Governments in the West 
to make the Secretary -General a, 'scapegoat, ' for their own individual and collective 
inability to find away out of this mess. 3 After being cajoled back into office, U Thant's 
second term was overshadowed by this executive decision for the rest of his tenure. -' Like 
'Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 212. 
2UN Doc. S/7896,18 May 1967 
3The above discussion on the political issues surrounding UNEF withdrawal is based on an interview with 
Brian Urquhart, 28 December 1994. 
4Urquhart believes that as a result U Thant's contribution to the Secretary-Generalship is undervalued. and of 
all the Secretary-Generals to date U Thant is the most under-rated incumbent. In this respect Urquhart 
regrets not going to greater lengths to persuade U Thant to expose the real villains of the peace 
by invoking C) - 
Article 99. 
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Hammarskj6ld in the Congo, U Thant was operating in a political vaccuum. Unlike 
Hammarskj6ld, however U Thant's actions had a strong legal grounding. 
The deployment of UNEF in 1956 was delayed and complicated by Nasser's insistence on 
clarification of the practical applications of the consent principle. Nasser was highly 
sensitive to the deployment of foreign troops on Egyptian soil, of their nationality, 
functions, remit, and most of all the provisions for their withdrawal. Conversely, 
Hammarskj6ld was concerned that UNEF would lack authority if Egypt was allowed to 
dictate, wholesale, the terms and conditions of UNEF. Hammarskjold was also concerned 
that UNEF should not become a front behind which Egypt might prepare for war. The 
objective was to secure a good behaviour bond from Egypt as well as to secure British, 
French, and Israeli withdrawal and to deter future incursions by Israel. The Secretary- 
General therefore set out to secure agreement that UNEF's withdrawal should be contingent 
as much on UN, as Nasser's command. To this end Hammarskj6ld visited Cairo for three 
days of negotiations in November 1956. Talks with the Egyptian President and his Foreign 
Minister produced a, 'good faith, ' agreement on the principles governing the operation of 
UNEF. In that agreement Nasser declared that, "when executing its sovereign rights on 
any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF it will be guided, in good 
faith, by its acceptance of Resolution 1000. "I On behalf of the UN Hammarskjbld signed a 
concommitant commitment declaring that, "the activities of UNEF will be guided, in good 
faith, by the task established for the force in the aforementioned resolution ... [and] 
understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirm it's 
willingness to maintain UNEF until its task is completed. "2 
For Dag Hammarskjbld this agreement meant that UNEF withdrawal was dependent on the 
completion of its tasks, and that necessarily involved General Assembly confirmation that 
those tasks had been satisfactorily fulfilled. Ibis would require a two thirds majority vote, 
though three months later Hammarskjbld conceded that it would be for the Advisory 
Committee to decide whether formal General Assembly approval was necessary. 3 In other 
words, in the event of profound differences between UN members and the permanent 
members of the Security Council in particular, this agreement placed executive control of 
UNEF with the Secretary -General. Nasser, however, believed that on this issue of 
withdrawal the principle of consent was sacrosanct and unlimited. In this respect the 
agreement was an unsatisfactory compromise which merely placed on paper the exigent 
differences between Egypt and the Secretary -General. The weakness of the 
Secretary- 
'UN Doc. A/3375,20 November 1956. 
2ibid. 
3See UN Doc. A/3563,26 February 1957. 
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General's position in this respect is illustrated in the conclusions of the Secretary-General's 
review of the UNEF operation published in 1958, 
"The consequence of such a bilateral declaration [aide-memoire] is that, were 
either side to act unilaterally in refusing continued presence or deciding on 
withdrawal, and were the other side to find that such action was contrary to 
a good faith interpretation of the purposes of the operation, and exchange of 
views would be called for towards harmonising positions. "' 
Put another way, the agreement functioned on the illusive and misguided hope that their 
good faith would not be tested. Before the deal had been struck, in view of the need for a 
rapid deployment, Hammarskj6ld had suggested, "that we can go ahead hoping that the 
controversial will not arise. ' 12 
When that situation did arise U Thant followed the procedure laid down by his predecessor. 
Firstly, the Secretary-General consulted the Advisory Comi-nittee. The Committee did not 
recommend convening the General Assembly. In constitutional terms, therefore, the 
decision to withdraw belonged to the Secretary-General. Secondly, the original mandate 
was to oversee the withdrawal of France., Israel, and the UK. In this respect UNEF had 
fulfilled its tasks, (its redeployment along the Armistice lines came after the 'good faith' 
agreement). Thirdly, UNEF was not an occupation force, as some Western governments 
had led their domestic populations to believe. 3 It was founded only on a Chapter VI 
mandate, the General Assembly's non binding recommendations, and under Article 33, the 
willingness of the host state to settle differences, 'by any other peaceful means of their own 
choice. ' 
In accepting Nasser's request U Thant sided with the principles of national sovereignty 
where Hammarskjbld had attempted to develop a theory of executive action. In so doing 
the Secretary -General defined the principle of consent in Nasser's favour. 
Had U Thant 
acted otherwise, UNEF would undoubtedly have incurred higher casualties than it did in its 
withdrawal. Moreover, in future operations, troop contributions would have been harder to 
come by, and, host states less willing to provide consent for the deployment of UN forces. 
Expanding the Good Offices Remit: Humanitarian Initiatives. 
For Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskj6ld, human fights had been an important but not 
primary consideration in the maintenance of international peace and security. This is 
understandable, as Ramcharan explains, because they served, "during the formative years 
'UN Doc. AJ3943,9 October, 1958. 
2Unpublished comments to Fawzi, Egyptian Ambassador, cited in Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 
18 
1 
9. 
317he 'good faith' agreement was accompanied by 2 memoranda highlighting the specific practical 
limits on 
C) r_1 UNEPs remit. In deference to the UK and French Governments the Secretary -General 
did not publish these 
memoranda immediately. They are cited in Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., pp. 191 
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of the organisation and it would be unrealistic to have expected them to go further. "' For U 
Thant, however, human rights were more than a secondary factor in international peace and 
security. By his actions in respect of the cessation of East Pakistan, and the subsequent 
war between India and Pakistan in 197 1, U Thant formally expanded the traditional 
military-political conception of international peace and security to encompass the field of 
human rights. In so doing he extended the field within which the Secretary-General's 
independent discretionary initiatives applied. 
Latent rivalries between the Bengalis and Punjabis in West and East Pakistan respectively, 
were never satisfactorily reconciled after the British departure in 1947. On 25 March 197 1, 
against a background of civil disorder, violence, and mutual intolerance, the Pakistan 
President, Yahya Kahn, postponed discussions on the drafting of a new constitution - the 
latest attempt to satisfy their rival ambitions. In East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 
President of the Punjabi Aswami League, declared the cessation and independence of 
Bangladesh. President Kahn called in the army to restore law and order and the cycle of 
violence escalated rapidly, precipitating a major refugee crisis. Both sides were guilty of 
indiscriminate and brutal killings, civilian casualties were high, and by June the refugee 
exodus totalled five million. By November it would total ten million. Freak weather 
conditions compounded disease and food shortages, which were further exacerbated when 
civil war spilled over into the long-standing rivalries between India and Pakistan and 
triggered a military clash. 
At the UN both the Indian and Pakistani Governments insisted that the matter was an 
internal affair which did not warrant, or require, the Security Council's attention. Equally 
the differing major power associations with Pakistan and India, coupled with divisions 
between the East and West, and between the USSR and China prevented Security Council 
consideration of the situation in East Pakistan. Throughout the summer U Thant undertook 
2 
a series of highly secret initiatives to promote a negotiated solution. Although 
unsuccessful, U Thant's private dialogue opened up possibilities enabling the Secretary- 
General to address, "the humanitarian aspects of the problem. "3 Without recourse to the 
General Assembly or the Security Council, U Thant established a new type of UN 
Presence: the United Nations East Pakistan Relief Operation, (UNEPRO). Consent for the 
deployment of UNEPRO was provided by India on 23 April 1971,4but was not 
1 Rarricharan, B., Humanitarian Good Offices in International Law: The Good Offices of the Secretary- 
General in the Field of Human Rights, (Dordrecht: Mart, nus Nljhoff. 1983). p. 
83. 
2See U Thant, View From the UN, op. cit., p. 424-7. 
31*bid., p. 423. 
41-etter to the Secretary-General see Repertory of Practice, Supp. 4, Vol. 11, UNST, 
LEU (02) R3, Ne"v 
York, 1982, Article 98, para. 49. 
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immediately forthcoming from Pakistan. On 22 April U Thant made a formal approach to 
President Khan in a letter which stated, 
"Although he had always scrupulously observed Article 2 (7) of the UN 
Charter and would continue to do so, he was also deeply conscious of the 
responsibility of the UN, within the framework of international economic 
and social co-operation, to help promote and ensure well-being and 
humanitarian principles he therefore offered to Pakistan, on behalf of the 
UN organisations, all possible assistance to help it provide urgently needed 
relief to the population of East Pakistan. " I 
That offer was accepted on 3 May, and Mr Kittani, Under Secretary-General for Inter 
Agency Affairs, was despatched to Pakistan to formalise arrangements for the deployment 
of UNEPRO. The Secretary-General's justification for this unprecedented initiative was 
uncomplicated, "I felt that my obligations under the Charter must include any humanitarian 
action which I could take to secure the lives of large numbers of human beingS. "2 From 
this statement and the content of the Secretary-General's letter to President Khan it is 
evident that U Thant viewed his actions purely and exclusively in humanitarian terms. The 
Secretary -General's actions, however, had a much wider significance. As Boudreau 
explains, "the Secretary -General's preventive role requires that he take active steps, as U 
Thant did, during a conflict to minimise civilian casualties. A quick and lasting peace is 
often more difficult to achieve when systematic violence is aimed at civilian populations. 113 
In other words, UNEPRO was both and end in itself, and, a means to a much greater goal - 
a negotiated solution under the Secretary-General's auspices. The latter was not to be the 
case in East Pakistan, but this approach would be put to good effect by Waldheim 
throughout his tenure, and by Perez de Cuellar in the Iran-Iraq war. 4 In India, UNEPRO 
was moderately successful, but in East Pakistan it was quickly politicised. In East 
Pakistan, (Bangladesh), UNEPRO had been authorised by the, 'old, ' not the, 'new, ' 
regime and in Aswan-ii eyes, the Secretary-General was complicit in maintaining the status 
quo, by his association with Khan and control over the distribution of limited aid resources. 
As fighting intensified UN personnel and supplies were attacked and when India intervened 
directly the provision of aid virtually ceased. Today, U Thant's recollection has a strikingly 
familiar ring, 
"I received a report from Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan in Geneva, that war 
conditions had forced the suspension of UN shipments to East Pakistani 
refugees in India. The Government of India had closed Calcutta airport to 
'ibid., para. 5 1. 2 UN Doc. SG/ 1763/1HA, 17 November 197 1. 
313oudreau, op. cit., p. 75; & Protecting the Innocent: Enhancing the Humanitarian Role of the 
UN in 
Natural Disasters and Other Disaster Situations, (New York: Council on Religion and 
International Affairs, 
1983). 
4See pp. 238-41. 
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international flights, resulting in the suspension of shipments of blankets, 
which constituted a large part of the relief programme. The harbour at Calcutta was also closed and fourteen ships headed to Calcutta with 
thousands of tons from Rangoon and Bangkok would not be able to 
unload. "' 
In practical terms the consent on which UNEPRO was deployed in East Pakistan had 
evaporated. Although no fonnal request was made for UNEPRO withdrawal, U Thant 
instructed, as far as was logistically possible, its retreat from East Pakistan. 2 By 
conforming to the principles of the Secretary-General's good offices and peacekeeping, U 
Thant protected the Secretary-General's independent actions from any shift in support at 
Headquarters, 3and the application of the Secretary-General's good offices also remained a 
possibility. 4 
UNEF 11: Narrowing the Secretary -General's Executive Discretion. 
On 6 October 1973, frustrated by the stasis of no war and no peace, and in an attempt to 
reclaim lost territories, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel across the Suez 
Canal and through the Golan Heights. The Security Council met between 8 and 12 October 
but was paralysed by Soviet support for the Arabs, and American backing for Israel. 
Waldheirn appealed against Security Council inaction but, "did not want to interfere with the 
efforts of the Security Council, ' '5and did not submit proposals of his own which might 
either move the Security Council forward or bring a cease-fire closer. With American 
assistance Israel began to reverse the Egyptian tide in mid October, and soon threatened the 
Arabs with total military humiliation for a second time. Further Israeli gains on those made 
in 1967 did not suit US interests. Superpower d6tente and Kissinger's policy of 
containment were at stake. Continued Isreali advancement threatened to provoke Soviet 
intervention in support of the Arabs. The US did not relish the prospect of either a 
superpower confrontation or bringing a close ally to heel. Kissinger visited Moscow where 
mutual interest in a return to the status quo ante, enabled a cease-fire agreement negotiated 
with Kosygin, and ratified by the Security Council on 22 October. 6 This was followed by a 
resolution authorising the Secretary-General to despatch military observers to supervise the 
cease-fire. 7 In a statement immediately following the adoption of this resolution, Waldheim 
informed the Security Council that, "in all probability it will be necessary to increase the 
number of observers available in the area to carry out the intentions of the Council 
'U Thant, View From the UN, op. cit., p. 430. 
20n difficulties of withdrawal see U Thant, View From the UN, op. cit., p. 432-4. 
3Ratified by GA Res. 2790 A, 7 December 197 1; & by SC Res. 307,21 December 1971. 
41n this respect UNEPRO provides an interesting comparison to UN Involvements in Somalia and the zn 
former Yugoslavia where continued humanitarian intervention compromised the potential of the 
UN and it,, 
Secretary-General In these and future conflicts. See pp. 383-6. 
5Quoted in Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 17 1; see UN Doc. S/ 1102 1,11 October 1973. 
6SC Res. 338,22 October 1973. 
7SC Res. 339,23 October 1973. 
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effectively. "' Israel continued undeterred by developments in New York and before the day 
was out Waldheirn called Kissinger to propose a second UN Emergency Force. 2 
Since 1964, however, the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping had been 
in continuous session without resolving fundamental differences between East and West in 
respect of the role of the Secretary-General, financing, and the composition of peacekeeping 
operations. Bilateral discussions were convened by the US and USSR in an effort to break 
the impasse in the Peacekeeping Committee, and find agreement on peacekeeping ground 
rules. In this dialogue, however, the US Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organisation Affairs argued that, "the Soviet approach continues to fall far short of the 
concerns of members for improved, workable peacekeeping arrangements. It appears to 
extend the veto to operational matters which would best be left for the Secretary-General to 
handle in consultation with a committee of the Security Council. "3 
The introduction of renewable mandates, and the voluntary financing and composition of 
UNFICYP circumvented these problems but were only interim solutions. Sustainable and 
workable arrangements were required if operations on the scale of UNFICYP, ONUC, and 
UNEF I were to repeated with any consistency. In a cold war environment these problems 
were unlikely to be resolved in the abstract context of the Special Conu-nittee, but, as 
Urquhart noted, "an emergency might just demand a practical arrangement that would 
eventually become the generally accepted solution. ' '4 The growing threat of superpower 
intervention provided just such an emergency. To Washington in particular, Waldheim's 
suggestion for UNEF H looked increasingly attractive. On 24 October Anwar Sadat made a 
desperate appeal for Soviet and American intervention to oversee the cease-fire agreement. 
Brezhnev was willing to comply with this request, and even intervene unilaterally if the US 
did not agree on a joint venture. This prospect was described by Kissinger as, 
"menacing, ' '5and provoked reciprocal power play - American forces went to Defcon III, 
(the highest state of peace time alert), and engaged in very public military manoeuvres. 
The formal proposal for a UN Force was tabled by Yugoslavia and seven other non-aligned 
members of the Security Council on 25 October and passed the same day. It requested the 
Secretary -General to report back on the setting up of UNEF 
11 within twenty-four hours. 6 
Given the stalled Peacekeeping Committee deliberations, Urquhart explains, in that report, 
1SCOR, 1748th meeting, 23 October 1973. r) 2Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 240. 
3Samuel de Palma, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisational Affairs, "United Ntions: 
Missions Possible and Impossible, " An American Assembly on the US and UN, Alden House, 
New York, 
13-16 April 1972, UN Archives, DAG 1/5.3.2.8: 4G US Gov. 1972. 
4Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 240. 
5QUoted in Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 175. 6SC Res. 340,25 October 1973. 
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"Our problem was to circumvent the obstacles which hitherto prevented 
agreement on the direction of peacekeeping operations and at the same time 
produce arrangements for the new peacekeeping force which would actually 
work. We had to preserve the working authority of the Secretary-General 
while respecting the overall authority of the Security Council to make decisions on basic questions. Thus we could run the force on a day to day 
basis, but the Security Council would have the responsibility for deciding 
on controversial political matters, and the Secretary-General would be 
protectedfi, om the kind of no-win decisions such asforce withdrawal which 
had crushed U Thant in 1967. "1 (emphasis added) 
To insure Soviet agreement under secretary-general Arkady Shevchenko was enlisted to 
consult with Moscow in drafting the report, which was adopted by the Security Council on 
27 October. 2 The general guidelines contained therein broke the peacekeeping deadlock. 
Firstly, the tenns of reference ratified by the Security Council stipulated, 
'The Secretary-General shall keep the Security Council fully informed of 
developments relating to the functioning of the Force. All matters which 
may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force will 
be referred to the Council for its decision. ' '3 
This provision served a dual function. In theory it protected the Secretary-General from 
exposure to uncertain mandates. Conversely, for the Security Council, in conjunction with 
renewable mandates, it reclaimed responsibility for policy direction and interpretation of 
mandates from the Secretary-General. If there remained any doubt that the Secretary- 
General's scope for executive discretion had narrowed, the US Permanent representative, 
John Scali put on record, "Washington's understanding that the force would not be 
withdrawn during any period for which it had been authorised by the Council without that 
body's explicit approval. 114 
Secondly, the concept of impartiality was revised such that, 
"Contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council, and, 
with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of 
equitable geographic representation. 1'5 (emphasis added) 
Pen-nanent Members of the Security Council remained excluded, but otherwise the staffing 
of peacekeepMg operations formally came in line with the staffing provisions of Article 10 1 
which embodies the notion that an international civil service can only be impartial between 
nations and loyal to an international perspective if it is itself truly international. Accordingly, 
'Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 241. 
2SC Res. 341,27 October 1973; for report see UN Doc. S/ 11052 Rev. 1,26 October 1973. 
3UN Doc. S/ 11052 Rev. 1,26 October 1973. 
4Quoted in Franck (1985), op. cit., p. 173. 
5UN Doc. S/I 1052 Rev. 1,26 October 1973. 
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a Polish contingent became the first from the Eastern bloc to serve in a UN peacekeeping 
force. 
Thirdly, the Secretary-General recommended, and Moscow agreed to, the apportionment of 
expenses by the members of the organisation in accordance with Article 17 (2). Pursuant to 
this agreement the General Assembly established a special account for the operation of 
UNEF H, and created a special peacekeeping scale of assessments which increased the 
Security Council permanent members liability for the finance of peacekeeping operations by 
fifteen percent each. I 
In drafting these reforms the major constitutional issues surrounding peacekeeping were 
resolved to the mutual benefit of the Secretary-General and Security Council members and 
put peacekeeping on a surer footing. On 31 May 1974 SCR 350 authorised the Secretary- 
General to apply the same provisions in the creation of the UN Disengagement Observer 
Force, (UNDOF), secured by Kissinger under the Geneva Conference Arrangement. The 
same provisions were also adopted in 1978 for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, 
(UNFIL), on a recommendation from the Secretary-General which stated, "although the 
general context of UNFEL is not comparable with that of UNEF and UNDOF, the 
guidelines for these operations having proved satisfactory, are deemed suitable for practical 
application to the new force. ' Q These were the last of the qualitative developments 'in the 
Secretary -General's role prior to Perez de Cuellar's, 'tenure of transition. 
' 
'GA Res. 3 10 1,11 December, 1973. 
2UN Doc. S/ 12611,19 March 1978. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Role of the Secretary-General in the Cold War EXDlored. 
The preceding chapter describes the evolution of the Secretary-General's role between 1946 
and 1982. The emphasis on qualitative changes in that role distorts the readers perception 
of the role undertaken by each incumbent. This is particularly the case with respect to Kurt 
Waldheim. The apparent dirth of innovations in the Secretary-General's powers suggests a 
barren tenure. Certainly, Waldheim's tenure has been the least inspiring and most 
uneventful to date, but Waldheirn was not an inactive incumbent. The thematic approach of 
this section redresses this imbalance, and, the second part of this section demonstrates that 
with respect to U Thant and Waldheim, the Secretary-General's activities which are not 
ground breaking and, therefore, until now are not referenced, are also central to a holistic 
understanding of the Secretary -General's evolving role. Nevertheless, from the case 
studies considered so far, there are two very discernible periods in the Secretary -General's 
development for the era under review. The first encompasses the tenures of Trygve Lie and 
Dag Hammarskj6ld, (1946-196 1), and the second those of U Thant and Kurt Waldheim, 
(1961-1982). 
Aggrandisement (1946-1961). 
The aggrandisement of the Secretary-General's powers is the characteristic feature of the 
first two incumbents and has been identified by Bailey as the product of two parallel but 
inter-related trends: I 
- the policy-making organs increasingly entrusted the Secretary-General with broad 
diplomatic functions and gave considerable discretion to the Secretary-General in 
implementing decisions of the policy-making organs; 
- the Secretaries-General used to the full the resources of the office in the exercise of the 
independent initiatives to further the principles of the Charter. 
The latter is certainly true for both Lie and Hammarskj6ld, though clearly Hammarskj6ld 
enjoyed considerably more success in this respect. Lie's comparative lack of success 
suggests, in respect of Bailey's first observation, that initially the deliberative organs were 
not particularly willing to entrust the Secretary-General with broad diplomatic and 
operational functions. Though Lie was charged with the creation and administration of 
UNTSO, he was not the members' preferred mediator in Palestine. Similarly, in disputes 
between Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia (1946), between the UK and Albania, (1947), 
and in the dispute over Kashmir, (1948), the Security Council preferred to create its own 
'Bailey, (1962) op. cit., p. 41. 
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investigative commissions or sub-committees, rather than utilise the investigative powers of 
the Secretary -General. I In the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia the Security 
Council created a Good Offices Committee in preference to delegating the Secretary -General 
such functions under Article 98.2 In the General Assembly the Lebanese Govern-ment 
proposed a Permanent Committee of Conciliation, Yugoslavia proposed a Permanent 
Commission of Good Offices, and in 1949 the General Assembly established a Panel for 
Inquiry and Conciliation. 3 Furthen-nore, the Secretary-General's offers of assistance during 
the Berlin crisis were declined. 4 Not until 1952 was the Secretary-General entrusted with 
intermediary responsibilities. The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to 
assist in facilitating negotiations between India, Pakistan, and South Africa on the treatment 
and status of South African nationals of Indian origin. 5 Even then, however, the three 
governments rejected the resolution and the matter was not pursued by Lie. The Secretary- 
General was not delegated such responsibilities again until almost exactly three years later 
in the dispute between Washington and Peking regarding the continued detention of 
American airmen. 
Lie's tenure, therefore, was one of constitution building, especially at the procedural level - 
in securing the Secretary -General's rights of intervention in Security Council meetings, and 
asserting, if not testing, the Secretary -General's investigative powers. At a practical level 
Lie may not have made the substantive advancements of his successor, but he paved the 
way for those advancements. In particular, despite his preference for public rather than 
private diplomacy, Lie continued to develop the tradition of quiet diplomacy expounded by 
his League predecessors. 
Quiet Diplomacy Defined. 
Quiet diplomacy is that part of the Secretary-General's role which arises out of his day to 
day responsibilities as the chief administrative officer of the UN. At the hub of the UN 
organisation, the Secretary-General is in constant contact behind the scenes with the 
world's diplomatic corps and politicians, at the UN, on state visits, in the field, in the 
Secretary-General's office, over lunch or dinner, or in the rest room. In these unofficial, 
private, unrecorded, and unashamedly political conversations, the Secretary-General has the 
ear of those who shape and decide policy. Conversely, the Secretary-General provides a 
sounding board, a confidant, and an independent internationalist perspective in a state 
'See SC Res. 15,19 December 1946; SC Res. 19,27 February 1947; & SC Res. 39,20 January 1948 
respectively. 
2See SC Res. 3 1,25 August 1947 & SC Res. 35,31 October 1947. 
3See Goodrich, Leland M., & Simmons, Anne P., The United Nations and the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), pp. 293-4. 
4See Rovine, Arthur W., The First Fifty Years: The Secretary- Genera I in World Politics 1920-70, (Lelden: 
Sij'thoff, 1970), p. 227-8. 
5GA Res. 511,12 January 1952. 
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centric world. The Secretary -General is in a unique position to persuade, cajole, and 
pressure the decision-makers. As Barros argues, "the very nature of the Secretary- 
General's office is unavoidably political. "' And as Walter Lippman, noted, 
"The greatest although it is the least advertised of the functions of the Secretary-General is to be a father confessor to the member governments, to be a man in whom they can confide, and who knows, therefore, from 
continued private privileged information, the real position in an international 
controversy. 112 
In a more formal framework, and if exercised with the explicit intent of reconciling two or 
more adversaries, the Secretary -General's quiet diplomacy becomes the Secretary-General's 
good offices. In this respect the cease-fire in Korea, if not mediated by the Secretary- 
General, was based on a proposal posted by the Secretary-General, and, in conjunction 
with the Secretary-General's close relationship with the UN Mediator in Palestine, laid the 
foundation for the development of the Secretary-General's good offices. Equally, in the 
creation and administration of UNTSO, and the relentless campaign for a UN force of 
varying degrees of potency, Lie paved the way for the development of peacekeeping forces 
in the Suez and Congo. 
Good Offices Defined. 
Good offices is not amongst those methods of dispute settlement listed in Article 33 of the 
UN Charter, (negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
and resort to regional agencies or arrangements). Its exclusion from the Charter, and wide 
discrepancies in the definitions of good offices necessitate a note of clarification. The 1948 
American Treaty on Pacific Settlement applies a restrictive definition, limiting the good 
offices concept exclusively to facilitating dialogue, and precluding any substantive 
participation in dispute settlement. In contrast, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions for 
the Pacific Settlement of Disputes considered good offices and mediation to be synonymous 
and interchangeable methods of dispute settlement. 3 The problem of definition arises 
because in UN practice it has become impracticable to distinguish where facilitating 
dialogue ends and a substantive contribution begins. Equally, the boundaries between 
negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration are easily blurred. 4 
I Barros, James, "The Importance of Secretaries-General of the United Nations, " in Jordan, Robert S., Dag 
Hammarskj6ld Revisited: The UN Secretary- General as a Force in World Politics, (Durham, N. C.: Carolina 
Academic Press, 1983), p. 26 
2The New York Herold-Tribune, 7 November 196 1; see also The UN Secretary-General: His Role in World 
Politics, Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace, Fouteenth Report, New York, January, 1962, p. 
53; cited in Rivhn, The Clallenging Role of theUN Secretary- Gen real: Making the 'Most Impossible Job in 
the World'Possible, (Westport, Connecticut: Prager, 1993), p. 4. 
3See UN Handbook on the Paci c Settlement of Disputes Between States, (New York: United Nations, 
1992), pp. 33-5. 
4For definitions see, UN Handbook on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes Between States, op. cit., pp. 40- 
66. 
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Moreover, these different methods or concepts are not progressions in a linear relationship, 
and can be undertaken one, two, or three at a time. For these reasons, Perez de Cuellar 
described good-offices as, "a flexible term, it may mean very little or it may mean very 
much. "' This thesis therefore adopts a broad definition of the Secretary-General's good 
offices incorporating any method in which the Secretary-General is engaged in a third 
party/ intermediary capacity. It encompasses, but is not limited to negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, and arbitration -a broad definition enables the good-offices concept 
to account for new and innovative methods of conflict prevention and resolution, such as 
the use of personal and special representatives, fact-finding and the UN presence. Judicial 
settlement and the use of regional arrangements are distinguishable by their resort to 
arrangements outside the Secretary-General's jurisdiction and are therefore not included in a 
definition of the Secretary -General's good-offices. 
Under Hammarskjbld the Secretary-General ship advanced dramatically. The formal 
exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices was long overdue, but the extent of the 
development of the Secretary-General's independent powers could not have been foreseen. 
The Peking Formula, the UN Presence, and the use of personal and special representatives 
elevated the status of the Secretary-General to unprecedented levels as an individual in the 
international system. This was carried over into the responsibilities delegated to the 
Secretary -General. In respect of UNEF and ONUC, Hammarskj6ld virtually wrote his 
own mandates, and in his administration of LTNOGEL Hammarskj6ld demonstrated the 
extent of the Secretary-General's command and control over UN operations. All of these 
advances, chronicled earlier in the previous chapter, are significant both as precedents in 
themselves, and, moreover, as part of a much greater whole; preventive diplomacy. 
Preventive Diplomacy Defined. 
Preventive diplomacy is an approach to peace formally articulated retrospectively by 
Hammarskj6ld in his 1960 report on the work of the organisation. In the introduction to 
that report he stated, 
"Preventive diplomacy ... is of special significance 
in cases where the 
original conflict may be said either to be the result Of, or to imply risks for, 
the creation of a power vacuum between the main blocs. Preventive action in 
such cases must in the first place aim at filling the vacuum so that it will not 
provoke action from any of the major parties, the initiative for which might 
lead to counter-action from the other side. The ways in which a vacuum can 
be filled by the UN so as to forestall such initiatives differ from case to case, 
but they have this in common: temporarily, and pending the filling of a 
vacuum by normal means, the United Nations enters the picture on the basis 
of its non-commitment to any power bloc, so as to provide to the extent 
possible a guarantee in relation to all parties against initiatives from the other. 
'UN Doc. SG/SNI/3525. 
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The special needs and the special possibilities for what I here call Preventive 
United Nations Diplomacy have been demonstrated in several recent cases 
such as Suez and Gaza, Lebanon and Jordan, Laos and the Congo. "' 
Preventive diplomacy, as conceived by Hammarskj6ld, had a specific cold war context, and 
differs from that articulated by Boutros Boutros Ghali in An Agendafor Peace, 2or by 
Gordenker and Boudreau. 3 The objective, primarily was to forestall the intrusion of the 
superpowers into regional conflicts. Insofar as a resolution of the differences between the 
regional adversaries could achieve this end, the pacific settlement of disputes or conflict 
resolution was the objective. Where this was not possible, conflict management or 
peacekeeping took precedence. Preventive diplomacy thus provided a pragmatic and 
flexible approach to the maintenance of international peace and security in which the ends 
justified the means. 'Me only constant was the pivotal role played by the Secretary- 
General. As Claude observes, in each of the cases Hammarskj6ld cites as examples of 
preventive diplomacy, the outstanding feature was, "the practice of international 
statesmanship by the second Secretar-y-General. ' '4 In this respect, preventive diplomacy 
provided the justification for Secretary -General's aggrandisement under the stewardship of 
Hammarskj6ld, but was equally a product of that aggrandisement. If this was not evident 
in the formal 1960 definition of preventive diplomacy it was clear in the statement made by 
Hammarskj6ld on his reappointment as Secretary-General in 1957. This statement was the 
bedrock on which the concept was built, 
I do not believe that the Secretary-General should be asked to act, by the 
member states, if no guidance for his action is to be found either in the 
Charter or in the decisions of the main organs of the United Nations; within 
the limits thus set, however, I believe it to be his duty to use his office and, 
indeed, the machinery of the organisation to its utmost capacity and to the 
full extent permitted at each stage by practical circumstances. On the other 
hand, I believe that it is in keeping with the philosophy of the Charter that 
the Secretary -General should be expected to act also without such guidance, 
should this appear to him necessary in order to help in filling any vacuum 
that may appear in the systems which the Charter and traditional diplomacy 
provide for the safeguarding of peace and security. "5 
The central position of the Secretary -General and the widening array of actions on the 
Secretary -General's part permýitted by preventive diplomacy reflect the 
impartial functions 
required of the UN in the cold war. Irrespective of the constitutional basis, (Article 33,99, 
Haniniarskjbld, Dag, ''Introduction to the Annual Report, " 31 August, 1960, reproduced in Foote, op. cit., 
303. 
-Ghal i, Boutros Boutros, An Agenda for Peace, (New York: United Nations, 1992), UN Doc. DPIJ 1247, 
aras. 23-33. 
See pp. 140-3. 
4CIaude, op cit., p. 285. 
5Hammarskj6ld, Dag, "Statement on his Re-election to a Second Terrn, before the General Assembly, 26 
September 1957, '' reproduced in Foote, Wilder, The Servant of Peace: A Selection of Speeches and 
Statentents of Dag Hammarskjdld, (London: Bodley Head, 1962), pp. 148-50. 
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or 98), on which the Secretary -General's actions were founded, the underlying principles 
remained fundamentally the same. Thus the Secretary -General's good offices and 
peacekeeping roles were based on five parallel and interrelated principles: consent; the non 
use of force; impartiality; function; and respect for sovereignty and non interference in the 
domestic jurisdiction of member states. 
Hammarskjbld went to great lengths to articulate the principles governing the exercise of the 
Secretary -General's good offices and peacekeeping. In respect of the Secretary -General's 
good offices these are categorised in the Secretariat Repertory of Practice under five inter- 
related headings-' The Repertory applies these principles solely to the Secretary-General's 
independent intermediary capability, but in reality the same principles apply whether the 
Secretary -General is acting at the behest of a UN organ or not. These principles were 
mirrored in the documents that laid down the operational guidelines for UNEF and adopted 
as the a priori assumptions on which subsequent operations have been based. 2 
(i) Consent: The agreement of the parties to a dispute is a pre-requisite for the Secretary- 
General's involvement. As Hammarskjbld explained in a 1959 press conference, what the 
Secretary -General can do is limited by the Charter, and, given that the Secretary-General's 
prerogatives are implied powers, by the consent of the nations concerned. 3 UNEF was 
authorised by the General Assembly which does not have the authority to impose its 
decisions. Deployment therefore, also rested on the catch all safety net of Article 33 which 
upholds the right of parties to a dispute to settle differences by, 'peaceful means of their 
own choice. ' 
(ii) Non enforcement: The Secretary -General cannot force himself upon disputants and 
cannot sanction those who do not want his assistance. Only the Security Council enjoys 
mandatory powers. For this reason Hammarskjbld argued that although the Secretary- 
General has the discretionary right to initiate his good offices, that right is subsidiary, and 
best applied as, "a kind of intensified availability. "4 The initiative for third party functions 
may of course, also come from the General Assembly or the Security Council, but the very 
reason for Hammarskjbld's conception of the Peking Formula was to empower the 
disputing parties not the Secretary-General. Equally, given the limits on the General 
Assembly's powers the use of force by peacekeeping troops was limited only to self 
defence. As Harnmarskj6ld explained in a 1958 Report, "men engaged in the operation 
'Secretariat Repertorýy of Practice, op. cit., pp. 477-84, paras., 290-311. 
2See UN Docs. ST/SGB/UNEF / 1; A/3289,4 November 1956; A/3302 add. 27,29 November 1956, 
A/3943,9 October 1958; see also Diehl, Paul F., International Peacekeeping, (Baltimore, 
Maryland: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 4-14. 
3Press Conference, Palais des Nations, 5 May 1955, Note No. 1090. 
4Press Conference, 26 February 1959, Note No. 1947, p. 6. 
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may never take the initiative in the use of force. "' Limiting the use of force was central to 
protecting the independence of the force, (point 3), and reflected the functions for which the 
force was conceived, (point 4). 
(iii) Impartiality: The Secretary -General's lack of power is his strength, and reinforces 
the impression of impartiality and independence on which the Secretary -General's roles in 
the maintenance of international peace and security ultimately rest. In 1958, Hammarskj6ld 
explained that the Secretary -General's diplomatic roles had developed out of, "acceptance of 
the Secretary -General as the 'neutral' representative of the organisation. "2 As the 
Preparatory Commission's Guardian of the UN Charter, the Secretary -General is bestowed 
with a certain moral authority akin to that non-nally reserved for the heads of religious 
organisations. Hammarskj6ld even once described his position as, 'representative of a 
secular church of ideals and principles in international affairs. '3 The Secretary -General, in 
other words, cuts a solitary figure above the vagaries of state centric politics. 
UNEF was only acceptable because of the perception of its neutrality. This neutrality was 
preserved by the command structure, which dictated that the force commander, 'should be 
fully independent of the policies of any one nation. 14 Uie force commander was 
answerable to the Secretary -General and not his state government, and the same rules 
applied to the force commander as to civilian members of the Secretariat regarding Article 
100. Furthen-nore, membership of the force did not include troops from the permanent 
members of the Security Council, or from any nations which, 'might be considered as 
possibly having a special interest in the situation. '5 In this respect the Secretary -General 
argued UNEF and subsequent operations should, 'take fully into account the view of the 
host Government as one of the most serious factors which should guide the recruitment. '6 
Equally, the impartiality of an operation could be compromised if the host was allowed to 
dictate its terms and conditions. In the case of UNEF, the views of Britain, France, and 
Israel also had to be accounted for. In this respect Hammarskjbld won a lengthy battle with 
Nasser over Canadian participation in UNEF and in his post UNEF view recommended, 
"Usually ... serious objections 
by the host country against participation by a 
specific country ... will determine the action of the organisation. 
However, 
were the United Nations for good reason to find that course inadvisable, it 
I UN Doc. A/3943,9 October 1958, para., 179. 
2Hammarskj6ld, Dag, "Do We Need a United Nations? - An Affirmative Answer, " United Nations Review, 
June 1959, Vol. 5, No. 12, p. 26. 
3For further development of this comparison see Murphy, J. David, '117he Papacy and the Secretary- 
Generalship: A Study of the role of the Exceptionally-Situated Individual Actor in the International 
System, " Coexistence, Vol. 7,1970. 
4UN Doc. A/3302,6 November 1956 
ýUN Doc. A/3289,4 November 1956. 
6UN Doc. A/3943,9 October 1958. 
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would remain free to pursue its own line, and any resulting conflict would have to be resolved on a political rather than legal basis. "' 
(iv) Function: Although the Secretary-General may/can claim the moral high ground, he 
cannot challenge the supremacy of state sovereignty. 2 This means that the subject matter of 
his good-offices is limited by the consent of the parties concerned when acting in an 
independent capacity, or by the discretion permitted by the General Assembly or Security 
Council, when acting under a mandate of one of these organs. The resolutions of UN 
organs are the UN equivalent of statute law. The Secretary-General is therefore bound by 
the resolutions of UN organs as much as he is by the UN Charter. There is a sense in 
which Hammarskjbld's role in the release of the American airmen might be construed as 
never deviating from the General Assembly mandate. If the member nations had not been 
prepared to permit the Secretary -General such a wide margin of discretion, and chosen 
instead to set the Secretary -General's terms of reference more explicitly, Hammarskj6ld 
would never have been able to make his assistance available to Peking. The objective of the 
Secretary -General's role as an honest broker, whether at the command of a UN organ or the 
request of a member state is to empower disputing parties to settle their differences, not to 
empower the Secretary-General. 
Like the Secretary -General's good offices, peacekeeping was conceived to assist a political 
settlement, not to impose one, and accordingly UNEF was not bestowed functions or used, 
'to influence the military balance in the present conflict, and thereby, the political balance 
affecting efforts to settle the conflict. '3 Just as the Secretary -General's remit as a third party 
in international relations is to empower disputants to resolve their differences, UNEF was 
conceived to provide stability so the search for a political settlement could continue. In 
this respect, Hammarskj6ld explained, "it must be impartial, in the sense that it does not 
serve as a means to force settlement in the interest of one party, of political conflicts or legal 
issues recognised as controversial. 114 
(v) The sovereignty principle: The Charter is founded on the principle of non- 
interference in the domestic jurisdiction of member states. In theory, therefore, the 
Secretary -General deals only with state governments and can only engage national 
minorities where the domestic situation constitutes a threat to international security and the 
Security Council demands it, or where the government concerned provides its consent. 
Peacekeeping also operates on the principle of non interference in the domestic affairs of 
1 ibid. 
2These last two categories are considered separately by the Secretariat Repertory of Practice, op. cit., as 
"Subject Matter of the Diplomatic Functions exercised under the Inherent Powers, " pp. 480-48 1, paras. 299- 
301, & "Effect of Charter Provisions and United Nations Resolutions, " pp. 481-2, para, 302-307. 
3UN Doc. A/3302,6 November 1956. 
4UN Doc. A/3512,19 January 1957. 
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the host state, respects the integrity of Article 2 (7), and occurs only with the consent of the 
government of the territory where it is deployed. Hammarskjbld was concerned by this 
principle more than any other, and in this respect endeavoured to extract from Nasser an 
agreement that UNEF could not be withdrawn without General Assembly Agreement. I 
This correspondence of principles reflected a combination of the limits on the General 
Assembly's powers, and the need to protect the Secretary -General's impartiality. Firstly, 
only the Security Council has the power to authorise enforcement action, or waiver the 
principle of non intervention enshrined in Article 2 (7). General Assembly resolutions are 
only recommendatory and as such not binding on member states. If a force of any kind 
was to be deployed at Suez, its status, composition, and functions had to be limited by the 
principles of consent, impartiality and non- interference. Secondly, if UNEF was 
authorised to use force to fulfil its mandate, the operation and its commander, (the 
Secretary -General), would no longer be perceived by all parties as impartial. So long as the 
peacekeeping operation observed the same principles as the Secretary-General's good 
offices, the Secretary -General's intermediary capacity was not compromised. As Jordan 
argues, there was a very real fear that, "no longer could the office be compared to the 
Pope's as consisting of moral authority, but without the terrestrial means to change the 
course of history. "2 Accordingly, in the planning of UNEF, protecting the impartiality of 
the Secretary -General was of utmost importance for Hammarskj6ld. Thirdly, the Secretary- 
General's peacekeeping and intermediary roles were mutually reinforcing. The very 
purpose of UNEF was to establish a buffer zone and provide stability facilitating the pursuit 
of a political compromise. Where the Secretary-General undertakes that responsibility, the 
peacekeepers presence, in theory, enhances the potential of the Secretary -General's good 
officeS. 3 Equally, the Secretary-General's command brings to a peacekeeping operation 
assurance of impartiality and independence. 
The Limits to Preventive Diplomacy. 
If the broad theory of preventive diplomacy justified and facilitated the Secretary-General's 
aggrandisement it also explains Hammarskj6ld's' personal demise and ushered in a new 
period of consolidation. 
Firstly, preventive diplomacy blurred the distinction between the Secretary -General's 
different roles, (good offices and peacekeeping), and the capacity in which the Secretary- 
'See Status Agreement between UN and Egypt, UN Doc. A/3526; & discussion of this agreement and the 
withdrawal of UNEF, pp. 10 1 -4. "Jordan, op. cit., p. 8. 
3Though a case can also be made, as in Cyprus, that peacekeepers not only remove the threat of escalation 
but also the urgency for a political settlement, and can in fact lead to the defacto settlement which theý, were 
deployed to prevent. 
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General was acting when undertaking these roles, (independently or at the behest of the 
General Assembly or Security Council). From a functionalist perspective, for instance, the 
UN Presence, UNOGIL and ONUC might all be considered variations of the peacekeeping 
theme. The UN Presence, however, was primarily a scout post. Conversely, UNOGIL, 
and ONUC had substantial 'quiet diplomatic' functions. The distinction between the 
Secretary-General's good offices and peacekeeping responsibilities was not always evident. 
Furthermore, the capacity in which the Secretary-General's good offices were employed is 
not always evident. Although Hammarskj6ld employed a personal representative in the 
dispute between Cambodia and Thailand it was only in Laos that the Secretary -General first 
distinguished between personal and special representatives. Over time it has become 
standard practice for'special representative' to be used irrespective of the constitutional 
base of a good offices mission. Gordenker does not make the distinction at all, I and to 
simplify research and commentary Puchala prefers not to. 2 Certainly, it is a laborious 
process trawling the documents to establish in whose capacity a representative of the 
Secretary -General is acting. Moreover, the documents will not necessarily provide the 
answer, for as Pechota explains, the terms have not been uniformly applied because, "no 
substantial difference exists between the two categories, at least insofar as their relationship 
with the Secretary-General is concerned. ' '3 Once the generalised right of the Secretary- 
General to act in these capacities was established, the need to articulate publicly the precise 
remit and basis of a good offices mission or representative receded. For functional 
purposes it became accepted practice to use the term special representative in a generalist 
rather than specific capacity. 4 That does not mean that the practical value of the academic 
distinction was sacrificed. As often as not that distinction does not need to be made. The 
Secretary-General, given judgements regarding his personal integrity, is either trusted or 
not trusted as an impartial intermediary. The Secretary-General's good offices in Peking, 
however, demonstrated that delineating between the constitutional origins of a good offices 
mission has useful political properties. The same can be said of those to whom the 
Secretary-General delegates good offices functions. If necessary the distinction between 
I Gordenker, Leon, The UN Secretary- General and the Maintenance of Peace, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1967), p. 153. 
2puchala, Donald J., "ne Secretary -General and His Special Representatives, " in Rivlin, 
Benjamin & 
Gordenker, Leon, The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary- General: Making the Most Impossible job in 
the World Possible, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993), p. 82. 
3Pechota, op. cit., p. 73. 
4The situation in Congo provides a good example of the 'personal/ s pec I aF representative question. 
Technically Ralphe Bunche began as a personal representative deployed as in an early-waming, 'preventive 
capacity under Article 99. Once the Secretary -General convened the Security Council the 
Secretary-General's 
role and responsibilities, and those of his personal representative under Article 99 ceased to exist. T-he 
Secretary -General became the executor of Security Council mandates and in this capacity 
Bunche was 
technically a special representative. Bunche was the Secretary-General's representative in a personal capacity 
for only two weeks. He and his successors served as the Special Representative for four years. The UN 
literature, even UN Documentation do not make the distinction, which in this case is purely an academic 
exercise. 
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personal and special can be made in private, in what might be described as the quiet 
application of the Peking Formula. In this way the S ecretary -General and his representative 
explore the possibilities of diplomatic avenues without undermining the positions taken in 
the very public statements and resolutions of the deliberative organs. What matters is that 
where there is a discernible political advantage that distinction remams available. I 
The status of the Secretary-General's representatives was not, and has not in itself been 
problematic but was symptomatic of a much wider problem. If the capacity in which the 
Secretary -General operates is not understood, then nor is the responsibility for the success 
or failure of an operation, mission, or negotiations undertaken by the Secretary -General. 
In this respect Franck's conception of the Secretary-General's office as a, 'black box, ' is 
instructive in explaining the, 'Ieave it to Dag, ' phenomenon. Franck explains that for 
scientists the black box is that part of a system, "which is capable of transferring and 
synthesising stimuli through a process not fully understood, but which is surmised by 
comparing input and oUtpUt. "2 The Secretary-General's office Franck argues, became and 
remains the UN's black box in which, "through some ineffable but ineluctable process, "-' 
solutions to the most intractable problems emerge. Thus the, 'leave it to Dag, ' culture of 
which preventive diplomacy was both facilitator and product fostered a false and 
unsustainable expectation of the role, influence, and capability of the Secretary-General, 
which arguably, in the Congo, Hammarskj6ld also bought into. 
Such was Hammarskj6ld's personal role in the creation of UNEF, command of UNOGIL, 
and in defining a role for the UN in the cold war, that even prior to his ill-fated, 
'irresponsible observation, ' and subsequent executive actions in the command of ONUC, 
the role, responsibility, and capability of the Secretary-General were grossly exaggerated. 
If the central pillar of preventive diplomacy was the pivotal role of the Secretary-General, 
then the limits to the Secretary-General's role had to be the limits to the potential of 
preventive diplomacy. In the Congo these were transgressed in two key respects: in the use 
of force; and in Hammarskj6ld's justification of the executive actions taken in his name 
which led to the use of force. 
In setting up ONUC Hammarskj6ld adhered strictly to the principles vis-a-vis the use of 
force established for UNEF. SCR 161 , 
however, immediately called into question this 
priciple of peacekeeping by authorising the use of force, albeit in the last resort. 
I Personal representatives include Mr. Jos6 Rolz Bennet between the Governmen it 
of Guinea 
i 
and the lvorý 
i Coast, and Ernest A. Tbalman in Jerusalem. Mr. Nils-Goran Gussing was appointed a special representative 
in the Middle East as requested by SC Res. 237,14 June 1967. Technically, Ralphe Bunch served as 
both 
in the Congo. 
2Franck, (1985), op. cit., P. 134. 
3ibid. 
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Hammarskjbld requested this resolution from the Security Council after his first act of 
executive discretion and envisaged its use only to protect peacekeepers and action 
undertaken by the peacekeepers to prevent the outbreak of civil war. T'he Security Council, 
however, remained silent on precisely what circumstances, other than the last resort 
warranted the use of force. The Secretary-General was effectively delegated executive 
discretion in interpreting the mandate, and responsibility for the application of force. In 
accordance with the circumstances in which the Secretary-General requested this mandate, 
Hammarskj6ld applied a very restrictive definition regarding the use of force - ONUC was 
empowered to round up foreign nationals in the Congo whose presence was preventing the 
possibility of a national reconciliation, but was to remain impartial between the internal 
parties. In other words, the Secretary-General could authorise the expulsion of foreign 
mercenaries and officers from Katanga but could not impose reunification. O'Brien, 
however, applied a more expansive interpretation, and understood SCR 161 to empower 
the use of force to impose the reintegration of Katanga. The executive action taken by 
O'Brien to this end brought the UN into a direct confrontation with Tshombe. ONUC and 
the Secretary-General were no longer impartial by-standers. The basis on which the 
Secretary-General's quiet diplomacy and good offices were employed had been 
compromised. 
O'Brien's action, like Hammarskjbld's, 'irresponsible observations, ' a year earlier were the 
direct consequence of an unclear mandate and the lack of policy direction from a divided 
Security Council. In both cases, action in the Secretary-General's name was taken ultra 
vires, the consequences of which were compounded by Hammarskj6ld's attempt to 
enunciate a theory of executive discretion which might be applied on a consistent basis. 
In his final report on the work of the organisation Hammarskj6ld stated, 
"The Secretary-General had been under the obligation to seek guidance, to 
all possible extent, from the main organs; but when such guidance had not 
been forthcoming, developments have sometimes led to situations in which 
he had to shoulder responsibility for certain limited political functions, 
which may be considered to be in line with the spirit of Article 99 but which 
legally have been based on decisions of the main organs themselves, under 
Article 98, and thus the exclusive responsibility of member states acting 
through these organs. Naturally, in carrying out such functions the 
Secretariat has remained fully subject to the decisions of the political 
bodies. "' 
Hammarskj6ld had been afflicted by the, 'Cassandra Syndrome. ' According to Greek 
mythology Apollo gave Cassandra the gift of prophecy. When she disappoInted him 
he 
decreed no-one would believe her predictions, and her warnings against Paris going to 
Sparta, and against the Trojan Horse went unheeded. Harnmarskj6ld did not 
have to be a 
lHammarskj6ld, Dag, Introduction to the Annual Report 1960-61, reproduced in Foote, op. cit., P- 367. 
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clairvoyant to foresee the dangers that lay ahead in the Congo, but like Cassandra was 
powerless to alter the course of events. In this respect, Hammarskj6ld's theory of 
executive action was at once an attempt to justify the actions of his representatives in the 
Congo, and, an attempt to resolve the Cassandra dilemma for future S ecretari es -General. 
Although the Secretary-General's intentions were both admirable and understandable, his 
justification, based on Article 99 was fundamentally flawed, and added to the controversy 
surrounding the future of peacekeeping and the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance 
of international peace and security. 
Firstly, the implied powers of Article 99 provide the Secretary -General with a role derived 
from the discretion to convene or not to convene the Security Council. Once convened that 
discretion ceases to exist, and with it the role emanating from that discretion. Any role 
thereafter, is purely at the direction and discretion of the Security Council, (or General 
Assembly), under Article 98. 
Secondly, in the execution of that mandate the Secretary-General is limited to the provisions 
of the mandate. In the UK, a citizen's rights are expressed residually in common law and 
the legislative system functions on the basis of negative statute formulation. The contrary is 
true for the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General enjoys no residual rights beyond 
those encompassed in Article 99 and 33 and the legislative resolution of the UN deliberative 
organs outline only what the Secretary-General can do. In short, there exists no, 'spirit of 
Article 99, ' in the application of Article 98 responsibilities. The very point of the Secretary- 
General's, 'irresponsible observation, ' was that it was a measure of last resort and ultra 
vires - it could not be justified either by recourse to Article 99 or to the mandate which he 
had been accorded. In its title the Secretary-General had implicitly recognised the limits to 
the Secretary-General's powers. Arguably, executive action could be justified on moral 
grounds as a one-off, and if applied in the circumstances Hammarskjbld originally 
envisaged. In such circumstances only the incumbent and his interpretation of the 
Secretary-General's powers are contentious. Hammarskj6ld's attempt to articulate a formal 
theory of executive action entailed the possibility that the Secretary -General might enjoy the 
right to alter or re-interpret mandates. As Boudreau argues, "to link his discretionary 
powers under Article 99 to executive powers under Article 98 might be construed as 
allowing the Secretary-General an independent role in the use of military forces. "' Despite 
Lie's campaign, the Secretary-General had no independent resources of his own. For 
troops and logistics he relied on the member states. These contributions would soon have 
dried up because the member states would not give up resources, troops, and lives, for 
action over which they had no effective control. Equally, linking such a right to the 
lBoudreau, op. cit., p. 55-7. 
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discretion which the Secretary-General enjoys in the application of Article 99, and to the 
associated implied third party prerogatives, would have discouraged member states from 
engaging the Secretary-General's good offices because of the possible chain of events. 
Force cannot be applied neutrally, and its use or the possibility of its use did not rest well 
with his conception of the Secretary-General's good offices, peacekeeping and preventive 
diplomacy. Moreover, further aggrandisement of the Secretary -General's powers would 
have in part usurped Security Council status as the UN organ with primary responsibility 
for peace and security, and was more than the members, particularly the USSR, and 
increasingly the US were prepared to tolerate. In this respect Hammarskj6ld's death might 
also be viewed as an indication of the Secretary-General's influence in international politics 
per se, and not just the possibility that he might have persuaded Tshombe to end the 
Katanga secession. 
The Death of Hammarskjd1d. 
Hammarskj6ld was killed in a plane crash in Northern Rhodesia on 17 September 196 1. 
Two official reports found no concrete evidence of foul play, but circumstantial evidence 
has cloaked Hammarskj6ld's death in uncertainty and suspicion., In September 1992, after 
an Italian UN crew were shot down over Yugoslavia, Ivan Smith and O'Brien published 
new evidence in a letter to The Guardian. 2 The new evidence came from records of twenty 
interviews passed to Smith around 1987 by a senior French diplomat and friend, whom he 
explains, "was approached in the 1970s by some of the mercenaries involved, including the 
Belgian pilot of the plane that fired the [disputed] shot. ' '3 The Secretary-General was en 
route to Ndola where he was scheduled to meet Tshombe for cease-fire talks. Smith and 
O'Brien are convinced that the transcripts confirm Hanunarskj6ld's death was the result of a 
bungled attempt to prevent the meeting and redirect Hammarskj6ld's plane to the Belgian 
airbase at Karnina in Congo. Smith and O'Brien explain that a mining cabal of European 
industrialists, "feared that Tshornbe would cave in when he met Dag. ' '4 Two aircraft were 
sent to intercept the flight and authorised to fire warning shots across Hammarskj6ld's 
bow. The official reports found no evidence of a direct hit, but aircraft control transcripts 
record the second pilot shouting, "Christ you've hitit. "5 O'Brien insists the inter-views 
substantiate his long held theory that, "the warning shot must have hit a wire and caused the 
plane to veer out of control so that it could not complete the landing. ' '6 Moreover, Smith 
ISee Gavshon, Arthur L., The Mysterious Death Of Hammarskjdld, (New York: Walker, 1962); O'Brien. 
Murderous Angels: A Political Tragedy and Comedy in Black and White, (Boston: Little Brown, 1968)-, & 
Urquhart, op. cit., p. 472. 
2Smith, Ivan & O'Brien, Connor Cruise, "Hammarskj6ld plane crash 'no accident"'. letter to the editor. The 
Guardian, II September, 1992. Also see lead article by Pallister, David, "Mercenaries 'ki I led UN Chief in 
air crash. "' 
3SMith & O'Brien, op. cit. 
4ibid. 
5ibid. 
6ibid. 
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and O'Brien support Colonel Rene Trinquier's contention that the Europeans had smuggled 
on board a representative to speak with the Secretary-General in flight. ' Inthisrespect 
O'Brien recalls a conversation regarding the death toll in which Roy Welensky, then Prime- 
Minister in Rhodesia, "gave one of those big srTffles of his and just said, 'was it fourteen or 
fifteen? "'2 Furthermore, Sergeant Harold Julien, the only survivor, informed the 
investigators that Hammarskj6ld had informed the pilot of a change in destination and 
directed him to abort the landing. He died four days after the crash. No further official 
investigations were commissioned as result of O'Brien's and Smith's information, but the 
evidence, which is persuasive, raises some important questions 
Smith and O'Brien's agenda was the safety and protection of UN personnel in Yugoslavia. 
In Katanga Smith had been the target of a failed kidnap attempt and both were used to 
operating in an extremely hostile environment. They were speaking out in defence of more 
assertive action in Yugoslavia for the very same reason that O'Brien instructed UN troops 
to arrest European mercenaries on 13 September. The irony is that their evidence in fact 
vindicates Hammarskj6ld's more measured approach. Throughout the Congo crisis the 
Secretary -General believed that Tshornbe's intransigence and Katanga's secession was only 
maintained by external interference. If Tshombe could be persuaded to talk with Adoula, 
or to expel the mercenaries, a national reconciliation could be realised. For Hammarskj6ld 
UN expulsion of the mercenaries was a last resort measure. The lengths to which the 
Europeans were prepared to go to prevent that meeting, or at least speak to the Secretary- 
General first, vindicates Hammarskj6ld's rather than O'Brien's assessment of Tshombe's 
position. 
The extent to which the Western states were involved in the plans to intercept the Secretary- 
General is unclear. The conspiracy theorists might conceive of Europe's own, 'Congate, ' 
if Hammarskj6ld's death were read alongside James' explanation for the Secretary- 
General's aggrandisement during his tenure. 3 James attributes the S ecretary -General's 
aggrandisement to 'momentum. ' After Suez, James argues, "he proceeded to build on his 
own success, creating a momentum which could only be stopped at considerable political 
CoSt. "4 In the Congo the, 'dirty work, 'had been done by the USSR. The Secretary- 
General's position had been undem-iined by Khruschev's attack on person and office, and 
by Hammarskj6ld's attempt to justify executive action. Successful talks with Tshombe 
would have made the continued presence of European nationals in Katanga untenable, 
paved the way for national reconciliation, and provided the Secretary -General with a final 
ITnnquier, Ren6, Notre Guerre au Katanga, cited by Pallister, op. cit. 
21bid. N. B. the 14 official passengers are listed in Urquhart, op. cit,, p. 588. 
3James, Alan, "The S ecre tary- General: A Comparative Analysis, " in Berridge, G., & Jennings, A., 
Diplomacy at the UN, (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 46-7. 
4ibid. 
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triumphant political coup. In this respect, maintaining the Katanga secession was not only a 
matter of national commercial interests, but had the secondary advantage of bringing to a 
halt the seemingly unyielding aggrandisement of the Secretary-General's role and influence. 
The Soviet defector Arkady Shevchenko suggests KGB involvement in Hammarskjbld's 
death, I but this does not match with the two notes from Heinz Weischoff found on 
Hammarskj6ld's body. 2 In these notes Weischoff informed the Secretary -General that he 
had been informed by, 'a usually reliable resource, ' that Khruschev admitted to having 
made an error in condemning Hammarskj6ld. But if it is assumed that the CIA exercised 
editorial control over the publication of Shevchenko's memoirs, Shevchenko's assertions 
can be interpreted as having corroborative value. These suggestions are of course highly 
interpretative and based almost entirely on unsubstantiated conjecture. Nevertheless the 
very existence of such a conspiracy theory is indicative of how far the role of the Secretary- 
General had evolved before Hammarskj6ld's ill-conceived, if well intentioned, conception 
of executive authority. 
Consolidation (1961-1982) 
The process of aggrandisement brought both Lie and Hammarskj6ld into a clash with one 
of the superpowers, precipitated a constitutional crisis at the UN, and ushered in a period a 
of greater regulation and moderation. For the period 1961-1982 Bailey's observations 
regarding the first two Secretary-General can be inverted such that: 
- the Security Council attempted to regulate more closely the Secretary -General's diplomatic 
functions and allowed the Secretary-General less discretion in implementing its mandates; 
- the Secretaries-General were more circumspect in their interpretation of the resources of 
the office and in the exercise of independent initiatives to further the principles of the 
Charter. 
These trends had markedly different effects on the Secretary -General's peacekeeping and 
good offices roles. 
Consolidation, the Secretary-General and Peacekeeping. 
In the peacekeeping field U 'Mant and Waldheim were compliant with a tighter regulatory 
regime and returned to the peacekeeping principles espoused in UNEF 1. In UNFICYP, 
UNEF 11, UNDOF, and UNFIL, the Security Council reclaimed competence for 
peacekeeping mandates from the General Assembly and narrowed the Secretary -General's 
scope for executive discretion in applying and interpreting mandates. Thus, whilst 
Hammarskj6ld played a central substantive role shaping the UNEF and (to a lesser degree) 
ONUC mandates, an internal report reviewing the authority of the Secretary -General over 
IShevchenko, Arkady, Breaking with Moscow, (New York: Ballantine, 1985), p. 134. 
217or full text of notes see systemic analysis, pp. source, Dag Hammarskj*6]d papers. Royal Library 
Stockholm, quoted in entirety in Tracthenberg, Larry, "A Bibliographic Essay on Dac' Hammarsk 61d, 
" in 
Jordan, op. cit., p. 149. 
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peacekeeping operations noted, "the normal practice has become of the Security Council to 
define the mandate of the mission in question and to request the Secretary-General to make 
all necessary arrangements for its establishment and funding, including determination of the 
size and composition of the operation. "' In this latter respect the efficient and effective 
command of the UN operations was insured - suggestions in the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping had at one stage included proposals for the joint command of operations by 
the Secretary-General and the Security Council President. The Secretary-General also 
retained a significant input into the decision-making process but the institutional balance of 
power had shifted substantially and irrevocably. After ONUC, the reassertion of UNEF 
principles: consent, impartiality and the non use of force, ensured that the Secretary- 
General's command of peacekeeping reinforced the Secretary -General's good offices 
andvice versa. This was most clearly demonstrated in Cyprus, where the limits to 
peacekeeping and the Secretary-General's good offices were also exposed. 
UNFICYP Revisited: The Problem with Peacekeeping. 
UNFICYP is the longest running peacekeeping operation, but since its deployment in 1964, 
U Thant, Waldheirn, Perez de Cuellar, (as Waldheim's special representative and as 
Secretary-General), and Boutros Ghali have all tried unsuccessfully to resolve the political 
impasse. Either side of the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus in 1974, UNFICYP 
has provided the peace and stability which has permitted the Secretaries-General and their 
representatives to engage the two conu-nunities in talks. In 1967, however, U Thant 
warned that the confidence of the conununities in the operation may have reduced the 
urgency for a political solution and the intensity of a virtually non-existent political 
process. 2 Similarly, in 1992, in an effort to kick-start talks, Boutros Ghali threatened to 
consider, "alternative action. ' '3 As Franck and Nolte explain, Boutros Ghall's statement 
was a public acknowledgement that, "critics now view the UN's role in Cyprus as 
contributing as much to the problem as to its solution by inadvertently encouraging the 
parties to remain safely intransigent behind the UN policed line. ' '4 In other words, 
UNFICYP became a victim of its own success. Until 1974, the 'fashionable' solution was 
to propose the withdrawal of UNFICYP placing the onus on the parities to reconcile their 
differences or, "fightit oUt. "5 The events of 1974, however, gave impetus to an alternative 
approach. 
Untitled, undated and unattributed report filed in UN Archives under, "SG Press Releases and Clippings on 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, " DAG. 1/5.2.2.11 -1 
2UN Doc. S/7969,13 June 1967. 
3UN Doc. S/23780,3 April 1992. 
4Franck, Thomas M., & Nolte, Georg, "The Good Offices Function of the UN Secretary-General, " in 
Roberts, Adam, & Kingsbury, Benedict, United Nations Divided World: The UN's Roles in International 
relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 156. 
5See James, "The UN Force in Cyprus, " International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 3, Summer 1989-, & Henn, 
Francis, "EYEWITNESS: The Nicosia Airport Incident of 1974: A Peacekeeping, Gamble. " International 
Peacekeeping, Vol. 1, No. ], Spring 1994. 
- 127- 
On 15 July 1974 a coup d'etat by the National Guard installed as President the EOKA 
radical, Nicos Sampson who was sponsored by the military Junta in Greece. The revival 
and prospect of enosis, (unity with Greece), unsettled the Turkish Cypriots and carried with 
it the possibility of reciprocal Turkish intervention. On 16 July Waldheim invoked Article 
99 and warned the Security Council that in his opinion a threat to international peace and 
security existed. 1 On 20 July Turkey launched a large scale military operation in Northern 
Cyprus. UNFICYP was neither equipped nor intended to reverse the coup d'&at, or resist 
a powerful army on the march. At Nicosia airport, however, the courageous actions of the 
UNFICYP commander, Prem Chand, acting with the backing of Kurt Waldheim, helped 
bring about a cease-fire. The airport was held by the Greek Cypriot National Guard, but 
was an obvious strategic and presitgious prize. The UNFICYP commander negotiated with 
local Greek and Turk commanders for the UN to assume control of the airport. The 
Turkish commanders, however, had acted without authority from Ankara, where the 
President had declared his intention to take the airport, if necessary by force. As Turkish 
forces approached, UNFICYPs authority was boosted by RAF 'fly-bys' and borrowed 
British tanks. Although furious with the local Turkish officers, the President was not 
prepared to mow down an international force which included members of allied states. 
Moreover, the imperative for the military offensive had subsided the previous day with the 
collapse of the Greek Junta and resignation of Nico Sampson. A cease-fire came into 
effect, and the UK, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus entered into, 'negotiations for the 
restoration of peace, ' as requested by SCR 353 of 20 July. 
On 30 July the guarantor powers agreed a cease-fire formula which required UNFICYP to 
establish a security zone between the opposing armies and provide protection for Turkish 
enclaves and security in mixed villages. 2Waldheim reported these recommendations to the 
Security Council on 31 JUly, 3 and on 1 August the Secretary -General was authorised, "to 
take appropriate action in light of his statement. "4 The failure of the National Guard to 
withdraw from Turkish Cypriot territory, and the Turkish conunitment to secure a, "bi- 
regional Federal Republic of Cyprus, ' '5prompted a renewed ground offensive on 14 
August. When fighting ceased on 16 August, Turkish advances, coupled with a process of 
Ivoluntary' ethnic cleansing had created, defacto, two separate Cypriot states. 
UNFICYP, now redeployed to stand between rather than amongst the Turk and Greek 
Cypriots, also took on a significant humanitarian role. These measures, built on the 
1 UN Doc. S/ 11334,16 July 1974. 
2UN Doc. S/ 11398,31 July 1974. 
3ibid. 
4SC Res. 355,1 August 1974. 
5UN Doc. S/ 11624, Annex B, 18 February, 1975. 
- 128- 
precedents established by U Thant, built confidence in the communities in the Secretary- 
General as an honest broker. Waldheim also incorporated the humanitarian strategy into the 
negotiating framework. Urquhart, recounts that in their first visit to Cyprus in August 
1974, "we [Urquhart and Waldheim] brought Clerides and Denktash together for the first 
time since the war to discuss the island's humanitarian problems as a starting point for 
wider discussions on a political settlement. "' On this basis the Secretary -General 
established agreements on frameworks for talks in 1977 and 1979, but no more than that. 2 
These negotiations, Waldheim. claims, "took up more of my time and attention than any 
other confrontation, "3 and Urquhart recalls were the "the most frustrating ... in my 
experience. " When the UNFICYP mandate came up for renewal in 1978, the Security 
Council for the first time did not include the provision that future renewal be contingent on 
satisfactory progress towards a settlement thus facilitating the withdrawal or down-sizing of 
UNFICYP. 5 
The failure of the UNFICYP to forestall the Turkish invasion, and the success of passive 
resistance at Nicosia airport added a new twist to the criticisms of the operation. Just ten 
years after the Congo, advocates of an occupation force began to resurface blaming 
UNFICYP passivity for the creation of a, 'secular and federated [Turkish Cypriot] state"6 
and citing the stand-off at Nicosia airport as evidence of what greater resistance might have 
achieved. As Franck contends, the failure to halt the Turkish invasion and the 
redeployment of UNFICYP, "reinforced the status quo imposed by the latest round of 
fighting. "7 Consequently the Secretary-General was now charged with the near impossible 
task of resolving the problem. This approach, however, misunderstands the conceptual 
and pragmatic grounding on which UN peacekeeping was founded, as do proposals for 
UNFICYP's withdrawal. 
Firstly, the functions, remit and principles of peacekeeping reflect the political will of the 
international community. Peacekeeping was borne out the cold war paralysis of UN police 
action. In the case of Cyprus, for the USSR, UNFICYP prevented Cyprus falling into 
Turkish hands and entirely within the NATO net. For the Western nations it satisfied the 
twin objectives of a just solution, (Britain was a guarantor power), without forcing a 
confrontation with a NATO ally, in Turkey. 
'Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 258. Clerides and Denktash were the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot leaders 
respectively. 
2See UN Docs. S/12323 30 April 1977; & S/13369,31 April 1979. For a summary of Waldhelm's effort.,, 
see, Repertory of Practice, op. cit., paras. 411-38. 
3Waldheim, In the Eye of the Storm, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), p. 78. 
4Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 259. 
5SC Res. 430 16 June 1978. 
6UN Doc. S/ 11624,18 February 1975. 
717ranck, Tliomas M. (1985), op. cit., p. 179. 
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Secondly, peacekeeping is a, 'derivative function, ' which James explains, "is dependent on 
the will of the parties towards a peace. If one or both of them are bent on war, the 
peacekeeping body will not offer a serious obstruction ... what it does provide a barrier 
against, is an unwanted war. "' Equally, the Secretary -General's good offices are a 
derivative function, the potential of which is enhanced by the presence of UNFICYP. In 
this respect it is interesting that UNFICYP is criticised for preventing progress on a political 
solution, but the Secretary-General is not. Both the peacekeeping role and the Secretary- 
General's good offices have the same conceptual foundation. What is apparent is not a 
conflict between peacekeeping and a negotiated solution but different attitudes towards 
UNFICYP and the Secretary-General's good offices. Just as the success of the Secretary- 
General's good offices is a function of the willingness of the parties to co-operate and their 
desire to settle their differences, the stability provided by UNFICYP reflects the policies of 
the parties rather than the strength of the UN barrier between them. 2 
If UNFICYP reinforced the status quo, it is not because of a fault in UN peacekeeping but 
because the parties are united in that they want to live in peace, but, seemingly irreconcilable 
on a system that permits them live together. The negotiating process therefore continues 
without any real prospect of a solution. As Franck explains, 
"To each side, while the status quo, is unsatisfactory, all but one of the 
alternatives is worse. That alternative, outright victory over the other side 
could be extremely costly and is probably beyond the military capability of 
either side. The respective Governments of Athens, Ankara, and the two 
Cypriot communities are realistic enough to know this, but are also 
politically aware that, were the UN not in the way, they would come under 
irresistible pressure from their own supporters to attempt a military solution. 
Thus, UNFICYP, and other UN peacekeepers also serve as a consistent 
excuse for Governments not to pursue popularity by courting disaster. ' '3 
Consequently, one of the UN commanders in Cyprus today now occupies the post held by 
his father twenty-five years earlier. 4 This is more than anecdote. It emphasises that either 
side of the Green line patrols are new generations who have no shared tradition or cultural 
links with their Cypriot compatriots. Their segregation, education, propaganda and the 
famous museums of barbarism reinforce prejudice, intransigence, and the status quo over a 
Federal Cyprus, and guard against the emergence of a political elite with the commitment to 
and support for a settlement. Thus the problem of peacekeeping, and of the Secretary- 
General's good offices after Hammarskj6ld's tenure, was one of expectation. During this 
period, peacekeeping and the Secretary-General's good-offices were mutually reinforcing. 
'James, "The UN Force in Cyprus, " op. cit., p. 499. 2ibid., pp. 498-500. 
3Franck, Thomas M. (1985), op. cit., p. 179. 
41nterview Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York, Fall 1994. 
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As secondary activities concerned with empowering disputing parties to reconcile their 
differences peacefully, if they were so disposed, they made an important contribution to the 
maintenance of peace and security, but were no panacea for peace. 
Consolidation and the Secretary -General's Good Offices. 
Given the circumstances in which the tenures of Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskj6ld came 
to an end, greater circumspection on the part of their successors was inevitable. 
Consolidation, however, does not necessarily mean inactivity, merely greater respect for the 
Charter limits. In respect of the Secretary-General's good offices charges of undue caution 
on U Thant's part are ill founded and arise largely out of his compliance with Nasser's 
request for the withdrawal of UNEF in 1967. In the Western press U Thant was made the 
scapegoat for the six day war. History has not treated U Thant kindly and the third 
Secretary-General is the most underestimated incumbent to date. I The charge of undue 
moderation is also a factor of the act which he had to follow. The tragic manner in which 
Hammarskj6ld's tenure came to an end also elevated his standing. Fifteen years of 
successful aggrandisement left far less scope for constitution building and in this respect a 
diminishing law of returns was also inevitable. Finally, in respect of the Secretary- 
General's good offices U Thant's preference for the quiet approach, belled the qualitative 
and quantitative expansion of the Secretary-General's good offices during this period. 2 
Thus, in his memoirs U Thant notes, 
"A list of all the instances in which the good offices of the Secretary -General 
have played a role would certainly have been a long one; it would also be 
difficult to make because the intervention often were made in complete 
secrecy - only the parties themselves were aware of thern. ' 13 
Even a cursory consideration of those cases which are documented demonstrates U Thant 
was an active and industrious exponent of this aspect of the Secretary-General's role, the 
independence of which he also defended vehemently. 
In 1962, building on the precedent of Hammarskj6ld's UN Presence, U Thant established 
under his own authority, a Temporary Executive Authority for West Irian, (UNTEA). 4 
Until Indonesia won independence in 1949, West Irian, (West New Guinea), was part of 
the Dutch East Indies. An ongoing dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over 
fights of governance came to a head in military clashes during 1961, fuelled by Soviet 
'View held by Brian Urquhart, interview New York, December 1994. 
2See, "The Cuban Missile Crisis, " pp. 92-6, "Good Offices Experiments: Arbitration, " pp. 96-7, 
"Expanding the Good Offices Remit: Humanitarian Initiatives, " pp. 106-9. On U Thant's approach see pp. 
208-17. 
3U Thant, op. cit., p. 53 
4See UN Doc. S/5170, August 1972. GA Res. 1752,21 September 1962 also provided for a United 
Nations Security force in West New Guinea, (UNSF), to assist UNTEA. 
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military aid. U Thant's quiet diplomacy involving both the US and USSR paved the way 
for the Secretary-General's good offices and an agreement in which the UN took over 
administration of the territory in the transition period between the Dutch departure and a 
new Indonesian Administration obliged to ascertain the wishes of the people regarding 
independence and self determination. 
in the same year, the Yemeni Premier was deposed in a coup d'etat. The new regime was 
supported by the UAR and USSR but opposed by Saudi Arabia and the UK. U Thant sent 
Ralphe Bunche as his personal representative and a negotiated settlement under the 
Secretary -General's auspices was reinforced by the UN Yemen Observer Mission, 
(UNYOM). UNYOM was formally authorised by the Security Council belatedly and only 
after the USSR requested a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the issue. I 
On 6 September 1965 the Security Council called for an end to hostilities in the war 
between India and Pakistan over the disputed Kashmir territory and requested the Secretary- 
General, "to take every possible effort towards that end. ' Q The Secretary-General's shuttle 
diplomacy was unsuccessful despite the highly personal rapport U Thant enjoyed with Ali 
Bhutto, (Indian Foreign Minister), and Dr. Savrepalli Radhakrishnan, (President of 
Pakistan). Mediation by the Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin provided for a cease-fire 
and settlement in the Tashkent Declaration of 10 June January 1966. To monitor an earlier 
cease-fire, however, U Thant established the United Nations India Pakistan Observer 
Mission, (UNIPOM), without fon-nal recourse to the Security Council. 
In 1967 U Thant responded to a request from a number of Governments and sent a personal 
representative to the Ivory Coast where the Guinean foreign minister and permanent 
representative had been detained. Their plane had made an unscheduled landing while 
returning home from a special session of the General Assembly. Their arrest was in 
retaliation for the arrest of Ivory Coast civilians in Guinea. U Thant's representative was 
unsuccessful and the Secretary-General intervened personally writing to the Foreign 
Nfinster directly and initiating a General Assembly resolution, "deploring all departures 
from the rules of international law governing diplomatic privileges and immunities. ' 13 
U Thant also provided good offices in various forms, inter alia, between Rwanda and 
Burundi, (1963-4); between Cambodia and Thailand on several occasions between 1961 
and 1968; between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in response to alleged attacks by Egyptian 
Planes on Saudi border towns (1967); following the hijacking of an Israeli airliner taken to 
'See UN Docs. S/5298,29 April 1963: S/5321,27 May 1963; S/5326,8 June 1963. & SC Res. 179.11 
June 1963. 
2SC Res. 210,6 June 1965. 
3U Tliant, op. cit., p. 56. 
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Algiers in July 1968; and at the request the USSR, in securing the release of Soviet trawlers 
and crew detained by Ghana in 1969. 
This last example is interesting in that the USSR was the most consistent and persistent 
objector to the Secretary-General's activities in this field. Repeatedly where the Secretary- 
General acted on his own initiative, his actions were challenged by the USSR. Objections 
were first voiced against HammarskjbId's UN Presence in Laos and were repeated in 
Security Council statements, inter alia, with respect to the creation of UNYOM, 
2 UNIPOM, and in the appointment of personal representatives between Cambodia and 
Thailand, 3and their deployment in Jerusalem, Bahrain and Equatorial New Guinea. 4 On 
each occasion the wording was predictable. In respect of UNIPOM, the USSR asserted, 
"only the Security Council was the competent organ to take the necessary decisions on all 
specific matters concerned with their functions, command and financing of their activities 
and so on. "5 And in respect of Bahrain the USSR contended, 
"It is a matter of common knowledge that according to the Charter of the 
United Nations, question of this kind and the decisions taken on them come 
within the jurisdiction of the Security Council ... that actions such as this by the Secretary -General, 'have become customary in United Nations practice' 
cannot serve to justify these action, for its widely known that this illegal 
practice was forced upon the United Nations in the past by certain powers 
contrary to and in violation of the Charter. "6 
On each occasion U Thant's reply was equally predictable. The Secretary-General 
repeatedly emphasised the provisions of Articles 99 and 33, the statements of the 
Preparatory Commission and the now substantial case law in his favour. 
The discretionary provision of the Secretary-General's good offices was only seriously 
threatened on one occasion during U Thant's tenure. On 7 March 1969, U Thant informed 
the Security Council President of his decision to send Marcial Tamayo, as the Secretary- 
General's personal representative, to Equatorial New Guinea. The President informed the 
Security Council, as was U Thant's intention, but did so by reference to, "the content of 
our consultation. ' 17 In so doing the President inferred a substantive contribution to 
decisions taken by the Secretary-General acting in an independent capacity. U Thant was 
quick to make clear the President had been informed only as a procedural, "matter of 
information, "8 and that in respect of the deployment of the Secretary -General's good 
'See UN Doc. S/5236,11 June 1963. 
2See SCOR 1247th meeting, 25 October 1963 & 1251st meeting 5 November 1965. 
3See UN Doc. S/7478 
4See UN Doc. S/9101,19 March 1969. 
5SCOR, 20 October 1965, quoted in U Thant, op. cit., p. 412. 
6UN Doc. S/9737,2 April 1972 
7UN Doc. S/9054,7 March 1969. 
8UN Doc. S/9055,7 March 1969. 
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offices and personal representatives, "it was not my purpose ... to establish any precedent 
of prior consultation. "' On 10 March the President confirmed the procedural nature of their 
exchange, but also added that he was duty bound to inform the Security Council of issues 
of international peace and SeCUfity. 2 There the matter should have been laid to rest, but on 
19 March with specific reference to the appointment of Tamayo, the USSR stated, "it is 
necessary to emphasise that under the UN Charter decisions on matters connected with 
action by the United Nations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security 
are taken by the Security Council. "3 To this U Thant replied in his annual report on the 
work of the organisation defending the Secretary-General's independent prerogatives as 
before. 4 The issue finally came to rest on 2 December when the Security Council 
authorised a statement through the President announcing it members, "fully respect the 
Secretary-General's position and his action in bringing issues confronting the organisation 
in many parts of the world to their notice. ' 15 
'Me threat that the established practice of informing the Security Council might limit the 
future independent application of the Secretary -General's good offices, and the repeated 
challenges to this right, forced U Thant to conclude, "it is my impression that its [the 
Secretary-General's good offices] nature and possibilities are sometimes not very well 
understood. "6 The Secretary-General thus commissioned a UNITAR study of the 
Secretary -General's good offices to draw clearer lines of responsibility and avoid 
confusion and differences over what the Secretary-General was and was not entitled to do. ' 
The development of the Secretary-General's role during the cold war ground to a halt with 
the publication of this Report in 1972. 
These were not the actions of a Secretary-General tirnid or circumspect in the application of 
the Secretary-General's good offices. U Thant was constrained in the application of his 
good offices only by the limits of the Charter, and, the willingness, of disputing parties to 
engage the Secretary-General. U Thant's respect for the Charter limits, (already evident in 
the UNEF withdrawal), in Nigeria and East Pakistan, in particular, fuelled the moderation 
myth. In Nigeria, the civil war was an internal matter in which the Secretary -General could 
not intervene without a request from the recognised Government. Despite the Secretary- 
General's offers of assistance, that request was not forthcoming. Furthermore, the 
1 ibid. 
2UN Doc. S/9066,10 March 1969. 
3UN Doc. S/9101,19 March 1969. 
4U Thant, Introduction to Report of the Secretary- General n the Work of the Organisation, 1969, (New 
York: United Nations, 1969). 
5SCOR 1329th meeting, 2 December 1969. 
6U Thant, Report on the Work of the Organisation, 1969, (New York: UN, 1969), p. I 
7Pechota, Vratislav, The Quiet Approach: A Study of the good Offices Exercised by the United Nations 
Secretary- General in the Cause of Peace, (New York: UNITAR, 1972). 
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involvement of the OAU ensured strict observance of the sovereignty principle, comprised 
as it was, of highly protectionist newly independent states. The Secretary-General was thus 
powerless to halt the civil war while a massive humanitarian crisis unfolded. I 
Similarly, in the crisis over East Pakistan in 1971,2U Thant was circumscribed by the 
provisions of Article 2 (7). On 20 July 1971 the Secretary-General addressed a confidential 
memorandum to the Security Council President stating, "it is for the members of the 
Council themselves to decide whether ... consideration should take place formally or 
informally, in public or private. ' 13 On 2 August U Thant prompted the Security Council 
again by making that memorandum public in an 'implied' invocation of Articlegg. 4 The 
Security Council did not heed the Secretary-General's prompt until 3 December, after 
fighting between India and Pakistan had already broken out. Some commentators have 
criticised the Secretary-General for not fully invoking Articlegg. 5 Of these Boudreau 
accepts that in the given climate convening the Security Council may have exacerbated 
rather than eased the situation but cannot be justified if the Secretary-General then fails to 
exercise his own preventive responsibilities. U Thant's secret advances to Pakistan and the 
Aswami League which facilitated the creation of UNEPRO have already been discussed. 6 
U Thant also attempted to employ the good offices of the Secretary-General of the Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers on the grounds that an intermediary better acquainted with 
the politics of the region might be more acceptable to the parties. The Islamic Secretary- 
General was no more successful than U Thant. The parties and the Security Council, 
however, remained unaware that this intermediary's endeavours were the product of a 
secret initiative by the Secretary-General, who has been unjustly criticised not only for 
failing to convene the Security Council, but for failing to fulfil the obligations that flow 
from Article 99. 
The other respect in which the Secretary-General's good offices were restrained by the 
Security Council, was in those cases where the members of the Security Council were 
directly involved. On 28 August 1965 President Johnson ordered US Marines ashore to 
guard against the threat of another Castro in the Dominican Republic. In a similar action 
three years later, on 21 August 1968, Brezhnev ordered Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia 
to crush Dubcek's Prague Spring. In the Dominican Republic the US used the OAS to 
I See U Thant, 'The United Nations and Some Problems of Public Understanding, " address given to News 
Media Seminar on 3 December 1971 at UNHQ, see UN Archives New York, DAG 1/5-3.2.1.1: 1 Bx 19, 
Middle East UNEF 1972-3. 
2See pp. 104-7. 
3UN Doc. SG/SM 1516,2 August 197 1. 
4U Thant, View From the UN, p. 423. This is U Thant's term for the informal invocation of Article 99, 
see pp. 77-79. 
5See Boudreau op. cit., p. 73; & Bailey, Sydney, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 74-5. 
6See pp. 106-9 
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provide retrospective legitimacy for its actions, but under pressure from its allies, also 
agreed to a Security Council resolution requesting the Secretary-General to send a special 
representative to report on the situation in the Dominican Republic. Jose A. Mayobre, (of 
the Executive Commission of Latin America), was accorded only a narrow reporting 
mandate and the Secretary-General prevented from making any substantive contfibution to 
the resolution of the conflict. In respect of the situation in Czechoslovakia the Security 
Council was convened by the US and Denmark, but only served as a forum for the 
exchange of cold war propaganda. There was absolutely no prospect of the Secretary- 
General even sending a special representative. ' Following consultations with the Soviet 
and Czech permanent representatives, U Thant made a statement, which at the time, 
Urquhart described as the strongest ever made by a Secretary-General, 2 
"In the present case, the Secretary-General regards the developments in 
Czechoslovakia as yet another serious blow to the concepts of international 
order and morality which form the basis of the Charter of the United 
Nations, for which the United Nations has been striving all these years. It 
is also a grave setback to the East-West detente which seemed to be re- 
emerging in recent months, and to which the Secretary-General attaches the 
greatest importance. He has appealed to the government of the USSR to 
exercise utmost restraint in its relations with the government and people of 
Czechoslovakia, and strongly hopes that this appeal will be heeded by the 
government of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. "3 
In 1965 U Thant had also lambasted the US for its refusal to consider a negotiated 
settlement to the Vietnam War. Throughout his tenure, U Thant made repeated attempts 
both in private and public to promote a negotiated solution to the conflict in Indo-China. 
The first private initiative was an attempt to arrange secret exploratory talks between the 
North Vietnamese and US representatives in his native Rangoon. This proposal was 
tentatively raised at a State Department luncheon in August in 1964, after which U Thant 
proceeded on the basis of what he regarded as an indication of intereSt. 4 Encouraged also 
by the US permanent representative, Adlai Stevenson, U Thant contacted the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Their response was positive but no official reply came from 
the US for four months. On 30 January 1965 Stevenson informed U Thant that his offer 
had been rejected. The US permanent representative had encouraged the Secretary-General 
without direction or formal authority from Washington. A week later the US initiated its 
bombing campaign against the DRV, to which U Thant replied in a public statement, on 24 
February, 
IU Thant had actually been scheduled to depart for Prague on 22 August to receive an honorary degree from 
Charles University. 
2Nass1f, op. cit., p. 109. 3Reproduced in Nassif, ibid. 
4Department of Political and Security Council Affairs Confidential Review, "U Thant and the Indochina 
Conflict, " JGS: IP: dd, 30 May 1972, UN Archives, Dag 1/5.3.2.3.0: 1 Vietnam U Thant. 
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"I am sure that the American People, if only they knew the facts and the background to the developments in South Vietnam, will agree with me that further bloodshed is unnecessary. The political and diplomatic method of discussions and negotiations alone can create conditions which will enable the US to withdraw gracefully from that part of the world. As you know, in 
times of war and of hostilities the first casualty is truth. "' 
In this rare outburst, as an internal paper acknowledged, "U Thant all but erased the credit 
he had built up with the Johnson Administration. ' 12 The same paper also argued, however, 
that given US intransigence, 
"The damage done to the Secretary-General's own position as an impartial 
mediator in the eyes of the US Governments was outweighed by the 
possible value of an appeal to the American people over the heads of its 
Government, and the fulfilment of the Secretary-General's moral 
responsibility to speak for mankind as a whole. "3 
U Thant continued his campaign for a negotiated solution but his proposals, inter alia: for a 
peace conference and a 'stand still truce' but was sidelined by the absence of a willingness 
on the part of combatants to compromise on essential issues. 4 
U Thant's public statements in respect of Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, like Lie's support 
for the Unified Command in Korea, were calculated risks on the part of the Secretary- 
General. The Secretary-General's good offices rest on a combination of impartiality 
between interests, and integrity derived from a consistent and unswerving conunitment to 
the principles and purposes of the Charter. Unless the Secretary-General observes the 
latter, his impartiality lacks moral authority and the Secretary-General's good offices 
become an endless pursuit of compromise with no context of principle or purpose. 
The exclusion of the Secretary-General by the major powers from the Dominican Republic, 
Czechoslovakia, and, Vietnam. continued under Waldheim. During the 1970s the Secretary- 
General increasingly became a peripheral figure in matters of international peace and 
security. In the Yom Kippur War, (1973), a cease-fire was brokered by Kissinger in 
Moscow and ratified by SCR 388 on 22 October 1973. Waldheirn provided an invaluable 
service in clarifying issues, most notably in reporting that Egypt dealt the first blow despite 
its stated innocence. 5 Secondly on 23 October, Waldheirn suggested to Kissinger, the 
placement of a UN Force between Egypt and Israel and played a pivotal role in the creation 
of UNEF II, and the placement of UNDOF between Israel and Syria. These operations, 
brought relative stability to an inherently volatile situation and facilitated the Geneva 
'Press Conference, 24 February, 1965, quoted in Department of Political and Security Council Affairs 
Confidential Review, op. cit. 
2Department of Political and Security Council Affairs Confidential Review, op. cit. 
3ibid. 
4ibid. 
5UN Doc. S/7930/Add 2141,6 October 1973. 
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Conference on the Middle East and the Camp David Accords in 1978. As the commander 
of these peacekeeping operations the Secretary-General played an important secondary role 
but made no substantive contribution to the peace process. The Middle East Peace 
Conference was convened by the Secretary-General, but only at the request of the 
superpowers who also jointly chaired the conference. I Waldheim's attempts to resurrect the 
Conference after his re-election as Secretary-Genral were also met with a stem warning 
from the new US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, that, "Waldheim should not make 
commitments on anything to do with the Middle East Conference without checking with the 
U S. 112 Furthermore, the Secretary-General was not party to the Camp David process. Over 
Vietnam Waldheirn also continued to offer the Secretary-General's good offices but as in 
the Middle East was excluded from sensitive negotiations and attended the Paris Peace 
Conference only in a ceremonial capacity, where Urquhart concludes, "Canada's proposal 
that the UN should supervise the cease-fire was not even seriously considered by the 
Conference ... To the bitter end the world organisation would have no mitigating effect on 
the tragedy on Indo-China. ' '3 
Waldheim's exclusion from the Nfiddle East and Vietnam peace processes was imposed 
upon him by the direct intervention of the superpowers. Elsewhere, for instance in Cyprus, 
Western Sahara, East Timor, Cambodia, Namibia, Iran-Iraq (1974), and Afghanistan, 
Waldheim provided good offices predominantly at the direction of the Security Council and 
General Assembly. 4 Progress on the substantive aspects of these conflicts floundered on 
combinations of indirect great power intervention, the intransigence of the parties 
concerned, and the provisions of Article 2 (7). Where substantive negotiations, or 
negotiations about substantive negotiations were blocked Waldheim extended the Secretary- 
General's good offices in an independent capacity, with some success, in humanitarian and 
subsidiary aspects of the conflicts. 
Thus, acting in an independent capacity Waldheim secured the release of eight French 
hostages held by Frente Polisario, (Western Sahara Liberation movement), but made 
progress only on procedural aspects in the negotiations of self determination for Western 
Sahara. 5 In East Timor Waldheim provided, good offices on humanitarian grounds at the 
request of the Portuguese President's Special Envoy and helped secure the safe passage of 
twelve hundred foreign nationals out of Dili in 1975.6 But in the Security Council and the 
1 See UN Doc S/ I 1161 18 December 1973. 
2Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 229. Attempted only at the direction of the General Assembly see GA Res. 
3414,5 December 1975, & UN Docs. S/ 11985 17 February 1976; S/ 11991,20 February 1976; & 
S/ 12290,28 February 1977. 
3Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 240. 
4For continuity Waldheim's contribution in Iran-Iraq, Afghanistan, and Namibia is reserved for chapter 6. 
5See UN Docs., SG/SNV2521 Rev. 2; & SG/SNV2522, both 15 December 1977. 
6UN Doc. SG/SM 2236,26 August 1975. 
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General Assembly mandated efforts to secure the Indonesian withdrawal and self- 
determination for the former Portuguese colony, Waldheim, and his successors succeeded 
only in keeping the issue on the international agenda. In Cambodia, Franck observes that, 
"once blocked in his General Assembly mandated efforts to negotiate Vietnamese 
withdrawal, " Waldheim, "acting entirely on his own, organised a highly successful 
pledging conference to fund a gigantic relief effort on behalf of Kampuchean refugees. " 
Waldheim's independent initiatives here were preceded by a Geneva Conference in July 
1979 convened to raise awareness and assistance for the Vietnamese boat people. The 
campaign itself raised $190m in resettlement aid and an additional 125 000 resettlement 
places, 2but in respect of peace and security paved the way for an agreement reducing the 
exodus negotiated under the Secretary-General's good offices. 
For the most part U Thant's good offices were provided at the Secretary-General's 
initiative. In the independent exercise of the Secretary-General's good-offices, U Thant 
provided leadership and direction for the member states in the deliberative organs. 
Waldheim, however, extended the Secretary-General's good offices independently only in 
areas of little controversy which did not bring him into clashes with the major powers or the 
deliberative organs. Waldheim. was active, and as Skellsbaek notes, "ambitious on behalf 
of the organisation, "3 but in his reliance on the member states for policy direction and 
reluctance to take bold initiatives or statements and lead/shape international policy was 
complicit in the marginalisation of the UN during the 1970s. Thus Boudreau describes 
Waldheirn as a, "caretaker Secretary-General, "4while Finger and Saltzman accuse the 
Secretary -General of, "bending with the winds. "5 
In 1980 Waldheim's invocation of the Peking Formula to visit Iran at the height of the 
hostage crisis thrust the Secretary-General back into the public limelight. The Secretary- 
General's attempts to secure the release of American hostages captured on 4 November 
1979, however, are typical of his tenure. The Secretary-General offered his good offices 
but without articulating proposals by which the Iranians might extricate themselves. The 
Secretary-General convened the Security Council but made no recommendations on how 
the Security Council might progress. The Security Council failed to provide the guidance 
and direction which the Secretary-General sought and requested the Secretary-General to 
continue making available his good offices. 6 And finally, the Secretary-General's visit to 
Tranck, (1985), op. cit., p. 151. 
2ibid. 
3Skellsbaek, Kjell, "Me UN Secretary- General and the Mediation of International Disputes, " Journal of 
lnternational Peace Research, February 199 1. 
413oudreau, op. cit., p. 76. 
517inger, Seymour Maxwell & Saltzman, Arnold, Bending with the Winds: Kurt Waldheim and the United 
Nations, (New York: Praeger, 1990. 
6SC Res. 457,4 December, 1979. 
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Iran was only at the US request. The value of the Peking Formula was immediately undone 
by an insensitive American press hailing the Secretary-General's visit as a victory for US 
diplomacy. I On his arrival, Finger and Saltzman report that Waldheim was instructed, "to 
avoid the impression that you are here to negotiate the release of the hostages. The 
important point to stress is that your visit is a fact-fMing mission and not a negotiating 
mission. ' Q The Secretary-General received an incredibly hostile welcome, never met with 
Khomonei and found his mission manipulated by the Arab and the Western Press, "who 
seemed delighted to have someone new to blame. ' '3Waldheim's visit to Tehran was both 
bold and brave but Franck also argues was foolish. 4 Franck argues that during Waldheim's 
tenure the Secretary-General's efficacy was brought into question by a marked decline in 
the success/failure rate of the Secretary-General's black box function. The Secretary- 
General's office became a dumping ground for the world's insoluble problems and Franck 
argues Waldheim failed to resist the members passing the buck where there were no 
prospects of a solution. As a result, the Secretary-General was too often manipulated for 
propaganda purposes, and too easily made the scapegoat for the weakness and actions of 
others. Furthermore, the Secretary-General lacked a clear and coherent vision of the 
Secretary -General's role in the maintenance of international peace and security, and was 
less inclined to put Charter principles before impartiality between interests. Successful 
outcomes rested much more on the parties themselves than on the invention, ingenuity, 
political skill and leadership of the Secretary-General within Franck's black box. Put 
another way, Waldheirn. was less inclined than his predecessors to speak out publicly in 
defence of the principles and purposes of the Charter. To protect his impartiality Waldheim 
erred on the side of caution to the extent that Urquhart comments, "I remember one evening 
early on, exasperated by hours of dithering over the phrasing of a statement on Vietnam 
saying, 'we really must make a decision. ' 'There will be no decision, ' snapped Waldheim, 
'That's a decision. '5 Thus as a Secretary-General, Waldheirn was a competent executor of 
the Secretary-General's good offices but developed no further the Secretary-General's role 
within Franck's 'black box. ' 
Redeflniniz Preventive Diplomagy, 
The period of consolidation witnesses the deconstruction and redefing of preventive 
diplomacy. For Hammarskj6ld there were two key aspects to preventive diplomacy: the 
cold war context, and the pivotal role of the Secretary-General. It did not matter whether 
the Secretary-General was acting in a peacekeeping or good offices capacity, at the direction 
of a UN organ, or on his own initiative. During the period of consolidation the Secretary- 
Tranck, (1985), op. cit., p. 141. 
217inger and Saltzman p. 63. 
3ibid. 
4Franck, op. cit, p. 141. 
5Urquhart, (1987). op. cit., p. 229. 
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General continued to command peacekeeping operations but the extent of the Secretary- 
General's political command in the fulfilment of this executive function narrowed 
significantly. At the same time the qualitative and quantitative expansion of the Secretary- 
General's good offices under U Thant, their defence by U Thant, the report into the 
Secretary -General's good offices commissioned by U Thant, and Waldheim's continued if 
more moderate application of this aspect of the Secretary-General's role, all indicated a 
narrower but incontrovertible sphere of autonomous action for the Secretary-General. 
Thus, Franck differentiates between two 'categories' or 'kinds' of black box function: one 
for the Secretary-General's good offices role and one for the Secretary-General's 
peacekeeping role. ' Franck argues, 
"Whether effective or not in carrying out these functions in particular 
instances, the Secretaries-General have been completely successful in 
drawing a line between their role and the role played by the political organs 
at the behest of member states. Successive incumbents have created for 
themselves a role that is separate and often different from the expressed 
intent of some or even most members. Secretaries-General have fully 
justified, (some more than others) acting on their own to safeguard what 
they perceived to be minimum standards of world order. ' Q 
Given the clearer demarcation of the Secretary-General's Peacekeeping and good offices 
roles, and the clearer demarcation of the capacity in which the Secretary-General was 
acting, during the period of consolidation of the Secretary-General's role, a secondary 
phenomenon, the process of deconstructing and redefining the preventive diplomacy, is 
evident. 
UNEF 11 and UNDOF were examples of preventive diplomacy in that they were designed 
to forestall superpower intervention in the Middle East as much as facilitate a resolution of 
the long-running difference between the Arabs and Israel. But in no sense was the practice 
of international statesmanship by the Secretary-General in evidence in either negotiating the 
cease-fires, the interjection of a UN force, or in the diplomatic processes the UN presence 
facilitated. If the central feature of preventive diplomacy is the role played by the Secretary- 
General then during the period of consolidation the practice of preventive diplomacy 
became, defacto, the practice of the Secretary-General's good offices. If never articulated 
formally, that new definition began to emerge in the statements by the Secretary-General 
regarding their good offices. Thus U Thant noted, 
'The exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices can be a useful 
method of preventing differences between states from developing into major 
Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 134. Franck applies this observation as much to the tenures of Lie and 
Hammarskjbld as to those of U 71ant and Waldheim. This approach belies the extent to which these two 
roles were bluffed under Hammarskjbld, and, therefore, belies the extent to which this distinction really 
began to emerge post Congo. 
2Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 152. 
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crises or of getting results on sensitive problems before they reach the 
insoluble stage. Preventive diplomacy of this kind is far more effective, and 
no less important, much cheaper in money and human lives than attempting 
to settle a conflict that has been allowed to reach an acute stage ... it requires the total co-operation, restraint, and good will of the parties concerned. It 
also requires from them courage and vision, as well as confidence in the discretion and integrity of the Secretary-General. When these conditions are 
present much can be done quietly. When they are absent little can be done. "' 
Similarly on his accession to office Waldheirn stated, 
"Efforts at peace-keeping though the United Nations cover many areas 
which are seldom publicly mentioned. Quiet diplomacy, good-offices, and 
the many contacts and efforts at conciliation that go on at the UN almost 
every day must be listed. The objective of most of these efforts is to deal 
with international problems before they reach the public crisis stage. This 
general effort has sometimes been called 'preventive diplomacy. ' When it 
succeeds it is far more effective and much cheaper than trying to deal with a 
fully developed political or military confrontation. Much of the day-to-day 
work of the Secretary-General and the permanent representatives of the 
member States comes under this general heading of preventive diplomacy. "2 
U Thant uses the terms good offices and preventive diplomacy interchangeably, and 
Waldheim equates preventive diplomacy with any aspect of the Secretary-General's 
intermediary role. In that the concept of good offices was not limited to incipient cold war 
conflicts and filling cold war power vacuums, the Secretary-General's practice of good 
offices advanced the process of redefining preventive diplomacy. For both, what mattered 
was not the type of conflict in which the Secretary-General became involved but the stage at 
which the Secretary-General became involved. This equates with Gordenker's 1967 
definition; 
"Because the Secretary-General's preventive diplomacy relates to specific 
situations and is not the subject of instructions by the Security Council or 
General Assembly no single statement accurately defines it. But all 
approaches to a definition are based on the doctrine that the Secretary- 
General has a generalised responsibility emanating from Article 99. "3 
Implicit in the statements of U Thant and Waldheirn with respect to preventive diplomacy is 
a distinction between the Secretary-General's roles as honest broker and peacekeeper. 
Equally, as Boudreau argues, in his definition of preventive diplomacy Gordenker, 
"tentatively distinguishes between preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping. "4 By defining 
preventive diplomacy entirely within the purview of Article 99, Gordenker excludes UNEF, 
UNOGIIL and ONUC as examples of preventive diplomacy. Yet these are three of the four 
'U Iliant, op. cit., p. 44. 
2UN Doc. SG/SM/1696, May 1972. 
3Gordenker, Leon, The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance ofPeace, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1967), p. 76. 
4Boudreau, op. cit., p. 5 1. 
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cases which Hammarskj6ld referenced as prompting the conception of preventive 
diplomacy. Instead Gordenker cites the Secretary-General's interjection of a personal 
representative between Cambodia and Thailand in 1958 as the first example of preventive 
diplomacy. I Gordenker was not in the process of redefining preventive diplomacy for the 
tenures of U Thant and Waldheim. but approached the concept from a literal rather than a 
contextual perspective. Boudreau also accepts Gordenker's definition for both periods 
under review here, but only having noted the incongruities in his definition, and only 
because conveniently, "it allows us to focus on preventive diplomacy as a specific 
application of the Secretary-General's role under Articlegg. "2 Thus, as for U Thant and 
Waldheim, for Gordenker and Boudreau the preventive diplomacy concept was not limited 
to or born out of a specific cold war context, but the provision of the Secretary-General's 
good offices prior to the outbreak or resumption of conflict. 
In this Gordenker also descfibes Beck-Ffiss as the Secretary -General's special rather than personal 
representative. 
2ibid. 
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CHAPTER 5 
, 
The Secretary- General in the Cold War Explained. 
I The_-Systemic Explanation. 
In his 1985 comparative analysis of Secretaries-General of different organisations, James 
notes there is a sense in which the Secretary-General is always a creature of circumstance. 
The exploration of the evolution of the Secretary-General's role in chapter four suggests 
that, as James observes, "some historical periods are more likely than others to be 
encouraging or restricting. " I At the first level of analysis this chapter sets out to explain the 
evolution of the Secretary-General's role during the periods of aggrandisement and 
consolidation in terms of the prevailing systemic circumstances. 
At this level James hypothesises that when relations between the chief members of an 
organisation are very poor, "not much is likely to be left specifically to his [the Secretary- 
General's] discretion in respect of high political matters, nor are interventions on his own 
initiative likely to find favour. "2 Conversely, James suggests when relations between the 
chief members are good, "the members might be expected to have relatively little use for the 
Secretary-General: they can make their own arrangements without his emollient 
assistance. "3 The Secretary-General, James deduces, is most likely to play a significant 
role in the conduct of international relations when international relations, "are at an in 
between stage ... for at such times the 
leading member states may be sufficiently at one to 
agree on desired goals but insufficiently close to achieve them without assistance. Similarly 
they may welcome diplomatic nudges in a pacific direction. " This latter observation, made 
as it was in 1985, is prophetic in the context of Perez de Cuellar's tenure of transition. 
James' first observation also holds true for the restricted advancement of the Secretary- 
Generalship under Trygve Lie at the height of the cold war. Between these two stools, 
however, James concedes that his hypothesis does not offer adequate explanation for the 
Secretary -General's aggrandisement under Dag Hammarskj6ld, or 
for the consolidation of 
the Secretary -General's role under U Thant and Waldheim - the 
Secretary-General's 
aggrandisement preceded detente between the superpowers, which never developed to the 
extent at which James supposes the superpowers, "might dispense with the political 
services of the Secretary-General. "5 Yet the Secretaries-General were subjected to greater 
regulation and their personal initiatives less well received. James concludes therefore, "that 
IJames, (1985), in Berridge, op. cit., p. 41. 
2ibid. 
3ibid. 
4ibid. 
5ibid. 
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the general circumstances of a period do not have an over-riding influence on the amount of 
personal intervention in which the UN Secretary-General is able to engage. III 
James conclusions, however, are flawed by an extremely narrow conception of 
circumstance. The cold war was the constant and pervasive systemic feature of the period 
under consideration but the very simple model of a bi-polar world is misleading. It denies 
the possibility of different systems of superpower relations within the bi-polar order, and 
denies consideration of how institutionalised systems and relations are played out at the 
UN. It also denies consideration of much wider systemic variables and the changing 
structure of international society. The following analysis compensates for these deficiencies 
in the explanatory power of James systemic approach by distinguishing between analysis at 
the cold war level, (systemic), and decolonisation, (environmental trends and the changing 
structure of international society). 
I (a) Cold War Systemic Factors. 
The inaugural General Assembly convened in London on 10 January 1946. If the cold war 
was not already entrenched, the war-time solidarity on which the UN was built had 
evaporated and the bi-polarisation of global politics was progressing rapidly. The 
consequences for the UN were evident in a State Department memorandum on I April 
1946, 
"The Charter of the UN affords the best and most unassailable means 
through which the US can implement its opposition to Soviet physical 
expansion. It not only offers the basis upon which the greatest degrees of 
popular support can be obtained in the US but it will also ensure the support 
and even assistance of other members of the UN. If, as may occur, the UN 
breaks down under the test of opposition to Soviet aggression it will have 
served the purpose of clarifying the issues before America and world 
opinion and thus make easier whatever steps may be requested by the US 
and other like-minded nations in the face of new threats of world 
aggression. 112 
Conversely, the USSR viewed the UN with a great deal of trepidation. A UN with teeth 
provided guarantees for Soviet security against German aggrandisement. But at Dumbarton 
Oaks, Yalta, and San Francisco Stalin's bid for membership for all sixteen Soviet Socialist 
Republics, his policy of concentrating authority in the Security Council, and his campaign 
to maximise the remit of the veto were defensive moves to guard against the (ab)use of the 
organisation by the Western majority in the UN. The consequences for the Secretary- 
General were first evident in the election of Lie. 
ibid. 
2QUoted in Armstrong, David, Lloyd, Loma, & Redmond, John, From Versailles to Maastricht: 
International Organisation in the Twentieth Century, (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 3. 
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Selecting the First Secretary- General: The Expediency Rule. 
Lie was originally nominated for the Presidency of the General Assembly. His candidacy 
for the Secretary-Generalship was only made possible by the election to the Assembly 
Presidency of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul Henri Spaak. Spaak had played an 
integral role in the work of the Preparatory Commission and on hearing Spaak's nomination 
Lie withdrew his candidacy, but was brought back into the frame for the Presidency by the 
USSR and Soviet (! ) assurances of US support. The US, however, had joined France, 
Britain and China in supporting Spaak whom the USSR rejected on grounds of nationality, 
and because of the lack of consultation. To British consternation, Stevenson, (the US 
permanent representative), also agreed to support Lie. The UK, however, continued to 
canvass on Spaak's behalf. The US was cornered. Stevenson's commitments to support 
different candidates prevented the US from making a public statement on behalf of either, a 
predicament reconciled to British and Soviet satisfaction by an agreement to vote for Lie but 
not to press the Latin American countries to do so, and resolved to American satisfaction by 
insistence on secret nomination and a secret ballot. On the manner of nomination, however, 
the rules of procedure were silent and when the General Assembly convened Gromyko 
launched a declaration of support for Lie's candidacy. The General Assembly Chairman, 
Zulate Angel, had little option but to conclude that, "the rules of procedure for the General 
Assembly do not exclude the presentation of the candidates in the way that Gromyko has 
just done, but the view of the Assembly must be expressed by secret ballot. "' Prior to 
Gromyko's intervention the US Delegation were convinced that Spaak would be elected to 
the Assembly Presidency by a "commanding majority. "2 The Soviet declaration, however, 
was enough to win Lie twenty-three votes to Spaak's twenty-eight in an election which Lie 
had not been keen to partake in the first place. 3 
Barros contends that because Spaak was assured of twenty votes from the Latin American 
states his election was a virtual certainty. 4 Confident of his defeat the USSR was able to 
exploit Stevenson's diplomatic gaffs, tie American hands, and secure Lie a large enough 
vote, (including American support), to make him a serious contender for the Secretary- 
Generalship. The Assembly elections undoubtedly elevated Lie from the, 'possibles, 'to 
the, 'probables, ' for the Secretary-Generalship, and it is certainly true that Lie does not 
become a serious contender until after the General Assembly election. However, a great 
1 Lie, op. cit., p. 8. 
2ibid., p. 5. 
31n his memoirs Lie recounts that he had decided to withdraw from the election if Spaak should receive a 
public nomination. Moreover he had only been persuaded to let his nomination go forward because he was 
promised the support of the USSR and the USA and because the Norwegian Delegation had advised 
him that 
"the USSR or the US might misinterpret such a refusal, to the damage of Norwegian interests, 
" Lie, op. 
cit., p. 6. 
4See Barros, James, Trygve Lie and the Cold War: The UN Secretary- General Pursues Peace, 1946-1953, 
(Dekalb: Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), pp. 10-26. 
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many other names were in contention, and moreover, Lie's appointment fulfilled US as 
well as Soviet objectives. 
Table 1: Shortlist of Candidates for the Offlce of Secretary-General, 1946. 
us USSR UK France China 
Ist choice Pearson Simic Eisenhower Bonnet Pearson 
(Canada) (Yugoslavia) (US) (France) (Canada) 
2nd choice Lie Rzymowski Pearson Pearson Masaryk 
(Norway) (Poland) (Canada) (Canada) (Czech) 
3rd choice Koo Lie Lie 
(China) (Norway) (Norw 
Amongst those also considered by the US were, Spaak, Van Roijen, (Dutch Minister of 
State), Robertson (Canada), two UK nationals including Anthony Eden (Lie's personal 
favourite but neither interested or available); and three Soviets including Arkady Sobolev 
(later to become Assistant Secretary-General for Security Council Affairs). Barros' 
conspiracy theory alleges the close association of Stettinius and Hiss, I could explain the 
inclusion of three Soviets and Lie on this list; "what better way for Moscow to channel 
Lie's name into the general discussion about possible candidates for the Secretary- 
Generalship than through the State Department. "2 
The other permanent members were relatively quiet on the subject of the Secretary-General. 
Interestingly, until Simic was proposed the only name put forward for consideration by the 
USSR was that of Hiss. The LJK was keen on an American, and if not Eisenhower, 
Winant, (US Ambassador in London), or Stettinius himself. British policy considered the 
American candidates to be the strongest and also recognised that an American Secretary- 
General could secure American support for the fledgling organisation. Stettinius and 
Eisenhower also found favour with France, as did Koo and Eden. China included Van 
Kleffens, (Dutch Foreign Nfinister), as their second choice but he was dropped following 
US objections because of doubts concerning his age and health. China had also supported 
Spaak. 
IDirector of the State Department's Office of Political Affairs, , 
and former S ecre tary -General of the San 
Francisco Conference later charged with being a Soviet agent. 
213arros, James, Trygve Lie and the Cold War: The UN Secretary- General Pursues 
Peace, 1946-1953, 
(Dekalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), p. II- 
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The Preparatory Commission had recommended that, "the Secretary-General should, if 
possible, not be a national of one of the Security Council permanent members, "' but the 
cold war, rather than the Preparatory Commission's recommendations, imposed the 
exclusion of pen-nanent five nationals. As Lie explains, "the desirability of choosing the 
first Secretary -General from among the smaller nations not so directly involved on one side 
or another in the power struggles of the world ... only became chrystallised in the course 
of the London discussions. ' Q The close North American relationship between Canada and 
the US also precluded the candidacy of the clear favourite, Lester Pearson. To emphasise 
this point the USSR proposed the Yugoslav Ambassador to Washington, Stanoje Simic. 
Although officially the Soviet first choice, Simic was little more than a stalking horse. 
Wincenty Rzyomski, the Polish Foreign Minister was a more serious proposition on the 
Soviet part, but he too was an unlikely candidate given the Soviet failure to fulfil its Yalta 
commitments in respect of Poland. Both were probably proffered as candidates to be 
bargained away. As the only name on the lists of both the US and the USSR there was a 
certain inevitability about the election of Lie. 
Even though Barros voices US concerns that Lie had always been the Soviet first choice, 3 
Lie suited US as well as Soviet interests. A Norwegian national offered a compromise few 
other states could match. In Lie the US and the West saw, "the Foreign Minister of one of 
America's most intrepid wartime allies with a fine war record and who had rendered 
conspicuous service to the cause of the Grand Alliance. ' '4 Lie himself acknowledged that, 
"The two countries had always been on most friendly terms and the 
Norwegian Government co-operated closely with the Americans during the 
war years ... had a good standing in American political circles, and the Foreign Minister of Norway - whatever his name - might not be an unnatural 
choice by the Americans when candidates from small countries were sought 
for high office in the United Nations. "5 
Norway had equally high standing in the USSR. Lie explains that Norway was unique in 
its relations with the USSR and Russia among the states of Western Europe, "my countryls 
traditional good neighbourly relations with Russia had lasted centuries. In fact Norway is 
one of the few European countries which have never been at war with Russia. "6 
Lie's nomination was instigated by the US but officially proposed by the Australian 
delegation shortly after the General Assembly Presidential election. 7 This diplomatic 
1 See P. 43. 
21-ie, op. cit., p. 12. The London discussion took place 25-28 January 1946. 
3See Barros, op. cit., p. 24. 
4ibid. 
51-ie, op. cit., pp. 17-18. 6ibid. p. 19. 
71-ie, op. cit., p. 14. 
-148- 
manoeuvre enabled US and Soviet support for a compromise candidate during a period 
when US/Soviet relations were deteriorating rapidly. Agreement was reached in private 
discussions in London between 25 and 28 January 1946, and following a full meeting of 
the Security Council on 29 January Lie's nomination was forwarded to the General 
Assembly for approval. On I February the General Assembly voted forty-six to three to 
support Lie's nomination and on 2 February 1946 Lie was sworn in as the first UN 
Secretary-General. As Schwebel notes, the choice of the first Secretary-General was, "as 
naturally and eminently political as the office itself. ", 
Once agreement was reached between the US and the USSR the other members of the UN 
were quick to fall in line. The UK, for example, was not an advocate of Lie's candidacy 
and Webster privately considered Lie a, "poor choice. "2 In US circles, Lie was also 
variously described as, "third rate, " "unimpressive, " and "clearly not an ideal choice. "3 
Agreement itself was an achievement and no nation was prepared to jeopardise that 
agreement and risk widening rifts at the UN which could shatter public support for the UN 
before it was even operational. Personal qualifications had given way to political 
considerations in the appointment of the first Secretary-General. As the cold war developed 
the superpower imperative was not so much that, 'their man, ' was in place but that their, 
'opposite number, ' was not. It is naYve of Lie, therefore, to assert that in choosing him, 
"neither party had accomplished much. "4Moreover, the choice of the first Secretary- 
General and the manner of his appointment are instructive as indicators of the hopes and 
aspirations of those making that choice. The disregard for personal qualifications was 
mirrored in comments regarding the role of the Secretary-General made by a source close to 
the State Department, 
"That anything helps is good, anything that stands in the way is bad ... it is 
taken for granted that when the Secretary-General is moving our way he is 
doing well, but when he's against us he's clearly beyond his powers. 115 
This, 'expediency rule, ' is indicative of both superpowers' attitudes towards the Secretary- 
Generalship for the next four decades, and instructive in explaining the evolution of the 
Secretary-General's role when read alongside the systemic trends of the same time period. 
Trygve Lie and Containment. 
Lie's elections coincided with the beginning of the cold war and except for the special 
circumstances in Korea, the Security Council was paralysed as a forum for collective 
'Schwebel, op. cit., p. 53. 2Webster, Charles K., Diary, Sun., Feb 3,1946, Part 11, 
ý 25. ýee 
Barros, op. cit., p. 25. 
4Lie, op. cit., p. 16. 
5Schwebel, op. cit., p. 165. 
Webster Papers LSELS, cited in Barros, op. cit., 
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security. In NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and the Warsaw Pact, the superpowers and their 
allies made alternative regional collective security arrangements. The paralysis of the 
Security Council created a political vacuum in the UN system for the maintenance of 
international peace and security but it was not until after the hostility of the Stalin and 
Truman era subsided that the Secretary-General began to fill that void. As the first of James 
expectations suggests, during Lie's tenure the Secretary-General's good offices were 
conspicuous by their absence and Lie's campaign for a UN Guard amounted to little. Just 
as the superpowers were not prepared to trust each other to carry out military action through 
the MSC, neither were they prepared to let the Secretary-General carry out military action, 
however limited, on their behalf. Lie's initiatives constantly came up against the conflicting 
interests of the two superpowers such that Lie once stated, 
"Everything is in order as long as I agree with a particular Government but 
as soon as I don't - Aren't we paying for you? Aren't you a servant of the 
Governments? You are an administrator, why do you talk? "' 
How then was Lie able to make the progress he did? If the expediency rule is applied the 
Secretary -General's early procedural advances are easily explained. For a brief honeymoon 
period Moscow seemed convinced they had got their man -a Norwegian national, if not 
sympathetic to Soviet interests then at least susceptible to Soviet pressure. The USSR was 
over zealous in its support for a Secretary-General whose legal memorandum had supported 
the USSR against Western opposition for the removal of the Iranian question from the 
Security Council agenda. In respect of the Greek question, Gromyko clearly considered an 
investigation by the Secretary-General was better than an investigative committee dominated 
by Western members under the auspices of the Security Council. Acceptance of the right to 
know was probably enhanced by Lie's decision not to test the principle immediately. 
Instead the General Assembly mandated the Special Committee on the Balkans, 
(UNSCOB), to assist Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in settling their 
differences. Armstrong, however observes that UNSCOB, "in practice acted as a 
chronicler of communist inequity. "2 Lie was not the ally the USSR perceived him to be. 
Findings which challenged Soviet interests, (like those of UNSCOB), would have been 
disputed in the Security Council, and succeeded only in undermining Soviet support for Lie 
and the Secretary-General's right of enquiry. Furthermore, as Valentine Lawford observed 
at the time, in the eyes of the West, "it would be a serious reflection on Lie, "3 if the USSR 
permitted the Secretary-General to pursue such investigations and not a Security Council 
subsidiary body. 
'Cited in Schwebel, op. cit., p. 165, with the accompanying note, "this quotation has been verified but the 
author is not at liberty to document the source. " 
2Armstrong et al, op. cit., p. 68. 31-awford, Valentine, deputy permanent under secretary, FCO, October, 1946, FO/371/59719, cited in 
Barros, op. cit., p. 57. 
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When the Secretary-General's initiatives ceased to support Soviet interests on a consistent 
basis the USSR quickly reverted to limiting UN activities as far as possible to the Security 
Council. The USSR thought they had an ally in standing up to the Western majority but as 
the legal advisor to the Polish delegation noted, "the USSR misled by Mr Lie's intervention 
in the Iranian question favoured granting him broad political powers and regrets now its 
niistake. "I Thus Schwebel explains, it became apparent that, "the last thing that Russians 
want is a Secretary-General who will forcefully assert UN ideals and recommend courses 
of action. ' 12 
The US too provided only reticent support for a politically active Secretary-General, 
and joined with the USSR to elect Hammarskj6ld as the second Secretary-General. 
Hammarskj6ld was widely believed to be a non controversial Swedish civil servant. 3 
Washington was initially highly sceptical of Lie's socialist background, leanings, and links 
with Moscow. The UN Charter, however, was essentially a Western construct asserting 
Western principles and purposes. Lie's efforts to uphold those principles and purposes 
naturally endeared him to the US, especially over Korea where the US 'discovered' the 
Secretary-General. When Lie backed the Security Council, and the Unified Command the 
Secretary -General was vilified by the USSR, but as Franck notes, so long as, "the efforts 
of that activist ethically autonomous Secretary-General were so thoroughly compatible with 
US aims ... [like the USSR earlier] it encouraged his aspirations without realising that, 
while his aims coincided with its own in that instance, they derived from a radical view of 
his office which the US had scarcely considered. "4 The politicisation of the Secretary- 
Generalship, and its subsequent defence by the US, not least in instigating a legally dubious 
extension of the Secretary-General's term, protected the independence of action on which 
preventive diplomacy was built. Given the US veto, the uniting for peace resolution which 
circumvented the Soviet veto, and given the Western majorities in the Security Council and 
General Assembly, the US was also assured that the Secretary-General's mandated 
responsibilities would be compatible with US interests. 
The Secretary - General's Role and Peaceful Co-existence. 
A UN dominated by the US, however, only partly explains the advent of preventive 
diplomacy and the Secretary-General's aggrandisement. Preventive diplomacy and the 
Secretary-General's aggrandisement required at least tacit Soviet acceptance. Under 
Hammarskj6ld the Secretary-General only emerged as the benefactor of the cold war 
Security Council paralysis because of changes in the system of bi-polar relations. A 
'Schwebel, op. cit., p. 95. 2ibid., p. 167. 
3See p. 204. 
4Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 153. 
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Korean cease-fire, the death of Stalin and Khruschev's succession, and Eisenhower's 
defeat of Truman in the US elections, ushered in a less confrontational era and Khruschev's 
conception of a competitive, 'peaceful co-existence. ' 
By 1949, from Berlin to Beijing the map had turned red but the communist third of the 
world was far from united. During the Korean War Stalin's influence in the far East 
crumbled. In 1953 his death pre-empted a battle not only for the leadership of the USSR 
but for the communist bloc as a whole and brought an end to the world communist 
movement. Deteriorating Sino/Soviet relations, and deteriorating relations between the 
USSR and Eastern Europe, (Hungary 1956), required some kind of accommodation with 
the US, and were the background against which peaceful co-existence was conceived. 
The Korean War also convinced the US of the dangers of a direct confrontation. In Korea 
US F-86 fighter planes had clashed with Soviet MiGs defending supply routes across the 
Yalu river. This secret war was purposely kept from public consumption, "because if we 
published the facts the public would expect us to do something about it and the last thing we 
wanted was for the war to spread to a more serious confrontation with the Soviets. "' In 
conjunction with the Palestine experience, these systemic developments encouraged the 
search for new and innovative ways to maintain international peace and security within the 
confines of the cold war. Thus, while the USSR vehemently opposed the uniting for peace 
resolution, Claude argues that the USSR tacitly supported UNEF because Hammarskj6ld 
provided more than the means by which the UK and French could extricate themselves 
from the region. Vyshinsky argued that the uniting for peace resolution would make the 
Secretary-General, "commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the General Assembly 
riding on a white horse, ' '2but as Claude explains, 
"While the Soviet Union indulged in talk about introducing troops for the 
defence of Egypt and formerly gave UNEF only grudging and critical 
acquiescence, it is conceivable that [new] Soviet leaders actually welcomed 
UNEF as a device for forestalling a dangerous confrontation with the 
Western powers in that area. This was clearly the mood in the West; the 
exclusion of the major powers was regarded as essential, less because it 
would facilitate the peaceful settlement of local disputes than because it 
would discourage importation into the region of the general rivalry between 
East and West. The value of UNEF lies more in its preventive than 
therapeutic action. "3 (emphasis added) 
In other words, peaceful coexistence entailed an implicit agreement such that, 'we won't get 
involved if you don't get involved. ' The superpowers were prepared to let the Secretary- 
I Nitze Paul, US Department of State Policy and Planning, quoted in 1992 by Walker, op. cit., pp. 76-7. 
2Vyshinsky, New York Times, International Air Edition, October 11,1950, p. 4, reproduced in part in 
Schwebel 
, op. cit., p. 82 and 
in Lie, op. cit., p. 347. 
3Claude, op. cit., p. 290. 
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General fill the resultant political vacuum and attempt conflict management, provided that 
conflict management was undertaken impartially. impartiality in this context meant 
impartiality between superpower interests. The superpowers were more concerned that 
neither lost ground to the other by the Secretary-General's actions than securing definitive 
settlements to international problems. Preventive diplomacy facilitated the Secretary- 
General's aggrandisement, but the Secretary-General's pursuit of a just peace was not 
necessarily reconcilable with superpower interests, and so preventive diplomacy also set 
the Secretary-General on a collision course with the superpowers. Soviet concerns at the 
Secretary -General's expanding remit and powers began to surface in 1959 when Khruschev 
warned Hammarskj6ld, "do not do anything which forces us to criticise you. "' The USSR 
then alleged the Secretary -General's UN Presence in Laos, "was designed to cover by the 
name of the UN further interferences of the Western powers. ' Q By comparison, the US 
seemed totally indifferent to the aggrandisement of the Secretary-General, and the 
emergence, as Franck explains, "of what political scientists are pleased to call a new 'actor, ' 
in world politics, not wholly in the control of the members or even the superpowers. "3 
Success breeds success and James argues that the success of UNEF gave the Secretary- 
Generalship a momentum of its own which could only be stopped, "at considerable political 
CoSt. "4The US and Western allies showed little inclination to do so, except for France. De 
Gualle took such exception to Hammarskj6ld's stance on French policy in Algeria, and his 
initiatives to secure the removal of French troops from Bizerte, (Tunisia) and Belgian troops 
from the Congo that Armstrong notes, "he declined to send condolences when 
Hammarskj6ld died. "5 Otherwise, Hammarskj6ld was encouraged in the expansion of his 
conception of preventive diplomacy by US ambivalence and Western "tardiness. "6 As 
James argues, "states took a little while to get to grips with the fact that peacekeeping was 
although a secondary activity, one with considerable implications and consequences in the 
realms of high politiCS. "7 Concern at the emergence of a new force in regional conflict 
management and the interplay of superpower interests only surfaced in the West as cold war 
tensions once more began to escalate. In 1960 the collapse of the Paris Summit and the 
shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory, coupled with cold war 
competition for influence amongst the burgeoning Afro-Asian General Assembly 
membership, heightened superpower sensitivity to the actions of an independent Secretary- 
General which might upset the delicate equilibrium between them. Washington was no 
more prepared than Moscow to tolerate a strong Secretary-General whose initiatives did not 
'quoted in Urquhart, (972), op. cit., p. 467. 
2SOviet Mission to the UN Press Release, 16 November 1959. 
3Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 152. 
4James, (1985), in Berridge, op. cit., p. 46. 
5Armstrong et al, op. cit., p. 83; also see Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 530-41. 6James, (1985), in Berridge, op. cit., p. 41. 
7ibid. 
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coincide with their national interests. But as James explains, "it took a major crisis - in the 
Congo - to get them to grasp the nettle they themselves had sown. "' 
The US and USSR were both principled advocates of decolonisation but in the cold war 
context, also viewed the end of empire as a, "ticket to influence in the third world. ' 12 When 
the fragile consensus that facilitated the creation of ONUC began to evaporate, 
Hammarskj6ld's preventive diplomacy was no longer viewed as mutually beneficial but in 
zero sum terms. For the USSR, Hammarskj6ld failed to back Lumumba, failed to prevent 
Lumumba's arrest and murder, and failed to prevent Mobutu's expulsion of Soviet 
diplomats. For the US, Hammarskj6ld failed to endorse Mobutu's regime, refused to arrest 
Lumumba, and persistently criticised the Belgian and Western presence at a time when the 
State Department was concerned that, "if we [the US] pulled out completely and the 
Russians could fill this vacuum in the centre of Africa, we would soon lose much, if not all 
of Africa. ' '3Hammarskj6ld's strict impartiality and pursuit of a just settlement brought into 
question his cold war neutrality, as Lipmann explains, 
"The cause of the opposition from East and West is a determination not to 
have the UN succeed in what it is attempting to do. For if the UN succeeds, 
there will not be a communist government in the Congo. That is what 
Khruschev hated about Dag Hammarskj6ld and the Secretary-General's 
office. And if the UN succeeds there will not be a restoration of white 
supremacy in the Congo, and that is why white money, propaganda and 
clandestine intervention are being employed to frustrate the UN. N 
Furthermore, in his executive actions, and subsequent use of force, Hammarskjbld 
extended the Secretary-General's preventive diplomacy into new and uncharted waters 
exacerbating superpower, and in particular Soviet fears. As 
6sten Unden explained to 
Hammarskj6ld, 
"He [Khruschev] has become aware of you being a power factor in 
international politics which he is not able to manage. It must be unbearable 
for Khruschev to know that the right of veto cannot be used when the 
Secretary-General is applying the directives of the Security Council. "5 
Interestingly, however, two notes from Heinz Weischoff question Khruschev's true intent 
and are worth recounting in full, 
ibid., p. 46. 
2Durch, op. cit., p. 322. 
3Assistant Secretary of State in Senate Foreign Relations committee quoted in Durch, 
William (ed. ) The 
Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, (London: 
Macmillan, 1994), p. 
322. 
4Lippman, "Dag Hammarskj6ld, United Nations Pioneer, " International Organisation, Vol. XV, No. 4, 
Autumn, 196 1. 
5Und6n, bsten, unpublished letter to Hammarskj6ld, cited in Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 
470. 
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"I have been told by a, 'usually reliable source, in the USSR delegation that 
they feel they have made an, 'error, ' in their attack on you. But K himself feels very strongly on this as well as on some other questions which some in the 'delegation' also regard as errors. "I 
"The USSR informant repeats today his reference to the 'error' that has been 
made by them regarding the position of yourself as Secretary-General. He 
again referred to the fact that this was a decision by K who had confronted 
Gromyko with this decision, about a year ago, when disarmament was discussed. He repeated that they thought you had been very objective. In 
regard to the sharp attacks on you personally, he shrugged it of as one of, 
'those things in politics. ' Now it was difficult to reverse their position; they 
thought Narasimhan [sic] would make a good Secretary-General. "2 
In this context Khruschev's continued advocacy of the troika, especially after 
Hammarskjbld's death brings into question the efficacy of his principled opposition to the 
notion of international civil service. It suggests that Khruschev viewed the troika as an 
early bargaining ploy in the selection of the next Secretary-General. In this respect Ulam's 
interpretation of Stalin's approach to the Charter negotiations is instructive, 
"Serious objections would be raised to this or that aspect of the American 
proposals, the Soviet position being apparently inflexible; fearing the whole 
future of the United Nations was endangered the American negotiators 
would be close to dispair. And then from the highest source an indication 
would be forthcoming that perhaps things were not so hopeless after all, that 
accommodation might yet be reached. The Americans would hail the 
subsequent compromise as a considerable Soviet concession and in their 
relief would be much more willing to meet [other] Russian demands. "3 
Khruschev's sentiments regarding Hammarskjbld's actions in the Congo, and regarding an 
activist Secretary-General were echoed, if not as strongly, in the US administration. 
Because of Khruschev's proposals they did not have to be. The US was now prepared to 
join the USSR in greater regulation of the Secretary-General's activities. The US, 
however, was not prepared to support Khruschev's troika nor Soviet proposals made in the 
Peacekeeping Committee, inter alia, for joint command of peacekeeping operations between 
the Secretary-General and Security Council President. For the US, UN peacekeeping 
remained a potentially useful tool of Soviet containment but would not fulfil this function if 
it came under the revolving control of the Security Council President. 
The Secretar -General's Role and Detente. y 
For the next two decades of consolidation, during which superpower detente emerged, the 
Secretary-General increasingly became a peripheral figure in international relations. The 
I Hand written note from Heinz Weischoff to the Secretary -General, undated, Dag Hammarskj6ld's papers in 
the Royal Library, Stockholm, first published in entirety by Trachtenberg, Larry, "A Bibliographic Essay 
on Dag Hammarskj6ld, " in Jordan, op. cit., p. 149. 
2ibid. 
3UIam, Adam, The Rivals, (London: Allen Lane, 1971), pp. 38-9. 
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superpowers assumed greater responsibility for the management of global affairs that 
affected their interests, squeezing out the Secretary-General. Again this reflected a 
combination of the expediency rule and developing trends in the system of cold war 
relations. 
The Cuban Missile crisis restored some faith in the Secretary-General as an institution, and 
in its new incumbent, but was the exception which proves the expediency rule. In Cuba the 
superpowers had a mutual interest in any mechanism by which they could extricate 
themselves from the threat of nuclear war. Prior to Soviet intervention the US had rejected 
UN involvement in favour of its regional surrogate, the OAS. The OAS was necessarily a 
party to the dispute not an organisation through which US and Cuban differences might be 
resolved. In January 1962 Cuba was expelled from the OAS and Castro sought through the 
Security Council an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on whether a regional 
organisation could take enforcement action against a member state without prior recourse to 
the Security Council. The request was obstructed by the US. Keeping the dispute between 
Cuba and the US out of the UN was no different to keeping Soviet interventions in 
Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Poland (1981), and US intervention in the 
Dominican Republic (1964), and Grenada, (1983), out of the UN. Preventing an ICJ 
ruling, in conjunction with the successful removal of the immediate Soviet threat, 
constituted a revival of the Monroe Doctrine and defacto, formally endorsed the 
superpowers' exclusive rights of intervention within their respective spheres of influence. 
Thus, if the role played by U Thant in the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated the crisis 
management cabilities of the new Secretary-General, it did not distract the superpower 
retreat to the Security Council, and the prevailing systemic drift from the UN per se. U 
Thant continued to take personal initiatives and if the ritual of the Soviet challenge, and the 
Secretary -General's defence of his actions did not discourage U Thant's efforts, it was not 
lost on Waldheim. During his first term in office, however, U Thant's quiet successes won 
the Secretary-General a second term. Disenchanted by the financial crisis, the lack of 
progress in the Peacekeeping Committee, and the refusal of Washington and Hanoi to seek 
a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, U Thant accepted only reluctantly. Great power support 
was not so much a ringing endorsement but typified the permanent members distaste for the 
tiresome search for a compromise candidate. The superpowers mistakenly considered U 
Thant sufficiently quiescent. Before accepting that nomination, the Secretary-General 
exploited this position of relative strength to demand from the permanent members 
assurances of their commitment to the UN, its principles and purposes, and support for the 
Secretary-General's actions.. The Security Council was compelled to acknowledge U 
Thant's, 
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"Demonstrated capacity to evoke the co-operation and confidence of all the Members ... his proven qualities ... the geat positive role played by the Secretary-General in the activities of the United Nations ... [and] fully respected his position and his action in bringing basic issues confronting the Organisation and disturbing developments in many parts of the world to 
their notice, " I 
As Boyd argues, "the permanent five promised him everything and virtually pleaded with 
him from a kneeling position. '12 Public pronouncements of support for the Secretary- 
General from the most important players in the international system play an important role 
in bolstering the Secretary-General's moral authority but in the context of the prevailing 
systemic trends the Security Council demarche had a distinctly hollow ring. During the 
Secretary -General's second term any pretence of support for an active and principled 
advocate of the Charter principles evaporated very quickly. U Thant had already had one 
dispute with the Johnson Administration over Vietnam. In the withdrawal of UNEF the US 
and Secretary-General clashed again and Franck argues, "the US stopped trying to shore up 
the system. "3 The USSR was also on the receiving end of U Thant's assertiveness and 
with the US looked to elect a successor, (Waldheim), "who might not be dynamic, but was 
unlikely to do anything damaging to American [or Soviet] interests. " 
While U Thant was in office, the effects of the expediency rule were paralleled by the 
emergence of a superpower detente which reached maturity during the early years of 
Waldheim's first term. The superpower retreat to the Security Council was matched by an 
improving and increasingly sophisticated system of bi-lateral relations between the cold war 
protagonists outside the UN: the Kremlin-White-House hotline was introduced in June 
1963; the first nuclear test ban treaty was signed in August 1963; and the first non 
proliferation treaty was signed in July 1968. This emerging detente was not 
institutionalised as a system for managing superpower relations until the election of Nixon 
as the US President in 1969. Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry A. 
Kissinger gave detente a new theoretical and philosophical dimension which imposed a new 
order on the conduct of international politics. Kissinger's detente reinvented and inverted 
Kennan's notion of containment. Kissinger argued that co-operation at economic, political 
and strategic levels would provide the USSR with, "a stake in the international equilibrium 
... and a vested interest in restraint. "5 Implicit 
in Kissinger's detente was US recognition of 
the Soviet sphere of influence, nuclear parity, and the existing balance of power. At the 
economic level the USSR was given favoured trade status, at the strategic level arms 
ISCOR, 1329th meeting, 2 December 1966. 
2Boyd, Andrew, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg: A History of the UN Security Council, (London: Methuen, 
1971), P. 356. 
3Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 27 1. 
417inger & Saltzman, op. cit., p. 33. 
5quoted in Kegley, Charles, W. Jnr., & Wittkopf, Eugene R., World Politics: Trends and Transformation, 
Ord ed. ), (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 79. 
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limitation talks were initiated, and at the political level the Helsinki Accords (a Soviet 
initiative) 'normalised' relations between Washington and Moscow. In detente the 
superpowers may not have attained the levels of harmony at which James anticipated the 
Secretary-General would become a peripheral figure, but an implicit agreement was reached 
on a system for the management of international relations, and necessarily, the role of the 
UN and Secretary-General within that system. Washington and Moscow assumed direct 
responsibility for the management of conflicts where the cold war threatened to blow hot, 
(Middle East), or supported their surrogates indirectly while monitoring closely the 
Secretary-General's initiatives, (Vietnam, Namibia, Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq). The 
opportunities for Waldheim were considerably restricted. 
These trends were reinforced when the US was finally defeated on the issue of Chinese 
representation. I The accession of the Communist People's Republic of China to the 
Chinese seats in UN organs factored a new and unknown variable into Security Council 
decision-making equations. The advent of a new, highly independent, modemising power- 
broker, and potential superpower, reinforced the propensity of the superpowers to address 
the main issues of international peace and security outside the UN framework. This trend 
was also fostered by the tripolar interplay of Chinese, Soviet, and American relations. The 
Sino-Soviet stand-off and US rapprochement with China initiated by Kissinger fostered 
Soviet interest in detente and the bi-lateral management of international order. 
China, as a highly introspective state, was also suspicious of any actor in international 
politics which did not conform to, or which in any way challenged traditional notions of 
national sovereignty. The legacy of Lie's alignment with the Unified Command in Korea, 
was, as Armstrong notes, the admission of, "a powerful supporter of Franco-Soviet 
determination to keep the Secretary-General on a short lead. "2 Practice, however, did not 
quite conform to expectation. Between 1971 and 1981 Peking practised a policy of non- 
participation, in voting on peacekeeping operations and related issues conceived in 
absentia. 3 Non participation, Nicol explains, reflected Peking's objection to the 
unnecessary use of the veto, but was applied, "mainly to reserve their rights and freedom of 
action with regard to any resolution to which they objected, ' 4and disclaimed responsibility 
for the resolution passed. On this basis non participation enabled Peking to hold in reserve 
nascent objections to the Secretary-General's peacekeeping role in a period during which 
peacekeeping returned to basic principles and was much more closely regulated by the 
10n history of this battle see Boyd, op. cit., pp. 340-9; Bailey, Sydney D., The Procedure of the 
UN 
Sec lit Council, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 160-7; & Nicol, Davidson, op. cit., pp. 
120-120. 
2AIzstyrong et al, op. cit., p. 110. 
3See Morphet, Sally, "Resolutions and Vetoes in the UN Security Council: Their Relevance and 
Significance, Review of International Studies, Vol. 16,1990, p. 348. 
4Davidson, op. cit., pp. 127-8. 
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Security Council. And in respect of the Secretary-General's independent role Waldheim's 
personality and approach never pressed China, or any other member, into challenging the 
Secretary-General's right of initiative. I 
The cold war has had a more or less deterministic impact on international politics and the 
actions of the participants in the international system. But even accounting for the formal 
entry of China into that system this approach is extremely restrictive in explaining the 
development of the Secretary-General's role in systemic terms. The superpower powers 
did not entirely control the evolution of the international system. Other systemic forces 
have been at work which also have to be accounted for. 
I (b) Environmental Trends and the Changing Structure of International 
Society. 
The end of empire and the decolonisation. process had a marked effect on the evolution of 
the Secretary-General's role. Firstly, as James notes, "the Secretary-General cannot create 
situations which are suitable for his intervention. ' Q Decolonisation was the predominant 
environmental trend of the first two decades of UN history and provided the basis for the 
Secretary -General's aggrandisement. Secondly, the proliferation of UN members 
graduating to independent statehood restructured international society with profound 
implications for the role of the Secretary-General before and after the Congo crisis. 
Decolonisation as an Environmental Trend. 
At the end of World War H the European colonial powers were drained militarily, 
economically and psychologically, and neither able to sustain their colonial territories, nor 
resist the growing demand for self-determination. In 1946, US guarantees replaced British 
guarantees of Greek security and symbolised the changing balance of power. Withdrawal 
from Palestine and the independence and partition of India followed in 1947. In 1946 the 
French withdrew from Lebanon and Syria, though the collapse of the French Empire was 
longer in coming, and the protracted withdrawal of the Dutch from Indonesia began in 
1947. As the decolonisation process gained momentum conflicts arising out of the end of 
empire as well as East-West issues such as the Berlin Blockade, (1948), the Korean War, 
(1950-3), and Hungary (1956), as the predominant threats to peace and security. For the 
first two decades of UN history, most of the conflicts with which the UN was confronted 
were products, whether directly or indirectly, of the end of empire and the accession to 
independent statehood of former colonies. The UN was involved with varying 
degrees of 
success in one or more of four situations: 
'See pp. 217-226. 
2James, (1985) in Berridge, op. cit., p. 41. 
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(i) at the request of the colonial powers in assisting withdrawal, (Palestine, 1947); 
(ii) in conflicts arising out of the battle for independence from the colonial power, (Indonesia - 1947-9); 
(iii) in conflicts which erupted on accession to independence, (Kashmir - 1947, Palestine - 1947, Congo - 1960, Cyprus - 1964); 
(iv) in conflicts which were a product of colonial legacies, (Suez - 1956, Lebanon -1958, Jordan - 1958, Laos - 1959). 
In respect of the last, newly independent states were created from arbitrary colonial 
boundaries which cut across traditional, national, ethnic, tribal, cultural and religious 
borders and were often given artificial and weak political constitutions and civil institutions. 
Scarce resources aggravated tensions and provided fertile ground for intra and inter state 
conflict. It was not, however, the aspirations and claims of the various groupings either to 
self-determination or greater representation, and the outward expression of these fights 
alone, which facilitated the Secretary-General's involvement and aggrandisement. Rather 
the constellation of decolonisation and cold war factors were responsible for creating the 
situations suitable for the Secretary-General's intervention. 'llie instability left by the 
colonial powers and the threat of superpower intervention encouraged the evolution of the 
Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace and sectifity. Preventive 
diplomacy was not just about preventing a superpower clash but protecting the decolonised 
states from superpower interference. As Hammarskj6ld stated in 1960, 
"It is not the Soviet Union, or indeed, any other big powers who need the 
United Nations for their protection; it is all the others. In this sense the 
Organisation is first of all their Organisation, and I deeply believe in the 
wisdom with which they will be able to use it and guide it. "' (emphasis not 
added). 
This statement also highlights the implications for the role of the Secretary-General of the 
structural changes in international society resulting from the decolonisation process. 
Aggrandisement and the Changing Structure of International Society. 
In 1945 fifty-one founding members signed the UN Charter. The Charter decreed that 
membership should be open to all peace-loving states as determined by the General 
Assembly, "on the recommendation of the Security Council. "2 In 1946 Sweden, Thailand, 
Iceland and Afghanistan were admitted, and in 1947 Yemen and Pakistan joined the UN. 
Any pretence at universalism, however, was denied by the Western states refusal to vote for 
communist states and Soviet vetoes for Western allies. In 1955 the Geneva Summit 
Conference paved the way for agreement on a, 'package deal, 'first mooted in the Security 
Council Committee on Admission of New Members in 1947.3 On 14 December the 
'Hammarskj6ld, Statement to the General Assembly, 3 October 1960, reproduced in Foote, op. cit., p. 319. 
2Article 4 (2). 
30n history of membership disputes see Luard, Evan A History of the United Nations Volunte 
1: The Years 
of Western Domination, 1945-1955, (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 361-72; & Bailey, (1975), op. cit., 
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Security Council agreed a resolution recommending the admission of fifteen new states. I 
The floodgates were open. By 1960 UN membership had reached one hundred, and of the 
new states thirty-three were former colonial territories. 
In the same year that the superpowers agreed a membership package deal, twenty-nine 
Asian and African nations met in Bandung, (Indonesia), to promote decolonisation and 
establish a united front against the neo-imperialism which cold war alignment threatened. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian Prime-Minister, provided leadership and direction for the 
emerging non-aligned movement. After the British withdrawal from India Nehru had 
insisted that Commonwealth membership should not infringe upon the right to conduct an 
independent foreign policy. India was not therefore bound to agree with Britain and the 
US against the USSR. In 1956, Tito's Yugoslavia, which had successfully broken away 
from the communist bloc provided the emerging non-aligned movement with European 
representation and a second forceful advocate of neutrality in the cold war. 
Not only did decolonisation provide the opportunity for the Secretary-General's 
aggrandisement, it provided for a group of states with an agenda that matched 
Hammarskj6ld's. The imperative of non-alignment in the East-West conflict mirrored 
Hammarskj6ld's conception of preventive diplomacy. The burgeoning UN membership 
therefore provided the Secretary-General's ambitions and moral authority with a political 
constituency. Hammarskj6ld, unlike Lie, did not have to speak out in defence of Charter 
principles and purposes in purely abstract terms. Furthermore, at this stage the non-aligned 
were only an embryonic, loosely organised collection of states brought together by anti- 
colonial common interests. This movement was prepared to provide the Secretary-General 
with political support, and where necessary, General Assembly mandates for the 
development of peacekeeping and the expansion of the Secretary-General's fact-fmding 
capability. It was also malleable and prepared to accept the Secretary-General's leadership, 
or the leadership of those in the movement with whom Hammarskj6ld cultivated close and 
strong relations, (Nehru). Such was the importance of this group that Hammarskj6ld 
described the Afro-Asian membership, (by 1964, fifty-seven of one hundred and fourteen 
states), as, "the main field of useful activity of the UN in its efforts to prevent conflicts or 
solve conflicts. 112 In the League of Nations, Drummond had noted, "the smaller the country 
the more trust it placed in the Secretary-General. "3 During the period of aggrandisement the 
'Drummond rule'held for the UN Secretary-General, and as Schwebel noted before the 
dramatic expansion of the UN membership, 
pp. 353-65. 
IGA Res. 109,14 December 1955. 
2Hammarskjbld, Dag, Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary- General on the Work of the 
Organisation, 1959-1960, in Foote, op. cit., pp. 293-297. 
3QUoted in Schwebel, op. cit., p. 177. 
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"The middle and small powers ... tend to applaud such activity [expanding the Secretary -General's role] as further strengthening a UN which has given 
them a world forum for expression of their views in international affairs. " I 
In the context of the cold war and the end of empire the General Assembly and Secretary- 
General magnified the third world's voice in international politics and served as a catalyst 
for action on behalf of third world security concerns. 
Consolidation and the Changing Structure of International Society. 
If Hammarskj6ld benefited ftom decolonisation and the influx of new states he did so 
because his tenure predated the effective and efficient organisation of the non-aligned 
movement. In 1961 the first formal conference of the non-aligned countries was held in 
Belgrade. In the General Assembly the US-led Western majority had been overtaken by a 
more cohesive third world majority that attracted the attention and interest of the USSR. 
The immediate and direct implications for the Secretary-General were twofold. Firstly, the 
non-aligned were no longer the Secretary-General's automatic conduit in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The Secretary-General was less able to exercise leadership 
over, or elicit support from, the non-aligned in his peace and security initiatives. Secondly, 
as a group, the non-aligned were highly protective of their new found independence, and 
the legacy of UN intervention in the Congo and the Secretary-General's role in that 
intervention, reinforced highly defensive attitudes on questions relating to their territorial 
integrity and national sovereignty. As Armstrong notes, one of the pitfalls of straying from 
the basic principles of peacekeeping was, "the Africans in particular were apprehensive 
about the perils of hosting peacekeepers. "2 The'Drummond rule'no longer automatically 
applied. U Thant's background and approach, 3 undoubtedly assisted in expanding the use 
and remit of the Secretary-General's good offices. At the same time, however, the UN's 
new membership applied a very conservative application of Article 2 (7). U Thant was thus 
prevented from making any substantive contribution to the conflicts at the hearts of the 
humanitarian crises in Nigeria and East Pakistan. Whilst the Secretary-General's 
interventions in West-Irian and Bahrain furthered the claims of the peoples of these 
territories to self-determination, the application of the superpowers expediency rule 
illustrates the increasing sophistication of the non-aligned movement. In the emerging 
superpower detente that followed the Cuban Missile Crisis the world was, "less anxious 
about small wars escalating into superpower confrontations. " The relative stability of the 
cold war order permitted the maturing non-aligned movement to develop its own agenda. 
ibid., p. 165. 2Armstrong et al, p. 82. 3See, pp. 208-17. 
4Armstrong et al, op. cit., p. 109. 
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In peace and security, the assertiveness with which the third world articulated its interests 
outside the cold war framework reduced and compromised the Secretary-General's 
diplomatic potential. In respect of Namibia the Secretary-General's position was 
compron-fi sed by the General Assembly's confrontational stance towards South Africa. I In 
the Middle East in particular, Waldheim was repeatedly called upon to undertake functions 
which called into question his impartiality. Finger and Saltzman's find no evidence that 
Waldheim initiated or supported these efforts. Moreover, they argue that by placing a unit 
mandated by the Assembly to address, 'the inalienable rights, ' of the Palestinians under the 
jurisdiction of the American William Buffen in the Department of General Assembly and 
Political Affairs, 'Waldheim could feel comfortable that any effort by the unit to exceed its 
responsibilities would be checked. ' '2 Despite the Secretary-General's best efforts, Israel 
was understandably intolerant of UN involvement in the Nfiddle East political processes, 
and prefered US mediation. Israel, however, was prepared to support Waldheim's re- 
election campaigns, if only because it feared the appointment of a proactive Arab or AfTican 
in the Middle East. 3 
The evolution of the Secretary-General's role was also shaped indirectly by the changing 
structure of international society. During the tenures of U Thant and Waldheim the trends 
discussed at the systemic level were reinforced by the continuing expansion of the UN 
membership, and the changing agenda that maturing membership imposed on the UN. 
Although a not particularly cohesive group, until the mid 1950s this majority, as Peterson 
notes, "was particularly united on any issue that involved or could be presented as 
involving cold war competition to the USSR. "4 Post 1960, however, the US could no 
longer rely on the uniting for peace resolution to circumvent the Soviet veto and initiate 
collective action under the UN flag. The US now had reason to join the USSR in 
concentrating UN action in the Security Council. Concomitantly, it was also inevitable that 
the Secretary-General's peace and security mandates would come increasingly from the 
Security Council, where the Secretary-General enjoyed less political clout and less scope 
for leadership. 
The non-aligned states pursuit of their own agenda reinforced this process and during the 
1970s even encouraged the superpowers to address issues of peace and security outside the 
UN framework altogether. The General Assmebly designated the 1960s as the first 
development decade, and the first UN Conference on Trade and Development, (UNCTAD), 
was held in 1964 giving birth to the so called Group of seventy-seven, (G77). In addition 
to the horizontal division of. the world between East and West a growing vertical division 
'See pp. 261-4. 
2Finger & Saltzman, op. cit., p. 151. 
3ibid. 
4Peterson, MI, The General Assembly in World Politics, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 2. 
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between the 'haves' and 'have nots. ' was emerging. During the 1970s this essentially 
North-South divide widened. The OPEC crises dealt a double blow to the developing 
world. Rising oil prices simultaneously increased third world debt and decimated aid 
receipts from the developed world. A world debt crisis engulfed the IMF in the early 1980s 
and resentment against Eurocentrism, neo-imperialism manifested itself in the demands for a 
New International Economic Order articulated through the General Assembly, which had 
become the focus of third world efforts to improve their position. 
The universal suffrage of the General Assembly and its control of UN purse strings 
provided the means by which the third world could voice its resentment, and influence and 
develop UN policy. The characteristic feature of these efforts during the period of 
consolidation was the proliferation of international conferences addressing issues such as 
food, population, the environment and economic development. These conferences, a 
United Nations Association report concluded, 
"Far from being isolated events ... are stages along a sort of evolutionary ladder. After a particular world problem is acknowledged it is often 
investigated by a UN study. The study leads to a follow up action, usually 
involving an intergovernmental committee with its own mini Secretariat until 
by a series of gradual steps an institution is created to deal with the 
problem. "' 
As the largest contributor the US was liable for a burgeoning social and economic budget 
over which it had no control. Not only was the US picking up the mounting tab for the 
development agenda, but it was also finding it increasingly difficult to win support for its 
own foreign policy agenda, and, was often confronted by policies contrary to its interests. 
1'he anti Israeli attitudes of the third world majority (cultivated by the twenty-two Arab 
members) - the Zionism is Racism Resolution (1975), and the extension of Observer status 
to the PLO (1974) - led the US Ambassador to the UN, David Moynihan, to describe the 
2 UN as A Dangerous Place where 'the tyranny of the majority, ' prevails, and prompted 
Senator Vandenberg's advocacy for the conduct of US foreign policy, "outside the UN but 
inside the UN Charter. ' '3 These sentiments were encouraged by General Assembly 
Conferences on the Middle East and South Africa, and reflected in the Middle East peace 
process and formation of the Namibian Contact Group. 
The Third World had matured as a force in the international system and its agenda was far 
more sophisticated than just non-alignment. Moreover, during the 1970s the third world 
I UNA of the USA Factsheet, "Financing the United Nations, " n. d. 
2Moynihan first made reference to the tyranny of the majority in his article, `17he US In Opposition, " 
Commentary, Vol. 59, March 1975, pp. 31-44, and expanded on this thesis with Suzanne Weaver in their 
book, A Dangerous Place, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978). 
3UN Files DAG 1/5.3.2.8: 47 US Government AMB Bush 1971-74. 
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agenda which dominated the General Assembly agenda began to impact on the traditional 
preserve of the superpowers. The membership explosion had created pressure for a more 
representative Security Council. The first proposal to increase the representation of non- 
permanent members was posted in 1960 but failed to secure the requisite two-thirds 
majority for institutional reform, because of disagreements over the reallocation and 
distribution of non-permanent seats between the different regions. By 1963 these 
difficulties had been resolved and agreement was reached on the expansion of the non 
permanent membership from six to ten seats, and the allocation of five seats to Africa, and 
Asia, two seats to Latin America and the Caribbean, one seat to the East European, and two 
for the West Europeans and Other states. I Only France, the USSR and its supporters voted 
against the resolution, and only the UK, US, Portugal and South Africa abstained. Ninety- 
seven members voted in favour. In the Security Council the permanent members 
acquiesced and fifteen members sat for the first time in 1965. 
To accommodate the larger membership the voting procedure was amended so that nine, 
(rather than seven), affirmative votes were required for a majority decision. The 
implications were threefold: 
(i) a procedural decision, in which the veto did not apply could be passed by the non 
permanent members; 
(ii) in substantive matters the non permanent members collectively held a blocking majority 
or 'hidden veto; ' 
(iii) as Jackson notes, "in the absence of a veto the non permanent members for the first 
time could pass resolutions without supporting votes from any of the five permanent 
members. "2 
The possibilities for the non permanent membership were not immediately realised. 
Like any alliance system the non-aligned movement had its own internal contradictions and 
conflicts of interest. During the 1960s Morphet argues, "its effectiveness was put into 
abeyance during the attempts of President Sukarno and Ben Bella to radicalise third world 
foreign policies. 113 Moreover, the non-aligned presence in the Security Council depended 
on the configuration of non permanent seats allocated by the General Assembly. Internal 
disputes did not help and it was not until the 1970s that non-aligned representation, 
bolstered by Latin American membership of the movement, exceeded four. Non aligned 
representation reached seven in 1973, six in 1974,1979 and 1980, and peaked at eight in 
1983.4 
IGA Res. 1991,17 December 1963; previously, in accordance with a gentleman's agreement the 6 seat were 
allocated 2 for the Latin Americans, I for the Commonwealth, I for the Middle East, I for West Europe, I 
for East Europe. 
2Jackson, R. L., The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, (New York, 1983), p. 111 
3Morphet, op. cit., p. 35 1. 4See Morphet, Table 3, "Non-Aligned Members of the Security Council, " op. cit., p. 350. 
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Their growing influence was reflected in Security Council voting. In 1973 for the first time 
a Security Council resolution was passed without a single assenting vote from the 
pen-nanent members-' In respect of Afghanistan (1980), Palestine (1980), Namibia (1981), 
and the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, the non-aligned mustered the requisite 
majorities to invoke the uniting for peace resolution. Furthermore, the Western members, 
and in particular the US, were forced to adopt a much more defensive attitude in the 
Security Council. Between 1970 and 1982, the US cast seven vetoes in respect of the 
Middle East, five in respect of the situation in South Africa, and five in respect of the 
situation in Namibia. 2 Overall between 1970 and 1986 American vetoes outnumbered the 
3 Soviet vetoes four to one. 
Hostile anti American rhetoric was matched by third world indifference to the USSR. 
Soviet initiatives under Brezhnev, as often as not, were proving counterproductive. 
Support for India, for example, meant opposition to Pakistan, and backing Ethiopia 
antagonised Somalia. Soviet forays into the third world cultivated as many enemies as 
friends. Furthermore, the indiscriminate provision of, "friendship treaties, trade credits, 
military advisors and the rest, "to newly independent states exposed an alarming 
indifference to, and lack of understanding of, local culture and politics. Thus in 1958 the 
USSR ploughed money and support into the new Iraqi regime but was embarrassed by, and 
powerless to halt, the Ba'athist coup in 1962 and subsequent violent repression of the Iraqi 
communists. Increasingly, blatant efforts to exploit the third world anti-colonialism for its 
own ends fell foul of a general disdain for all great power intervention. As the Soviet 
military presence extended around the globe, Soviet actions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
reinforced third world contempt for intervention. Soviet support began to dissipate from 
the African and Asian countries whom it had supported over decolonisation and in holding 
Western imperialism responsible for the widening gap in standards of living between the 
first and third worlds. Finally, the Soviet Union's diminishing authority in the third world 
was compounded by the competitive threat for'the hearts and minds' of the third world 
posed by a modernising China. With the third world majority no longer at its beck and call, 
the USSR was less able to oppose US interests at the UN, and was increasingly itself the 
target of third world hyperbole. 
Once political emancipation was secured the non-aligned turned to securing economic 
independence and the exposition of their own security agenda. Keeping matters in the 
General Assembly and even in the Security Council no longer suited American and Soviet 
'SC Res. 344,15 December 1973. 
2See Table 1: Vetoes in the Security Council 1946-1989 in Morphet, op. cit., p. 347. 
3ibid. 
4Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military, Conflict From 
1500 to 2000, (London: Unwin, 1988), pp. 503-8. 
-166- 
interests. For Waldheim this meant fewer opportunities to extend and expand the Secretary- 
General's role. For those issues which did come before the UN, the Secretary -General's 
remit was regulated by the Security Council permanent members and an assertive third 
world majority keen to articulate its own agenda. 
11 (a) The Organisational-Bureaucratic Explanation. 
The central problem in the study of bureaucracy at the national or international level is that 
of actorhood. I In an intergovernmental organisation the problem of actorhood is manifest 
in the extent to which the Secretariat staff are independent of their national government. As 
Simai argues "is an especially important question because there is the possibility that it will 
be utilised by one state more than by another and that in so doing such a state uses for that 
purposes its citizens on the staff of the Secretariat. ' Q At the organisational-bureaucratic 
level, this fact of intergovernmental organisation has affected the development of the 
Secretary-General's role more than any other. 
At San Francisco the question of loyalty was seemingly reconciled in Articles 100 and 10 1, 
and, in the successful resistance to Soviet proposals for a politically appointed cabinet 
system of advisors for the Secretary-General. Two advisory opinions of the International 
Court of Justice, (ICJ), also reinforced Drummond's transfer of the British model of civil 
service to the international level. Firstly, in 1949, following Bernadotte's assassination, 3 
the Court provided an opinion on the right of the organisation to claim reparations from a 
member state - the right of a non state actor to initiate such action was untested 
in 
international law. The request was made by the General Assembly on behalf of the 
4 Secretary-General, and in its opinion the Court stated, 
"It must be acknowledged that its members, by entrusting certain functions 
to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the 
competence required to enable these functions to be effectively discharged 
... Accordingly the 
Court has come to the conclusion that the organisation is 
an international person. '15 
ISee Deutsch, Karl, "External Influences in the Internal Behaviour of States, " in Farrell, R. B., (ed. ), 
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, (New York: Free Press, 1966); & 
Wolfers A., "I-he 
Actors in International Politics, " in Wolfers, (ed), Discord and Collaboration, (Baltimore, John Hopkins 
Press, 1962). 
2Simai, Mihdly, "Some Problems of International Secretariats, " in Taylor, Paul, & Groom A. 
J. R, 
International Organisation: A Conceptual Approach, (London: Pinter, 1978), p. I 10. 
3See p. 55. 
4UN Doc. A/674,7 October 1948; GA Res. 258,3 December 1948. The Secretary-General is not 
authorised by the Charter to request an advisory opinion of the Court. On relations 
between the Secretarý- 
General and the ICJ see pp. 356-60. 
5"Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the UN, " Advisory Opinion, II APnl 1949, ICj 
Reports; see Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 98; see also Cordier & Foote, op. cit., pp. 
230-5. 
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The Court also added, "this is not the same thing as saying it is a state, "' but had explicitly 
recognised the, "distinct legal identity,, 12 of the UN. In respect of the issue under 
consideration, the Court continued, 
"To ensure the independence of the agent, and consequently the independent 
action of the Organisation itself, it is essential that in performing his duties, 
he need not have to rely on the protection of his own state. If he had to rely 
on that state his independence might well be compromised, contrary to the 
principle applied by Article 100 of the Charter ... it is essential that whether the agent belongs to a powerful or a weak state; to one more or less affected 
by the complication of international life, to one in sympathy or not in 
sympathy with the mission of the agent - he should know that in the 
performance of his duties he is under protection of the organisation. ' 13 
Franck thus concludes, "the judges had distinctly broken the exclusive fiduciary 
relationship between a citizen [workýing for the UN] and his state. ' 14 
In 1954 an opinion was also requested from the Court on the right of the General Assembly 
to refuse compensation awarded to Secretariat officials by the Administrative Tribunal for 
wrongful dismissal. The Court considered that in such matters exclusive jurisdiction for the 
Administrative Tribunal, "was essential ... to give effect to the paramount consideration of 
securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity, "5 and that the 
General Assembly enjoyed only, "a power to make recommendations, but not a power to 
adjudicate upon or otherwise deal with particular instances. "6 With this Franck concludes, 
"the Court recognised the rights of international civil servants to carry out the administrative 
duties with appropriate independence and integrity, as against attempts by member states to 
use the power of the press to punish them. "7 Formally at least, the Secretary-General was 
to head, and be served by a Secretariat, international in composition and purpose. Ideals 
and reality, however, have proven difficult to reconcile. The Secretafies-General have 
faced a constant battle, to protect the independent and efficient functioning of the 
Secretariat, and repeatedly the impartiality of the Secretariat and therefore its chief 
administrative officer have been called into question. 
Ghosts in the Machine. 
Three types of ghost existed in the UN machine. The first category was American 
communists during the 1950s. The second category, Soviet nationals, haunted the 
ibid. 
2Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 98. 3"Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the UN, " Advisory opinion, II April 1949, ICJ 
Reports; see Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 99. 
4Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 99. 5Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the UN Administrative Tribunal, " Advlisory Oplin, 
ion, 13, July, 
ICJ Reports, 1954; see Franck, (1985), p. 100. 6ibid. 
7Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 100. 
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organisational functioning of the UN as long as the cold war prevailed. The third category 
was nationals of the third world and did not emerge until the expansion in membership after 
1955. In its own way each called into question the neutrality, independence, and efficiency 
of the Secretariat. Each has demanded organisational reform and innovation to circumvent 
the challenges to the impartiality of the Secretariat and its chief administrative officer. In 
turn the organisational functioning of the Secretariat has had a profound impact upon the 
evolution of the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
McCarthyism and the Secretariat. 
During 1952 the McCarthyist witch-hunt for subversive communist US nationals turned to 
the UN. I US nationals in the Secretariat attended hearings held by the Internal Security 
Sub-Conu-nittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee during October and November. On 2 
December 1952 a separate Federal Grand Jury ruling alleged, "infiltration into the UN of an 
overwhelmingly large group of disloyal US citizens, ' '2and on 2 January 1953 the Sub- 
Committee named thirty-eight allegedly practising communist US nationals in the 
Secretariat. Lie, ironically himself under suspicion until providing the Secretary-General's 
unqualified support for the Unified Command, appointed and followed the 
recommendations of a three man Commission. 3 Those who had invoked the fifth 
amendment in the hearings to protect themselves from self incrimination were dismissed. 
Lie argued that although a tiny minority, their resort to the right to silence, "discredited the 
Secretariat as a whole, cast suspicion on all the staff, and imperilled the position of the 
Organisation in the host country. "4 Twenty one of those dismissed successfully filed and 
won suit for wrongful dismissal through the UN Administrative Tribunal. By this stage 
Hammarskj6ld had succeeded Lie, and untainted by the episode, provided compensation 
but refused to reinstate the former employees as the Tribunal had decreed. The decision not 
to reinstate the US nationals did not satisfy those who insisted that failing to do so 
compromised the Secretariat's independence and integrity under US pressure. Conversely, 
the decision to pay compensation did not satisfy the cold war xenophobia prevailing in the 
US Congress, and those who like Lie argued that the Secretariat's independence was only 
compromised by the employment of nationals, "barred from employment in the service of 
his own Government. 115More damaging, however, was the agreement Acheson negotiated 
'See Franck, (1985), op. cit., pp. 110-3; see Rovine, op. cit., pp. 251-6; & Foote, op. cit., p. 487-509; & 
Lie, op. cit., pp. 386-405. 2Cordier & Foote, op. cit., p. 487. 317he national composition of which, irrespective of the individual's abilities and integrity, was hardly 
formulated to inspire confidence: William Mitchell, (former US Attorney General); Sir Edwin Herbert, (UK 
solicitor); Paul Veckens, (Belgian Professor). 
4Cordier and Foote, op. cit., p. 496-7. 5Lie, "Statement on Personnel Policy before the General Assembly, " GAOR 413th meeting, 10 March 
1953, reproduced in Cordier & Foote, op. cit., p. 487-8. 
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with Lie, that current and future US nationals should be subject to US security clearance. 
As a result the FBI was allowed to hold court inside the organisation until expelled by 
Hammarskj6ld. By this time, however, Truman's Executive Order 10422 of 9 January 
1953, had determined that the International Organisations Employees Loyalty Board would 
provide the Secretary-General with 'advisory, ' information on all US candidates. When the 
intensity of the cold war subsided, General Ford replaced Truman's Executive Order with 
one of his own requiring, "a less onerous national agency check. "' In this vetting process, 
however, as Hazard argues, the US engaged in a passive variant of Soviet policy to 
Secretariat recruitment, 
"The most significant aspect of the clearance requirement ... does not lie in the exceptional circumstance of a candidate whose suitability may be 
contested by the Secretariat and the national agency, but in the pervasive and 
repressive conformity it implies and imposes on the majority of the 
approved. "2 
The McCarthyist propaganda contributed to a crisis of confidence in the Secretariat's 
independence and integrity, and in the ability of the Secretary-General to neutrally 
implement the mandates delegated by the General Assembly and Security Council. It is 
little wonder that the Secretary-General was not initially delegated good office functions, 
nor that the member states were prepared to tolerate Lie's proposals for a permanent or ad 
hoc UN Force under the Secretary-General's administration. 
Reds in the Machine. 
The Soviet approach to international civil service was most publicly articulated in 
Khruschev's 1960 proposals for a triumvirate of regionally and politically representative 
Secretaries-General. Although a radical departure from the basis on which the League and 
UN Secretariats were conceived, Khruschev's troika was a logical progression from 
established Soviet policy towards the Secretariat. From the outset the USSR applied 
Hankey's philosophy to the composition, status and role of the Secretariat. The Soviet 
grievance was that even given an adequate geographical representation of posts there 
remained an inherent cultural and ideological bias in the Secretariat which would permeate 
policy analysis, policy-making, and policy implementation. At its inception, for example, 
six of the nine most senior positions were held by Western nationals. 3 Such a distribution 
of posts throughout the Secretariat reflected the balance of the wider UN membership, the 
geographic location(s) of the UN, 4 and the shortage of appropriately qualified personnel 
outside Europe. The Soviet concern was not only with overt bias but that culturally 
I Executive Order 11890 December 1975, see Franck, (1985), op. cit., P. 102. 
214azard, Shirley, The Defeat of An Ideal: A Study of the Self-Destruction of the United Nations, (Boston: 
Little, Brown & co., 1973), p. 58; see also Franck, (1985), op. cit., pp. 182-3. 31ncluding the Secretary-General. 
4London then New York, and Geneva. 
-170- 
received a priori attitudes, values, opinions, and assumptions prevented the international 
civil service neutrally implementing the mandates of the deliberative organs, or providing 
the Secretary-General with independent advice, and impartially executing his directives. 
Drummond's approach assumed that, as Jordan explains, 
'The development of agreed methods for the analysis of problems by 
citizens of diverse nationalities ... its own approach, derived from the objectives of the UN which affords some definition of the range of necessity 
and legitimate interest and a scale of evaluation among the multifarious 
aspects of international politics. The mere juxtaposition of national interests, 
interpreted in a so-called objective manner, is no solution to the problem. "' 
The Soviet/Hankey approach, 2however, denied, "any such agreed technique, which might 
offer some possibility of translating at least some aspects of political controversy into 
technical discussion, is at all feasible. ' '3 This context helps explain the lack of Soviet 
support for either delegating the Secretary-General extensive or politically sensitive fact- 
finding or peacekeeping mandates. It also helps explain the Soviet interest in keeping the 
Secretary-General's independent role in check. For the USSR Drummond's model was a 
utopian and unrealistic aspiration. While Khruschev's efforts to politicise the Secretary- 
General's role and revive Hankey's model of international civil service belly-flopped, 
Soviet nationals in the Secretariat operated on this basis from the outset. While the US 
imposed a security clearance requirement on its nationals in the Secretariat, Franck notes, 
"the USSR has successfully impressed on the Secretary-General that its citizens cannot be 
approached directly. "4While US security clearance imposed on US nationals a bland 
uniformity, Soviet nationals, as Franck argues, "have acted more like insidious termiteS. "5 
The USSR and its allies have persistently argued, "only the country can decide who 
represents it in the Secretariat. ' '6 The USSR claimed diplomatic immunity for its Secretariat 
staff on the grounds that they were, "seconded from the Soviet Foreign Service and hold 
diplomatic passports. '17 Arkady Sobolev, for example, the first Soviet head of the 
Department of Security Council and Political Affairs succeeded Vyshinsky as his country's 
permanent representative at the UN. The number of espionage cases and the career of 
Arkady Schevchenko, chronicled in Breaking with Moscow, 8 reveal the extent to which 
Soviet nationals failed to fulfil the obligations of Article 100 and 10 1- 
'Jordan, William, unpublished memorandum, 28 May 1962, quoted by Jordan, Robert S., op. cit., p. 13. 
2See pp. 27-9. 
3ibid. 
4Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 107. 
5ibid., p. 104. 
6(Emphasis added). Polish Mission Press Release 30 October 1961; see Balley, (1964), op. cit., p. 
80. 
7Stavropoulos, Constantin A., Memorandum to the Secretary-General, 9 February 1970, UN Archives DAG 
1/5.2.1.1-14, "Secretariat - USSR Staff. " see also Note for the Secre tary- 
General, "USSR Attitude to the 
UN Secretariat, " JS: mm, 15 July 1966, UN Archives DAG 1/5.2.2.10-1. 
8Schevchenko, Arkady, Breaking with Moscow, (New York: Random House, 1985). 
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The Secretariat and the Secretary- General. 
From the very outset the portents for the independent functioning of the Secretariat were not 
good. The Preparatory Committee recommended the organisation of the Secretariat in eight 
Departments, each headed by an assistant secretary-general (ASG): The Department of 
Political and Security Council Affairs; the Department of Economic Affairs; the Department 
of Social Affairs; the Department of Trusteeship and Information from Non Self Governing 
Territories; the Legal Department; the Department of Administrative and Financial Services; 
and the Department of Conference and General Services. The ASGs provided Lie's 
'cabinet' of senior advisors, and in accordance with Charter provisions, and as determined 
by the Preparatory Committee and General Assembly, were to be allocated with due regard 
for geographical representation. Before the development of the network of permanent 
missions and representation at UN HQ, it was envisaged that these senior posts would 
provide the Secretary-General with access to the views of member states in different regions 
and vice versa. Responsibility for the actual running of Departments was thus delegated to 
the Directors in the Departments. This quasi -politicisation of the higher echelons was to 
provide reassurance against the concentration of bureaucratic power and the abuse of that 
power by nationals of one state or group of states. On entering office, however, Lie was 
informed by Vyshinsky of a, 'Gentleman's Agreement, ' which had been reached at San 
Francisco between the permanent members, allocating five of the Assistant posts amongst 
themselves. The agreement provided for a Soviet head of the Department of Security 
Council and Political Affairs,, an American head of the Department of Administrative and 
Financial Affairs, a French head of the Department of Social Affairs, a UK head of the 
Department of Economic Affairs, and a Chinese head of the Department of Trusteeship. Lie 
accepted the agreement as a, "sign of good will, "' and sought advice from the said 
governments on the appointment of officials. The US provided a list of recommendations 
from whom Lie selected John Hutson. From the USSR Lie requested Roshchin, whom he 
knew, but was informed that only Sobolev was suitably experienced. Similarly, in the 
appointment of David Owen, the UK, "took an approach which was so solicitous of my 
right to appoint whatever British subject I chose. "2 Henri Langier was appointed from 
France, Victor Hoo from China, and the remaining three vacancies were filled by nationals 
of Chile, (Benjamin A. Cohen), Czechoslovakia, (Ivan Kerno), and the Netherlands, 
(Adrian Pelt). 
Lie did not expect this arrangement to be permanent, but henceforth, and with only minor 
exceptions, the posts, 'commandeered, ' by the permanent members remained in their 
hands. Furthermore, at San Francisco, a proposal requiring the, "prior [national] approval 
ILie, op. cit., p. 43. 2ibid., p. 47. 
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of officials ... to build a up a staff adequately representative of governments, "' had been 
rejected. If it was not immediately obvious that this principle had also been sacrificed, Lie's 
acquiescence to prevailing political realities, especially given the Soviet approach, was the 
first step towards a system of political patronage. 
The appointment of a Soviet national as head of the Department of Political and Security 
Affairs (DPSCA) had an, "inevitable consequence. "2 The DPSCA was originally envisaged 
as the main source of political advice to the Secretary-General, but given the cold war 
climate and the Soviet approach to the Secretariat it waý impracticable for the Secretary- 
General to use the ASG for DPSCA as his primary advisor and confidant. Instead Lie used 
as his main political advisors and confidants Abraham Feller, (American in the Office of 
Legal Affairs), until his suicide at the height of the McCarthyist allegations, and Tor 
Gjesdal, (Norwegian in the Office of Public Information. )3 Consequently, the functions of 
the DPSCA and its Soviet head were, according to an internal note, "curtailed to servicing 
Security Council meetings and meetings of the First and Special Political Committees, and 
to preparing certain studies which with few exceptions were read by hardly anyone in the 
Secretariat. ' '4 In practical terms this approach was demonstrated in Korea where the 
international circumstance dictated the exclusion of Soviet nationals from high level 
meetings. However, in his reliance on three Americans in his, 'war office, ' (Cordier, 
Feller and Foote), Lie did nothing to inspire, Soviet and Chinese confidence in the 
Secretariat. 
Hammarskj6ld put Lie's ad hoc measures for circumventing Soviet nationals on a more 
formal footing by his reorganisation of the upper echelons of the Secretariat in 1955. The 
eight Departments were restructured such that: the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs became one; the ASG for Administrative and Financial matters became two posts at 
a new under-secretary-general level, (USG); the new USG's for Personnel and Financial 
services were incorporated into the Secretary-General's Executive Office, which was given 
an expanded role and remit; and of critical importance, two new USGs for Special Political 
Affairs, (without portfolio), were appointed. 
In creating a single tier of USGs in place of the politically appointed ASGs and 
administratively charged Directors, Hanunarskj6ld diluted the significance of the 
gentleman's agreement. The Secretary-General had widened the formal 'cabinet' of 
advisors on whose advice he relied such that the permanent appointees outnumbered the 
ISee Hammarskj6ld, "The International Civil Servant, " in Foote, op. cit., p. 333. 
2Stavropoulos, Constantin A., (Legal Counsel) untitled personal note to the Secretary -General, 
7 January 
1970. 
3ibid. 
4ibid. 
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'political' appointees. Furthermore, the enlargement of this group made it more unwieldy, 
decreased its collective influence, and enabled Hammarskj6ld to consult selectively 
individuals within this higher echelon. At the same time, and as a concession to Soviet 
concerns, Hammarskj6ld appointed the Soviet head of the DPSCA, Ilya Tchernychev, and 
an American, Ralph Bunche, as his two new USGs for Special Political Affairs. Once 
more, however, discrepancies soon emerged in the quantitative and qualitative workloads of 
the new appointments. In 1958 Moscow insisted on a return to the status quo ante and 
Anatoly Dobrynin, who had succeeded Tchernychev in 1957, became the USG for 
DPSCA. I Moscow reluctantly accepted the unsatisfactory situation in which the DPSCA 
played a secondary role in political matters, whilst the most important political work, 
especially that relating to peacekeeping missions, was assigned to a US national. 2 Bunche 
was accepted by the USSR, and was able to undertake such responsibilities, because of his 
perceived neutrality. Paradoxically Bunche epitomised the Drummond model of 
international civil service the USSR so vehemently denied. As Stavropuolos explained to U 
Thant in discussing a successor to Bunche, 
'The only basis on which the USSR temporarily resigned itself to such a 
situation was by most reluctantly accepting the theory advance by Mr 
Hammarskj6ld and by U Tbant that Dr. Bunche was a leading Negro, a 
Nobel Prize winner, and a model international civil servant. It was argued 
that in his official capacity, rather than being an American citizen, Dr. 
Bunche was an international institution. '13 
Significantly, however, neither Dobrynin, nor Bunche, was succeeded by a Soviet or US 
national. The practice developed instead for the Secretaries-General to surround themselves 
with a pool of advisors recruited from outside the two blocs (except for UK nationals). If 
Bunche was tolerated, after Suez the emergence of the Secretariat as an executive instrument 
heightened Soviet sensitivity to the actions of the Secretary-General and the roles delegated 
to the Secretariat. These issues came to a head in the Congo where the collapse of Soviet- 
Secretary-General relations reflected long-running concerns as to whom the Secretary- 
General consulted for advice. In particular, the USSR was aggrieved by the so called 
'Congo club, ' at UN HQ which excluded Soviet officials, and was dominated by Western, 
mainly US officials. In this respect, more threatening than the troika itself, were the 
proposals posted by Nkrumah, (Ghana) and Nehru, (India) for three regionally 
representative deputies and an advisory consultative council respectively. These more 
temperate proposals were designed to appease Khruschev and were quickly dubbed a, 'sub- 
troika. ' As such, they gave credence to Khruschev's allegations, if not his solutions. In 
view of the organisations expanding membership and functions a Committee of Experts had 
IDuring this brief interlude Dragoslav Protitch of Yugoslavia served as USG for the DPSCA- 2Stavropoulos, op. cit. 3ibid. 
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been appoint y the General Assembly in December 1959 to review the activities and 
structure of the Secretariat. For Hammarskj6ld, the possibility that the so-called Group of 
Eight would factor these proposals into its final report was a very real fear. To counter 
unfavourable recommendations Hammarskj6ld invited three fon-ner Presidents of the 
General Assembly to consider the issue. The so-called, 'three wise men, ' however, 
proposed increasing from two to five the under- secretaries-general without portfolio. This 
group, Urquhart explains, were to be available for consultations on political and diplomatic 
questions, for special assignments and would help redress the imbalance in geographical 
representation at this level. ' For Hammarskj6ld these recommendations ran too close to the 
variations on acabinet system'under consideration in the Committee of Experts. 2 The 
Secretary-General was unswerving in his opposition to pressures for anything resembling 
an intergovernmental or compulsory consultative tier in the Secretariat which would dilute 
the independence and dynamism of the Secretary-Generalship. At Oxford Hammarskjbld 
explained that such deputies would create, 
"A group of high officials who would not be responsible to the Secretary- 
General but to the bodies which elected them. This would inevitably mean a 
dilution of the responsibility of the Secretary-General for the conduct of the 
Organisation and would be conducive neither to the efficient functioning of 
the Secretariat nor to its independent position. "3 
As is his prerogative the Secretary-General put forward his own recommendations for a 
single level of assistant and under secretaries-general. 4 Their title denoted function, not 
rank, which was equal. The assistant secretaries-general, (political), were to serve one term 
of three to five years, and the under secretaries-general, (administrative), could serve a 
maximum of two terms. 5 The Secretary-General's proposal accepted the need for greater 
representation and consultation in the higher echelons of the Secretariat, but crucially 
reasserted the Secretary-General's right to determine whom he would consult and when. 
His death prevented his proposals going forward and reopened the debate. 
As an interim measure the USSR proposed the appointment of a single Secretary-General 
with three regionally representative second level under secretaries-general whom the 
incumbent was required to consult. The USSR added that it would veto any nomination for 
the Secretary-General's post without prior agreement on the, 'sub-troika. ' U Thant, who 
emerged during September as the leading candidate, was vehemently opposed to any 
conditions on the appointment of the Secretary-General. In this he received strong backing 
'Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 526. 2See Final Report, UN Doc. A/4776,14 June 196 1. 
30xford Lecture, op. cit., p. 336; also see "Hankey versus Drummond, " in Franck, op. cit., pp. 
94-97, & 
Bailey, (1964), op. cit., pp. 64-76. 
4UN Doc. A/4794 30 June 196 1. 
5Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 527. 
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from his Government, (Burma). During September the Soviet position softened, and on 2 
October the US and USSR announced that agreement had been reached that an Acting 
Secretary-General should serve out the remainder of Hammarskjbld's term and that the 
recommendation of the Security Council was a pre-requisite, I as was an advisory cablnet. 2 ii 
In private, agreement was also reached on the suitability of U Thant but negotiations stalled 
on the number and geographical representation of the Secretary-General's advisors, and the 
precise nature of their relationship with the Secretary-General. In this last respect, the 
USSR wanted compulsory consultation and wanted the Secretary-General to announce his, 
'running mates, ' prior to election. The so called, 'numbers game, ' was played out until, on 
19 October U Thant announced he would stand only on his terms. On American television 
he recounted Hanunarskjbld's Oxford defence of neutrality. 3 The permanent members 
remained deadlocked until, on 1 November, the UK and US announced they were prepared 
to allow the Secretary-General to introduce his own formula. France followed suit, and the 
following day the USSR agreed. On 3 November the Security Council recommended U 
Thant to the General Assembly where he was appointed Acting Secretary-General. In his 
acceptance speech the Acting Secretary-General paid heed to the Soviet concerns but 
without compromising the Secretary-General's independence. U Thant announced the 
appointment of Bunche and Georgi Petrovitch Arkadev as the first of his principal advisors, 
with whom he declared his intention to work, "in close collaboration and consultation in a 
spirit of mutual understanding. ' 4 Crucially, the appointments were his choice, there was no 
obligation to consult, and they had no authority other than that bestowed upon them by the 
Secretary-General. Hammarskj6ld and U Thant thus won an important victory for the 
continued independence of the Secretariat. As Bailey observes there was at least, "no 
formal erosion of the Secretary-General's right to hire, fire and structure the Secretariat. ' 15 
This victory, however, did not resolve some fundamental questions regarding the command 
and control of ONUC and ultimately the central question of, "how far should peacekeeping 
operations be controlled by the Security Council and what should be the rights of the 
Secretary-General. ' '6 
The rapid deployment of troops in the Congo took place without adequate logistic and 
command preparations, and on his arrival in the Congo, General Henry Alexander, 
(seconded British commander of the Ghana contingent) assumed overall control. 
Alexander, however, was not the appointed Force Commander, nor was ONUC a purely 
military operation. Hammarskj6ld responded by placing Bunche in overall control in the 
Iln view of US and U`K proposals to put the matter to the General Assembly, compare with instance in 
which Trygve Lie's term was extended, see pp. 65-6. 2See U Tlant, View From the UN, (London: David & Charles, 1978), p. 12. 
3ibid., p. 17. 
4ibid., p. 18; see also UN Doc. SG/ 1102,29 December, 196 1. 513ailey, op. cit., p. 87. 6Hiscocks, op. cit., p. 282. 
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field. The combination of Bunche's lack of military experience, the lack of UN 
preparedness and logistical support, (in particular inadequate communications equipment), 
and the sheer size of the country, created problems of command and control both within the 
military command and between the political and military officials. I More important, 
however, was the diffuse and changing line of command between the Secretary-General 
and the field. When Bunche returned to New York he became the focal point of contact 
between the Force Commander, (first Van Horn, then Mckeown), and the special 
representative, (Dayal), who was clearly the highest ranking UN official in the field. By 
May 1961, Dayal's position had become untenable and reluctantly the special representative 
was withdrawn. 2 The special representative was never formally replaced and instead Sture 
Linner became the, 'officer in charge. ' Mahmoud Khiary was promoted from head of field 
services to head of civilian operations. Finally Connor Cruise O'Brien was appointed the 
Secretary-General's representative in Katanga. This ad hoc arrangement was highly 
unsatisfactory. Firstly, Linner's position was weakened by his title. As 'officer in charge, ' 
he was more primes inter pares, than special representative. Secondly, lines of 
communication and authority between Khiary, Linner, O'Brien and HQ were never 
formalised. Thirdly, in Katanga ONUC was a highly subordinate operation. Finally, 
O'Brien was a hasty and last minute appointment whom Durch argues was, "not steeped in 
the pacifist ethos of the Secretariat. ' '3 The choice of UN personnel, coupled with the 
confused lines of authority in the field and between the field and HQ, add a significant 
dimension to understanding the circumstance in which the Secretary-General's executive 
action was conceived. This issue, however, was specific to the Congo. So while the 
Secretariat was subsequently criticised for failing to formally address the issues of 
command and control the Congo operation raised, it was not a situation which recurred in 
subsequent operations. In UNYOM and UNFICYP there existed considerably more 
agreement over what the UN was trying to achieve and the liryfits to the UN's role. And 
UNEF H and UNDOF were military operations in which military disciplines applied and 
were not confused or subordinated by the very different approach required for civilian 
components. A sharper division of responsibility existed between force commander and 
special representative in the field, both of whom reported directly to UN HQ. Furthermore, 
the Security Council took greater responsibility for political leadership. 
On issues of organisational preparedness, however, Hammarski6ld moved quickly. In 
1960 the Secretary-General stated, "it is a considerable weakness that the Secretariat has not 
in its ranks a highly qualified military expertise which is able, on a current basis, to 
maintain a state of preparedness for the kind of situation which the Organisation has 
'See Durch, op. cit., pp. 337-9. 2See Urquhart, op. cit., pp. 516-8. 3Durch, op. cit., p. 335. 
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suddenly had to face. "' Accordingly, Harnmarskj6ld approved an in house training 
programme for both civilian and military personnel, which because of his death, was never 
implemented. To his executive office, however, the Secretary-General added a Military 
Advisor, (Major Indar Jit Rikhye), and a small military staff. But when Rikhye left UN 
service in 1968 the post and staff were downgraded because of long running opposition to 
the strengthening of the Secretary-General's peacekeeping role and the impracticability of 
recon . ciling independent military advice with the inclusion of Soviet and American personnel 
in this staff. 2 
Stand-by forces and training programmes in Canada, New Zealand, and Scandinavia 
promised better preparedness, co-ordination, command, and control in the field but the on 
going dispute at the superpower level in the Peacekeeping Committee negated, 'out of 
house, ' progress. 3 In the Committee the USSR advocated the revival of the MSC and the 
delegation of peacekeeping command to the MSC. 4 This had the benefit of providing a 
forum through which troop contributors views could be represented but otherwise was 
unworkable on three counts. Firstly, its chair, like the Security Council President would be 
a state representative and therefore a political appointee, not an executor of Security Council 
mandates in the Secretariat tradition. Secondly, day-to-day command by committee is 
unwieldy and unresponsive, and in times of crisis unworkable. Thirdly, it would extend 
the permanent members' Security Council veto to the day-to-day management of 
peacekeeping. By contrast, the US rejected Security Council micro-management of 
peacekeeping in favour of clearer guidelines for the Secretary-General and the fon-nalisation 
of existing advisory arrangements - the creation, under Article 29 of the Charter, of a 
Security Council subsidiary organ with oversight functions. Because this Security Council 
body was not the MSC it would not be able to over-rule the S ecretar-Y -General's decisionS. 5 
Progress was slow, but resolved in the organic development of this relationship as well as 
pragmatic responses to need in the NEddle East, rather than by artificial attempts to 
formalise the relationship between the Security Council and the Secretary-General in 
abstract battles. 6 
The only reform which did take place during this period was another rearrangement of the 
senior positions in the Secretariat. In 1967 U Thant appointed a committee of experts to 
consider reorganisation of the Secretariat and make reconimendations. 7 The committee and 
lHammarskj6ld, Introduction to the Annual Report 1959-60,31 August 1960, reproduced In Foote, op. cit., 
300. ýliscocks, 
op. cit., p. 277-80. 3ibid. 
4See UN Doc. A/8669,20 March 1972; also see Hiscocks, op. cit., pp. 280-5. 
5See UN Doc. A/8672,3 April 1972; also see Hiscocks, op. cit., p. 280-5. 
6See pp. 187-92. 
7Ramcharan, B. G., "The History, Role and Organisation of the 'Cabinet' of the United Nations Secretarý - 
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General Assembly endorsed U Thant's recommendations for re-establishing the division 
between ASGs and USGs, and supported his practice of weekly meetings at this level. 
These meetings improved co-ordination of activities between organisational units, and with 
respect to Soviet fears in the Secretariat was an inclusive measure. 'Me new posts 
established at the USG level reflected the growing demand for a streamlining and functional 
rationalisation of the Secretariat. In their respective functional areas, the two new posts 
were also indicative of the changing demands on the organisation. Andrew Stark, (UK), 
was made USG for Administration and Management with a mandate for, "a fresh and 
comprehensive approach to some of the most stubborn problems in the area of 
administration, personnel and budget. "' Constantin Stavropoulos was appointed USG for 
General Assembly Affairs. This post was previously held by the Chef de Cabinet in the 
Secretary-General's Executive Office. These functions were temporarily separated in 1961 
to appease Soviet concerns with respect to the, 'Congo Club, ' at UN HQ. Andrew 
Cordier, formerly Chef de Cabinet with dual responsibility for General Assembly Affairs, 
retained responsibility for the latter and C. V. Narasimhan became the Secretary-General's 
Chef de Cabinet. But when Cordier left the UN in 1962 the functions were re-united under 
Narasimhan. Significantly the post has not since been held by an American. 
In this shake-up, for the first time Secretariat reform addressed organisational. aspects of 
early warning in preventive diplomacy. The Manpower Services Report on the work of the 
DPSCA recommended the appointment of additional staff for peace research and peace 
studies. The Peace unit was not well defined, and a less systematic forerunner of the 
Organisation for the Research and Collection of Information (ORCI). 2 This peace research 
unit, however, was rejected on grounds of penury, but probably also for political reasons 
given the sensitivity of the member states to any activity in resembling intelligence gathering 
in the post cold war era and in the creation of ORC1.3 
The refonns undertaken, are described by Ramcharan as, "organising for leadership. " 
They freed the Secretary-General's Executive Office to focus on, "the implementation of the 
decisions of the Secretary-General and assist him in the direction of the Secretariat, ' '5and 
ensured that the Secretary-General's office remained, "responsive to his needs. ' '6 This 
progress, however, was not replicated in the rest of the Secretariat. Between 1946 and 
General, " Nordic Journal q International Law, Vol. 59, Fax 2/3,1990, p. 109. 
1 ibid., p. I 11. 
20n ORCI see pp. 289-91,301-2 & 351-5. 3"Management and Manpower Utilisation in the DPSCA, " November 1971, & "Note on the 
AMS Report 
on the DPSCA, " TG/mc, 25 May 1972, UN Archives, New York, DAG 1/5.3.1 -0: 1 UN 
File, SG: 
Management Survey. 
4ibid., p. 115. 
5ibid., p. I 11; see also "Review of Management and Manpower Utilisation In Executive 
Office of Secretary- 
General, " Feb 1973, UN Archives, New York, DAG 1/5.3.1.0: 1 UN File, SG: Management Survey. 
6ibid. 
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1982 membership of the organisation increased threefold with adverse consequences for the 
administrative arrn of the UN. 
The Third World and the Secretariat. 
The enlargement of the organisation posed different problems for the development of the 
international civil service. Firstly, the diversity of linguistic, cultural and technical 
differences erected further obstacles to the development of an effective and efficient 
organisation. Secondly, the career based service was not well equipped to adapt its 
composition to reflect the rapidly expanding membership. While the Charter made the 
Secretary -General the chief administrative officer of the UN and endowed him with the 
attendant powers to hire, fire and structure the international civil service, it also provided the 
General Assembly with broad structural, regulatory and oversight functions. I The third 
world membership utilised these powers adeptly in correcting the geographical imbalance of 
national representation in the Secretariat, but in so doing unden-nined the original conception 
of a career civil service based on the principles of permanence and neutrality. The 
proliferation of the mandates and programmes initiated by this majority also increased the 
workload and size of the UN bureaucracy. In this, albeit for different reasons, the USSR 
found an ally in the third world. For the new members the emphasis on fixed term 
contracts over pen-nanent placements reflected their particular circumstance, rather than a 
significantly different approach to the international civil service. 
Firstly, the pressure for quotas and, 'desirable ranges, ' of national representation in the 
Secretariat increased during the 1960s and reached a crescendo during the 1970S: 2in 1967 
the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General report on the nationality of the 
senior staff in the Secretariat; 3 in 1974, the Algerian Foreign Minister famously stated, "the 
only thing left now was to decolonise the Secretariat; "4 in 1975 the General Assembly 
complained that the developing states compromised 73% of the membership but the 
developed states occupied 64.5% of the senior Secretariat positions; 5 and in 1976 and 1980 
the weighted formula for calculating the desirable range of member states representation 
was revised in the favour of this group. 6 
ISee Articles 10,15 (2) and 17. 
2See Bailey, (1964), op. cit., pp. 76-94; Franck, (1985), op. cit., PP. 110-6; James, R. R., Staffing the 
UN 
Secretariat, (Sussex: Institute for the Study of International Orgamsation, 1970); Finger, S. M., & Mungo, 
U., "The Politics of Staffing the UN Secretariat, " ORBIS, Spring 1975; Meron, T., The UN 
Secretariat, 
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977), pp. various; Peterson, M. J., The General Assembly In World 
Politics, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 165-71; & Weiss, T., "International Bureaucracy: Myth and 
Reality of the International Civil 'Service, " International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 2,1982. 
3GA Res. 2359A (1967); see Peterson op. cit., p. 170. 
4Bouteflika, cited in Peterson, op. cit., p. 169. 
5GA Res. 3417A (1975); see Peterson op. cit., p. 170. 
6Peterson op. cit., p. 169-70. 
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A second and faster track to greater geographical representation was to increase the 
proportion and turnover of staff employed on fixed term contracts. This also reflected the 
domestic circumstance of recently decolonised and developing states. For new and 
underdeveloped states with low levels of education and high levels of illiteracy the problem 
was one of bureaucratic scarcity and choice. As Claude explains, the objective of greater 
geographical representation and the development of a stable domestic political and civil 
infrastructure were contradictory forces only reconcilable, to the Secretariat's disadvantage, 
in fixed ten-n contracts, 
"T'he lack of a national surplus of trained and experienced public service 
made it difficult for the UN to secure [adequate] qualified staff. The urge of 
these states to place a substantial number of their citizens in UN jobs ran 
counter to their need to retain their most competent people for the national 
service. Under these circumstances the UN tended to employ citizens of the 
African states for limited periods, treating this employment in part as a 
means to provide training for members of national bureaucracies. " I 
This trend began with Hammarskj6ld, who acknowledged the possibilities short term 
appointments offered in this respect, but also professed a desire for maintaining a ratio of 
three to one in favour of permanent Staff. 2 At the time Hammarskj6ld expressed this 
preference, which was also endorsed by the General Assembly, 3 the proportion of 
Secretariat staff on the fixed term appointments was already approaching 30%. 4 By 1969 
5 those appointed on fixed term contract had reached 34%, and by 1975 38.4%. 6 The 
acceleration of this trend, in view of General Assembly pressure was in part due to the 
replacement of retiring first generation UN civil servants on permanent posts with fixed 
term contract staff - by 1970 80% of new recruits were being appointed to fixed term 
poStS. 7 As Peterson noted in 1986, therefore, "it will not be long before the Secretariat 
becomes a 25% career and 75% short-term appointment service. ' 18 The erosion of the 
career concept did not necessarily compromise the neutrality, competence, and efficiency of 
the Secretariat. As Hammarskj6ld noted at Oxford, however, the Secretariat's fortunes 
would increasingly be contingent upon the attitude and benevolence of the member states 
and the integrity of its personnel, 
"A national official seconded by his government for a year or two with an 
international organisation is evidently in a different position psychologically 
- and one might say politically from the permanent international civil servant 
'Claude, op. cit., p. 180. 
2UN Doc. A/5377,18 December 1962, pp. 15,29; A/ 17/P. V. 1119 19 December 1962; see Franck, (1985), 
op. cit., pp. 111-2, & Peterson, op. cit., p. 171; see also Oxford Lecture, in Foote, op. cit., p. 
341-2. 
3GAOR II 99th meeting, 19 December 1962, p. 1194, & UN Doc. A/5377,18 December, 1962; see 
Franck, ( 1985), op. cit., pp. 111-2. 
4UN Doc. A/6487,26 October, 1'966, p. 7; see Franck, (1985), op. cit., pp. 112. 
5UN Doc. A/7745,5 November 1969; see Peterson, op. cit., p. 171. 
6UN Doc. A/ 10 184,28 August 1975, Annex, Table 9; see Peterson, op. cit., p. 17 1. 
7UN Doc. A/8156,12 November, 1970, Table D; see Franck, (1985), op. cit., pp. 112. 
8Peterson, op. cit., p. 171. 
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who does not contemplate a subsequent career with his national 
government. "' 
Thirdly, the third world has lobbied with increasing effectiveness for particular posts in the 
Secretariat. 'Mis approach to an international civil service is by no means unique to the 
third world. The emergence of, 'the gentleman's agreement, 'at the highest Secretariat 
levels as an ad perpetuum arrangement set the tone for the rest of the membership. 
Irrespective of the level, posts have been regarded as a national inheritance and jealously 
guarded or, 'traded, ' for posts of equal standing. 2 Furthen-nore, as Franck implies by his 
description of the Secretariat as, 'bis sister and his cousins, and his aunts, "3and as the staff 
union reported in 1980, nepotism was rife in Secretariat recruitment: "a successful career in 
the UN is contingent, above all, on 'contacts, ' 'knowing someone, ' and having pressure 
applied by members of their national mission to the UN. "4 'I'he consequences have been 
twofold. Firstly, Archer argues this has affected the efficiency and ability of the Secretariat 
to execute collectively agreed policy, and member states confidence in Secretariat, 
"It represents an attempt by some states at 'two bites at the cherry' having 
not quite obtained all they want in plenary meetings they can direct 'their' 
members of the Secretariat to interpret, (or not to interpret), policy in such 
away as suits their interests. '15 
Secondly, Franck argues that the impact on Secretariat morale has been profound. With the 
permanent career service, as Hammarskj6ld feared, went promotion on merit. The experts 
and the neutrals slowly began to disappear and those whom, "knowing that they do not 
have the political support necessary for their promotion, but also aware that under staff 
rules they cannot be fired ... settled for a career of unproductive vegetation. 
' 16 
The fourth feature of the Secretariat's development was a consequence of the changing UN 
agenda during the period under review. The articulation of a third world, North-South and 
anti-semitic agenda had marked effects. The creation of new programmes, subsidiary 
organs and Secretariat units contributed to a burgeoning bureaucracy addressing 
increasingly partisan objectives. In the development area especially, General Assembly 
mandates, budgetary control, and voluntary contributions were used to, "increase the 
organisational prominence, ' '7of third world nationals. The creation of a Director General 
'Hammarskj6ld, Oxford Lecture in Foote, op. cit., p. 341. 
217ranck, (1985), op. cit., p. I 10. 
3ibid., chapter heading, p. 94. 
4Personnel Questions: Report Submitted by the Staff Unions and Associated of the UN Secretariat, 19801, 
UN Doc. A/C. 5/35/17; see Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 114; & Peterson, op. cit., p. 172. 
5Archer, Clive, International Organisations, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 139; see also Weiss, 
Thomas, "International Bureaucracy: Myth and Reality of the International Civil Service, " International 
Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 2,1982, pp. 294-305. 
6Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 113. 
7Peterson, op. cit., p. 167. 
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for Development and Economic Co-operation second only to the Secretary-General, and the 
General Assembly insistance that, "third world nationals committed to Group 77 goals of 
economic change, "' staff UNCTAD are cogent examples. Franck comments that, as a 
result of these initiatives, the Joint Inspection Unit and the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions, "have proven all but useless to hold meaningful 
competitive examinations to select a candidate who, because of Assembly guidelines and 
bloc politics must be a woman agronomist form Burundi. "2 Many of these bodies and jobs 
however, like the Director General's post, "remained somewhat undefined because he 
lacked clear authority over the various UN development related programmes. '13 The net 
effect of this trend was to create great bureaucratic empires and organisational inertia in the 
face of reform proposals to rationalise the Secretariat, eradicate duplication, and improve 
efficiency and co-operation. In his memoirs Waldheim recounts, 
"The situation today is a bureaucratic nightmare. Because of the lack of a 
proper hierarchical structure, no less than seventy under-secretaries-general, 
assistant secretaries-general and other officials of comparable rank in New 
York and around the world reported directly to me. This is an impossible 
span of managerial control. Moreover, whenever, I left New York, no 
matter how pressing my business, I was constantly pursued by telephone 
and cable to make decisions that no-one was empowered to handle. "4 
'I'his was in fact Waldheim's case for the creation of yet another post, a Deputy Secretary- 
General. Such a proposal, however, addressed the symptom of a bureaucratic malaise, not 
the cause, for which he was himself, at least partially responsible. During his tenure the 
number of senior posts in the Secretariat increased by 25%. 5 Waldheim's approach was to 
adopt the recommendation of the 1961 Committee of Experts that increasing geographical 
representation in the higher echelons might be reconciled with keeping open opportunities 
for career staff by, "a temporary increase in the number of higher poStS. "6 Ramcharan 
compares Waldheim's views on a Deputy Secretary-General with those of Hammarskj6ld, 
"The head of each Department and office is directed to carry on his operations 
and to make such decisions as are necessary within the limits of established 
policy. Where marginal policy questions or new questions of importance not 
covered by existing policy, arise the daily contact maintained by the 
Secretary-General through the Executive Office provides a basis for his 
continuing direction of the Secretariat. It is only on those occasions when, 
due to unsatisfactory communications, the Secretary-General is both absent 
and unavailable, that some special measure would appear to be indicated. In 
these circumstance it is my view that an arrangement should be made 
whereby a group or, 'panel' consisting of the under-secretary confronted 
with and urgent and important policy decision, not covered by existing policy 
'ibid. 
217ranck, (1985), op. cit., p. 114. ' 
3Peterson, op. cit., p. 167. 
4Waldheim, op. ci . t., p. 18. 
517inger and Saltzman, op. cit., p. 73. 613ailey, (1964), op. cit., p. 94. 
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lines, associated with two other under-secretaries selected on the basis of 
geographical distribution should make the decisions. "' 
What is patently clear, however, is that by the time Waldheim came to office the 
Hammarskjbld approach was not feasible without a substantial rationalisation of the 
Secretariat. The Secretaries-General have fought to resist the collective processes which 
brought about this situation. The reform process however, has been ad hoc and reactionary 
rather than systematic and rational because the Secretaries-General, as Peterson argues 
"have found it hard to resist the specific pressures, partly because they are so pervasive and 
partly because resistance would consume political capital that might be needed for other 
things. "2 A key aspect of the of the Secretary-General's good-ofices and peacekeeping 
roles is the availability of a Secretariat international in composition, purpose, and principle. 
During the 1960s and 1970s this basis for the Secretary-General's authority was 
substantially eroded. The collective features of the Secretariat's development brought into 
question the integrity of UN personnel in general, and the Secretariat's managerial 
effectiveness - especially in social and economic fields - which by association, 
'exaggerated, ' concerns already prevalent regarding the Secretary-General's peacekeeping 
and good offices capacity. 3 
11 (b) The 0 rgy anisati onal -Institutional Explanation. 
The inter-institutional relationship between the organs of the UN was far less formalised in 
the Charter and by the Preparatory Commission than the role of the international civil 
service. So while institutional developments at the UN also mirrored systemic conditions, 
the evolution of the Secretary-General's role can also be seen as a product of the interplay 
between the organs of the UN. During the period of aggrandisement the Secretary-General 
was the main beneficiary of an expanding role for the General Assembly. After 1961, 
however, the concentration of UN action to maintain international peace and security in the 
Security Council had mixed consequences for the role of the Secretary-General. 
Aggrandisement, the Secretary-General and the General Assembly. 
Between 1945 and 1960 the role of the General Assembly and the institutional relationship 
between the General Assembly and Secretary-General was integral to the development of 
the Secretary-General's role, and as Armstrong notes, reflected the prevailing systemic 
factors, 
"The prestige of the General Assembly rose at the expense of the strife- 
ridden Security Council. This was because the US continued being more or 
less assured of voting majorities in that organ and because weaker states 
I Ramcharan, op. cit., P. 112. 
2Peterson, op. cit., P. 173. 
3Finger and Saltzman, op. cit., p. 49. 
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were keen to increase the authority of the Assembly. And so while the Security Council lost work and went into decline, the General Assembly 
came to be seen as the important organ. " I 
The uniting for peace resolution was the public expression of this trend and formally altered 
the institutional balance between the General Assembly and the Security Council. It 
provided the means by which the General Assembly could assume responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security when the Security Council was unable to 
act, and provided for a number of specific functions involving the Secretary-General. 
Firstly, the resolution established a, 'Peace Observation Mission, ' to, 'observe and report 
on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which 
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. '2 T'he Assembly 
had no power to impose its will on nations and so the presence of a Peace Observation 
Mission would require the consent of the nations on whose territory it was to be stationed. 
Secondly, the resolution established a'Collective Measures Committee. ' The Committee 
(CMC), would comprise the representatives of fourteen member states, including the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, and, 'in consultation with the Secretary- 
General, '3 was required to examine the methods by which the resolution might be applied, 
in accordance with the Charter, to maintain international peace and security. 
Thirdly, the resolution recommended that member states should, 'maintain within its 
national armed forces elements so trained, organised and equipped that they would be 
promptly made available for service ... upon the recommendation of the Security Council or 
General Assembly. '4 
Finally, the resolution requested, 'the Secretary-General to appoint, with the CMC, a panel 
of military experts who would be made available, on request, to member states wishing to 
obtain technical advice regarding the organisation training and equipment for prompt service 
to the UN. '5 
The uniting for peace resolution, therefore, put at the disposal of the Secretary-General, 
upon the instruction of the General Assembly, those forces which Lie had requested for 
Palestine. The national contingents, however, would be available for the creation of UN 
'Armstrong, et al, op. cit., p. 73. 2GA Res. 377,3 November, 1950. 
3ibid. 
4ibid. 
5ibid. 
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Forces on an ad hoc basis, and would not constitute a UN standing army in the sense of 
Articles 42 and 43, nor the permanent force which Lie had campaigned for. 
These were particularly uncomfortable propositions for the USSR. if the USSR was to 
obstruct action by the Security Council, that issue could be passed to the General Assembly 
where the USSR voted on equal terms with the entire UN membership. The same applied 
to any of the permanent members, but in the General Assembly Britain, France and the US 
entertained a pro Western majority. The uniting for peace resolution was a means of 
bypassing the Soviet veto. The Secretary-General, not the General Assembly, however, 
was the main beneficiary of this institutional development. The specific responsibilities 
accorded to the Secretary-General by the resolution meant that the office would play a key 
role in the formation, co-ordination and command of any Assembly created forces. 'Me 
greater size and diversity of the General Assembly membership meant that the Secretary- 
General was intimately involved in the creation of General Assembly mandates and was 
accorded greater political responsibility and discretion in the execution of the responsibilities 
delegated. Thus Schwebel argues that the resolution entrusted the Secretary-General with 
"unequivocal political power. "' The USSR vehemently opposed the transfer of such power 
to organs over which it had little or no control and Vyshinsky argued, 
"This provision is basically and fundamentally incompatible with the 
Charter. It short circuits the MSC and the Security Council... It is even 
more bizarre than that: it speaks of military experts and advisors whom it 
suggests ... will be under the orders of the 
Secretary-General ... Apparently, the military experts will be at the beck and call of the Secretary- 
General. He is to be the commander-in-chief of the armedforces of the 
General Assembly riding on a white horse ... However, under the 
Charter 
the Secretary-General can only command his workers in the Secretariat ... he does not have military experts with or without special panels ... He has 
mimeograph machines ... One does not need military experts to run 
mimeograph machines. "2 (emphasis added) 
Trygve Lie added to Soviet concern by reviving his proposals for a UN Force in the CMC. 
Lie proposed a, UN Legion, ' of trained volunteers held in reserve for dispatch by the 
Security Council or General Assembly. The availability of national volunteer forces was to 
be determined by the troop contributing government in accordance with their national 
interests in a given situation. In its second report to the General Assembly on 16 March, 
1953, the CMC recommended that further consideration be given to Lie's, 'tentative"3 
proposals for a retitled, UN Volunteer Reserve, ' but those discussions were discontinued 
on the instruction of the new Secretary-General. Harnmarskj6ld was probably wise not to 
'Schwebel, op. cit., p. 81. 
2Vyshlnsky, New York Times, International Air Edition, October ", 1950, p. 4, reproduced in part in 
Schwebel 
, op. cit., p. 
82 and in Lie, op. cit., p. 347. 
3Report of the Collective Measures Committee, GAOR 7th Session, supp., 17 October 1952. 
For and 
report see Cordier and Foote, op. cit., pp. 472-6. 
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pursue initiatives which were so strongly associated with his predecessor, even though 
earmarked national contingents were provided for by the uniting for peace resolution. The 
uniting for peace resolution may have made no further progress towards the creation of UN 
standing army, however limited and distinct from the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, but 
this institutional innovation provided for the first peacekeeping force in 1956 and was 
utilised on three further occasions before the end of Hammarskj6ld's tenure, (Lebanon, 
Jordan and Congo). The ad hoc development of the specific functions which the resolution 
envisaged further enhanced the Secretary-General's role in the creation and command of 
peacekeeping operations. Critically, the resolution did not pass over to the General 
Assembly from the Security Council any other prerogatives than the right to discuss matters 
of international peace and security. The General Assembly's non mandatory powers were 
not extended. The creation of ad hoc neutral forces that would keep nations apart rather 
than enforce peace reflected the extent of the General Assembly's prerogatives. It also 
ensured that the creation of forces in which the Secretary-General was directly involved, 
was complimentary to the negotiation of peaceful settlements by the Secretary-General, 
(undertaken on the basis of his impartiality). Until 1960 and the Congo the Secretary- 
General was not required to make the kind of public judgements, (which the use of force or 
full invocation of Article 99 require), that compromise his impartiality. 
Consolidation, the Security Council and the Secretary-General. 
The Security Council was based on Woodrow Wilson's preference for, "open covenants 
openly arrived at, "' over private diplomacy. Early cold war practice reflected this 
inheritance from the League of Nations but it was not relevant to international circumstances 
from the 1960s on. As the first General Assembly President noted, 
"Those who are involved [in open diplomacy] are forced to pay more 
attention to the repercussion of actions in the outside world than the goal 
they are seeking to achieve. They are bent on asserting themselves rather 
than trying to convince others of the rightness of their cause. They give far 
more thought to public opinion at home than to the problems which call for a 
solution. 112 
The expansion of the Security Council in 1965, the subsequent amendment of the voting 
procedure, and Beijing's acquisition of the Chinese seat on the Security Council had 
profound implications for Security Council practice, the relationship between the Security 
Council and Secretary-General and therefore the role of the Secretary-General. 
As Chai noted, it was now, "difficult if not impossible for any power or group to force 
decisions of importance, [and], any substantive decision of consensus could be achieved 
'Quoted in Berridge, (1991), op. cit., p. 6. 
2Spaak, Paul-Henri, quoted in Bailey, (1975), op. cit., p. 39. 
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only through consultation negotiation and compromise. "' Put another way, the 
predominance of the third world in the General Assembly and its growing influence in the 
Security Council required, "genuine diplomacy on an inter-caucus basis. "2 After 197 11 
Communist China provided an additional world view to account for, but, given its close 
third world links, also gave that caucus added authority and blocking power. The 
imperative of closer consultation was demonstrated in Chiao Kuan Hua's objections to US- 
Soviet attempts to, "railroad, "3 draft resolutions through the Security Council. When SCR 
339 was submitted for a vote without discussion a row broke out between the Chinese and 
Soviet representatives that was only resolved by a ten minute recess, after which Hua 
stated, 
"Before the US and Soviet draft resolution is even tabled, you allow no-one 
else to speak. This is the wrong attitude. We are firmly opposed to that. 
The United Nations is not a tool to be manipulated by the two superpowers 
... The Chinese delegation firmly opposes such a malicious practice of using the United Nations Security Council as a tool to be juggled with by the two 
superpowers at will. In our opinion this also shows utter disrespect for the 
other members of the Security Council. The Security Council cannot 
tolerate such practice. We have something to say. We believe that the other 
states members of the Security Council also have something to say fTom the 
bottom of our hearts. ' '4 
The Security Council rules of procedure, however, made no provision for the private 
consultation of substantive issues on a regular basis. Private meetings were explicitly 
provided for in the selection of the Secretary-General, and the custom also developed for 
the Security Council to discuss the Secretary-General's Annual Report in private. 5 During 
the 1960s and 1970s, however, the development and practice of, 'informal consultations of 
the whole, ' was institutionalised. As this process matured, its own separate customs, 
conventions, and traditions emerged. In respect of private meetings a single copy of the 
minutes is kept in the Secretary-General's office. Only those present and those authorised 
by those present are permitted to view this record. The only other record is a 
'communique' issued by the Secretary-General or Security Council President on the 
Security Council's approval. No such records exist for informal consultations of the 
whole. No agenda is circulated, no minutes are taken, no public references are made to the 
debates, discussion and positions undertaken in private, and the meetings are not 
'numbered' by the Secretariat. In 1978 the institutionalisation of this 'secret diplomacy, ' 
IChai, F. Y., "A View From the Secretariat, " in Nicol, op. cit., p. 88. 
2Berridge, (1991), op. cit., p. 5. ' 
3SCOR 1748th meeting, 23 October, 1973; see Nicol, "The People's Republic of China in the Security 
Council, " In Nicol, op. cit., pp. 120-9. 
4SCOR 1748th meeting, 23 October, 1973. 5See Bailey, (1975), op. cit., pp. 39-42; & Hiscocks, op. cit., pp. 104-6. 
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was confirmed by the completion of a specially constructed committee room for the purpose 
and adjacent to the Security Council chamber. ' 
out of this process emerged the, "consensus procedure, ' Q which Hiscocks describes as the 
process of negotiation and compromise permitting unanimous decisions to be taken without 
vote. These decisions Hiscocks argues takes three forms: consensus resolutions; 
consensus decisions; and Presidential statements expressing unanimity in the Security 
Council. 3 This process, Bailey adds, contributed to a fifty percent increase in the annual 
number of agreed resolutions. 4 Thus for the first time, diplomatic practices in the Security 
Council began to approximate, on a consistent basis, the approach to the maintenance of 
international peace and security envisaged by the Charter framers. For the Secretary- 
General the implications were mixed and help explain the contrasting fortunes of U Thant 
and Waldheim. during the period of consolidation. 
Informal consultations of the whole provided the Secretary-General with regular and private 
contact with the Security Council members. The privacy and informality of the meetings 
permýitted open and candid discussion in which the Secretary-General as well as the member 
states could openly express his opinion and canvass support for his preferred approach. 
This explains why, despite the constitutional crisis, U Thant was able to continue 
expanding the Secretary-General's independent remit without aggravating the permanent 
members unduly. Greater consultation between the Secretary-General and the Security 
Council permitted greater use of the Secretary-General's independent prerogatives because, 
while applied without formal mandate, the Secretary-General enjoyed the Security Council 
members' prior tacit support. In this respect Soviet objections vis-a-vis, Bahrain, West 
Irian, Yemen, et al , were a means of 
keeping in check the Secretary-General's evolving 
role. The activities which the Secretary-General undertook did not fundamentally challenge 
any Soviet interests but by placing on record its concerns it encouraged the Secretary- 
General to progress with caution and apply a degree of self regulation. U Thant was thus 
prevented from building up the momentum which James argues explains the Secretary- 
General's aggrandisement under Hammarski6ld. 
Zacher also argues that the process of informal consultations was greatly facilitated and 
reinforced by the development and expansion of permanent missions at the UN. 5 New and 
smaller states did not, (and do not), enjoy the pervasive global diplomatic networks retained 
'See Berridge (1991), op. cit., pp. 4-5; Hiscocks op. cit., PP. 104-6. 
2Not to be confused with the consensus mechanism between the permanent members that 
developed during 
Perez de Cuellar's second term in office, see pp. 340-6. 
3Hiscocks, op. cit., p. 105; N. B. Chai makes a case for 5 types of decision- mak i ng, see 
Chai, F. Y. "I'lie 
Scope of Consensus, " in Nicol, op. cit., pp. 48-63. 
4Bailey, in Nicol, op. cit., p. 43. 
5Zacher, "Hammarski6ld's Conception of the UN's Role in World Politics, " in Jordan, op. cit., pp. 122-4. 
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by the great powers. A permanent mission in New York, however, provides direct access 
to the Governments of any member nation. Hammarskjbld argued that the development of 
an informal diplomatic network and consultations, "often in close contact with the 
Secretariat - may well come to be regarded as the most important, 'common law' 
development which has taken place so far within the constitutional framework of the 
Charter. "' Thus Zacher contends that multilateral diplomacy behind the scenes, and the 
Secretary-General's quiet diplomacy, "enabled officials to gain a much better understanding 
of each other's positions, encourage the initiation and acceptance of mediatory missions, 
and tended to produce consensuses on issues which inevitably influenced the policies of the 
disputing parties. "' 
Informal consultations of the whole also provided the Secretary-General with clearer 
guidance on the interpretation and application of Security Council mandates. They perm=itted 
a consensual rather than a combative relationship between the Secretary-General and the 
Security Council which was acknowledged by Waldheirn; 
"On the political side I believe that the twenty years of experience and 
practice since 1961 have created a closer and more positive relationship 
between the Secretary-General and the Security Council. It has for example 
proved possible, after the great peacekeeping controversy of the early 1960s 
to develop a practical consensus on the running of peacekeeping operations. 
The growing habit of private consultations has also given the Secretary- 
General a means of keeping the Council informed and consulting it on 
delicate situations affecting international peace and security and of enlisting 
the support and understanding of the Council in his day-to day efforts on 
such problems. "3 
In this respect the organic development of the UN institutions circumvented the abstracted 
attempts of the Peacekeeping Committee to formalise the relationship between the Secretary- 
General and the Security Council. The informal process, however, offered no guarantees 
for a more cordial and constructive relationship between the Secretary-General and Security 
Council, or for the continuing development of the Secretary-Generalship. Nevertheless, U 
Thant was the first Secretary-General not to be forced from office. At this second level of 
analysis, informal consultations of the whole helps explain this considerable achievement. 
Informal consultations, however, also had a "dark side, "which during the 1970s, was 
increasingly a cause for concern for Urquhart and Waldheim. Urquhart feared meetings 
behind closed doors were, "a useful pretext for avoiding public meetings the Security 
Council where no consensus can be achieved, and that in consequence the Secretary- 
General upon whom the burden of dealing with international crises is thus placed more and 
'Foote, op. cit., Pp. 251 & 354; see also Zacher, op. cit., pp. 122-4. 
2Zacher, op. cit., p. 123. 
3Waldheim, Kurt, "Dag Hammarskj6ld and the Office of United Nafions Secretary-General, " in Jordan, op 
C, . t., pp. 20- 1. 
4Berridge, op. cit., pp. 6-9. 
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more, is deprived of the strong and consistent backing necessary for his effectiveness. "' 
Waldheirn on the other hand argued, 
"It could be harmful if it came to appear that the Security Council were 
simply rubber stamping agreements that had been reached behind the scenes in a secret process. A minimum of discussion and debate in the formal 
meeting is essential to enable the public and the media to understand not only 
the full significance of the action taken, but also the essentials of how the 
consensus was achieved. ' Q 
The main thrust of both criticisms is not fundamentally different. Waldheirn was arguing 
that a minimum of public discussion was imperative to facilitate public understanding, "not 
only of the full significance of any action authorised by the Council but also to understand 
the essential of how any consensus is achieved. "3 If this line of argument is developed to 
its logical conclusion, as Berridge contends, it is also imperative that where consensus 
cannot be reached or where the UN cannot act it must also be patently clear why, if public 
confidence in the UN and Secretary-General are to be retained. The dangers of not doing 
so are demonstrated in the Western vilification of U Thant's withdrawal of UNEF, and the 
criticisms of U Thant for not convening the Security Council formally over the secession of 
East Pakistan in 197 1. Berridge also cites Boyd's account of Security Council proceedings 
on 8 and 9 July 1967 which, "emphatically gave lie to an important thrust of pro-Israeli 
propaganda at the time -U Thant had surrendered to Russian and Arab pressure in agreeing 
to put UN Observers on the Suez Canal. "4 Boyd thus concludes, "the public nature of so 
much of the Council's activity may sometimes impact on its effectiveness, but there are 
times, like this one, when it is good that the truth is made easy for all to see. 115 
Waldheim and Urquhart were concerned that the Secretary-General's office was becoming 
the dumping ground for the most intractable conflicts which the divisions between the 
permanent members prevented the Security Council addressing. 6 Informal consultation 
provided the facade behind which the major powers could hide and abrogate their collective 
responsibility. At the same time, where progress could be made, negotiations were 
conducted by the major powers outside the UN framework and informal consultations 
provided the private forum, where, presented with afait accompli the wider UN 
membership was brought on side. As a result during the 1970s Waldheim was afforded 
'Urquhart, Brian, "International Peace and Security: Thoughts on the Twentieth Anniversary of Dag 
Hammarskjbld's Death, " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1, Fall 1981, PP- 14-15; and for discussion see 
Berridge, (199 1), op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
2Waldheim, Kurt, "Foreword, " In Nicol op. cit., p. xi. 
3Davidson, Nicol, The United Nations Security Council: Towards Greater Effectiveness, (New York: 
UNITAR, 1982), pp. 70-72; & Berridge, (1991), op, cit., p. 7. 
4Berridge, (1991), op. cit., p. 8. 
5BOyd, Andrew, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg: A History of the UN Security Council, (Norwich: 
Methuen 
& Co., 1971), p. 220. 
6A view also shared by Perez de Cuellar, see pp. 354-6. 
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few opportunities to develop further the Secretary -General's role. Infonnal consultations of 
the whole contributed to the paucity of the Secretary-General's good-offices under 
Waldheim, and like developments at the organi sational -bureaucratic level brought into 
question the efficacy of the Secretary -General's role in the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 
III The Individual Level: Idiosyncratic Exvlanations. 
Trygve Lie. 
Trygve Lie was born on 16 July in 1896. His father, a carpenter, died young, and to 
support them his mother ran a boarding house. Through the lodgers Lie was first 
introduced to politics, and later became an office boy at Norway's Labour Party 
headquarters. Lie went on to become President of the local branch organisation at sixteen, 
and to read law at Oslo University, (1919-1923). While at University he served as 
Assistant Secretary-General of the Labour Party, and in 1926 became the National 
Executive Secretary. He served as General Counsel to Norway's Trade Union Federation 
from 1919 until 1935, when he was elected to Parliament, and upon which he was 
appointed Minister for Justice. In 1939 he became Minster for Trade, Industry, Shipping, 
Farming, and Supply, and during the Nazi occupation served as Acting Foreign Minister of 
the Government in exile in London. At the end of the war he was appointed to this post in 
the new Labour Government, and during April 1945 chaired the proceedings of 
Commission III on the Security Council at the San Francisco Conference. 
At first glance there are certain aspects of Lie's experience and background which indicate 
his suitability as the first Secretary-General. In the context of the cold war, Lie's nationality 
and international relations experience made him acceptable to both the US and USSR. 
During the war he had served as the exiled Foreign Minister of a country fmnly within the 
victorious allied camp. Although a member of a Labour Government with a strong 
commitment to socialist principles, Lie was not a communist. ' Conversely, for the USSR, 
Lie was at least a socialist. Moreover, the USSR believed that in Lie they had a known 
quantity. In different capacities Lie had visited Moscow on three occasions, and states that, 
"truly, I had in the period before my service as Secretary-General, an entr6e into the 
Kremlin which few non-communists have had. "2 Lie's closest dealings with Moscow came 
during the war, and from his handling of the Svalbard and Trotsky questions Barros argues 
the USSR surmised Lie was malleable. 3 Lie was unlikely to be a Soviet stooge, however. 
On important issues, not least in publicly backing Finland, and providing Finland with aid 
17bough some doubts remained in American quarters regarding Lie's Political inclinations and affiliations, 
see Barros, op. cit., p. 30-36. 
2Lie, op. cit., p. 19; Barros explores Lie's relationship with the Russians intimately, op. cit., pp. 
38-44. 
3See Barros, op. cit., pp. 38-44. 
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during the Russo-Finish War, he had demonstrated courage and asserted independence of 
nation and mind. 
Having led the Norwegian delegation at the San Francisco Conference Lie was in theory 
well versed in the system for maintaining international peace and security, and presumably 
in the role of the Secretary-General provided for by the Charter. In this respect Lie 
considered his experience as a Trade Union negotiator an appropriate training ground for 
developing the skills, techniques, and methods of mediation he envisaged would assist the 
Secretary -General in international diplomacy, 
"It is very much like the process of settling Labour disputes. Investigation, 
mediation, arbitration, its very much the same kind of work ... That was my life, my experience - mediating, negotiating, settling Labour disputes ... its about the same sort of thing. "' 
Barros argues, however, that Lie's, "persona and politiCS, "2 were not on the whole 
salutary, and one commentator argues that Lie's nationality was as much a handicap as a 
source of strength, because it gave Lie, 'a sense of isolation; ' 
"A Frenchman, an Englishman has a sense of the world. An Englishman 
has an empire, the Frenchman feels himself at the heart of the world. But a 
Norwegian tends to have an abstract sense of the world. This is of real 
significance. A Scandinavian can only be an umpire. He cannot be a leader. 
Lie being what he is couldn't have done more ... A man coming from Oslo what leadership can he exert. He knows very little has had very little 
experience ... but the post he occupies certainly demands certain things. "3 
Given that the membership did not begin to expand until 1955, the 'small nations card' 
carried little weight. These criticisms, however, did not constitute advocacy of a Secretary- 
General from France, the UK, or any other of the permanent members. The veto denied 
this possibility and even that of the Canadain, Lester Pearson, because he was national of a 
country with very stong US ties. Rather this commentator advocated a major figure with 
the international presence and stature of a Nehru, Churchill, or Roosevelt. The idea of a 
President or, 'World Moderator, ' however, was rejected at Dumbarton Oaks and San 
Francisco. Moreover, the advocacy of such an individual entails an expectation of world 
leadership which misunderstands the dual functions of the Secretary-Generalship and the 
primacy of quiet diplomacy. 4Where the nationality issue is salient, is in the features, 
associated with an individual's national and culturally received education, experience, and 
outlook. Lie's experience of international relations was limited mainly to the narrow field 
of Norwegian-Soviet relations, and beyond this field only in the context of war-time 
'Lie to an unnamed source quoted in Schwebel, op. cit., p. 138. 2Barros, op. cit., p. 27 (chapter heading). 3Undisclosed interview, Schwebel, op. cit., p. 173. 
4See pp. 196-9. 
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diplomacy and alliances. Certainly, this helps explain US reservations regarding Lie's 
appointment, and initial Soviet enthusiasm for the first Secretary-General. Barros argues 
questions regarding Lie's knowledge and understanding of international relations are borne 
out by his conception of the cold war as, 'basically ideological, ' and in his failure to see the 
Marshall plan, for instance, in the context of political, military, strategic and historical 
factors. I Lie's naivety was reflected in a number of undiplomatic public statements and 
inconsistent or poor judgement in the timing and content of public statements. 2 
Lie's lack of language skills must also be viewed as a disadvantage, and in particular his 
poor grasp of French and English. That the first Secretary-General could not easily 
communicate in the first and second languages of international diplomacy was a 
considerable handicap. Barros considers that the language barrier, "probably hindered his 
ability to discuss abstract questions dealing with the expansion of the powers and 
prerogatives of his office, ' '3 though considerable doubt also exists regarding his inclination 
for such philosophical discussion. Barros also contends the language barrier might help 
explain, "difficulties in properly presiding over the UN and its Secretariat. "4 Lie's lack of 
executive leadership, administrative experience and disinterest for administrative matters 
also combined to alienate all but his closest staff. Regular meetings of the assistant- 
secretaries-general dwindled, and the chaotic organisation of his executive office 
contributed to the lack of direction and guidance. Moreover, Barros argues, "left to their 
own devices, " the departmental heads began, "building up their own courts. "5 Lie's 
approach was in this respect a contributory factor to the problems of bureaucracy that would 
later afflict the Secretary-General's role more fundamentally. Finally, the linguistic issue 
probably also exaggerated certain negative aspects of Lie's persona. Lie was a candid and 
forthright character but has also been described variously as blunt, brash, impatient and 
short tempered. 
Lie's tendency to compare industrial disputes with international diplomacy was also short- 
sighted. The combative and adversarial nature of the field of industrial relations and trade 
union representation, may or may not on occasion marry with the demands of representing 
and negotiating Norwegian interests in international relations, but is a far cry from the 
diplomacy required of the Secretary-General. As an arbiter in a domestic industrial dispute 
Lie negotiated from a position of legal strength. As a representative of workers rights Lie 
negotiated from a position of political strength. In both instances Lie had at his disposal 
tangible sanctions. In international relations, as the Secretary-General rather than a 
1 Barros, op. cit., p. 3 1. 2See pp. 196-9. 
3Barros, op. cit., p. 46. 
4ibid. 
5See Barros, op. cit., pp. 45-46,58-67. 
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representative of a vested interest, Lie enjoyed only a moral authority. In this respect the 
Secretary -General negotiated from a position of weakness which required very different and 
more versatile diplomatic skills. As an umpire the Secretary-General cajoles, persuades, 
encourages and facilitates, rather than rules. The member states are the Secretary-General's 
constituency not the opposition, as may sometimes appear. In canvassing support for a 
particular stance or approach, therefore, the Secretary-General must be mindful of state 
sensitivities where the domestic politician thinks first about exploiting his opposite 
number's weakness and last about causing offence. Of course these rules are not absolute, 
and the debate between the private and public approach was never sharper than during Lie's 
tenure. But these features of Lie's experience and background, along with certain other 
personality traits, discussed below, feature heavily in the approach Lie brought to the 
Secretary -General ship, and in particular his personal preference for public over private 
diplomacy. 
Lie's Approach. 
The outstanding feature of Lie's approach to the Secretary-Generalship is the lack of a 
grand design for the UN and the role of the Secretary-General. Of the public statements 
reproduced in Cordier and Foote's five hundred page anthology only one is devoted 
exclusively to the role of the Secretary-General, and even this is a short, one page, after 
dinner address. I In his memoirs Lie even acknowledges that on entering office, 
I had no calculated plan for developing the political powers of the 
Secretary-General but I was determined the Secretary-General should be a 
force for peace. How that force would be applied I would find out in the 
light of developments. "2 
In his acceptance speech, Lie devoted only two paragraphs to an uncontroversial 
interpretation of the Secretary-General's prerogatives, the essence of which was, 
"Your Secretary-General is not called upon to formulate the policy of the 
UN. The lines of Policy are laid down in the Charter and determined by 
decisions of the different relevant organs of the United Nations in preparing 
and carrying out all decisions taken by them in order to make the policy 
programme of the Charter a living reality. '13 
This lack of a discernible theory of the office was first evident in practical terrns in Lie's 
assertion of the Secretary-General's right to know. According to Rovine, Lie later stated 
he, 11 never expected to alter the Council's decision, but the move was important both 
in 
'Lie, Trygve, "On the Political Role of the Secretary-General, " from address at dinner given in Trygve 
Lie's 
Honour by the USA UNA, UN Press Release, SG/22,29 September 1949, Cordier & Foote, op. cl . t., P. 
236-7. 
2Lie, In the Cause of Peace, op. cit., p. 42. 
3Lie, "Acceptance Speech as Secre tary- General before the First General Assembly, " 2 February 
1946, in 
Cordier & Foote, op. cit., p. 35. 
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terms of the development of the office and for the Secretary-General's understanding of the 
nature of the UN's political debates in the cold war atmosphere. "i This statement, 
however, contradicts his earlier admission that it was only as an afterthought that he 
recognised the significance of his legal memorandum. In this respect his intervention on the 
Iranian issue was typical of Lie's approach. It was an attempt to diffuse disagreement 
between the US and USSR and only indirectly, and 'accidentally, ' involved expanding the 
Secretary -General's remit. Lie's lack of a clear vision is also demonstrated by his lament at 
the absence of greater guidance from either the Charter or the members states, 
I think the office of the Secretary-General should be more clearly clarified 
... 
The Charter should actually say that he is more than the chief 
administrator. I think the experience gained now, the Secretary-General's 
right to state his opinion should be clearly stated in the Charter. Article 99 
should be detailed, its implications written out ... Article 99 is an atomic bomb, or at least a thirty-two inch gun ... why can't I have the smaller 
rifles. 112 
Lie was not by nature an intellectual, (especially in contrast to Hammarskj6ld, U Thant and 
Perez de Cuellar), and as Rovine argues, "was not given to theoretical pronouncements 
concerning the role of the Secretary-General regarding the world organisation. "3 In the 
absence of that guidance Lie explains in his memoirs he adopted a, "Middleway -a 
pragmatic and open-minded approach, " between the pre war precedents provided for by 
Thomas in the International Labour Organisation and Drummond and Avenol in the League 
of Nations. The problem for Lie, was that in failing to articulate a, "cohesive analysis, "5 he 
left the member states uncertain as to how he would approach either his independent 
prerogatives or the functions delegated to him. The consequent lack of continuity and 
consistency in Lie's actions did not inspire member states with the confidence to delegate to 
him important or sensitive political functions, and even encouraged them to resist his 
initiatives to undertake such functions. This product of a clear conception of the Secretary- 
General's role was compounded by, and endemic in, his preference for public over private 
diplomacy and questions regarding his judgement in applying public over private 
diplomacy. 
Lie never really satisfactorily reconciled the private and public aspects of the Secretary- 
Generals role. Thomas Hamilton once stated, "Mr. Lie's lobbying is a curious combination 
of high politics and pedestrian mechanics. "6 On the one hand Lie carried over from the 
League of Nations, and continued to develop, the practice of quiet diplomacy behind the 
'Rovine, op. cit., p. 215. 2QUoted in Rovine, op. cit., p. 260. 
3Rovine, op. cit., p. 257. 
4Lie, In the Cause of Peace, p. 42, (pp. 39-42). 
5Rovine, op. cit., p. 257. 6QUoted in Schwebel, op. cit., p. 139. 
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scenes. On the other hand, an important aspect of the Secretary -General's role as guardian 
of the UN Charter is to publicly enunciate the common purposes and interest. As the 
Preparatory Commission had decreed, "in the eyes of the world, no less than in the eyes of 
his own staff, he must embody the principles and ideals of the Charter to which the 
organisation seeks to give effect. "' In this Lie departed significantly from League of 
Nations traditions and made considerable strides in raising the public and political profile of 
the Secretary -General as the guardian of the Charter. Firstly, Lie did much to develop the 
concept and tradition of Charter neutrality by the use of legal memoranda to depolificise and 
justify his interventions in the UN organs, and in his constant assertion that, "the UN 
cannot function effectively unless the Secretariat acts in the collective interest of the UN as a 
whole, and in the collective interest only. ' Q Secondly, Lie was proactive in articulating his 
conception of the collective interest. In this respect the introduction to his third annual 
report broke new ground. It differed in tone and substance from his previous two, and 
from any speech given by Avenol or Drummond in the League. Lie provided candid and 
concise critiques of the UN activities and concluded with a section entitled, 'Proposals for 
Strengthening the UN. '3 Substantively this continued Lie's campaign for a UN Guard and 
included impassioned pleas for greater co-operation between East and West, respect for 
international law, and a resolution of the Chinese and wider membership questions. But as 
an assertion of the Secretary-General's right to publicly review the UN's activities and use 
the Annual Report as a'bully pUlpit"4 it was a new departure. Thirdly, in 1950 Lie 
undertook a tour of the major powers in which Lie presented to the respective heads of 
state, a twenty year, ten point peace plan, which he then made public and presented to the 
full UN membership on 6 June 1950.5 This differed from the Secretary-General's Annual 
Report in that it asserted the Secretary-General's right to initiate public and political debate 
outside the deliberative organs of the UN and the specific reporting obligation of Article 98. 
In this Lie fulfilled the Charter expectation that the Secretary-General should be citizen 
number one, representative of an internationalist perspective above the vagaries of 
individual national interests. In the General Assembly, Lie won considerable favour by the 
6 the exercise of this right, even though the plan itself was not particularly original and 
lacked the insight, invention, and direction which Hammarskj6ld and Perez de Cuellar 
brought to their annual reports. While the initiative demonstrated courage and commitment, 
it also followed the pattern of Lie's public statements which Rovine describes as, 
IPC Report, UN Doc. PC/20, p. 87. 
2GAOR, 299th meeting, I November 1950; see also Rovine, op. cit., p. 259. 
3Lie, Trygve, Introduction to the Third Annual Report, 5 July, 1948, UN Doc. A/565, see Cordier & Foote, 
pp-136-157. 
4Franck, (1985), op. cit., p. 150. 5FOr text, see "Memorandum of Points for Consideration in the Development of a 20 Year Programme 
for 
Achieving Peace through the UN, " UN Doc. A/ 1304,6 June 1950; United Nations Bulletin, Vol. 111, no. 
12,15 June 1950; or Cordier & Foote, op. cit., pp. 296-303. For comment, see Cordier & 
Foote, op. cit., 
pp. 268-308, Rovine, op. cit., p. 230-4; Schwebel, op. cit., pp. 148-64. 
6Schwebel, op. cit., p. 162. 
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"Devoted to rather straightforward analysis of UN structure and process, naturally concentrating on its successes exploring failures by reference to cold war conflicts and generally calling for greater co-operation among the great powers, and extolling the UN as the best hope for peace. " I 
Lie's approach thus lacked a grand vision, but he was nevertheless willing to address the 
public meetings of the UN organs or the world's media. With no real conceptual 
framework for guidance, Lie was prone to an injudicious use of public statements which 
exposed inherent contradictions in these two aspects of the Secretary-General's role. As 
Barros argues, undue publicity, like the invocation of Article 99, 
"Throws him into a public vortex and goes far to erode whatever, influence he might have behind the scenes, or whatever bridge-building he might 
attempt between the disputing parfies. "2 
Similarly, Goodrich and Simons explain, 
"Public manifestations of support for the particular position of government, 
although perhaps admirable in principle may indeed weaken if not destroy 
the effectiveness of the Secretary-General as an intermediary and as a 
servant of common purposes and interests. "3 
If contradictory, this paradox is not irreconcilable but maintaining the balance rests on a fine 
personal judgement, as Hammarskjbld noted in 1956, 
"As a servant of the organisation the Secretary-General has the duty to 
maintain his usefulness by avoiding public stands on conflicts between 
member states unless such an action might help resolve the conflict. 
However, the discretion and impartiality thus imposed on the Secretary- 
General by the character of his immediate task must not then degenerate into 
a policy of expediency. He must also be a servant of the principles of the 
Charter and its aims must ultimately determine for him what is right and 
wrong. A Secretary-General cannot serve on any other assumption than that 
- within the necessary limits of human frailty and honest differences of 
opinion. N (emphasis added). 
Just as Lie attempted to tread a middle path between the Drummond and Thomas approach 
to executive leadership, in his use of private and public methods he, "tried to tread a 
common-sense middle course, conscious always of my responsibility to stand for the 
interest of the UN. "5 Schwebel contends that as a negotiator before a speechmaker the 
'Rovine, op. cit., p. 257. 213arros, James, "The Importance of S ecre tarie s- General of the United Nations, " in Jordan, op. cit., p. 32. 3Goodrich & Simons, op. cit., p. , 608. 
4UN Doc. SG/514,31 October 1956. 
5Lie, "On the Political Role of the Secretary -General, " from after dinner address given in Trygve 
Lie's 
honour by the USA UNA, UN press Release, SG/22,29 September 1949; see Cordier & Foote, op. cit., p. 
236-7. 
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Secretary -General should put private before public diplomacy. ' Lie, however, erred on the 
side of public aggrandisement rather than on the side of caution. Barros argues that Lie's 
preference for public diplomacy was, "a throwback to his Labour days, ' 12and discouraged 
member states from delegating to Lie sensitive tasks or trusting him as a confidant. 
Member states were understandably less willing to avail themselves of the Secretary- 
General's quiet diplomacy and good offices because they feared information volunteered 
and undertakings arrived at in private, might later be paraded in public to their disadvantage. 
As a politician and trade unionist in domestic politics Lie's experience necessarily involved 
public representation. The argument follows that Lie had a natural disposition to a high 
public profile, notwithstanding allegations in respect of his vanity. 3 Given that Lie 
recognised the pre-eminence of the quiet approach - "if what I do is published, I lose my 
influence, it isn't the Secretary-General's job to make headlineS"4 - Lie's domestic political 
experience is not sufficient on its own to explain his public tendencies. If the injudicious 
content and timing of some of Lie's statements are accounted for, Lie's judgement was 
clearly hampered by his lack of diplomatic experience. For instance in a speech entitled, 
'r1lie Future for Peace with Freedom, " Lie insensitively stated, 
"Our most pressing task today is the redefining of combustibility in ... the 
economically under developed areas in the world we are obliged to defend. 
Until now they have received meagre attention out of all proportion to their 
significance. Their present condition, and the menace to our security that 
they represent, constitute - in my opinion -a constant threat to peace by joining the communist movement. Our degree of success in meeting the 
challenge, in time will determine whether the democracies of the West will 
survive. 115 
In the prevailing systemic context this statement was highly judgmental and prejudicial. In 
this and other statements, Rovine argues, "Lie failed to admit, at least publicly that an 
important part of the membership did not share those values, a failure which would make 
bridge-building difficult, if not virtually impossible. "6 Similarly, the timing of Lie's tour de 
capitals and ten point peace plan was ill-judged, coinciding as it did with discussions in 
London on the creation of NATO and Western rearmament. When Lie arrived in Moscow 
he became the, "unconscious tool of a Soviet peace campaign. "7Moreover, viewed 
retrospectively Lie's propaganda had inadvertent additional diversionary propaganda value. 
As Schwebel notes, "Lie was in Moscow and everywhere else talking about peace while the 
Russians were preparing for Korea. "8 
'Schwebel, op. cit., p. 174. 
213arros, op. cit., pp. 48-9. 
3ibid., p. 46. 
4QUoted in Schwebel, op. cit., p. 139. 
5Source n/a. 
6Rovine, op. cit., p. 
7S chwebel, op. cit., p. 159; see also Cordier & Foote, op. cit., p. 
269. 
8Schwebel, op. cit., p. 159. 
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The lack of continuity and the absence of a clear vision, coupled with Lie's tendency to 
wear his heart on his sleeve, however, also had its advantages. It provided Lie with a 
certain freedom of manoeuvre in a climate where, irrespective of approach the Secretary- 
General was likely to fall foul of one, other, or both blocs. That freedom enabled Lie to cut 
through cold war rhetoric incurring only personal injury and not seriously or irretrievably 
damaging the office itself. Lie's policy of speaking out, "with all my heart and soul, "' on 
occasions where the, "well being and perhaps the very life of the UN were at issue, ' 12was a 
more regular occurrence simply because that was precisely the state of international affairs 
during the first six years of cold war and UN history. The Secretary-General's paradox 
was that the level of tension between East and West demanded that the Secretary-General 
speak out in non partisan terms for common-sense and restraint, for the principles that the 
nations had signed up to in the UN Charter. As the first Secretary-General of the UN 
carrying a great weight of expectation, there was also a sense in which Lie was obliged to 
undertake a high public profile. But as long as the cold war stakes remained high, to 
contest the moral high ground with the US and USSR brought the Secretary -General into 
conflict with both. Allegations of partisanship followed and the Secretary-General's 
initiatives were privately, if not domestically and publicly rebuked. In this, Lie worked on 
the premise that the organisation, its goals and aspirations were far greater than the personal 
position of the Secretary-General. Paradoxically, by upholding those principles, even at 
personal cost, Lie secured the rights of passage for future Secretaries-General. Lie was 
expendable, the UN was not. As Rovine argues, in response to Lie's lament at the lack of 
guidance for the Secretary-General, 
"A more delineated outlook might have run the risk of restraining further 
developments and there was always the chance that particular proposals 
would be turned down, thus justifying further restriction upon the Secretary- 
General's discretionary power. "3 
Lie's uncomplicated but ubiquitous approach enabled the Secretary-General to establish 
certain traditions and rights which extended well beyond those of his League predecessors, 
and provided the procedural foundations on which his successors developed the office 
further. It is in this respect that Lie succeeded in making the Secretary-Generalship a force 
for peace. 
ILie, "On the Political Role of the Secretary-General, " see Cordier & Foote, op. cit., p. 236-7. 
2ibid. 
3Rovine, op. cit., p. 261. 
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Dag Hammarskj6ld: Preventive Diplomacy Revisited. 
Hammarskjbld's approach to the Secretary-General ship has already been considered in 
some detail. I Preventive diplomacy was Hammarskj6ld's conception of the role of the UN 
as a whole, but has not been considered as a product of his approach to the Secretary- 
Generalship per se. In this respect preventive diplomacy was itself a product of a 
sophisticated and threefold approach to the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
Firstly, in contrast to Lie, Hammarskj6ld did not apply a combative approach to the 
Secretary-General ship. Rather Hammarskj6ld contended, 
"The Secretary-General's initiative 
... is in principle a supplementary one. When governments reach deadlock, he may be the person to help them - and help them with their complete acceptance - out of the deadlock ... if governments are seized of a matter, if there is no deadlock, if discussions 
are going on and if contents have been established ... the Secretary-General 
- no matter how concerned he should be - should keep back... He has no 
reasons to jump on the stage and take-over the part of any responsible 
government. 112 
In eschewing public for private methods Waldheim argues, "Hammarskj6ld did not I think 
regard the Secretary-General primarily as a, Torce, ' in world politics, but rather as an 
honest-broker, a catalyst, and someone to whom governments could go for help in critical 
situations. "3 The preference for the quiet over the public approach, therefore, was in no 
sense a passive approach to the Secretary-Generalship, as his conception of, "intensified 
availability, ' '4testifies. The crux for Hammarskj6ld was empowerment, not of the 
Secretary-General, but of the member states. Critically, when the member states took 
advantage of the Secretary-General's services they found a highly resourceful incumbent, 
(see below). In preventive diplomacy Hammarskj6ld offered inventive and workable 
methods for maintaining international peace and security not necessarily foreseen in the 
Charter. Thus the very public profile of peacekeeping and the Secretary -General's UN 
Presence belied their secondary significance. If peacekeeping is considered as the public 
manifestation of diplomatic processes behind the scenes, and facilitative of that process, 
Hammarskj6ld conceived an approach and method which enabled pursuit of the UN's 
principle objectives without pandering to, or publicly offending, superpower sensitivities. 
In this way Hammarskj6ld offered much more than just a, 'middleway, ' between a 
'See pp. 114-9. 
2Hammarskj6ld, quoted in Waldheim, Kurt, 'Dag Hammarskj6ld and office of the Secretary-General, " in 
Jordan, op. cit., p. 19; see also "Diplomacy and the Press, " extemporaneous remarks by Dag Hammarskj6ld 
at UN correspondents Association Luncheon, 10 September 1959, in Foote, op. cit., pp 229-30; & "ne 
Element of Privacy in Peacekeeping, " United Nations Review, IV, March 1958. 
3Waldheim, Kurt, 'Dag Hammarskj6ld and Office of the Secretary-General, " in Jordan, op. cit., p. 16. 
4Press Conference, 26 February 1959, Note No. 1947, p. 6. 
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leadership and administrative role, between public and private roles, and between East and 
West. 
The second aspect of Hammarskj6ld's approach relates to the purpose for which, and the 
context in which, preventive diplomacy was conceived. Rather than taking, 'initiatives 
everywhere, " Hammarskj6ld distinguished between conflict inside and outside the 
immediate purview of the cold war power blocs. 2 By concentrating his energy and 
resources on the latter Hammarskj6ld achieved two things. He minimised the probability of 
a direct clash with the superpowers and he maximised the possibility of productive 
intervention. In respect of the first, Hammarskj6ld succeeded in one crucial respect where 
Lie failed. He stood back from those disputes and conflicts which might, "seriously ... 
impair the usefulness of his office for the organisation in all other cases for which the 
services of the United Nations are needed. "3 Thus Hammarskj6ld did not pursue the 
situation in Hungary, though he delivered a robust aside, as Zacher argues, to make sure, 
"the great powers realise that they could not commit aggression without suffering an 
international rebuke. ' '4 For Hammarskj6ld public statements, reports and rebuffs were 
reserved for, "getting the double standard right. "5 In respect of the second, in 1958 
Hammarskj6ld rejected UN administration and a peacekeeping operation in Berlin as 
impracticable, not just because the required consent was unlikely to materialise, but 
because, "crucial decisions concerning the operation would have to be made by the 
Secretary-General and that any action he took would invite the hostility of one side or the 
other - thus precluding co-operation with his office on other matters. ' '6 This was precisely 
the situation which arose in the Congo when the initial consent for the operation amongst 
the permanent members evaporated. In this way Hammarskj6ld married a measured realism 
and astute understanding of the prevailing systemic conditions with his deep commitmentto 
the principles and purposes of the Charter. 7 
'Chapter 7 heading , in Barros, op. cit., p. 
214. 
2See Zacher, Mark W., "Hammarskj6ld's Conception of the United Nation's Role in World Politics, " in 
Jordan op cit., pp. 112-3; see also Hammarskj6ld, "Statements at the time of the Suez and Hungarian 
Crisis 
on the Duties of the S ecre tary -General before the Security Council, " 31 
October 1956, &4 November 1956, 
in Cordier & Foote, op. cit., p. 123-5; & "Universality and it's Consequences, " from Introduction to Annual 
Report, 4 October 1956, in Cordier & Foote, op. cit., pp. 119-227 UN Doc. A/2911,8 July 1955. 
3Hammarskj6ld, Dag, "Introduction to the Annual Report, 1959-60, " 31 August 1960, in Cordier & Foote, 
op. cit., p. 302. 
4Zacher, op. cit., p. 114. 
51nterview New York, December, 1994. 
6Zacher, op. cit., p. 115. 
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The third aspect of Hammarskj6ld's approach was the careful construction, as far as 
possible, of a sound political and legal basis for action. Hammarskj6ld eschewed the 
traditional Euro-centrism of world politics for the African/Asian stage. Moreover, in that 
his conception of preventive diplomacy was directed specifically at keeping the cold war out 
of Africa and Asia, his approach was built on the support of a burgeoning third world 
political constituency. In the General Assembly in particular, Hammarskj6ld was vigilant in 
building political support and momentum for his initiatives. Hammarskj6ld's leadership in 
this respect enfranchised the emerging new General Assembly majority upon whom he 
relied heavily for his formal mandates. Once a mandate was delegated to him, often of his 
own making or at his own request, Hammarskj6ld was careful to inform and consult 
members, and especially the troop contributing countries. At the same time Hammarskj6ld 
did very little without at least the tacit support of the permanent members, especially where 
acting in an independent capacity. He consulted closely and infonnally with the permanent 
five and was careful, not only to construct a sound basis of political support, but to make 
sure that his actions were firmly grounded in international law. In this respect 
Hammarskj6ld more than any other Secretary-General went to great lengths to enunciate his 
theories of the office and the rights of the Secretary-General while still Secretary-General. 
The Introduction to his 1960 Annual Report and his Oxford defence of the Secretariat are 
only the two most well known of a four hundred page collection of statements, reports, 
speeches and press comments chronicled by Foote. By canvassing non-aligned political 
support for his initiatives and couching his initiatives in legal rather than political tenns, 
Hammarskj6ld emphasised the Secretary-General's neutrality and as Zacher argues, 
'buttressed, " the Secretary-Generalship from cold war criticism. Moreover as Urquhart 
notes, the legal grounding reflected long term as much as short term objectives; 
"Hammarskj6ld believed that a reliable and just world order could only be 
built pragmatically by making precedents and by case law. By this process 
he hoped that the UN would be gradually transformed from an institutional 
mechanism into a constitutional instrument recognised and respected by all 
nations. During this process the only guarantee that such an evolution 
would not be subverted by baser motives was a fearless adherence to the 
principle of the Charter, the nearest thing to a constitution which the nations 
world would have yet formally recognised. "2 
In this respect it was difficult to challenge the Secretary-General without challenging the 
Charter, or at least the Secretary-General's interpretation of it. It was only in the Congo 
when that political support evaporated and Hammarskj6ld resorted to legally dubious 
justifications for executive actions, that his position and approach became untenable. 
I Zacher, op. cit., p. 12 1. 2Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 595 
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Renaissance Man. 
How Hammarskj6ld's approach can be explained in terms of his background is not 
immediately obvious. Dag Hammarskj6ld was bom on 29 July 1905. He obtained a law 
degree from Uppsala University and a PhD in Economics from Stockholm where in 1933 
he was appointed as assistant professor in political economy. At thirty he became under- 
secretary-general to the Swedish Minister for Finance. He served for ten years as the 
Chairman of the Governors at the Bank of Sweden before becoming the under-secretary- 
general in the Foreign Office for economic issues in 1947. In 1949 he was promoted to 
secretary-general in the Foreign Office and in 1951 followed his father's footsteps into the 
Swedish Cabinet. He served just two years as Swedish Foreign Minister before being 
catapulted into the global spotlight as the second UN Secretary-General at just forty-seven. 
Hammarskj6ld had never joined a political party and in Sweden trained as a civil servant 
rather than as a politician. He brought to the UN an academic and practical experience in 
the fields of law, finance, and economics. He brought his administrative and executive 
experience to the re-organisation of the Secretariat. In particular his administrative and 
financial background and expertise were evident in the decision to concentrate responsibility 
for these functions in his executive office. His legal background was reflected in the terms 
in which he espoused the institutional development of the Secretary-Generalship. In the 
Swedish Foreign Office, he was involved in the technical and political administration of 
the Marshall Plan. In the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and the 
Council of Europe he gained valuable experience in international and multilateral diplomacy. 
It was here that Hammarskj6ld first came to the attention of Sir Gladwyn Jebb, his principal 
sponsor and advocate for the S ecretary-General ship. As Urquhart notes, however, it was 
not so much his curriculum vitae that is significant in explaining Hammarskj6ld's 
conception of the role of the Secretary-General - "his personality and character were his 
main assets. ' Q This observation goes a very long way to explaining why, in selecting 
Hammarskj6ld, the permanent members believed they had found a quiet, 'careful and 
colourless, '3unobtrusive administrator from Sweden who, "would concentrate on the 
administrative problems of the organisation and abstain from public statements on the 
political conduct of the organisation. "4 On the other hand, those who knew him and had 
worked with him greeted his appointment with universal approval. 5 
Hammarskj6ld possessed a strong sense of self. In his aptly titled essay , "Dag 
Hammarskj6ld: Private Person in a Very Public Office, " Urquhart describes the paradox in 
which Hammarskj6ld's introspection was the source of the, "great inner strength and 
IBioc 
', raphical details from 
Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., pp. 17-45. 
2Urq'uhart, in Jordan op. cit., p. 137. 
3Schfirmann, Carl, cited in Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 15. 
4ibid. 
5Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 14. 
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conviction, "' that provided direction for Hammarskj6ld personally, the Secretary- 
Generalship, and the organisation that he headed. His death denied us his memoirs, but 
more than any other incumbent, he documented his theories on the role of the Secretary- 
General. It is not, however, his UN speeches, reports and statements which provide the 
greatest insights into his diplomatic achievements and his approach to the Secretary- 
Generalship. It is a private, spiritual, quasi-religious and philosophical collection of essays 
which provide a guide to the persona of the man whom, by his own admission, found his 
vocation in life as UN Secretary-General; "Your prayer had been answered as you know, 
God has a use for yoU. "2 In Markings Hammarskj6ld reveals nine personal 
commandments which might easily be transposed as a Hippocratic oath for the UN 
Secretary-General: 
- It is more important to be aware of the grounds for your own behaviour than to 
understand the motives of another; 
" The other's 'face' is more important than your own; 
" If, while pleading another's cause, your are at the same time seeking something for 
yourself you cannot hope to succeed; 
- You can only hope to fmd a lasting solution to a conflict if you have learned to see the 
other objectively, but, at the same time, to experience his difficulties subjectively; 
" The man who 'likes people' disposes once and for all the man who despises them; 
" All first hand experience is valuable, and he who has given up looking for it will one day 
find that he lacks what he needs: a closed mind is a weakness, and he who approaches 
persons or painting or poetry without the useful ambition to learn a new language and so 
gain access to someone else's perspective on life, let him beware; 
-A successful lie is doubly a lie, an error which has to be corrected is a heavier burden than 
the truth: only an uncompromising, 'honesty, ' can reach the bedrock of decency which you 
should always expect to find, even under deep layers of evil; 
" Finesse must not mean fear of going on the offensive; 
" The semblance of influence is sought at the cost of its reality. 3 
These commandments reveal a self-effacing and modest character motivated by a positivist 
belief in the power of persuasion and personality. These attributes instilled confidence in 
him as a confidant and are central to understanding Hammarskj6ld's quiet approach. The 
sixth commandment also hints at his passion for literature, arts, and philosophy across 
national and cultural boundaries, reflected also in his election to the Swedish Academy. 
This intellectual pursuit, coupled with his linguistic flair, 4gave the Secretary-General's 
diplomacy a new dimension. Hammarskj6ld brought to negotiations a deeper contextual, 
cultural, and historical understanding of conflict and national positions. This sensitivity 
enabled Hammarskj6ld to recognise the wider ramifications and potential of subtle changes 
in the diplomatic tack, and to identify the basis for progress which might eluded a less 
sensitive mind. His respect for national, cultural, and domestic sensitivities and traditions 
'Urquhart, in Jordan op. cit., p. 133-48- 
2Hammarskj6ld, Dag, Markings, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 89. 
3ibid. entry 19-20 November 1955; see also Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 32. 
4Not only was Hammarskj6ld fluent in Swedish, English, French and German, but well read in each and a 
keen literary translator; see Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., pp. 37-41, & 577-8 
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also enabled Hammarskjbld to relate to those whom engaged his services, and to build an 
enduring rapport, confidence, and even friendships with government leaders. I 
Hammarskj6ld's modesty and conception of personal sacrifice was also matched by a great 
strength of character, as the eighth commandment suggests. This conviction was derived 
not from a single commandment but from the faith of which these principles were the 
constituent pillars. That faith is perhaps best conceptualised in his inaugural speech upon 
his election to the Swedish Academy. In this quasi-autobiographical speech which was 
devoted to his father, Hammarskj6ld reveals entrenched intellectual, literary, academic, 
legal, public service, and deep moral family traditions. 2 He described his father as, 
"One of those who are firm in their roots and firm in their faith, whose 
changing fates may well deepen their convictions and direction of their early 
years but not change them. They may be transported far from their original 
setting but their roots are never cut off. "3 
Hammarskj6ld junior then chronicles Hammarskj6ld senior's relatively undistinguished 
political record in pursuit of his own faith, "a supranational justice, through which may be 
created an international Civitas Legum. ' '4 In particular Harnmarskj6ld recounts his father's 
unhappy experience as Prime Minister between 1914 and 1917, as evidence of both his 
commitment to higher collective good above selfish interests, and his moral courage. 
Urquhart explains, 
"Believing that war would be short and indecisive, he declared a policy of 
unreserved neutrality which he himself called'Swedish and nothing but 
Swedish, ' his immediate objective was to keep Sweden out of the war but 
he also wished Sweden to be and unimpeachable position in international 
law ... he hoped to lend the country weight, which 
it would otherwise have 
lacked in a future international order based on law. ' 15 
Harnmarskj6ld senior conceived of Sweden as, 'the guardian of international principles, ' 
but his strict adherence to this policy thrust against the prevailing Swedish orthodoxy and 
cost him the premiership and his political career. Hammarskj6ld observed from the public 
gOery that his fathers valedictory, "epitomised a life of faith and in justice and of self- 
effacing service under a responsibility which unites us all. "6 He later noted, 
I Urquhart cites Ben Gurion, (Israeli P. M. ), and Mahmoud Fawzi, (Egyptian F. M. ) as 2 cogent examples. 
2Hammarskj6ld was elected to the seat in the Academy held by his late father. The inaugural address, by 
tradition is devoted to the successors predecessor. Ile Academy, Foote explains, " was founded in 1780 by 
King Gustav 111, modelled on the French Academy and aimed at preserving and enniching Swedish language 
and literature, It is limited to 18 members elected for life, who are generally authors and other leaders in the 
intellectual life of the country. Its most widely known responsibility is the annual award of the Nobel Prize 
in literature. " Foote, op. cit., p. 62. 
3Hammarskj6ld, "Hjalmar Hammarskj6ld, " Inaugural address to Swedish Academy, Stockholm 20 December 
1954; see Foote, op. cit., p. 64. 
4ibid., p. 69. 
5Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 20. 
6Hammarskj6ld, 'Ejalmar Hammarskj6ld, " Inaugural address to Swedish Academy, Stockholm 20 December 
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"A mature man is his own judge. In the end his only firm support is being faithful to his own convictions. The advice of others may be welcome and 
valuable, but it does not free him from responsibility. Therefore he may become very lonely. Therefore, too, he must run, with open eyes, the risk 
of being accused of obdurate self sufficiency. "' 
These words were as applicable to Dag as they were to HJalmar. In his conception of 
preventive diplomacy Dag Han-imarskj6ld also, 'declared a policy of unreserved neutrality. ' 
In his approach he was, 'international and nothing but international. ' His objective was to 
keep the the UN out of the cold war and in his innovations he attempted to place the 
Secretary-General in, 'an unimpeachable position in international law, ' which he hoped 
would give the Secretary -General's role, 'weight it would otherwise have lacked. ' 
Hammarski6ld's intellect, a fiercely analytical mind, linguistic and literary flair, phenomena] 
work ethic, and modesty all find expression in his conception of preventive diplomacy, its 
underlying assumptions, his defence of neutrality and his diplomatic ingenuity. 
Fundamental, however, was his personal code which brought self-belief, confidence, 
consistency to the Secretary-Generalship, and moreover invited and instilled trust in the 
incumbent. In this respect Hammarskj6ld famously commented, 
I hate talking in personal terms but it finally boils to the man ... where there is an uncontested right of the Secretary-General, I find it easier to stand up 
against whatever pressures there might be from whatever comers they might 
come, because then I can come down to the personal factor and say frankly 
this is something I would not do. This is sometimes a strong line of 
defence. ' '2 
Similarly, Hammarskj6ld also asserted, 
"Politics and diplomacy are no play of will and skill where results are 
independent of the character of those engaging in the game. Results are 
determined not by superficial ability but by the consistency of the actors in 
their efforts and by the validity of their ideals ... there 
is no intellectual 
activity which more tests the solidity of a man than politics. Apparently easy 
success with the public are possible for a juggler, but lasting results are 
achieved only by the patient builder. "3 
In his personal faith, and integrity Hammarskjbld embodied the moral authority on which 
role of the Secretary-General in the maintenance of international peace and security was 
conceived. In this respect Hammarskj6ld extended Weber's 'charismatic leadership, ' to the 
level of international organisation. But in that Hammarskj6ld was also careful to construct 
1954; see Foote, op. cit., p. 79. 
1 ibid., p. 76. 2UN Doc. SG/424,14 June, 1955; see also Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., pp. 17-18. 
3QUoted by Urquhart in Jordan op. cit., p. 135. 
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a, 'rational legal' basis for his actions, he also ensured the continued institutional 
development of the Secretary-Generalship. 
U Thant. 
Of all the Secretaries-General, U Thant's approach is the most straightforward to 
conceptualise and explain. This is in part because U'lliant's approach and personality are 
fairly straightforward, and in part because U Thant is the only Secretary -General to 
undertake this task in a scholarly manner himself. I 
The First Third World Secretary -General. 
U Thant was born in Panawa Burma on 22 January 1909. He attended the National High 
School in his home town and progressed to University College, Rangoon. He published 
his first newspaper article at fifteen and by twenty was writing political commentaries on 
Burma and the British Empire. At College he met U Nu with whom he emerged as one of 
the leading activists in the Burmese independence movement. On graduation he returned to 
the National High School as a Senior Master and in 1931 he was appointed Headmaster 
after topping the National Anglo-Vernacular Secondary Teachership Examination. Until U 
Thant and U Nu negotiated independence from British colonial rule in 1948 U Thant 
juggled careers in education, journalism, politics and public service. His first book, The 
League ofNations, appropriately enough, was completed in 1933, and before becoming 
Secretary-General U Thant wrote a further three: Towards a New Education, (1946); 
Democracy in Schools, (1952); and The History of Post War Burma, (1961-3 volumes). 
On accession to independence U Nu became the first Burmese Prime-Minister and in his 
administration U Thant held various posts, inter alia Press Director, Director of 
Broadcasting, Secretary of State for Information, Secretary for Projects in the Prime 
Minister's Office, and Executive Secretary of the National Economic and Social Board. As 
U Nu's, and latterly, U Ba Swe's principal advisor he attended the Bandung Conference of 
Afro-Asian Leaders, (1955), the Belgrade Conference of the non-aligned, (1961), and 
travelled widely in the Africa, Asia and Europe. Kirthisinghe argues that this diplomatic 
experience, "cultivated his insights into the nature of post war global nationalist movement, 
and his diplomatic skills, crucial to his success as Secretary-General of the UN. ' 12 U Thant 
IHis memoirs have chapters devoted to the questions, "how did I conceive my role? " and what is the 
Secretary -General? " necessarily the following is indebted to U 
Thant's efforts in this respect. op. cit., 20- 
43; biographical details collected from UN Doc. SG/1059 BIO/I 16 3 November 1961; UN Press 
Release 
BIOS/391,30 September 1965; UN Note No. 3890,25 November 1974, UN Archives, New York, UN File 
DAG 1/5.3.4.2.1.0: 3; Joyce, James A., "The Strength of U Thant, " n. d. UN Archives, New York, UN He 
DAG 1/5.2.1.9-15; & Kirthisinghe, Buddhadasa P., "U Thant Man of Peace, " Contemporary Review, Vol 
237, No. 11378, November, 1980; Nassif, Ramsis, op. cit., pp. 10-25. 
2Kirthisinghe, Buddhadasa P., "U Thant Man of Peace, " Contemporary Review, Vol 237, No. 11378, 
November, 1980, p. 232. 
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also rapidly established a reputation, especially in the third world as an able and astute 
diplomat. He was first a member of the Burmese delegation to the General Assembly in 
1952. Between 1957 and 1962 he served as Burma's permanent representative at the UN 
during which time he chaired the Afro-Asian group, . was elected Vice President of the 
General Assembly, (1959), as Chair of the General Assembly Congo Conciliation 
Committee, (1961), and Chair of the Committee on a United Nations Capital Development 
Fund. Although a compromise candidate, U Thant's curriculum vitae made impressive 
reading. That Hammarskj6ld privately viewed him as a potential successor was testament 
to a burgeoning reputation in UN circles. I On paper at least, with the exception of Perez de 
Cuellar, and maybe Kofi Annan, U Thant is the most qualified incumbent that an arbitrary 
selection process has produced so far. Unlike Hammarskj6ld, U Thant was a known 
quantity. He was known not only to the Soviet leadership at the time of his appointment 
but also to Brezhnev and Kosygin whom he had met in his earlier dealings with the USSR 
in Moscow and at the UN. He was favourably received by the US, where his close 
friendship with Adlai Stevenson, a principal sponsor, was an asset. U Thant was also a 
popular choice with the British authorities, to whom he first came to notice in the 
decolonisation of Burma. At the UN he was also a close acquaintance of Sir Patrick Dean 
the UK permanent representative who arranged an early audience with Macmillan, (Prime 
Minister), with whom, his Press Officer states, "he hit it off well. "2 Of the permanent 
members only the French voiced now familiar objections to a non Francophone, and a 
rumour also abounded that the French considered him, 'too shord' Both objections were 
met with a retort, candour, and humour typical of his press briefings and dealings with 
governments, "You can tell them that I am taller than Napoleon, who did not speak 
English! "3 U Thant's, real advantage, other than his integrity, and a personable character, 
was his nationality. Burma acceded to independence from British colonial rule in January 
1948 and was one of only a handful of newly independent states acceptable to both East and 
West for UN membership in April 1948. Moreover, coming from a small neutral country 
active in the emerging non aligned movement, U Thant enjoyed an automatic political 
constituency which East and West could ill afford to disregard. Soviet anti-colonial rhetoric 
would have looked distinctly shallow if Moscow vetoed the chair of the non-aligned 
movement, and, Moscow was unlikely to find a more acceptable candidate. 
Equally, 
Western objections would have fuelled third world antagonisms towards the 
developed 
world. Furthermore aggreement had been reached on one Secretary-General over threee 
Secretaries-General. Finally, by the appointment of Bunche, Arkadev, and Narasimhan, 
(the highly rated Indian replacement for Cordier as Chef de Cabinet), as principal advisors, 
lUrquhart, (1987), op. cit., P. 189. 
2Nassif, op. cit., p. 131. 3Recounted in Nassif, op.. cit., P. 8. 
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for all intents and purposes U Thant constituted an informal, but voluntary and temporary 
sub troika. 
U Thant was the first non-European Secretary-General, (of either the League of Nations or 
UN), and the first Secretary-General from a decolonised state. Not only was U Thant a 
symbol of the changing political climate he was also an agent of its advancement. UThant 
expressed strong resentments against the colonial legacy and conceded that his political 
experience in campaigning against British colonialism and his diplomatic experience 
Africa and Asia, 
"No doubt influenced my political thinking ... in the 1950s I found myself increasingly identified with the cause of small nations, poor nations, newly independent nations, and nations struggling for independence. So my 
conception of the UN was primarily from the vantage point of the third 
world. "' 
U Thant viewed the North-South divide, not the cold war as, "the most serious source of 
tension in the world. "2 During his tenure, Kirthisinghe notes, the Specialised Agencies 
became the, "chief dispensers of technical assistance, "3 to new and underdeveloped states. 
U Thant was a forthright advocate of development and related issues through ECOSOC, 
UNCTAD, and the development decade. This perception of world politics underlies his 
conception of the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
A Buddhist Secretary-General. 
U Thant states in his memoirs that, "to understand my conception of the role of Secretary- 
General the nature of my religious and cultural background must first be understood. '"' U 
Thant's discussion of the Buddhist faith provides four commandments which in substance 
do not differ greatly from Hammarskj6ld's nine point code. 
Firstly, Metta, U Thant explains is the practice of good will and kindness to all, "without 
distinction and impartiality ... to 
friends and foe alke. ' 15 This principle of, 
"tolerance, " also transcends the remaining three. Secondly, U Thant translates Karuna as 
compassion, and relates it to the Buddhist conception of suffering - "human life is one of 
suffering, hence it is the duty of a good Buddhist to mitigate the suffering of otherS. "6 
Moreover, Karuna asserts that suffering is the consequence of greed and 
ignorance and 
'U 'Rant, op. cit., p. 36. 2ibid., p. 441. 
3Kirthisinghe, op. cit., p. 232. 4U Thant, op. cit., p. 20. 5ibid., p. 2 1. 6ibid. 
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relates closely to his third world outlook. Thirdly, U Thant defines the principle of Mudita 
as "sympathetic joy, "' or the sharing in others' happiness which is probably best translated 
as empathy and relates best to U Thant's conceptions of community and human society, 
(see below). Finally, Upekka, is the pursuit of a balanced mind, an inner equilibrium 
detached from the material world. It is a, "lofty quality of [open and] even-mindedess, "2 
which alternatively, finds expression in Rudyard Kipling's, If 3 In this respect Waldheim's 
description of U Thant as a man of, "studied calm, "4is particularly apt. 
Individually each of these Buddhist attributes brought to the S ecretary -General personal 
qualities particularly suited to, "the most impossible job in the world. ' '5 At the lowest ebb 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis U Thant recalls practising metta and karuna, (with difficulty), 6 
both of which go to the very essence of the Secretary-General's role. But transcending all, 
if most evident in Upekka, is the inner strength and peace derived from a spiritual well- 
being, achieved by meditation. Meditation, U Thant laments, is popularly misunderstood in 
the Western world as, "associated with a particular posture, or musing on some kind of 
mystic or mysterious thought, or going into a trance, ' '7but is in fact related to the process 
of, "cleansing the mind of impurities, such as ill-will, hatred, a restlessness. "8 U Thant 
believed its purpose is to cultivate the qualities of, "concentration, awareness, intelligence, 
confidence and tranquillity, leading to the attainment of the highest wisdom. "9 It implies a 
considered, scholarly and disciplined approach to the role of the Secretary-General ship. To 
explain the value of this faith in its holistic form U Thant cites Nobel Peace Prize winner 
Father Dominique Georges Pine, 
I still think that to be a peacemaker, that is to say a man of peace, one must 
first be at peace with oneself. One must first achieve inner peace. Tlis 
involves getting to know and leaming to control oneself and learning to 
control one's impulses. Only then can a peaceful being approach the 
immense task of creating han-nony between groups and individuals. "' 0 
1 ibid.. 
2ibid., p. 22. 
31f you can keep your head while all those about you are losing theirs and blaming it on you; if you can 
trust yourself when all men doubt you. But make allowance for their doubting too; if you can wait and not 
be tired by waiting. Or being lied about don't deal in lies; Or being hated don't give way to hating, and yet 
don't look to good, nor talk too wise: If you can dream - and not make dreams your master. 
If your can 
think and not make thoughts your aim; If you can meet triumph and disaster and treat those two impostors 
just the same; If you can bear to hear the truth you've spoken twisted by knaves to make a trap 
for fools. 
Or watch the things you gave your life to broken, and stoop and build 'em up with worn out tools ... 
Yours 
is the earth and everything that's in it, And - what is more - you'll be a man my son! 4Waldheim in Jordan, op. cit., p. 20. 5Lie to Hammarskj6ld on leaving Office, source n/a. 6U Thant, op. cit., p. 186. 7ibid., p. 22. 8ibid. 
9ibid. 
10ibid., pp. 22-3. 
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U Thant's strong sense of self, like Hammarskj6ld before him, provided mcumbent and 
office with direction and conviction. That U Thant was unable to develop the UN's system 
for the maintenance of international peace and security and role of the Secretary -General 6 la 
Hammarskj6ld was a specific function of Hammarskj6ld's legacy, and reflected the 
changing systemic climate, and the changing political climate and institutional balance 
within the UN. 
U Thant also had very strong views on the concept of human society. These were in part a 
product of his Buddhist teachings but also part of a broader literary and philosophical 
education. He cites Albert Schweitzer and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "among Western 
thinkers, " with, "powerful ideas, " and, "an important influence. "' Both enunciate a 
"reverence for life, "2 as did Buber's conception of, I and Thou, (an acknowledged 
influence on Hammarskj6ld). 3 Collectively these authors aspired to the foundation of 
community on humanitarian, ethical, and spiritual principles which transcend divisions 
between political ideologies, and haves and have nots. These divisions U Thant argues 
constituted the, "uncivilised, "4 in whom the twin evils of greed and ignorance are self 
evident. If the Buddhist influences of Mudita and Karuna are evident here they are no more 
so than the tolerance and respect for cultural religious and historical heritage which U Thant 
promoted as a bridge builder, "between peoples, governments, and states. "5 This positivist 
emphasis on what peoples, governments and states have in common rather than what keeps 
them apart was the essence of U Thant's good offiCeS. 6 The Secretary-General's good 
offices in turn, were the essence of U Thant's approach to the Secretary -General's role in 
the peace and security field. 
U Thant's Preventive Diplomacy. 
U Thant demonstrated an astute grasp of the prerogatives of his office as developed by 
Hammarskj6ld and Lie, 7and applied them in what he considered to be his most important 
political duty, "to concentrate on the harmonising function of the UN as set out in Article 
1(4) ... to be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations. 
118 In this respect Article 33, as 
libid., p. 24. 
2ibid. 
3Which Hammarskj6ld was in the process of translating when he died; see Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., pp. 
277-8. 
4U Thant, op. cit., p. 26. 5U Thant, op. cit., p. 27. 6Nowhere more coherently articulated than in the John Hopkins University Lecture, see 
Joyce, James, A, 
'The Strength of UThant, " UN Archives, New York, UN File DAG 1/5.1.19-15. 7See U Thant "The Role of the Secretary -General " UN Chronicle, 
Vol. III, No. 9, October 1971. 
8U Thant, op. cit., p. 30; see also U Thant, "A Quiet United Nations Road to Accord, 
" UN Chronicle, Vol. 
VII, No. 7, July 1970; "I'lie Role of the Secretary-General " UN Chronicle, Vol. 111, No. 
9, October 1971 
Pechota, Vratislav, The Quiet Approach: A Study in the Good Offices of the Secretary-General Exercised in 
the Cause of Peace, (New York: UNITAR, 1972); & Introductions to & the 22nd 
24th 25th, & 26th Annual 
Reports. 
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opposed to Article 99, (the parameters of which Hammarskjbld had pushed to the limit), 
was the key. In Article 33 the Secretary-General was limited not by the provisions of the 
Charter in respect of the Secretary-General, nor by Article 99 and the implied powers theory 
or Article 98, but by the principle of consent. This Was demonstrated positively in the wide 
array and expanding remit of the Secretary-General's good offices, and negatively in 
respect to Vietnam, Czechoslovakia and the withdrawal of UNEF. In his focus, by 
inclination as much as in response to prevailing circumstances, U Thant began the process 
of redefining preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy was synonymous with the 
Secretary-General's good offices and the continuing development of the quiet approach, 
"This quiet method of forestalling conflict seems to me to be a part of the 
Secretary-General's role. There are good reasons why Article 99 has been 
specifically invoked only once. Nothing could be more divisive and useless 
than for the Secretary-General to bring a situation publicly to the Security 
Council when there is no possibility of the Council agreeing on effective or 
useful action. On the other hand a quiet approach that avoids a public 
confrontation may often hold some hope of success. "' 
U Thant was thus prepared to sacrifice his public reputation to protect the private dialogue 
and empower national governments engaging his services. Consequently, U Thant's 
version of events in the withdrawal of UNEF was largely ignored; his 'secret search for 
peace, 12 in Vietnam went'untold; '3 in India and Pakistan he was criticised for neither 
invoking Article 99 or opening a diplomatic dialogue; and not until Dean Rusk verified and 
expanded on U Thant's recollection was the true extent of U Thant's involvement in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis revealed. It is only in his memoirs that the extent of the Secretary- 
General's role in the above begin to emerge but even here U Thant agonised over his 
responsibility to those still in govenunent, 
"Many of the events related in these pages will have at times an 
astonishingly different meaning from that conveyed at the time that they 
occurred, as reported by a section of the press or other public media. For 
press reports are often necessarily based only on a few of the facts - often 
distorted facts then known ... has the time come 
for these things - some 
painful some glorious - to be said at all? Would it not be wiser to 
leave 
where they were the mistakes and tragedies of yesterday? One of my 
problems in compiling this record was deciding how much to reveal without 
wounding embarrassing some high government leader, official, or national 
spokesman. The demarcation line between what should and should not be 
disclosed is very thin, however, and I believe that will be in the public 
interest in the disclosure of facts and own assessment of those facts. The 
only limit, perhaps should be revelation that might affect the future of human 
society. 114 
'ibid., P. xvii. 2ibid. 
3ibid.. 
4ibid-, pp. xvi & xviii. 
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This post tenure dilemma is indicative of U Thant's faith in the unique diplomatic position 
in international politics and the imperative of Protecting that, "singular perspective"' which 
offers objectivity in times of crises and conflict. This conception of preventive diplomacy 
and the Secretary-General's good offices reflects U Thant's Buddhist teachings. While 
religion and politics in domestic circumstances are often a volatile and potent mix, for U 
Thant as Secretary-General, there was no such conflict. In addition to the principles 
outlined above, two Buddhist preachings are instructive in this respect. 
No man is noble by birth, 
No man is ignoble by birth, 
Man is only noble by his own action, 
Man is only ignoble by his action. 
If there is to be a victory all sides have to be victorious. 2 
Like Hammarskjbld, in his beliefs U Thant aspired to a moral integrity and neutrality 
indistinguishable from the moral authority on which the Secretary -General's political role 
rests. At a UN reception for Buddhists of various nationalities, U Thant even went as far to 
say, 
"In my view the UN Charter embodies most of the essential teachings of the 
Lord Buddha: the principles of non-recourse to force and violence; the 
fostering of understanding and co-operation; the goal of harmonising the 
actions of nations; and the principle of unity in diversity. "3 
In his conception of preventive diplomacy, therefore, U Thant, rejected peace imposed by 
force or compulsion, and pursued peace by the study and practice of humanist and 
metaphysical methods of transcending divisions caused by hate, greed, and delusion .4U 
Thant's conception of preventive diplomacy, however, was not exclusively a factor of his 
religious beliefs, but must also be viewed as a product of his political maturation. The 
Secretary-General's good offices were viewed by U Thant not so much as a means of 
keeping the cold war out of Africa and Asia, but a means of getting a better deal for African 
and Asian nations. Thus U Thant asserted, 
'ibid., p. xvi. 2Kirthisinghe, op. cit., p. 235. 3U Thant as recalled by Robert Muller, Director of UN Office for Inter Agency Affairs and Co-ordination, 
T Thant the Buddhist, " 25 January 1975, UN Archives, New York, UN File "SG: Death of U Thant, 25 
November 1974, " DAG 1/5.3.4.2.1.0: 3. 
4Kirthisinghe, op. cit., p. 234. The only exception to this rule was in the resolution of the 
Congo crisis 
after Hammarskj6ld's death. Hammarskj6ld's experience had demonstrated that the use of force, 'In the last 
resort' represented the thin end of the peace enforcement wedge. On 24 November a961 the Security 
Counc, l 
authorised the Acting Secretary-General, "to take vigorous actions ... including the use of the requisite 
measure of force, " to expel foreign and end the Katanga secession. In December 1962 
Tshombe defaulted on 
yet another set of agreements and attacks on UN personnel once more began to escalate. 
U Thant reluctant] v 
authonsed the expulsion of the Gendannerie and foreign mercenaries and as ONUC troops moved 
forward the 
Katanga regime collapsed. 
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'Waves of change in Asia and Africa have been stirred by nationalism and 
not by communism. No great power should become the policeman of this 
area of the world where more than half of mankind lives. The great powers 
should support the legitimate aspirations of these underdeveloped nations 
rather than support the status quo and reactionaries. "' 
This important but subtle change in the emphasis of preventive diplomacy as conceived by 
Ham. marskj6ld has considerable explanatory power in answering the questions posed by the 
Congo crisis. U Thant was able to continue extending and expanding the Secretary- 
General's good offices remit, inter alia, UNIYOM, UNIPOM in North Borneo and 
Sarawak because the nations concerned were prepared to consent to the arbitration, 
mediation, quiet diplomacy, or UN Presence of a Secretary-General who was one of them. 
The actions of a European Secretary-General in the Congo, irrespective of his unblemished 
record, had struck a raw and sensitive neo-imperialist nerve in the third world. With 
respect to the quiet and unassuming Buddhist from Burma no such qualms existed. 
Moreover, his integrity instilled trust and his own recent experiences and philosophical 
disposition enabled U Thant to relate to leaders in the developing world, and develop a 
valuable close personal rapport in this network. 
U Thant and the Media. 
Where Hammarskj6ld shied away from publicity, from the outset U Thant was keen to 
develop a constructive working relationship with the media. U Thant valued the media for 
its educative and public information role and in the aftermath of the Congo recognised that a 
public education campaign was needed to revive faith in the increasingly maligned 
organisation. This is an aspect of his work U Thant seemed to enjoy, arguably in a 
throwback to his days as a journalist, and which initially at least did not seem to clash with 
the quiet approach. Given his defence of the quiet approach, U Thant's relations with the 
media, and use of public statements, in particular against the USSR in respect of 
Czechoslovakia and against the US in respect of Vietnam is something of a paradox. Here, 
as well as in the withdrawal of UNEF, and in his initial refusal to stand for a second term as 
Secretary-General U Thant demonstrated his conviction that the Secretary -General, "must 
always be prepared to take the initiative, no matter what the consequences to his office or to 
him personally may be, if he sincerely believes that it might mean the difference 
between 
peace and war. ' Q In this U Thant remained true to the "cardinal principle"3 that the 
independence and integrity of the Secretary-General was sacrosanct and that 
if satisfactorily 
maintained vastly enhanced the prospect of both private and public 
initiatives. This 
assumption, if paradoxical correlates with Hammarski6ld's contention that the 
Secretary- 
General's good-offices and quiet diplomacy should not become an excuse 
for political 
lKirthisinghe, op. cit., p. 232. 2UN Press Release, SG/SMJ302,21 May 1963; see also U Thant, op. cit., p. 33. 
3ibid. 
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expediency, and that the public and private profiles of the Secretary-General could be 
reconciled. I 
The problem for U Thant, however, was that the legacy of Hammarskj6ld coupled with 
changing systemic and institutional factors limited the Secretary -General's scope for 
invention. "Any Secretary-General, " U Thant asserted, "is obliged to stand by every 
resolution or decision of the main deliberative organs of the UN. The Secretary-General 
must take a categorical stand in support of such resolutions. ' 12 In that the Security Council 
was more active as a forum for multilateral diplomacy and increasingly mindful of the 
Secretary-General's political activities, U Thant's scope for invention and leadership d la 
Hammarskj6ld was circumscribed. To avoid allegations of political expediency and fulfil 
his own compulsion to be more than just a global clerk U Thant was compelled to use 
public pressure perhaps more than he would have liked. That compulsion was not 
exclusively a reaction against the prevailing institutional and systemic circumstances, and 
can be explained in tenns of his religious and political convictions. Together, they gave U 
Thant "backbone, ' '3 to the extent that one Soviet Official once famously commented, "he 
made no secret of his views and would not be moved against his will ... convincing U 
Thant is like fighting your way through a room full of mashed potatoes. ' '4 U Thant even 
notes, 
"Partly because of my faith and philosophy, and partly because of my 
special vantage point, I am apt to moralise, from time to time, on the issues 
facing the human community, and I am inclined to remind man of those 
attribute of spirit and mind that can yet spare him from the scourge of 
another world war... I have before me a vision of a unified mankind living 
in peace under a just world order. "5 
Unfortunately for U Thant the quiet approach belied the extent of U Thant's activity behind 
the scenes. While active his private initiatives have not been widely recognised, even 
retrospectively. If his successes have not been widely chronicled his alleged failures and 
public demonstrations certainly were. The press fostered the misleading impression of a 
diplomatically passive and publicly tactless Secretary-General. 6 In this U Thant's tenure is 
the most misrepresented of all the Secretary-General's and his contribution to the cause of 
world peace underestimated probably as much as Hammarskj6ld's martyrdom has 
exaggerated his personal contribution. Consideration of U Thant's personality and 
ISee Pechota, op. cit., pp. 53-6. 2ibid. 
3Armstrong, op. cit., p. 108. 4ibid. 
5U Thant, op. cit., p. xviii. 617or further discussion see Joyce on John Hopkins Lecture op. cit. Frustrated by Tshombe oscillating 
negotiating position in the Congo U Thant once referred to the Head of the Katanga secession and 
hus 
advisors as, 'a bunch of clowns. ' His former press officer contends this was his only undiplomatic and 
regrettable public outburst. See Nassif, op. cit., pp. 98-9. 
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approach demonstrate that neither popular record is an accurate reflection of his tenure. 
What is evident instead is that U Thant's initiatives were welcomed in his third world 
constituency. This was his field of expertise and an area where he shared common 
experiences and beliefs with those whom he was assisting. It was in conflicts in this area 
of global politics that U Thant continued to develop the good offices concept. These cases, 
however, while important in themselves, were for the most part on the periphery of world 
peace and security. Equally, with the exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis, U Thant's 
exclusion from hard core peace and security issues is not solely a product of the 
Hammarskj6ld legacy. While disdainful of radicalism, his emergence as the vox 
populorum of development and the third world, and his use of the Secretary -General's 
office as a "bully pulpit" I placed U Thant in opposition to the US in a debate which the 
USSR was exploiting. Combined with his frustration at the superpower policy of 
exclusion, his objection to their intervention in Africa and Asia found expression in his 
attacks against Johnson's administration for its policy in Vietnam. Furthermore the 
withdrawal of UNEF from the Middle East did not satisfy US interests, (except in 
providing a convenient scapegoat). The USSR was also the subject to public criticism. In 
particular with respect to the Congo U Thant commented on Soviet radio that the Soviet 
people were not being told all the facts. 2 It is not surprising that after a promising start U 
Thant's role in high politics was strictly limited. This publicity, however, did not 
jeopardise his diplomatic initiatives elsewhere. U Thant had less to lose than 
Hammarskj6ld by speaking his mind on issues affecting the great powers because of the 
limited nature of the responsibilities that were delegated to him. Moreover, and in contrast 
to Lie, if in print his comments seemed blunt and tactless, the politeness and assuredness of 
their delivery, coupled with his personal integrity and clarity of vision, were indicative of a 
policy of outspoken independence rather than confusion betweent the Secretary -General's 
public and private roles. What emerges, therefore, is a contradiction between neutrality in 
East-West politics, and support for the non-aligned which challenged the systemic 
orthodoxy, and therefore those with a vested interest in that orthodoxy. 
Kurt Waldheim. 
Kurt Waldheim was born on 21 December 1918. He studied at the Consular Academy of 
Vienna and the University of Vienna where he graduated with a Doctorate in Law. He 
joined the Austrian diplomatic corps in 1945 as Private Secretary to the Foreign Minister 
Karl Gruber. Between 1948 and 1951 he served as First Secretary at the Austrian 
Legations in Paris. Between 1951 and 1955 he was responsible for Foreign Ministry 
recruitment. His affiliation with the UN began in 1955 as a Permanent Observer at the 
UN 
and when Austria was accorded full membership. At the end of that year he headed the 
first 
Tranck, (1985), op. cit., p. 150. 2press Release SG/1307,30 August 1962; see also Joyce, op. cit. 
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Austrian Mission proper to the UN. In 1956 he returned to Austria as Minster 
Plenipotentiary before secondment as the Austrian Ambassador to Canada. He returned 
home again in 1960 as head of the Political Department West, then Director General for 
political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry. Back at the UN between 1964 and 1968 as 
Austria's permanent representative, he was elected Chair of the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space and President of the First UN Conference on the Exploration and 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. In 1968 he resumed domestic service as Austria's Foreign 
Minister and after he failed to win election to the Austrian Presidency, he returned to the 
UN, once more as permanent representative. At the time of his appointment as Secretary- 
General, (1972), he was serving as Chair of the Safeguard Committee on the Exploration 
and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. I 
Three features stand out from Kurt Waldheim's curriculum vitae. Firstly, the rrýx between 
political office and adn-linistrative/diplomatic service. Secondly, the extent of his UN 
experience prior to his appointment as Secretary -General. Thirdly, conspicuous by its 
absence, especially in his memoirs, is any reference to Waldheim's war record. 
Revelations regarding his war record began to surface as early in 1980 but did not become 
public until 1986. These revelations have cast a dark shadow over his tenure as Secretary- 
General. They resulted in an international boycott of the Austrian President, and his 
placement on the US Justice Department, 'Watch List, ' which prevented him entering the 
US. At the very time the UN was shaking off the cold war shackles, reactionary and often 
inaccurate press hyperbole posed a wide array of questions regarding Waldheim's past. 
These have been considered in depth by a specially commissioned international committee 
of historians, and a number of informative and provocative studies. 2 For the most part the 
following facts, and the evidence that Waldheim lied repeatedly to cover his past, are 
undisputed. On the questions that these facts raise there remains some conjecture as to who 
knew about his past? how much was known by those who knew? to what use this 
information was put? and, how, if it all, it affected his tenure as Secretary -General? 
The least serious of the allegations levied against Kurt Waldheim was his membership of 
the Nazi Student Union and the Strum Abteilung, (SA or Brown shirts), cavalry corps. 
Given the pervasive nature of the Anschluss and the far reaching consequences of non- 
participation in National Socialist institutions, Waldheirn's participation is understandable 
and does not make him a war criminal. Moreover, to his credit, he was never a member of 
'Biographical details compiled from UN Press Release SG/1765 BIO/896,22 December 
1971, Economist 
Dictionary of Political Biography, (London: Economist, 1991); & Jordan, op. cit., p. 
15. 
2Palumbo, Michael The Waldheim Files, (London: Faber & Faber, 1988); & Finger, Seymour Maxwell, 
& 
Saltzman, Arnold A., & Saltzman, Bending With the Winds: Kurt Waldheim and the United Nations, (New 
York: Praeger, 1990); Herzstein, Robert Edwin, Waldheim: The Missing Years, (New York: Morrow, 
1988); see also for the World Jewish Congress Commission on the Holocaust and the 
Crimes of the Nazi, 
Waldheim's Nazi Past: The Dossier, (New York: World Jewish Congress, 1988). 
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the Nazi Party; his father was known to the authorities as an active campaigner against 
racism and for Austrian independence; and among others Lord Weidenfeld testifies to 
Waldheim's anti racism. His PhD thesis tackled the work of Konstantin Frantz under the 
supervision of the Professor Anthony Verdross, (a founding member of the anti-Nazi 
underground resistance organisation, Provisorisches 6sterreichisches Nationalkomitee), I 
and carefully circumvents Frantz' renowned anti-semitism. 2 In his memoirs Waldheim also 
avowedly declares his anti Nazi credentials. 3 There is little doubt that given this 
background his activities were closely monitored by the National Socialist Authorities. ` To 
get along Waldheim chose the path of passive complicity, but when first quizzed on his 
participation in National Socialist Organisations, and while still Secretary -General, 
Waldheim stated, "I wish to say I was never associated with the Nazi Youth. "5 During the 
1986 Austrian Presidential campaign his student affiliations were challenged again, and on 
this occasion supported by incontrovertible documentary evidence. 6Waldheim erroneously 
and vicariously claimed, "that he may have been seen riding with the SA Members thus 
giving people the wrong impression; "7that the records were forgeries, "perpetuated by the 
Socialists; "8 that, "these were purely sports activities and had nothing to do with the Nazi 
Party; "9 and that the appropriate forms may have been filled in on his behalf by family 
members. ' 0 Ironically, in the light of the more serious allegations regarding his war record, 
the very same documents which he sought to discredit also testified to his anti-Nazi 
credentials. Moreover, the article in which these details were revealed concluded, "there 
should be no problem allowing a man who strayed into the SA at twenty to assume the 
Austrian Presidency at sixty-seven. "' I 
More serious than the revelations regarding Waldheim's student days were the accusations 
regarding his war record. These were less clear cut but were met with an equally truculent 
response. In his memoirs, which were written prior to the public debate regarding his war 
record, Waldheim. glosses over this period of his life by merely stating that, "there was no 
I Molden, Otto, Der Ruf des Gewissens - der 6sterreichische Freiheitskampf, 
(Vienna: Harold Verlaa, 1958. 
see Palumbo, op. cit., p. 39. 
2See Palumbo, op. cit., pp. 29-33; & Finger & Saltzman, op. cit., p. 3-4. 
3Waldheim, (1985), op. cit., p. 17. 
4Finger & Saltzman, op. cit., p 5. 
51n reply to a letter from US Congressman Stephen Solarz following up an unsubstantiated article 
by 
Shirley Hazard in the New Republic; see Palumbo, op. cit., p. 35. 
6See Documentary appendix in Palumbo, op. cit. 
7Lingens, Michael Profil, 10 March 1986; see Palumbo, p. 37. 
8ibid. 
917inger & Saltzman, op. cit., p. 3. 
1OLingens, op. cit., p. 37. 
1 libid. To understand this generosity, both on the part of the author, and the 
Austrian public who elected 
him their President, is to understand the histoncal experience and legacy of 
World War Il peculiar to the 
Austrian people. De-Nazification was a sensitive issue in a country caught 
between accompl ice and \ ictim 
of Hitler's campaign. Simon Wiesenthal's global search for war cnminals, and 
Waldheim's past. ha" e 
provided a constant reminder of Austria's collective guilt and denied Austrian's the riLht 
to for, -, ct. 
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escape from military service ... the only alternative to being called up was execution, "' and 
that after being maimed by shrapnel in the Eastern push, I was discharged from further 
service at the front. "2 In reply to accusations that this anomaly was a deliberate omission to 
conceal wartime service in the Balkans Wehrmacht, Waldheim has repeatedly claimed, 
"My English publisher told me when I had finished my script there are many 
military things. People are interested in your experiences as UN Secretary- 
General not in the Wehrmacht so you should cut out these things. "3 
The imbalance between the few lines accorded his war record compared with the extensive 
coverage accorded his formative years does not rest well with this disclaimer, nor his claim 
in replying to Congressman Solarz that, "I myself was wounded on the Eastern Front and 
being incapacitated for further service at the front resumed my law studies at Vienna. " 
Waldheim's cover up and lies relate not to war guilt but to the existence of a fraudulent file 
registered by Yugoslavia with the UN War Crimes Committee, (UNWCC). In 1986 the 
contents of this file were revealed by the World Jewish Congress, (WJC). This file alleged 
Waldheim was a war criminal who had committed heinous crimes against Slavs, Jews, and 
British prisoners of war. Like the other 40000 names registered with the UNWCC, 
Waldheim's file did not require supporting documentary evidence or testament. It was 
merely an allegation of wrong doing submitted for judicial review. For the WJC, however, 
Waldheim was guilty until proven innocent. Public criticism of the evidence by Simon 
Wiesenthal was followed by the appointment of an International Commission of Histonans 
to investigate the allegations. The Commission's report, and the books by Michael 
Palumbo, 5 Robert Herztein, 6 Maxwell Finger and Arnold Saltzman, 7 all conclude that as a 
translator, intelligence officer, and supply officer, (rather than as a the loaded title of Special 
Missions Officer attributed to Waldheim. by the WJC), Waldheim was little more than 
administrative ancillary cog in the Nazi machine. He had no command authority, and, "if 
morally CornpliCit'118 did not actually partake in the enactment or formation of National 
Socialist directives. There are even suggestions that he challenged the reprisal edict by 
suggesting it was practically counterproductive. The question of Waldheim's, 'Innocence, l 
however, does not end with the repudiation of the WJC allegations. The mere existence of 
the UNWCC file throws up a number of questions. Two studies, while agreeing on the 
basic facts, come to markedly contrasting conclusions as to the impact of this falsified 
'Waldheim, (1985), op. cit., pp. 16 & 40. 2ibid. 
3Waldheim, Reputations: Simon Wiesenthal, BBC 2,16 July 1997. 
4Palumbo, op. cit., p. 35. 5Palumbo, Michael The Waldheim Files, (London: Faber & Faber, 1988). 
6Herzstein, Robert Edwin, Waldheim: The Missing Years, (New York: Morrow, 1988). 
7Finger, Seymour Maxwell, & Saltzman, Arnold A., & Saltzman, Bending With the Winds: Kurt 
Waldheim and the United Nations, (New York: Praeger, 1990). 8Herzstein, op. ct . t., pp. 259-60. 
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document and Waldheim's ambiguous past on his approach to the role of the Secretary- 
General. I 
The UNWCC was held by the British, Yugoslavia, and France. The US National Archives 
contained the UNWCC register of file names. At the end of the war Waldheim surrendered 
to US authorities and in two months of debriefing provided invaluable intelligence on 
communist Yugoslavia before embarking on a national diplomatic career. That career began 
as Private Secretary to the Austrian Foreign Minster Karl Gruber. The file itself was 
fabricated by communist Yugoslavia, seemingly in cahoots with the USSR, as part of an 
elaborate blackmail plot to discredit Gruber, but was either foiled or inadvertently scuppered 
by Waldheim's relocation to Paris. The UNWCC file was thus available to all the 
permanent members of the Security Council except China, and to one of the leading nations 
in the non-aligned movement. Palumbo's interpretation of these facts and their impact on 
Waldheim as Secretary-General is damning. Palumbo argues, "it is inconceivable that Tito 
would not have used this information to his own benefit; "2 that, "perhaps the CIA saw 
Waldheim's file as an insurance for good behaviour; "3 that the USSR did not know of the 
UNWCC file, "is of course impossible since the Soviets as routine procedure investigate 
every detail about people of a much lower rank than Waldheim; "4and that in the US the 
possibility that one branch of government withheld information from another is rejected as, 
"hardly plausible since the very purpose of the intelligence service is to keep diplomats 
informed of such service. ' '5 Palumbo's conspiracy theory, however, is based largely on 
supposition. By contrast, Finger and Saltzman's systematic and methodologically sound 
examination of the complicated election process, and their detailed examination of 
Waldheim's substantive performance as Secretary-General, reveals no concrete evidence 
that the UN Missions of the permanent five knew of Waldheim's past, or of any clandestine 
use of this information while Waldheirn was in office. If Waldheim's past was a factor in 
his appointment it demonstrates a blatant and disturbing disregard for the office, its sanctity, 
and the place of the organisation. in the international system by the permanent members. If, 
however, the permanent members were not aware of this file or his past, only Waldheim 
disregarded ethical and technical obstacles to his appointment. Firstly, as an Independent 
editorial put it, "to strive to achieve high office of such moral authority on the basis of a lie 
is an appalling betrayal of the international community. ' '6 Secondly, the Preparatory 
Conunission's guidelines for recruitment included a recommendation, (later included in the 
IFinger, Seymour Maxwell, & Saltzman, Arnold A., & Saltzman, Bending W, th the Winds: Kurt 
Waldheim and the United Nations, (New York: Praeger, 1990); & Palumbo, Michael 
The Waldheim Files. 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1988). 
2Palumbo, op. cit., p. 134. 3ibid., p. 115. 
4ibid., p. 122. 5ibid., p. 165. 6ibid. 
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staff regulations), that, "the Secretary -General should take the necessary steps to ensure that 
no persons who had discredited themselves by their activities or connection with Fascism 
and Nazism shall be appointed to the Secretariat. "' It is inconceivable that an miterriational 
service which places a premium on integrity and loyalty to the Charter alone should have 
one rule for the Secretary -General and one for his staff. As one member of the WJC 
commented, "Waldheim was not Mengele but then Mengele was not UN Secretary- 
General. 112 
More significantly at this level of analysis, this aspect of Waldheim's personal history adds 
greater clarity to highly personalised interpretations of Waldheim's design of the UN 
Secretary-General ship and personal ambitions. The lies that he has perpetuated, and the 
indignation with which he has met the 'slurs' on his past, suggest he was driven by 
personal ambition over principle. The question, therefore, is not whether Waldheim's 
secret past was used against him, not whether it made him susceptible to blackmail or self- 
censorship, but to what lengths Waldheim was prepared to go to further his career? 
The Pragmatic Approach. 
Waldheim never clearly or coherently articulated his approach to the Secretary -General ship 
in the manner of U Thant, Hammarskjbld, or Perez de Cuellar. Even Eric Rouleau, his 
editor in The Challenge of Peace, was "frustrated in trying to glean from Waldheim, 
significant insights that might be included. ' '3 Analysis of Waldheim's approach therefore, 
is more interpretative than for U Thant and Hammarskj6ld, and is pieced together from 
statements regarding the role of the Secretary -General in his memoirs, Annual Reports and 
the observations of those who worked with and studied his approach in the light of his war 
record. 
Waldheim's approach was a pragmatic one. Waldheim viewed the bi-polar superpower 
relationship as the most important factor in global politics and assumed the Secretary- 
General could not operate without the backing of, or against the interests of the US and 
USSR. He was thus only prepared to take independent initiatives, and initiatives on behalf 
of the third world, where he considered them not to be contrary to US and Soviet interests. 
As he put it himself, "those who know me.. know that I am a very active man but one who 
has to know the limits of activities. N Waldheim viewed the member states and the regional 
alignments as the electorate to whom he was ultimately responsible. In this the great 
powers were confident in whom they were getting and for the first time in three attempts 
successfully appointed a Secretary-General who would not rock the boat. 
By his handling 
'UN Doc. SGB/25, June 1948; SGB/94 December 1952; see Finger & Saltzman, op. cit., p. 
2Reputations, op. cit. 31nterview with Finger and Saltzman, op. cit., p. 52. 4QUoted in Palumbo, op. cit. p. 116. 
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of the Prague Spring (1968) as Austrian Foreign Minister, Waldheim provided a foretaste 
of his ability to juggle superpower interests. He limited visa applications of Czech refugees 
but did not take any substantive action to halt the influx of illegal immigrants. Thus 
Waldheim did not antagonise the USSR whose Warsaw pact machinery was now 
threateningly and provocatively situated, and, also fulfilled Western moral responsibilities 
to the Czech refugees -I 
Waldheim's pragmatism was reflected in a curious mix of public and quiet approaches. His 
conception of both, however, differed from those of U Thant and Hammarskjbld. In his 
espousal of the quiet approach Waldheim took to extremes the premise that, "the Secretary- 
General is wise to refrain from making public statements, " by arguing, "these can easily be 
distorted, sometimes intentionally, and only complicate matters... he stands a chance only 
if wanted and should never force himself upon a situation. ' 12 It is in this respect that 
Waldheim reinforced the process of redefining preventive diplomacy. 3Waldheim was also 
reluctant to bring moral pressure to bear on member governments by appealing to domestic 
audiences in the member states. Rather, Waldheim viewed public diplomacy as an 
educative function and means of improving the UN's reputation. Urquhart's identification 
of two markedly different Waldheims, however, provides for two very different 
interpretations of Waldheim's pragmatism. 
Waldheim Mark I 
Waldheim mark I was a scheming ambitious, duplicitous egomaniac ready to 
do anything for public advantage or public acclaim. We used to speculate 
just how far Waldheim would go to get publiCity. 4 
Waldheim mark I explains Waldheim's pragmatism in terms of a political instinct for 
flexibility and survival which prevented him from being tied to constraining principles and 
guidelines. This Waldheirn viewed public diplomacy as means of improving the UN's and 
thereby his own reputation. This interpretation explains the lies regarding his past, his 
attempt to secure U Thant's endorsement of his candidacy in 1971, his 'assiduouS"5 
pursuit of the press during his 1976 election campaign, and his refusal to withdraw his 
candidacy in 1982 until he had been vetoed sixteen times by China. This interpretation 
explains Waldheim's campaign for the Austrian Presidency in violation of the Preparatory 
Commission edict that as a former confidante of the member states former Secretaries- 
General should not be offered or accept office in national government. 
'See Palumbo, op. cit., P. 135; & Finger & Saltzman, op. cit-, P. 16. 2Waldheim, Kurt, The Challenge of Peace, (New York: Rawson Wade, 1980), p. 
5-, see also Franck, op. 
cit., (1985), p. 122. 3See pp. 140-3. 
4Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 228. 5ibid., p. 268. 
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Waldheim's ambition undermined the Secretary-Generals role during his tenure. During the 
1976 election campaign work on the 38th floor came to a virtual standstill. I And between 
elections Urquhart argues, "the need for constant public recognition deprived Waldheim of 
two qualities which in his lack of real power are essential for the Secretary -General - dignity 
and mystery. "2 In this respect Urquhart recalls commenting to Waldheim, "if the Lochness 
monster came ashore and gave a press conference it would never be heard from again .. but 
he didn't get the point. "3 U Thant on the other hand initially intended to serve only one 
ten-n and had to be persuaded to stay on. Critically U Thant had no election debts, no 
divided loyalties, and no conflicts of interest which might call into question his moral 
integrity. 
The source of U Thant's and Hanunarskj6ld's conception of their roles and the strength of 
their diplomacy was a moral integrity and conviction of fight and wrong denved from a 
spiritual code. If Waldheim is judged by Hammarskj6ld's personal code, in his approach 
he violated at least the first three and last three commandments. 4 Finger and Saltzman argue 
his pragmatism was designed, "to curry favour rather than out of any conviction of right or 
wrong. "5 They compare him as Secretary-General to a head waiter trying to please 
everybody, 6 and Rhodes argues this reflected his desire for critical acclaim, and pursuit of 
a Nobel Peace Prize. 7 He was instead an agnostic guided by personal ambitions, or as 
Urquhart notes, "a man with no real substance quality or character. " The consequent lack 
of backbone in the conception of his role, relations with government, and diplomacy led 
Urquhart on one occasion to conunent, "I was increasingly inclined to homicide or at the 
very least departure. "9 His lack of interest in the religious, philosophical, and theological is 
manifest in his disinterest for the, 'big, ' questions which helped U Thant and 
Hammarskj6ld communicate with those of different cultures and background. His 
insensitivity to national, cultural, or religious traditions was most publicly demonstrated by 
his refusal to wear a Yarmulka on visiting Yad Vashem, and by his reference to Jerusalem 
as Israel's 'beautiful capital. "O Waldheim was not strong on principle, and consequently, 
"lacked the qualities of vision integrity, inspiration and leadership. ", I Waldheim's concern 
with public impression rather than substance was reflected in a new emphasis on protocol, 
'Urquhart, interview, New York, December 1994. 2Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 268. 3ibid. 
4See p. 205 
5Finger & Saltzman, op. cit., p. 64. 617inger & Saltzman, op. cit., p. x. 7Jarnes, Robert Rhodes, "A UN Enemy Within, " n. d. 
8Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 269. 9ibid. 
10ibid., pp. 235-6. 11 ibid., p. 228. 
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procedure and appearance: I he refurbished the 38th floor; he lamented that the Secretary- 
General was not always received and honoured as would be a head of state; 2 he regretted 
that no-one on the streets of New York recognised him; 3he adopted the highly fashionable 
and, 'sumptuous, ' town house in Sutton Place as the Secretary-General's new residence; -' 
and he desired a private jet large enough to accommodate a press entourage. 5 This 
weakness also found expression in the fulfilment of his administrative duties. While 
Waldheirn voiced his objections to the, "institutional inflation, ' 16 imposed by the burgeoning 
demands of the General Assembly, his own actions compounded rather than eased the 
crises of morale and efficiency in the Secretariat. Waldheim was vulnerable to lobbyIng for 
Secretariat positions and abused his powers of patronage to interfere in recruitment even at 
the lowest levels to ingratiate himself with governments. 7 Even if the USSR had access to 
the UNWCC files, Jacob Malik had no reason to use it against the malleable Waldheim - 
instead he would merely assert that if the USSR did not get the Secretariat positions it 
desired Waldheirn. would not be re-elected. 8 
Waldheim Mark 11. 
Waldheim mark H is the statesmanlike leader who kept his head while all 
about him were losing theirs and was prepared to follow our advice in great 
power crises. 9 
If the above is highly condemnatory the identification of Waldheim mark 11 and 
interpretation of his pragmatism redresses the balance a little. This pragmatism might be 
explained by Waldheim's first hand experience at the UN during the previous sixteen years. 
Waldheim made a realist assessment on what was possible based on his observation of 
Hammarskj6ld's and U Thant's experiences during the latter parts of their tenures. Thus 
Waldheim shared Urquhart's reservations regarding the secrecy of informal consultations of 
the Security Council. He was concerned that the Security Council's legitimacy was being 
eroded and argued public diplomacy fulfilled an important educational function. Berridge 
argues that Waldheim's inclination for Wilsonian public diplomacy represented a legitimate 
attempt to raise the UN's ailing reputation. 10 In this respect, and in spite of his initial 
reservations Urquhart concedes, "Waldheim did rather better as Secretary -General than 
I 
'Nassif, op. cit., p. 131-2 2Waldheim, (1985), op. cit., p. 189. 
3New York Times, 13 September 1981; see Palumbo, op. cit., P. 120. 
4Nassif, op. cit., p. 13 1. 5Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 269. 6Waldheim, (1985), op. cit., p. 241. 7See Finger & Saltzman, op. cit., pp. 71-77. 
8ibid. p. 73; Schevchenko argues his subservience to superpower interests, 
''was his main weaknes 
Schevchenko, op. cit., p. 393. 9Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 228. 1OBerridge, (1985), op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
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had anticipated and demonstrated a determination and even on occasion courage. "' On 
occasion Waldheim was bold in his determination to make the Secretary-General an, 
'activist conciliator. 12 In 1974, the decision to take control of Niscosia airport averted a 
direct clash between Turkey and Greece, and if he did not succeed at the negotiating table 
Waldheim made commendable progess. His stamina and attention to detail matched that of 
Hammarskjbld, and Urquhart adds that not only was he, "ready to accept ideas and 
suggestions and follow then up, " he was, "never too tired to make an awkward Joumeý or 
to make a difficult phone call. ' '3When pointed in the fight direction he even demonstrated 
ability and resilience. 4 Urquhart's testimony is important because Waldheim relied heavily, 
if not exclusively, on Urquhart and his staff. Finger and Saltzman find no major issue on 
which Waldheim ignored or took action contrary to the advice provided by Urquhart and his 
staff. To have blackmailed Waldheim, therefore, would have been to blackmail Urquhart. 
At worst Waldheim may have imposed a degee of pre-emptive self-censorship to 
discourage the use of his war record, bogus or otherwise, against him. At best he 
perpetuated the cover up to avoid opening the Pandora's box which might jeopardise his 
career. 
The conclusions to be drawn from these observations regarding Waldheim's personality 
and approach are twofold. Firstly, given that Waldheim's lies were not uncovered until 
after his tenure and do not appear to relate directly to substantive policy decisions, they only 
contributed to an understanding of his approach if considered a product of his personal 
ambition. Secondly, while personal ambition explains his pragmatic approach, his 
approach to the role of the Secretary-General in the maintenance of international peace and 
security did not have exclusively deleterious effects on that role. However, his undisputed 
propensity to, "bend with the winds, "5 limited the opportunities for further developments in 
the Secretary-General's' role between 1972 and 1982. Waldheim, was as Urquhart, notes, 
11 an energetic ambitious mediocrity. "6 
The SecretarX-General in the Cold War. 
Four Secretaries-General encompassing nearly 40 years of cold war enjoyed very mixed 
fortunes. The division of the period into Secretaries-General between aggrandisement and 
consolidation is somewhat arbitrary but its value is in highlighting the underlying trends in 
the development of the Secretary-General. Despite the circumstances in which the tenures 
of Lie and Hammarskj6ld came to a close, during their time in office the role of the 
1 ibid. 
2Nevt, York Times, 15 January 1972, cited in Finger & Saltzman, op. cit.. p. 64. 
3ibid., p. 229. 
4 Interview, New York December 1994. 
5Finger & Saltzman, title of book, op. cit. 6Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 227. 
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Secretary -General was on an upward curve. Conversely, after 1961 the role of the 
Secretary -General advanced only incrementally during a period of consolidation. The 
historical overview, however, suggests the pre-eminence of the systemic factors in shaping 
the Secretary-General's role, but, organisational factors, (even if they reflect the systemic 
conditions), and personality factors give the analysis greater depth. The levels of analysis 
approach highlights that the impact of developments at the institutional level reflect trends in 
the international system. It suggests that bureaucratic factors were on the whole restrained 
the Secretary -General's evolution, while organic and less formal developments at the 
institutional level opened up new opportunities for the Secretary-General's role. It suggests 
too that within the cold war structure of international relations, systemic, or environmental 
developments were not constant and their consequences for the Secretary -General's role 
mixed. Finally, it also demonstrates that the interaction of personality and approach with 
the systemic and environmental trends were central to the evolution of the Secretary- 
General's role during this period. Taken together, analysis at all three levels explains the 
apparent contradictions that emerge within this historical framework - namely that there are 
perhaps greater similarities between the tenures Hammarskj6ld and U Thant than between 
Lie and Hammarskj6ld or U Thant and Waldheim. Lie and U Thant are seen, in their 
different ways to fight against systemic pressures, while, ironically, given his assertion 
that, "personalities more than anything else influence the destiny of the world, " I Waldheim 
went with them. The difference between Hammarskj6ld and U Thant, therefore, was that 
the second Secretary-General found the constellation of systemic and organisational forces 
flowing with him, or at the very least not against him. On entering office in 1982, Perez de 
Cuellar too found the systemic and organisational factors a constraint on the further 
development of the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
I New York Times, 15 January 1972; see Finger & Saltzman, op. cit., p. 5 1. 
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SECTION 11 
The Role of the Secretary- General in the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security During a Period of Transition 
1982 
When Perez de Cuellar was appointed Secretary-General the fortunes of the UN and its 
Secretary -General had arguably reached their lowest ebb, and the development of the 
Secretary -General's role had virtually ground to a halt. The USSR had invaded 
Afghanistan, Iraq had invaded Iran, and in Namibia there seemed little prospect of 
progress towards South African withdrawal. Within four months, the Argentinean 
invasion of the Falklands was added to the UN's ongoing concerns. Perez de Cuellar's 
inheritance also included a much maligned administration and a new cold war. The 
portents for the Secretary-General were not good. At the same time, however, Perez de 
Cuellar was not encumbered by unduly high expectations. By the end of the decade, 
however, the USSR had left Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq were no longer at war, and 
Namibia, along with a whole host of other nations was a free and independent state. 
Furthermore, Saddam Hussein had been expelled from Kuwait in the first expression of 
collective security by the UN since Korea. The role of the Secretary -General during a 
time of great change is the subject of this section. In this section these conflicts are 
studied not because they demonstrate new developments in the Secretary-General's 
prerogatives, but because they demonstrate how already established prerogatives were 
applied by a new incumbent, and how those prerogatives evolved in a new and wider UN 
schema for the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end, this section 
follows in three chapters the, 'described, explored, explained, ' structure of the previous 
section. Necessarily there is a great deal of continuity with the previous section, 
particularly because those conflicts which began as Waldheim's second term drew to a 
close are considered in their entirety in this section. This overlap has two analytical 
advantages. Firstly, for two different Secretary -General's it holds constant, as 
far as is 
possible, the prevailing systemic, institutional, and organisational factors, and in so doing 
highlights the importance of personality and approach. Secondly, for the period 1982- 
1992 the framework holds constant personality and approach, and emphasises the 
importance of the changing international context during Perez de Cuellar's tenure. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Secretary- General in a Period of Transition Described. 
The Falklands Crisis. 1 April - 14 June 1982. 
The sovereignty of the Falklands Islands was a long standing source of tension between 
Argentina and the United Kingdom, ' but according to the UK permanent representative, 
Sir Anthony Parsons, hit a UN and Security Council, "preoccupied with the Middle East, " 
like, "a bolt from the blue. "2 On 31 March 1982, the Argentina permanent representative, 
Eduardo Roca, informed the US Security Council President, Jeane Kirkpatrick, that 
Argentina was contemplating raising the issue in the Security Council. Conscious of 
being drawn into a public debate in which the US had a conflict of interests, Kirkpatrick 
recommended that Argentina and the UK resolve their differences bilaterally. 3 On I 
April, however, the UK informed the Security Council of its concerns that Argentina was 
preparing to invade the islands, 4 while Argentina announced a situation of 'grave tension' 
existed and reported that British warships were being sent to the region. 5 At this point 
that the Secretary -General became involved for the first time. 
Perez de Cuellar, "alarmed by press reports, ' '6arranged separate meetings with Roca and 
Parsons, and implored both governments to, "exercise restraint. ' 17 In a press conference, 
and then at New York airport en route to Europe for a series of pre-arranged meetings in 
Rome, Geneva, Beme, Austria, and Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General repeated his plea 
publicly. The Secretary-General's appeal for restraint was reiterated by the Security 
Council in a Presidential statement released after informal consultations that afternoon. ' 
On 2 April however, the UK informed the Security Council that the anticipated invasion 
had begun. 9 The Security Council responded uncharacteristically swiftly by determining 
the invasion a breach of the peace, and demanding, "an immediate withdrawal of all 
Argentinean forces. " 10 
Tor a historical summary of British Policy in the Falklands and the Anglo-Argentinean dispute over the 
islands see, The Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, (T'he Franks Report), Falklands Islands 
Review, (London: HMSO, 1982); & The Yearbook of the United Nations, 1982, (New York: The United 
Nations, 1982), p. 1320. 
2Parsons, Sir Anthony, "The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations, 31 March- 14 June 1982, '' International 
Affairs, Volume 59, Number 2, Spring 1983, p. 169. 
3For more on US Foreign Policy in Latin America and US-Argentina relations see the Sunday 
T1111e., 
Insight Team, The Falklands War, (London: Sphere Books, 1982), pp. H 3-116. 
4UK letter to the Security Council, UN Doc. S/ 14942,1 April 1982. 
5Argentinean letter to the Security Council, UN Doc. S/14940, I ApnI 1982. 
6 Parsons, op. cit., p. 169. 
7ibid. 
8UN Doc. S/ 14944,2 April 1982. 
9Letter to the Security Council, UN Doc. S/ 14946,2 April 1982. 
10SC Res. 502,2 April 1982. 
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The Falklands crisis was not a cold war conflict but one party was a permanent member 
of the Security Council. In the Security Council the UK was in a strong position to 
canvass political support and shape UN policy. Argentina, on the other hand, had to relý' 
for representation on the non-aligned non permanent members. Despite non-aligned 
sympathies with Argentinean claims against British colonialism North-South Ideological 
divisions did not prejudice debate as Argentina hoped. The UK instead drafted, 
introduced, and won support for SCR 502 without substantive amendment, albeit by the 
narrowest of margins. I This resolution formed the bedrock of British diplomacy in which 
Parsons explained, 
"Britain had secured a firm base of international support amongst a wide 
spectrum of member states, without which, in my view it would have been 
difficult to persuade our partners, friends an allies to join us in the 
economic and political measures which couples with military action under 
Article 51 fon-ned the three planks of British Government policy. "- 
Having secured the safe passage of SCR 502 and the implicit authorisation of the right to 
self defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter'3 the UK had little more to gain from 
the Security Council. The vote was so close that enforcing compliance through the 
Security Council was not an option. Moreover, further discussions in the Security 
Council forum could only increase the international pressure on Britain to compromise if 
the crisis continued unresolved, or were to escalate. The veto remained an option of last 
resort but its application would bring into question the efficacy of British intent. British 
UN policy was therefore now redirected to curtailing Security Council consideration of 
the Falklands. From this point, the Security Council ceased to play any meaningful role 
in the Falklands. It would be another month, however, before Perez de Cuellar became 
involved substantively in the search for a solution to the Falklands crisis. Instead it was 
the US Secretary of State Al Haig who took on responsibility for brokering a peaceful 
solution to the crisis. 
US Secretary of State versus Secretary-General. 
In the US, the UK had an ally in keeping discussion of the Falklands crisis out of the 
Security Council. The US willingness to assist in the search for a peaceful solution was 
heavily influenced by the conflict of US interests in Latin America with Anglo-American 
'The only amendment was to add Islas Malvinas to every reference to the Falkland 
Islands. Voting wa" 10 
for, (UK, US, France Guyana, Ireland, Poland, Togo, Uganda, & Jordan), I against, (Panama), and 4 
abstentions, (China, USSR, Poland, & Spain). For further details of the debate see Parsons, op. cit., pp. 
169-172; The Sunday Times Insight Team, op. cit., pp. 110- 113; & Yearbook of the United 
Nations 1982, 
OP. cit., pp. 1321-2. 
2Parsons, op. cit., p. 172. 3"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the fight of individual or collective self-defence is an 
an-ned 
attacks occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. " 
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relations. A partisan stance would sacrifice one or other whereas a US-brokered accord 
might save both. The US, however, was not well suited to a third party role. 
Firstly, serving as a third party between two allies is fraught with problems caused by the 
expectations of those allies. The failure of the US to come out and publicly support 
Britain immediately Argentina invaded the Falklands was a source of tension in the 
I special relationship; a relationship which led the British to expect the US to pressurise 
Argentina during the negotiating process. Conversely, given that the Argentinean 
decision to invade the Falklands was based, in part, on a miscalculation of the strength 
and importance to the US of Argentinean -American relations, the Junta expected the US 
to support and represent their sovereignty claims to the British Government. Rather than 
fostering diplomatic progress, Haig's shuttle diplomacy encouraged both sides to adopt 
less compromising positions. 
Secondly, such is the nature of international politics, it cannot be assumed that a national 
intermediary does not have a vested interest or hierarchy of interests. ' Boudreau argues 
that, "third party duties should be accepted only by those that can keep a commitment to 
impartiality and service throughout a crisis; otherwise much momentum in mediatory 
efforts is JoSt. 112 In the Falklands the US did not fit Boudreau's criterion. In supporting 
SCR 502, at an early stage the US had indicated where its allegiance lay. The vote was so 
close that an abstention by the US and one other state would have derailed the resolution. 
According to one review, throughout the-crisis Haig pursued, "a policy of even- 
handedness with the single option of support for Britain in the event of its failure. "' 
When the US eventually did come down off the fence to back Britain, "it left a gaping 
void in the interventionary efforts. "4 For similar reasons the Peruvian leader, Dr. 
Belaunde was unable to fill the vacuum left by the failure of Haig's shuttle diplomacy and 
US partiality. In the first instance Belaunde's efforts were undermined because, "drawn 
up in consultation with Haig ... they were tarred with the same 
brush. "5 Peruvian 
diplomacy, however, was crippled by the sinking of the Belgrano on 2 May. The 
escalation of the Falklands crisis not only blocked progress on the proposals put forward 
'That is not to say that mediation by states cannot succeed, merely that Boudreau's criteria Is a sound basis 
on which mediation be undertaken by any third party. The Secretary-General's office always fulfils that 
criteria and nations do not necessarily. States, however can bring to the diplomatic process greater political 
leverage which the Secretary-General cannot, unless backed by a Security Council with the political will to 
do so. 
2Boudreau, Thomas, E., Sheathing the Sword: The UN Secretary- General and the Prevention of 
International Conflict, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 84. 
3Unpublished Falklands Literature Review, personal files, David Allen, Department of European 
Studies. 
Loughborough University. 
4ibid. 
5Sunday Times Insight Team, op. cit., p. 170. 
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by Belaunde, but also prompted Belaunde to withdraw from a third party role altogether, 
"for fear of prejudicing Peruvian relations with the Junta. "' 
Perez de Cuellar Takes Over. 
For the first month of the crisis Perez de Cuellar was effectively sidelined by Haig's 
shuttle diplomacy. This is not to say that the Secretary -General was inactive. The 
Sunday Times Insight Team describe the Secretary -General's initial preparations for 
intervening in the Falklands as, 'characteristically modest, ' and note that the Secretary- 
General was careful, "to distance himself from both camps. "2 From the beginning of the 
crisis the Secretary-General was kept informed of developments by Parsons, Roca, and 
Enrique Ros, (Roca's successor). The development of these personal contacts was 
invaluable in establishing the trust upon which the adversaries were later prepared to 
engage the Secretary -General's good offices. 3 On 8 April the Secretary -General 
established a task force under the direction of under- secretary-general Rafee Ahmed to 
make preparations for such an eventuality, and on 19 April, in separate meetings, the 
Secretary -General was able to inform the representatives of Argentina and the UK of the 
assistance the UN could provide. 4 On 30 April Haig admitted defeat and the US publicly 
sided with Britain. Britain and Argentina had been equally uncompromising in their 
preconditions for talks. For Britain, Argentinean withdrawal was a pre-condition, 5 
whereas Argentina was not prepared to negotiate, nevermind withdraw, unless Britain 
first recognised Argentinean sovereignty over the islands. 6 Given that Britain recaptured 
South Georgia on 26 April, and sank the Belgrano on 2 May, and that in retaliation 
Argentina sank HMS Sheffield on 4 May, the task assigned the Secretary -General was 
formidable. 
On 2 May the Secretary-General again met separately with the two sides to convey a set 
of ideaS7which might provide the basis for progress towards a negotiated settlement. 
Parsons states that the Secretary-General's proposals included: mutual withdrawal; the 
commencement of diplomatic negotiations for a definitive settlement of the dispute; the 
lifting of sanctions and exclusion zones; and the establishment of transitional 
arrangements in the Falklands pending the outcome of the diplomatic negotiations. 8 'ne 
1 ibid. 
2ibid., p. 17 1. 
3For further details of the communications of the UK and Argentina with the Secretary -General 
between 3 
April and 21 May, see the Yearbook of the United Nations 1982, op. cit., pl). 1322-8. 
4See Yearbook of the United Nations 1982, op. cit., p. 1322. 5See telegrams transmitted to Security Council, UN Docs. S/14974,13 April 1982, &S 14987.19 April 
1982. 
6Argentinean policy statement in Security Council meeting of 2 April, 1982 which approved 
SCR 502. See 
Yearbook of the United Nations 1982, op. cit., p. 1320. 
7 Parsons, op. cit., p. 173. 8ibid. 
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Secretary-General's proposals did not differ substantially from those on which both Haig 
and Belaunde sought agreement but were accepted as grounds for continuance. 
Furthermore, the Secretary-General received official support for his initiative from the 
Security Council On 5 May. As the situation deteriorated, Ireland and Columbia 
requested the Security Council reconvene, ' but in informal consultations the Security 
Council agreed that it was better, "to allow the Secretary -General to pursue his 
negotiations without the hindrance of an acrimonious public debate. ' Q Subsequently, the 
Security Council President issued a statement, "expressing strong support for the 
Secretary -General with regard to his contacts with the two parties. ' '3 Henceforth, the 
Secretary -General became much more than just a 'letter carrier' between the two Parties. 
Between 7 and 21 May Perez de Cuellar held, "some thirty separate meetings''-, with 
Parsons and Ros to promote an agreement along the lines outlined in his proposals. Not 
once did Argentina and the UK sit down at the same table. During this period, according 
to one of the negotiators, "he [Perez de Cuellar] would warn us where there was no 
chance of our position being accepted, and suggest possible ways round the problem. The 
talks were between three professionals who knew each other. They were conducted in a 
very orderly, straightforward way. 115 
Throughout these talks, which Parsons describes as, "the most intense and vigorous series 
of negotiations, "6 Perez de Cuellar was able to gain concessions from both sides. Rather 
than insisting on the unconditional withdrawal of Argentina and a return to the status quo 
ante, Britain was prepared to accept mutual withdrawal under UN supervision and the set 
up of an interim UN administration pending the outcome of negotiations on the future of 
the islands. These concessions were in no small part due to an Argentinean compromise 
on the principle of sovereignty - on II May Argentina had stated it was prepared, "not to 
place any preconditions on the negotiations in view of its confidence in its legitimate 
stand. "7 By 15 May Perez de Cuellar believed that Argentina and the UK had reached an 
interim agreement, "without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions and it would 
include a cease-fire, phased mutual withdrawal of forces under UN supervision, 
termination of exclusion zones and economic measures, interim administration of the 
territory under UN authority and negotiations towards a settlement under the auspices of 
the Secretary-General. 118 The Secretary-General acknowledged that, "crucial differences 
I See UN Docs. S/ 15037 & S/ 15045 respectively, 4 May 1982. 
2Parsons, op. cit., p. 173. 3Statement by the President of the Security Councl*l, UN Doc. S/ 15047,5 May 1982. 
4yearbook of the United Nations 1982, op. cit., p. 1328. 51nterview quoted by the Sunday Times Insight Team, op. cit., p. 172. 6parsons, op. cit., p. 173. 7Yearbook of the United Nations 1982, op. cit., p. 1329. 8ibid. 
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remained, " I but members of the Secretary -General's task force believed they were 
extremely close to striking a deal. 2 Parsons also admits that a diplomatic solution did not 
seem an impossibility, 3 and a member of Haig's diplomatic corps is reported as 
commenting, "my God if the British had gone a quarter of this way in April we'd have had 
ourselves a deal. ' 14 At this point Parsons returned to England to clarify and confirm 
Britain's position with the Cabinet. On 17 May Parsons returned to New York with 
Britain's final position which was transmitted to Argentina through Perez de Cuellar 
On 18 May the Secretary-General informed Parsons that Argentina had rejected the 
British proposal. Furthermore, despite pressure from the US, Argentina reverted to its 
original stance on the sovereignty of the islands. A military solution now seemed 
inevitable and in a last ditch attempt to avert conflict Perez de Cuellar spoke directly with 
President Galtieri and Prime Minister Thatcher. The telephone conversations were 
followed up with a memorandum to both governments outlining the situation as he 
understood it, including a possible game plan for continuation. Thatcher and Galtieri 
agreed to consider the memorandum. Admitting points of difference existed between the 
Secretary-General's proposals and those of Britain, Parsons informed the Secretary- 
General that the UK was prepared to talk but not without hearing Argentinean views. No 
further communications were forthcoming from Argentina. On 20 May Perez de Cuellar 
reported to the Security Council, "that although substantial progress had been achieved in 
the preceding two weeks ... in his judgement the efforts 
in which he had been engaged, 
with the support of the Security Council, did not currently offer the prospect of bringing 
and end to the crisis nor of preventing the intensification of the conflict. 115 
The Secretary -General's role in preventing and resolving conflict in the Falklands really 
came to an end here. On 21 May Britain began operations to retake the Falklands which 
were completed with the surrender of Argentina on 14 June. The Sandwich islands were 
retaken on 24 June and a return to the status quo ante enforced. On 21 May the Security 
Council was reconvened at the request of Panama. 6 Five days of deliberation produced a 
request for the Secretary -General to renew his good-offices, and report 
back within seven 
dayS. 7 With the onset of war, however, the time for negotiation had passed. 
'Those differences included: certain aspects of the interim administration, the time frame for completion of 
the negotiations, the mutual withdrawal of the forces and how they are to be covered 
by the terms of 
agreement. ibid. 
21nterviews conducted by Boudreau, op. cit., p. 85. 31'arsons, op. cit., p. 173. 4The Sunday Times Insight Team, op. cit., p. 174. 
5Reproduced in Yearbook of the United Nations 1982, op. cit., p. 1328. 6UN Doc. S/ 1500 21 May 1982. 
7SC Res. 505,26 May 1982. 
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Why Mediation Failed. 
Firstly, although concessions were made to Perez de Cuellar, the fundamental positions of 
the adversaries remained largely unchanged and resurfaced in differences over the nature 
of the intefim administration. Britain was prepared to accept an interim UN 
administration, with UK and Argentinean representatives, provided the existing 
democratic framework and structures remained in place. Given the islanders wishes, 
negotiations that progressed on the UN principle of self-determination would result in a 
return to the status quo ante. The Argentineans concession on sovereignty and 
acceptance of negotiations, however, was based on the proviso of an, "exclusively UN 
administration, " which would guarantee, "parity in numbers of advisors between the 
Argentine population of thirty and the British population of eighteen hundred, " coupled 
with freedom of access and residential rights for Argentinean citizens. I Clearly the 
demographic impact would alter the outcome of negotiations based on the principle of 
self determination. In this sense the concessions the Secretary -General attained must be 
qualified by the continued intransigence of both parties. In the account of his efforts 
presented to the Security Council, the Secretary -General was therefore forced to conclude 
that the British final draft, and the position adopted by Argentina, failed to mirror the 
progress he felt had been made over the preceding two weeks. 2 
Moreover, the concessions being made at the UN were not being mirrored by actions in 
the field or governmental rhetoric for domestic audiences. Both governments were 
trapped by the xenophobic jingoism their actions and public statements had fanned. 
Withdrawal could not be on equal terms and therefore no face-saving compromise was 
ever really available. The capture of the Falklands was to be a military coup for a military 
Junta, which would deflect attention from the political, economic, and social ruin into 
which Argentina was falling. To back down in the face of international pressure would 
almost certainly mean revolution at home. The Junta had limited scope for compromise, 
especially while Galtieri continued to promise that, "not one metre would be given back 
to the invaders [UK]. "3 It seems the Junta had miscalculated the US and non-aligned 
reaction and strength of support. The Junta also had not foreseen a military response 
from 
Britain, the position, policy, and rhetoric of whom over the preceding 25 years indicated 
indifference towards the status and future of Falklands and its inhabitants. 4 Rather, 
Argentina had anticipated that presented with a fait accompli Britain would eventually 
'Sunday Times Insight Team, op. cit., p. 174. 
2Statement to the Security Council on 21 May 1982, see Yearbook of the United 
Nations 1982, op. bt., p. 
1329. 
3President Galtieri in a public address quoted by the Sunday Times Insight 
Team, op. cit.. p 119. 
4See The Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (The Franks Report), 
Falklands Islands ReOcit, I 
(London: HMSO, 1982). 
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concede the sovereignty of the islands. For a British Government shortly to go to the 
polls, however, the recapture of the islands had become a matter of national pride. 
Secondly, in passing SCR 502 the Security Council lost any leverage it might have been 
able to exert over Britain. In Charter terms the Security Council had begun well, albeit 
under British leadership, by recognising and condemning the Argentinean invasion as an 
unwarranted act of aggression. The Security Council, however, was unable to follow 
through with the measure the Charter prescribes - to rebuke the Junta and repel invasion. 
The'Council's way' was not an option because of British policy, the reluctance of the US 
to choose between two allies, and non-aligned sympathies with the Argentinean case. 
After the failure of Haig's shuttle diplomacy the initiative came to rest with the Perez de 
Cuellar. The 'Secretary-General's way'relied on a combination of the willingness of the 
parties to compromise and the international pressure that can be brought to bear on the 
parties to settle. SCR 502 sacrificed both. By publicly condemning the Junta, the 
Security Council relieved international pressure on the UK to resolve differences with 
Argentina diplomatically, and enabled the UK to adopt a more uncompromising stance in 
the negotiations which followed. This assessment is reaffirmed by British policy after 
SCR 502 was passed, and which was described by the Insight team as, "bent with great 
single-mindedness towards one single aim: keeping the Falklands out of the Security 
Council. "' The initial Security Council response which was in accordance with the 
practice prescribed by the Charter was at cross purposes with a negotiated settlement to 
both the immediate crisis and the long term issues surrounding the sovereignty of the 
islands, regardless of who the intermediary might be. 
The Iran-Irall War. 
The Iran-Iraq War began on 22 September 1980, fifteen months before Perez de Cuellar 
came to Office. Once again the immediate decisions of the Security Council had 
ramifications for the role that the Secretary-General, be that Waldheim or Perez de 
Cuellar, would undertake. For the sake of continuity the whole of the Iran-Iraq war is 
considered in this chapter. This has the additional advantage of contrasting the 
approaches of Waldheim and Perez de Cuellar to the same conflict. 
Iran-Iraq 1980-86: Leave it to the Secretary-General. 
Saddam Hussein's aggression was motivated by the potent combination of the 
destabilising temper of the Iranian Islamic revolution coupled with, "a prolonged period 
of escalation of tension between the two countries. "' Waldheim immediately appealed 
for 
'The Sunday Times Insight Team, op. cit., pp. 170- 1. 
I the Iran - Iraq War and the Gulf 
Ch.,, 2Avakov, V., "The Secretary -General in the Afghanistan Conflict, 
in Rivlin & Gordenker, The Challenging Role of the UN Secreta ry- General, (Westport: Praeger, 
1993), p. 
174. On history of Iran-Iraq relations and build up to war see: The United Nations and the 
Iran-Iraq ýVar, 
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the combatants to exercise restraint, offered his good offices, and requested that the 
Security Council President arrange informal consultations of the whole. The initial 
informal consultations concluded with a Presidential Statement on 23 September which 
merely reiterated the Secretary-General's earlier plea. Hume describes the Security 
Council's reaction as, "an extremely limp response to the outbreak of a war certain to have 
major consequences. "' The Secretary-General then wrote to the Security Council 
President repeating his opinion that a threat to international peace and security existed 
that warranted Security Council attention but did not request that the Security Council be 
convened. 2 Waldheim's attempt to convene the Security Council informally was not 
heeded, and the Security Council finally met from 26-28 September at the request of 
Mexico and Norway. 3 The sponsorship of a Security Council meeting by Mexico and 
Norway, however, had the desired effect. Waldheirn was saved from invoking Article 99 
fully and taking a public stance on the Iran-Iraq War which might have prevented him 
from serving as an impartial third party thereafter. 4 
The Security Council response, however, was only marginally less flaccid than the 
Presidential Statement. Discussions which Urquhart described as, "depressing and 
undignified, " and characterised by, "mindless pettifogging, ' '5produced a toothless 
resolution which merely called upon Iran and Iraq to, "refrain immediately from any 
further use of force, " and, "supported the efforts of the Secretary-General and the offer of 
his Good Offices for the resolution of this situation. ' '6 The Security Council gave further 
consideration to the Iran-Iraq conflict during October before releasing another 
Presidential Statement on 5 November which again merely, "reiterated their full support 
for the use of the Secretary-General's good offices ... and appealed to 
both parties to 
support the efforts of the Secretary-General. "7 The Presidential Statement also took the 
unusual step of emphasising the participation of the Secretary-General in Security 
Council consultations, indicating from the outset that at the UN the Security Council was 
passing responsibility for handling the Iran-Iraq conflict to the Secretary -General. 
(New York; The Ford Foundation, 1987), pp. 7-9; Berridge, G. R., Return to the UN: UN Diploniacý, in 
Regional Conflicts, (London: Macmillan , 1991), pp. 
43-6; and Hume, C. R., The United Nations, Iran. and 
Iraq: How Peacemaking Changed, (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 21-8 & 
36-8. 
'Hume, C. R., The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq: How Peacemaking Changed, (Bloomincyton, 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 38. 
2UN Docs. S/ 14196,23 September 1980 and S/ 14917,25 September 1980. 
3UN Doc. S/ 14190,23 September 1980. 
4The joint Norway/Mexico initiative was probably taken for this very reason. 
5Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 325. 6SC Res. 479,28 September 1980. 
7UN Doc. S/ 14244,5 November, 1980 and Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, p. 317. 
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Waldheim Balks: Leave it to the Special Representative. 
The search for a solution to the Gulf war was left to the Secretary -General but Waldhelm 
was an unwilling and unacceptable intermediary. Berridge and Urquhart note that in his 
initiatives to resolve the hostage crisis, Waldheim appeared to Iran to be an American 
stooge. ' Avakov also notes that, "his [Waldheim's] unhappy experience during the 
hostage crisis ... deterred him 
from pursuing any form of preventive diplomacy in the 
Iran-Iraq situation. 2 Waldheim also took the inconceivable step for the Secretary-General 
of justifying Security Council inactivity on the grounds it might erode the Security 
Council's neutrality. 3 If the Secretary-General was not already unacceptable he had 
ensured he personally could play no meaningful role by siding with the Security Council. 
Through a combination of choice and circumstance Waldheim passed responsibility to the 
former Swedish Prime Minister, Olaf Palme, as his special representative. On his 
appointment Palme emphasised the importance of personality and impartiality by stating, 
"it may be crazy to send a pragmatic Scandinavian with no knowledge on this mission but 
I have no prejudgements and I like both parties. "4 The authority on which Palme was 
acting remained firmly rooted within the office of the Secretary-General, and in five 
rounds of negotiation between 1980 and 1982 Palme, "sought commitments from the 
parties vis-a-vis the Secretary -General rather than with each other. "5 Implicit in his 
statement and approach was that he was acting on behalf of the institution of the 
Secretary-General rather than its incumbent. The role of the Secretary -General or his 
special or personal representative, in any case, is founded on a combination of personal 
and institutional authority. In the Iran-Iraq war, however, an unusual step had been taken 
in distinguishing between and separating the institutional authority of the office from its 
incumbent in favour of a more acceptable personality. Kurt Waldheim had in effect 
applied the Peking Formula to himself. Palme's negotiations, however, floundered on the 
preconditions for talks set by Iran and Iraq. Iran insisted that Iraqi troops must first be 
withdrawn from Iranian territory and Iraq was only willing to accept a cease-fire if Iran 
first recognised Iraqi sovereignty over the Shatt. 
Perez de Cuellar and Humanitarian Diplomacy. 
In October 1982 Palme reported to the new S ecretary- General that his efforts over the 
preceding two years had produced, "no substantial progress. 116With Iranian and 
Iraqi 
positions entrenched between 1982 and 1986 the new Secretary -General's role was 
limited in scope to humanitarian diplomacy. Perez de Cuellar first became 
involved in, 
'See Berridge, (199 1), op. cit., p. 49, & Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., pp. 283-4 
& 322-4. 
2Avakov, op. cit., p. 159. 3Waldheim, K., In the Eye of the Storm: The Memoirs of Kurt Waldheim, (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1985), p. 172; relate to personality and approach, pp. 217-26. 'Quoted by Hume, op. cit., p. 42, from The New York Times, 21 November, 
1980. 
5ibid., p. 42. 6UN Doc. S/ 15449,7 October 1982. 
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"protecting the innocent, "' in May 1983. On 2 May Iran repeated allegations that Iraq 
was bombing civilian targets and requested that the Secretary -General investigate. 2 Iran 
also indicated that it had no objections if Iraq wanted to make reciprocal arrangements. In 
a reply on 12 May, Iraq countered that Iran had bombed Iraqi civilian areas. 3 Having 
notified the Security Council, on his own authority Perez de Cuellar sent a fact-finding 
mission to both countries. For a short time, the Secretary -General was able to secure 
agreement from both Iran and Iraq not to target civilian areas. As the war escalated, 
however, these agreements were inevitably broken. In this first action, however, 
Boudreau observes that, "a precedent had been established for co-operation between the 
two governments with the United Nations. ' '4Moreover, Perez de Cuellar established, 
"trust and compliance for the direct involvement of the Secretary -General in humanitarian 
affairs. ' '5 This trust and compliance was to be tested by further Iranian allegations that 
Iraq was using chemical weapons. 
Iran first alleged Iraqi use of chemical weapons on 3 November 1983.6 In March 1984 
Iran requested the Secretary -General investigate the chemical and military evidence of 
these alleged attacks. 7 This request had the potential to compromise the Secretary- 
General's impartiality and integrity. To accede to a request which was opposed by Iraq 
could jeopardise any good will Perez de Cuellar had built up in Baghdad. Not to accede 
to the request would make the Secretary-General no better than the Security Council in 
Iranian eyes. It would also represent a failure to fulfil the obligations of the Charter. 
Citing the moral responsibility of his Office, Perez de Cuellar acted neutrally in terrns of 
the humanitarian principles of the Charter and international law, (the Geneva Protocol of 
1925), and again on his own authority dispatched a fact-finding mission from 13-19 
March 1984. The Secretary -General made it clear that his actions did not represent 
concurrence with the Iranian allegations but that he was fulfilling his duty to establish the 
facts, and the conclusions of his report would be predetermined only by these facts. The 
report of this first mission, "unanimously concluded that chemical weapons in the form of 
aerial bombs had been used. "8 Subsequently, the Security Council released another 
toothless Presidential Statement condemning the use of chemical weapons, but not Iraq 
specifically. 9 Perez de Cuellar, however, emerged with his integrity as Secretary -General 
'Boudreau, op. cit., p. 90. 2UN Doc. S/ 15834,20 June 1983. 
3ibid. 
4Boudreau, op. cl . t., P. 9 1. 5ibid. 
6UN Doc. S/ 16128,3 November, 1983. 
7UN Doc. S/ 16433,21 March 1984. 
8Yearbook of the United Nations, 1984, p. 232. For first report see UN Doc. S/ 164433,30 March 
1984. 
The Secretary-General would send a further seven missions between 1984 and 1988, see UN Doc. 
S, '20060, 
20 July 1988. 
9UN Doc. S/ 16454,30 March 1984. 
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intact, and his personal acceptance as a third party unharmed, and probably enhanced. As 
Franck observes, "despite the fact that this may have damaged his impartiality in Iraqi 
eyes both parties to the conflict continued to accept him as a good mediator. ", 
This was most in evidence in the moratorium on attacks on civilian populations that the 
Secretary -General was able to secure between June 1984 and March 1985. Following 
confirmation by the International Committee of the Red Cross, (ICRC), of an escalation 
in the attacks on civilian populations on and after 5 June, 2Perez de Cuellar, "called on 
both Governments to make a solemn commitment to him to end and in the future refrain 
from initiating, deliberate military attacks on purely civilian population centreS. "3 The 
Secretary-General also informed Iran and Iraq that he was prepared to, "initiate steps to 
introduce verification measures, " to reinforce his plea. 4 On 10 June the Secretary-General 
5 received favourable responses from both countries, and by 14 June Perez de Cuellar had 
secured agreement from Iran and Iraq on the stationing of United Nations Inspection 
Teams, (UNITs), in Baghdad and Teheran to observe and verify adherence to their 
commitment. 6With the agreement of the Security Council the UNITS became operative 
in Baghdad on 20 June and Teheran on 26 June. 7 Founded under the authority of the 
S ecre tary -General the UNITs had a humanitarian fact-finding mandate clearly within the 
remit of Article 99. This in itself was nothing new. The Secretary-General, however 
cannot take such action without the consent of the parties to the dispute. While the 
observer missions had limited impact they did demonstrate that Perez de Cuellar had not 
lost favour with Iran or Iraq. 8 
The cumulative effect of the Secretary-General's intervention on humanitarian grounds in 
these three instances extends beyond saving lives. As Avakov observes, by 1985 Perez de 
Cuellar, "was practically the only political figure in the world who commanded the 
respect of both sides engaged in the fighting. "9 Intervention on humanitarian grounds, 
however, cannot be a substitute for the solution to the conflict. Moreover, it cannot be 
discounted that the Office was being used for propaganda purposes by both Governments 
and that neither ever intended paying the Secretary-General's efforts anything more than 
lip-service. For these reasons , in 
March 1985 Perez de Cuellar initiated the first efforts by 
I Franck T. M., & Nolte G., "The Good Offices Function of the UN Secretary-General., " in Roberts A., & 
Kingsbury., United Nations Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations, 2nd Ed., (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 160. 
2UN Doc. S. 16611,11 June 1984. 
3Yearbook of the United Nations, 1984, p. 236. Also see UN Doc. S/ 16611,11 
June 1984. 
4ibid. 
5UN Docs. S/ 16609 (Iran), and S/ 16610 (Iraq), 10 June 1984. 
6UN Doc. S/ 16627,14 June 1984. 
7UN Doc. S/ 16628,15 June 1984. 
8See James, (1990), op. cit., pp. 168-9. 
9Boudreau, op. cit., p. 93. 
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the Secretary -General to negotiate a cease-fire and Political settlement since the five 
rounds of talks, led by Olaf Palme, were aborted in 1982. 
As once more the fighting escalated the Secretary-General's moratorium collapsed. 
Seizing the initiative, on 26 March, in separate meetings, (the Falklands format), Perez de 
Cuellar presented an eight point peace plan to the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, 
Kazenpour Ardebili, and the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. Both sides agreed that 
the Secretary -General's proposals merited further discussion. To this end Perez de 
Cuellar visited Teheran on 7 April and Baghdad on 8 April 1985. 
Points two to seven of that plan included: the cessation of attacks on cities, civil aviation, 
civilian shipping, and port facilities; coupled with observance of the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons and the 1949 Geneva Convention vis-a-vis 
Prisoner of War. These measures would underpin a cease-fire, (point 1), on which peace 
talks would begin under the Secretary-General's auspices, (point 8). 1 Like the Secretary- 
General's diplomacy, the plan built on the humanitarian foundations of the previous three 
years work, a point which Perez de Cuellar emphasised in presenting the plan to informal 
consultations of the Security Council. 
"I want to reaffirm that my main goal is, as it ought to be finding a way to 
end the tragic conflict and also to bring an end to the inadmissible 
practices that it has given riseto. "2 (emphasis added). 
Why Humanitarian Diplomacy Failed. 
The Secretary -General was left to take the lead role but continued to find the adversaries, 
(especially Iran), unyielding in their positions. Iran continued to insist on Security 
Council condemnation of the original Iraqi aggression and that Iraq pay war reparations, 
whereas Iraq was prepared to accept a cease-fire only if Iranian troops were withdrawn 
from Iraqi territory and Iran recognised Iraqi sovereignty over the Shatt. The Secretary- 
General was resigned to joining the Islamic Conference Peace Committee, Algeria, India, 
the non-aligned, Japan, Syria, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates as intermediaries 
who failed to broker a cease-fire and resolution of the differences between Iran and Iraq. 
As Avakov explains, 
"The destiny of the Secretary -General's peace proposals showed once more 
that where there is no political will on the part of the parties concerned, the 
Secretary-General has practically no chance of success. Even in theory, he 
has neither the constitutional power nor the institutional instruments to 
impose anything on. the parties in a conflict. In this particular case, his 
For further details of the eight point peace plan see Hume, op. cit., pp. 50-5 1; Hume, 
"Perez de Cuellar and 
the Iran-Iraq War, " Negotiation Journal, 1992, April, pp. 176-7; & Urquhart, Brian, 'The United Nations 
and the Iran-Iraq War, " SIPRI Yearbook 1988, (London: Oxford University Press Ltd., 1988), p. 
5 10. 
2Hume, op, cit., p. 5 1. 
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position was weakened by the lack of any real supportfrom the Security 
Council. (emphasis added). "' 
By 1982, Iran had expelled Iraqi troops enforcing a return to the status quo ante, 
presenting the UN with a new and rare opportunity. Sick explains, 
"If Iran had chosen to sue for peace in mid 1982, it would have been in a 
good position to influence the terms of settlement. At this time Iran was 
widely perceived as having snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, and 
its military forces were regarded as perhaps the most potent in the region. 
By pursuing peace Iran could have gone far toward restoring its image 
with both the regional states and the international community, and it could 
have established a role for itself as a power broker in the region. Instead 
Iran, once again chose to let its revolutionary fervour overcome a realistic 
appraisal of its long term interests. ' 12 
By condemning the original Iraqi invasion of Iran, the Security Council could have 
fostered this process. Rather, its continued failure to do so fostered the belligerence and 
intransigence of Iran. The Security Council members now seemed more concerned by the 
prospect of Iranian aggrandisement. With Iran in the ascendancy and taking the war to 
Iraq, the Security Council acted with the conviction it lacked when Iraqi troops violated 
Iranian territorial integrity. On 14 July 1982 the Security Council passed a resolution 
calling for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of all troops to internationally recognised 
boundaries. 3 Between 1982 and 1986 the Security Council passed a further five 
resolutions which only differed from SCR 514 in that they also addressed specific issues 
arising from the conflict: attacks on civilian populations; the use of chemical weapons; 
the treatment of prisoners of war; and the freedom of navigation in Gulf Waters. These 
resolutions and the Presidential Statements issued by the Security Council had no bearing 
on the conflict and the war degenerated into a bloody stalemate. With a thaw in relations 
between the superpowers, the process of redressing this imbalance began in 1986. 
Iran-Iraq War 1986-88: Invigorating the Security Council. 
On 10 February 1986 the Arab League Committee members of the Security Council 
called a Security Council meeting on Iraq's behalf following renewed Iranian ground 
offensives and the capture of the strategically significant FAO Peninsula. In an effort to 
improve the Security Council's ability to address the Iran-Iraq War Australia, Denmark 
and France implored Iran to end its Security Council boycott. More significantly, 
however, the early 1980s freeze in superpower relations was beginning to thaw. 
Although Iran had long since ceased to be an innocent victim of Iraqi aggrandisement, the 
non aligned movement seized the opportunity to initiate discussions, first amongst 
'Avakov, op. cit., p. 161. 2S, A. G., "Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War, " Middle East Journal, Vol. 43, Spnng 1989, 
pp. 236-7, quoted by Hume, op. cit., p. 46. ýS(' Res. 5 14,12 July 1982. 
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themselves, and then with the remaining non-permanent members on a draft resolution 
identifying Iraq as the original perpetrator of war. Representing the ten non-permanent 
members, the ambassador for Trinidad and Tobago presented their collective position to 
the permanent members. For a Security Council that had consistently demonstrated a pro- 
Iraqi bias this would have been a radical departure from past positions. The permanent 
members, therefore, worked together to produce an alternative draft which was then 
returned to the non-permanent members. After further discussions between the two 
groups SCR 582 was passed on 24 February, 1986. While SCR 582 did not specifically 
condemn Iraq as the aggressor it did state, "the Security Council deplores the initial acts 
which gave rise to the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq and deplores 
the continuation of the conflict. " As Hume observes, SCR 582 was, "at most a veiled 
concession to the Iranian demand that the Security Council acknowledge its failure to 
condemn the Iraqi invasion. "' While this concession was acknowledged by Tehran it was 
not sufficient to prompt a return to the Security Council and once more the Security 
Council was accused by Iran of, "double standards and partiality. "2 
More significant than the content of the resolution and the Iranian response was a 
departure from procedural non-ns in Security Council decision-making. The collective 
approach by the non-permanent members prompted the major powers to act and consult 
as a group. Further co-operation was stimulated as stalemate returned to the front lines 
and the conflict spilled into the Gulf during 1986. The so called, 'tanker war, 'now 
threatened to escalate into a wider regional conflict and pull in the superpowers. Kuwait 
requested protection for eleven tankers from both the US and the USSR. In February the 
USSR agreed to reflag and protect five Kuwaiti tankers. To combat an increase in the 
Soviet naval presence and influence in the Gulf the US countered with an offer to protect 
the entire fleet. Kuwait accepted the US offer but chartered three Soviet tankers for, 
"diplomatic insurance. "3 The Kuwaiti request raised the stakes in the Gulf. While at the 
systemic level superpower relations continued to improve, their intervention threatened to 
upset the balance of power between the superpowers. Hume argues there was now a 
growing realisation that, "co-operation rather than competition would better serve both 
Soviet and US interests. "4 
Against this background the Secretary -General initiated efforts to promote a collective 
response to the conflict by the Security Council. On 13 January 1987, Perez de Cuellar 
held a press conference in which he called for a, 'meeting of the minds, ' between the 
perrnanent members and, in a departure from previous positions, emphasised that in the 
'ibid. p. 76. 2Avakov, op. cit., p. 160. 3Hume, op. cit., p. 98. 4ibid., pp. 98-9. 
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search for common ground, the permanent members, "should not s= out by looking for 
positions to satisfy the parties. " I The Secretary-General was encouraging a concerted 
effort to address the Iran-Iraq war with the possibility of resort to the enforcement 
measures provided for by Chapter VIL To this end on 16 January the Secretary -General 
held a, 'tea party, ' in his thirty-eighth floor Office for the ambassadors of the permanent 
five and the Security Council President. Hume, then a member of the US UN delegation 
describes this meeting, 
"Perez de Cuellar asked the ambassadors to reflect on this request that the 
Security Council find a common line for dealing with the war. The 
ambassadors might meet privately and informally, keeping the discussion 
off the Council's agenda until they had explored all possibilities for a 
meeting of minds. Should the Council agree on a new basis for action, 
perhaps it should meet at the level of foreign ministers to signify the 
importance of the step. ' 12 
Having consulted with their respective governments the ambassadors reconvened in the 
Secretary -General's office on 23 January 1987. All had been authorised to proceed along 
the lines proposed by the Secretary-General. At this meeting the US forwarded a 
proposal for a chapter VII resolution ordering a cease-fire with the threat of sanctions if 
compliance was not forthcoming. The US proposal was not discussed specifically but 
there was agreement on the need for a more forthright, concerted and co-ordinated 
approach. This was the response the Secretary-General hoped for. 
The Twin Track Approach. 
By 29 May, after five months of intense private consultations the permanent five 
informed the Secretary-General of their readiness to open up discussions with the rest of 
the Security Council membership. The permanent members had completed a draft 
resolution, elements of which were presented to informal consultations of the whole on 23 
June by the British Ambassador, Sir Crispin Tickell. To emphasise the unity of their 
position, Tickell acted as the representative of permanent five. After a muted response 
and for tactical reasons, (waiting for the French Presidency of the Security Council), the 
full draft was not presented to the Security Council until I July. Having clarified 
positions with their respective governments the non-permanent members discussed the 
draft during the second week of July. A group position was not agreed but amendments 
to the draft were proposed bilaterally and some minor additions from previous resolutions 
incorporated. The force of the unity between the permanent members, however, was 
irresistible and on 20 July at a meeting of the Security Council at the level of Foreign 
Ministers, SCR 598 was passed unanimously. 
'ibid., p. 88. 2ibid-, pp. 88-9. 
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SCR 598 invoked chapter VIL It determined that there existed a breach of the peace and 
demanded a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all forces to internationally recognised 
boundaries. The Secretary -General was mandated to: "dispatch a team of United Nations 
observers to verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal; " mediate a, 
"comprehensive, just and honourable settlement, " to the differences between Iran and 
Iraq; and, "to explore in consultation with Iran and Iraq the question of entrusting an 
impartial body with enquiry into responsibility for the conflict. " 
The Secretary -General's mandate was broad to facilitate flexibility with Iran and Iraq in 
the implementation of a cease-fire and the search for a long term political settlement to 
their differences. At the same time by resorting to chapter VII and making a cease-fire 
mandatory the Security Council left open the possibility of enforcement action, if 
compliance with the Secretary -General was not forthcoming. If this process was going to 
move negotiations forward, Perez de Cuellar insisted it was imperative that the Security 
Council members view SCR 598 as the beginning and not the end of their responsibilities, 
I shall not be able to fulfil the mission assigned to me by the Council 
without the firm and sustained support of its members. "' 
On 23 July Perez de Cuellar received from Tariq Aziz a letter accepting a cease-fire, 
provided SCR 598 was accepted in full by Iran. 2 Iran, however, did not reply formally 
until August II when in a letter to the Secretary-General it stated, 
"Resolution 598 has been formulated and adopted by the US with the 
explicit intention of intervention in the Persian Gulf and that it reflected 
the Iraqi formulae for settling the conflict and therefore it could not be 
considered impartial or practical. `3 
Iran was still insisting on condemnation of Iraq as the aggressor but also indicated that, 
"in the framework of his [the Secretary-General's] independent initiativeS, "4 Iran was 
prepared to co-operate on the elements of SCR 598 that dealt with the use of chemical 
weapons and prisoners of war. The Iranian reply now raised questions for the Secretary- 
General and the Security Council on how to proceed. Tehran had effectively rejected 
SCR 598 but had indicated a willingness to negotiate on elements of SCR 598. 
The Secretary-General had pressed the permanent members and the Security Council to 
provide a concrete framework for the resolution of the Iran-Iraq conflict without 
being 
1 UN Doc. S/PV. 2750,20 July, 1987, pp. 64-5. 
2UN Doc. S/ 19045,23 July 1987. 
3See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1987, p. 225 & UN Doc. S/ 1903 
1,11 August 1987. 
4ibid. 
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influenced by the demands of the parties. In SCR 598 the Security Council provided that 
framework, and within that framework, accorded the Secretary -General considerable 
discretion, in consultation with the parties, for the implementation of a cease-fire and a 
political settlement. The Secretary -General could not now disregard elements of SCR 
598 to assuage Iranian demands. To do so would have been to challenge the authority of 
the UN organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. The result would be to undermine Security Council support for the Secretary- 
General and therefore the authority of the Secretary-General. Moreover, the Iraqi 
acceptance of the cease-fire would most likely have been withdrawn and the acceptability 
of Perez de Cuellar as a third party compromised. 
The US, with the largest naval presence in the Gulf wanted to impose an arms embargo 
rather than embark on further diplomatic initiatives. On 12 August the Secretary -General 
approached the permanent members for direction. In these discussions the Secretary- 
General confirmed that he considered SCR 598 to be indivisible but suggested that if Iran 
were to accept a cease-fire, implementation of the ten elements of SCR 598 might then be 
discussed. In other words a cease-fire must be accepted before responsibility for starting 
the war was given consideration. 
The Security Council agreed that the Secretary-General should proceed on this basis. 
From 12-13 and between 14-15 September Perez de Cuellar visited Tehran and Baghdad 
respectively. This was no 'Peking Formula'. The Secretary -General had been instructed 
to follow up SCR 598 and in reference to SCR 598 announced on arrival in Tehran, I am 
acting within a kind of straitjacket. "' Within that straitjacket, however, the Secretary- 
General provided the capitals with a plan for implementation. The Secretary -General's 
efforts were bolstered by press leaks that the Security Council had already agreed an arms 
embargo. This was not in fact true, but Berridge argues, "was probably a condition for 
permitting the visit insisted on by Washington which on I September had threatened to 
push for an arms embargo unless Iran accepted the cease-fire within four days. `2 
Perez de Cuellar returned to New York to report on 16 September that Iran might be 
softening its position. Iran was still insisting that Iraq be named as the aggressor but 
indicated that it might accept a cease-fire if such a declaration was first made privately. 
3 
In a meeting with the S ecretary- General on 25 September Khomonei went 
further stating 
that Iran would accept an informal cease-fire while an enquiry established the cause of 
war. While the Secretary -General appeared to be making 
diplomatic progress it might 
I The New York Times, 12 September, 1987, quoted in Hume, op. cit., P- 120. 
2The Financial Times, 2 September, 1987, quoted by Berridge, (1991), op. cit., p. 53. 
3UN Chronicle, November 1987, p. 21. 
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also be argued that Iran was engaging the Secretary -General and hinting at flexibility to 
stall the imposition of an arms embargo and enable continuation of the war on the ground. 
With the largest naval contingent in the Gulf the US favoured the early imposition of 
sanctions against Iran but found little support in the rest of the Security Council. Between 
17 and 21 September, however, international resolve stiffened against Iran. Firstly, on 21 
September an attack on a British tanker killed one crew member and led to the closing 
down of the Iranian procurements agency in London. Britain was now prepared to back 
the US stance. Secondly, on 22 September US forces killed three and captured twenty-six 
Iranians laying mines in the Gulf. The US was now even more insistent on invoking the 
enforcement provisions which SCR 598 provided for. Thirdly, following the US capture 
of Iranians, in the General Assembly on 24 September, Ayatollah Khomonei lambasted 
the US and described the Security Council as, "a paper factor issuing worthless and 
ineffective orders. "' Moreover, these events were preceded on 17 September by 
Gorbachev's ground breaking article on the UN which indicated that the USSR was 
committed to a more co-operative and more effective use of Security Council powers. 2 
Although the USSR and China remained opposed to the immediate imposition of an arms 
embargo, in private meetings with the US Secretary of State George Shultz, 
Shevardnadze and Wu Xueqian agreed to an arms embargo if further endeavours by Perez 
de Cuellar could not induce acceptance of a cease-fire. 3 On 25 September in a meeting 
with the Secretary -General the permanent five formalised this, 'twin track, ' approach of 
supporting the Secretary -General' s diplomatic initiatives with the threat of sanctions. 
Between 25 September and December, Perez de Cuellar continued his efforts while the 
Security Council began informal discussions on an arms embargo. On 16 October, 
building on his visits to Tehran and Baghdad, the Secretary-General sent to the parties a 
more detailed outline plan for the implementation of SCR 598 with a request for reply by 
I November. In their replies, Iran and Iraq reiterated their divergent conditions for a 
cease-fire. After further consultations with the Security Council on 2 November, the 
Secretary -General invited the parties to send representatives to 
New York in December. 
From 2-3 December Perez de Cuellar met with the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Javid 
Larijani, but made no further progress other than to accept that the Secretary -General 
would select the impartial body which would determine responsibility for the war. As the 
work of this body could only begin with the full implementation of a cease-fire, and 
because condemnation of Iraq as the aggressor remained a precondition for Iranian 
acceptance of a cease-fire, this was really no concession at all. From 7-8 December 
Perez 
I The Economist, 26 September, 1987, quoted by Berridge, (1991), OP. cit., p. 53. 
2See pp. 325-328. 
3The New York Times, I October, 1987, reported by Hume, OP. cit., P- 123. 
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de Cuellar met with Tariq Aziz who continued to insist on the application of SCR 598 to 
the letter. 
Between these meetings, the Secretary -General liaised with the Soviet and US 
ambassadors as the final preparations were being made for the Washington summit. The 
Iran-Iraq war was one of the regional conflicts which were to be discussed by Gorbachev 
and Reagan and Perez de Cuellar informed the ambassadors of his frustration with the 
continued intransigence of Iran. In response Gromyko addressed the Iranian ambassador. 
Gromyko accused Iran of, 'not carrying matters to end the war,, and threatened to place 
the enforcement of SCR 598 on the Security Council agenda. I In a public statement on 
10 December the Secretary-General went further, 
"I have just informed the members of the Security Council of my recent 
discussion with Iranian and Iraqi officials. My conclusion is, that at the 
moment a fresh and resolute impulse by the Council is needed ... I said also that I was ready to work together with the Council on this. The 
determination of the Council to stand by its own resolution is essential if 
respect is to be maintained for the authority of the Council on which the 
repute of the organisation and the well being of the international 
community depend. "2 
After a promising start, negotiations had ground to a halt. On 4 January Perez de Cuellar 
informed both parties that he was not interested in conducting any further talks unless he 
could be assured of the prospect of some progress. The Secretary -General now demanded 
that Security Council prove its threats were real. Although Gorbachev and Reagan 
discussed the Iran-Iraq conflict during the Washington Sumn-fit, no agreement on an arms 
embargo was forthcoming. In a Presidential statement on 24 December, however, the 
Security Council declared its intention, "to consider further steps towards ensuring 
compliance, ' '3 and stated that one of its members had tabled proposals for a draft 
resolution on an arms embargo. Throughout January and February discussions continued. 
Against the background of these discussions the Secretary-General stood firm on his 
position regarding further talks but kept the channels of communication open. On 25 
January, Perez de Cuellar met with the Iranian and Iraqi UN ambassadors to give them the 
opportunity to communicate any change in their respective positions. On behalf of Iran, 
Mahallti requested from both the Secretary -General and the Security 
Council, "a clear 
indication of what was expected from it and what Iran could expect in return, " coupled 
with a threat that, "the attempt by some members to adopt enforcement measure would 
cut off the ability of the Secretary-General to explore Iran's flexibility. "4 This was 
Iran's 
'Freedman, R. O., "Gorbachev, Iran and the Iran-Iraq War, " in Keddie N. R. & Gasiorowski M. j., eds., 
Neither East nor West, cited by Hume, p. 13 1, op. cit., p. 127. 2Perez de Cuellar, press conference statement reproduced in Hume, op. cit., p. 128. 3 UN Doc., S/ 19382,24 December, 1987. 
4Hume, op. cit., pp. 139-40. 
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most blatant attempt to stall the imposition of an arms embargo, and as such, an indication 
that the threat was perceived as real. Perez de Cuellar was unimpressed and in informal 
consultations of the whole on 29 January reiterated his 10 December plea. 
On I February the US assumed the Presidency of the Security Council determined to 
move discussions along on an arms embargo. On 6 February a Soviet official informed 
Baghdad that the USSR was working towards a resolution on an arms embargo at the UN. 
While factually this was correct, by February it had also become clear that there was not 
sufficient agreement between the permanent members to adopt such a measure. Iran had 
no need to worry. 
Working from a British draft during February, the Counsellors of the permanent members 
produced a draft arms embargo resolution. On 20 February the draft was presented to the 
non permanent members as the current state of proceedings because it had not yet 
received approval in the national capitals. China and the USSR only allowed the draft to 
go forward on the condition that its presentation did not imply Chinese and Soviet 
approval. The non permanent members recognised that the draft did not represent a 
united position and were not forthcoming with amendments or proposals. 
The USSR and China were never really in a position to endorse an arms embargo, but 
they were prepared to endorse the threat of an arms embargo to maintain Security Council 
unity and reinforce the Secretary-General's diplomatic tack. This conflict was most in 
evidence in the conditions imposed by the USSR on the arms embargo agreed between 
Schultz, Schevardnadze, and Gorbachev in Moscow between 21 and 23 February, 1988. 
Firstly, an arms embargo would not come into effect for a prescribed period, (30-60 
days), during which diplomatic efforts would be renewed. Secondly, the USSR wanted to 
replace Perez de Cuellar as the lead negotiator with a special representative under the 
Secretary -General's authority. This measure was more controversial 
because of the 
implication that Perez de Cuellar was in some way responsible for the failure to secure 
Iranian compliance with SCR 598. This proposal was not intended as a slight on Perez 
de 
Cuellar's efforts and performance. Rather, it was another tactic for delaying the 
imposition of an arms embargo. A new third party would need sufficient time to 
develop 
the diplomatic relations, confidence, and ideas to secure an agreement. 
This would mean 
pushing back further the prospect of imposing an arms embargo. 
The permanent members' counsellors continued work through March 
incorporating these 
provisions but by then the situation in the Gulf was changing once more and the 
Opportunity ebbed away. In February, Iraq had resumed attacks on civilian targets and 
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the use of chemical weapons. Furthermore, between April and June, Iranian capitulation 
on the FAO Peninsula forced Iran back east of the Shatt and was followed by the loss of 
the Shalamcheh and the oil rich island Majnoon. Meanwhile in the Gulf, the Iranian 
Navy was all but destroyed. Coupled with a shift in the balance of power towards the 
moderates and the domestic economic problems caused by sanctions as well as the cost of 
war, these defeats encouraged Tehran to seek accommodation with the West. With Iraqi 
ascendancy in the war, the balance of international sympathies was now tilting towards 
Iran. ' By July Iran and Iraq were roughly back where they had started. With both parties 
exhausted by eight years of war a new opportunity to end the conflict emerged. 
Cease-fire and SeUlement: The US and Saddam. 
Acceptance of a cease-fire was not prompted by the multilateral authority of the Security 
Council but the unilateral actions of the US, and a post cease-fire settlement was not 
down to the Secretary-General's diplomacy but a reappraisal of priorities by Saddam 
Hussein, 
On 3 July the USS Vincennes, mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger airliner on a 
scheduled flight between Mander-e Abbas, (Iran), and Dubai, (UAR), killing all of the 
two hundred and ninety passengers aboard. A Vincennes Patrol Helicopter had been fired 
on by Iranian boats which the US suspected were, "congregating to attack neutral 
merchant shipping. "2 The Vincennes and the USS Montgomery then sank two and 
disabled one of the boats which turned on the US vessels. Simultaneously the Vincennes 
fired on flight 655 suspecting it to be Iranian and hostile when it failed to acknowledge 
radio warnings. The. US immediately admitted that a, "tragic accident, ' '3had occurred and 
although it blamed Iran for not accepting a cease-fire it also accepted investigation by the 
International Civil Aviation organisation, (ICAO), and provided compensation ex gratia 
to the families of theViCtiMS. 4 For the USSR this episode was vindication of the need for 
a UN and multilateral rather than US naval presence in the Gulf. 5 This was not to become 
an issue, however, because in a letter to the Secretary-General on 17 July, Khomonei 
accepted the terms and conditions of SCR 598 including a cease-fire stating, 
"The war which had been started by Iraq on 21 September 1980, had 
reached unprecedented dimensions, drawing other countries into it and 
'UK Foreign Affairs Committee reports, "the mood of the members of the Security Council changed, and 
unanimous support for the Security Council to proceed with enforcement against Iran 
dissolved, " 2nd 
Report, Current United Kingdom Policy Towards the IranlIraq Conflict, (together with the proceedings of 
the committee), 27 June 1988, p. 33, quoted by Berridge, (199 1), op. cit., p. 55. 2Yearbook of the United Nations, 1988, p. 199, see also UN Doc. S/ 19987,6 
July, 1988. 
3Statement made in Security Council meeting 2821,20 July, 1988, after passing of 
SCR 616, see Yearbook 
of the United Nations, 1988, p. 199. 
4UN Doc. S/20005, II July, 1988. 
5UN Doc. S/ 19987,5 July 1988. 
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engulfing innocent civilians -a manifestation of which was the shooting down of Iran airflight 655. "1 (emphasis added). 
The unilateral action of the US succeeded in pressurising Iran where the Security Council 
failed. Moreover, because the US had acted unilaterally, Tehran could back down 
without loss of face, as Berridge explains, 
"It allowed Iran to claim vivid confirmation that its war was unwinnable because it was really fighting the superpowers; this action said, Rafsanjani, 
[moderate Speaker of Iranian Parliament] represented 'America's 
declaration that it might commit huge crimes if Iran continued the war. ' 
The corollary of this was also valuable to Tehran: since recent defeats had 
really been inflicted by the United States rather than Iraq, seeking peace 
with Baghdad was honourable as well as prudent. Finally under cover of 
seeking UN condemnation of the American 'crime, ' Iran was able to return 
to the Security Council, which it had been boycotting since October, 
1981.112 
It was now Iraq's turn to stall. Baghdad was convinced that Tehran was just buying time 
to regroup and rearm, and repeatedly demanded that direct talks take place between the 
two states to assuage its doubts. 3 Direct talks were not one of the conditions of SCR 598 
and so the diplomatic effort now turned on Iraq. Following a week of lobbying by the 
permanent members' respective representatives in Baghdad and parallel efforts by the 
Secretary-General in New York Saddam Hussein conceded to a cease-fire on August 6, 
provided talks took place immediately. 4 Iran accepted immediately, 5 and on 8 August 
Perez de Cuellar announced to informal consultations of the Security Council that the 
cease-fire would come into effect at 0300 hours GMT on 20 August 1988.6 
While this diplomacy was progressing, Perez de Cuellar set in motion the machinery for 
implementing a cease-fire. In the last week of July the Secretary-General sent a technical 
team to Iran, headed by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lieutenant-General Martin Vadset, 
to establish the requirements of an observer mission to oversee the implementation of a 
cease-fire and SCR 598. On the basis of Vadset's report, and at the same time as 
announcing the date from which a cease-fire would take effect, Perez de Cuellar 
recommended the establishment of a three hundred and fifty strong United Nations Iran 
Iraq Military Observer Group, (UN-HMOG), backed up military support staff, civilian 
administrative and logistics personnel. 7 The Secretary-General stated that UNIIIMOG 
1 UN Doc. S/20027, II July, 1988. 
213erridge, (1991), op. cit., p. 56. 3UN Doc. S/20039,20 July 1988; Press Conference, United Nations, 19 July 1988; Iraqi television 
broadcast, 21 July 1988; meetings with the Secretary - General and the Security 
Council President throu, -h 
July 1988 (later three cited by Hume, op. cit., pp. 168-70). 4UN Doc. S/20092,6 August, 1988. 
5UN Doc. S/20094,7 August, 1988. 
6Yearbook of the United Nations, 1988, p. 194. 7UN Doc. S/20093,7 August 1988. 
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should initially be mandated for six months, and that its terms of reference would be those 
already set out in SCR 598: to establish the cease-fire lines; to monitor compliance with 
the cease-fire; to investigate violation of the cease-fire; to confirm the withdrawal of all 
forces to internationally recognised boundaries; and to obtain agreement of the parties to 
other arrangement which could help reduce tension and build confidence between them. 
On 9 August the Security Council voted unanimously to create UNIIMOG and authorise 
the Secretary-General's recommendations. ' UNIIMOG was therefore in place on 20 
August when the cease-fire came into effect. Then in New York on 25 August, the 
Secretary-General held talks with both parties on the full implementation of SCR 598, 
though not face to face as Iraq had insisted on 6 August. The Secretary-General, 
therefore was simultaneously conducting negotiations towards a political settlement and 
heading a peacekeeping operation that conformed to the classical peacekeeping criteria. 
UNHMOG was an impartial buffer to which the parties had consented, and was backed up 
by the Security Council to the extent that James notes, "its parent body [the Security 
Council] might have been sluggish while the war was on, but once it was over the UN 
moved very smartly. 112 
On 1 September Perez de Cuellar passed responsibility for negotiations towards the full 
implementation of SCR 598 to a personal representative, Jan Eliasson, the Swedish 
Ambassador at the UN who had previously worked with Olaf Palme in efforts to resolve 
the Iran-Iraq War. In the Iran-Iraq war, the Security Council had at last provided a 
framework for ending conflict and addressing outstanding issues under UN auspices. Just 
because a cease-fire was secured, however, it did not follow that a political settlement was 
imminent. For the first time the parties had agreed to seek a diplomatic resolution to their 
differences. It was now up to the Secretary-General and the Security Council to 
encourage and foster the peace process while recognising that progress depended upon the 
parties. As Hume explains, however, 
"Negotiations [quickly] settled into a pattern. Now that a cease-fire was in 
place, the permanent members no longer treated the Iran-Iraq conflict as a 
subject for their joint action. the Secretary-General with Ambassador 
Eliasson, was on his own to coax and cajole the parties forward in the 
peace process. There was no progress. The peacekeeping force of 
UNIIMOG, despite logistical difficulties, monitored the cease-fire, 
resolved local incidents, investigated violations, and worked with the 
parties to solidify the cease-fire. "3 
It was not until 3 July 1990 that the Foreign Ministers Tariq Aziz and Velayati finally 
held direct talks. Iran continued to demand joint sovereignty over the Shatt but conceded 
'SC Res. 619,9 August, 1988 
2James, (1990), op. cit., p. 172. 3Hume, op. cit., pp. 174-5. 
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that if agreements could be attained on demarcation and prisoners of war then the 
implementation of the remaining aspects of SCR 598 would follow. ' Saddam Hussein 
was now prepared to negotiate, and on 30 July proposed a summit meeting between the 
Iraqi and Iranian President. Saddarn Hussein wanted to remove that part of SCR 598 
which provided for an impartial body to establish the cause of war. On 2 August 1990, 
however, Saddarn Hussein revealed his hand with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Iranian 
President Rafsanjani held firm, re-emphasising the validity of the 1975 Agreement which 
provided for joint sovereignty over the Shatt and on 14 Ausgust Saddam. Hussein 
concurred. Withdrawal of Iraqi forces began on 17 August. It was the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait rather than Security Council or Secretary-General pressure and persuasion that 
eventually prompted any progress in Iran-Iraq relations and the implementation of SCR 
598. 
Afi! hanistan. 
On 25 December 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan and Babrak Karmal was 
installed as the Soviet puppet at the head of the communist Peoples Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA) Government. The USSR had a long standing strategic interest in 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan bordered the Soviet Socialist Republics of Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan, and contained strong ethnic communities from these states. 
Afghanistan also contained strong Muslim communities with close ties to Iran and 
Pakistan. In 1978 the PDPA had seized power and initiated a radical reform program 
which rapidly exacerbated divisions along these ethnic and religious lines. Soviet alarm 
at the evaporation of PDPA support and the rise in Islamic insurgency was compounded 
by the fundamentalist Islamic Revolution in Iran which carried with it the threat of US 
intervention in the region. An Afghanistan invitation for Soviet assistance was 
manufactured, "solely to repel armed aggression from outside, ' '2and Soviet contingents 
promptly became embroiled in a guerrilla war with the Mujahideen. 3 
The Mujahideen found support, finance and arms from Pakistan and the US, both of 
whom feared Soviet expansionism. The Afghan civil war rapidly degenerated into a cold 
4 war proxy war, and as such the Security Council was inevitably paralysed. A draft 
resolution condemning Soviet actions was proposed on 7 January by the non-aligned but 
was obstructed by the Soviet veto and the issue was immediately passed to the General 
1UN Press Release 4 July 1990. 
2Afghanistan in discussion of Assembly resolution 38/39, GA meeting 69,23 November 1983, reported i 
The Yearbook of the United Nations 1983, p. 235. 3The Mujahideen is the collective name given to the diverse, disparate and disorganised dissident 
Islamic 
groups in Afghanistan. 
4Fought out principally by the Mujahideen and Afghan army but supplemented also by ad 
hoc air and 
ground offensives by Pakistan and Afghanistan on each other's military, customs, civilian 
installations and 
property in border areas. 
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Assembly under the uniting for peace resolution. ' The General Assembly responded by 
calling for, "the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from 
Afghanistan. ' '2 Beyond this expression of international opinion there was little the 
Assembly could do. In theory the General Assembly could recommend the use of 
collective force but it could not command it even if it was a feasible option. Attempts to 
negotiate a political solution by the Islamic Conference and the non aligned movement 
quickly fell by the wayside. Once more the Secretary-General became the only available 
option through which a solution to the conflict might move forward, but not without first 
side-stepping General Assembly resolutions. 
The original General Assembly resolution called upon the Secretary -General to employ 
his good offices but the association of the Secretary-General with such a condemnatory 
public statement compromised his acceptability to Afghanistan and the USSR. Ten 
months later in the second resolution addressing the Afghan conflict the General 
Assembly called simply for full withdrawal and emphasised the need for a political 
solution. 3 To this end the Secretary-General was mandated to appoint a special 
representative. As Avakov observes, this resolution was less exacting, "to give the 
Secretary-General room for improvising and manoeuvring in his mediating efforts. ' 14 
Waldheim still felt the General Assembly position hampered the prospects for his good 
offices and chose to exploit the freedom and discretion that the General Assembly had 
accorded him by applying the Peking Formula. 5 To maintain his perceived independence, 
Waldheim appointed non other than Perez de Cuellar as his personal representative, 6 
rather than as the special representative of the General Assembly reporting to the 
Secretary-General. As Waldheim explained, "this deliberate ambiguity would allow one 
side to assume that I was proceeding as directed by the Assembly while the other side 
could assume that I was not. 117 
Negotiating the Geneva Accords: The First Draft 1982-84. 
By August 1981 Perez de Cuellar had secured agreement on those issues which should 
form the basis of a settlement. The four point format of Geneva was already taking shape 
but the format of the negotiations which would resolve these issues was problematical, 
and reflected underlying divisions which would later scupper progress. 
'SC Res. 462 (1980), on Uniting for Peace also see pp. 66-7. 
2GA Res. ES. 6/2 (1980). 
3GA Res. 35/37 (1980). 
4Avakov, op. cit., p. 154. 5Not least because it was still supporting the right of self determination as part of a political 
solution. 
('rhen under secretary-general for Special Political Affairs. 7 Waldheim, op. cit., p, 182. 
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To Pakistan the presence of Soviet troops, by invitation or otherwise, was an illegal and 
aggressive intervention to prop up an illegitimate government and Islamabad could not 
and would not deal directly with a government it did not recognise as the legitimate 
representative of the Afghan people. Moscow and Kabul contended that the Afghan 
people had already chosen a system, "under which a comprehensive programme of reform 
was resolutely being implemented. "' Soviet troops were present to protect that regime 
and its reform process from outside interference in accordance with a 1963 Treaty of 
Friendship between the two countries. Kabul was refusing to meet face to face with the 
alleged perpetrators of that interference, and a government that would not accord them 
recognition. 
Both Governments were prepared to engage the Secretary-General's good offices because 
of perceived advantages from negotiating through the UN. Paradoxically, in the same 
resolution the General Assembly upheld the right to self detennination and recognised the 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, (DRA), as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Afghanistan. To facilitate negotiations, Diego Cordovez agreed a compromise with both 
sides which overcame the procedural deadlock and, "gave impetus to the diplomatic 
process. ' Q The personal representative would, 'go between, ' Islamabad and Kabul 
delegations who would never be in the same building at the same time. There would be 
no chance meetings, no escalator or rest room diplomacy. Other conditions included the 
non participation of the Mujahideen and Iran. The USSR and Afghanistan refused to 
negotiate with a counter insurgent militia hell bent on the destruction of 'their' regime. 
Pakistan, (and Cordovez), wanted Iranian participation but Iran refused to participate 
unless the Mujahideen were also present. Consequently, Cordovez could only address the 
Soviet dimension of the Afghan civil war. Accordingly, in the first round of talks at 
Geneva in June 1982, the parties agreed the maxim for a political settlement - the 
reciprocal withdrawal of Soviet troops and external aid to the Mujahideen. 3 
Encouraged by a change in the Soviet leadership, 4and private consultations in the 
respective national capitals during February and March 1983, Cordovez produced a draft 
identifying four substantive issues essential to a comprehensive settlement: non 
lAfghanistan in discussion of Assembly resolution 38/39, GA meeting 69,23 November 1983, reported in 
The Yearbook of the United Nations 1983, p. 235. 2Yearbook of the United Nations, 1983, p. 233. N. B. On his elevation to the Secretary-Generalship 
Perez de 
Cuellar appointed Diego Cordovez as his successor. 31n agenda item discussion with Perez de Cuellar during 1981 Pakistan had dropped its insistence 
that talks 
address self determination. The impact of such a narrow remit is discussed under, 
"Negotiating the Civil 
Dimension, " pp. 259-60. Compare also with the UN in Namibia et al., pp. 
261-73. 
41n a September 1982 meeting with a UN delegation to Moscow, Andropov 
had implicitly questioned the 
0 Brezhnev doctrine by stating, "anyone who believed the Soviets wanted to 
be in Afghanistan was crazy and 
that it caused nothing but casualties, money and international complications, 
" Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 
355. 
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interference and non intervention, (pillar one); international guarantees, (pillar two); 
return of refugees, (pillar three); and withdrawal of foreign troops, (pillar four). ' 
Cordovez's draft provided the basis for discussion in further rounds of talks at the Palais 
des Nations in April and June 1983. Consultations for the return of refugees were 
conducted with and through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, (UNHCR), and arrangements for their voluntary return began immediately. 
More significantly, Cordovez secured tacit agreements trading Karmal, (and the 
possibility of a coalition government), for Pakistani recognition of the DRA and the 
termination of assistance to the Mujahideen through Pakistan. Confident a settlement was 
imminent Cordovez reported that ninety-five percent of his package had been accepted. 2 
In September 1982, however, Andropov had warned Urquhart that the Soviets were not 
prepared to countenance withdrawal unless the continuance and security of the Kabul 
regime could be assured. 3 Yet it was the very overthrow of the DRA which the US hoped 
to precipitate by insisting on the right of self determination for the Afghan people. 4 
Karmal was expendable but the acceptance in principle of a coalition government was a 
major concession. At the height of the new cold war, US scepticism of Soviet integrity in 
this matter was sufficient to ensure military aid continued to the Mujahideen through 
Pakistan, disabling Cordovez' first draft. 
Negotiating the Geneva Accords: Round Two 1984-86. 
A procedural breakthrough in April 1984 encouraged Cordovez to renew the Secretary- 
General's good offices. While still refusing to sit down at the same negotiating table, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to each others presence in the same building. Cordovez 
still had to shuttle between conference rooms but the parties were at least a little less 
sensitive to their sponsors' diktats and a little more sensitive to each others position and 
Cordovez' diplomacy. The new format realised results immediately. In August 1984, 
without first consulting the US, Pakistan agreed to a bilateral treaty of non-interference 
with Kabul (pillar one). Moscow also proposed that international guarantees should 
extend to stalling any third party intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan (pillar two). 
Throughout all twelve rounds of talks the refugees issue was the least contentious (pillar 
three). The departure timetable for Soviet soldiers (pillar four), however, was 
problematical. The USSR and Afghanistan insisted that the termination of the aid to the 
Mujahideen should pave the way for Soviet troop withdrawals whereas Pakistan and the 
US demanded concurrent withdrawal, (also favoured by Cordovez). Islamabad also 
1 UN Doc. S/ 16005 28 September 1983. 
2Reported in Harrison, Selig S., "Inside the Afghan Talks, " Foreign Policy, No. 72, Fall 1988, pp. 42-3. 
3Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 355. 4See Berridge, (199 1) op. cit., p. 63; & Harrison, Selig S., "Cut a Regl*onal Deal, 
" Foreign Policy, No. 6" 1 
Spring 1986, p. 136. 
-256- 
required a formal commitment from Moscow to withdraw. The signature of a communist 
puppet government was insufficient to guarantee Soviet departure. For Moscow, 
however, co-signature of the fourth pillar would be a tacit admission of war guilt. Again 
under new leadership, Moscow conceded these points at Geneva in June 1985. Later that 
year Gorbachev and Reagan met for the first time and one month later Reagan committed 
the US to guarantee a settlement. I Only one issue remained unresolved; timetabling. 
Less than one year into the Gorbachev premiership, however, cold war habits proved too 
hard to break. The suspicion and cynicism of "powerful [reactionary] elements' 12 in the 
US foreign policy process prevailed. As Berridge argues, 
"The American offer to act as a guarantor appears to have been seen by the 
administration as nothing more than 'a harmless psychological warfare 
gambit'which would keep the Russians on the defensive. ' '3 
Andropov had earlier voiced his suspicions that in Afghanistan, "the US liked having a 
stick to beat the USSR with. ' '4 The real test was whether the US was prepared to push its 
proxy to settle rather just guarantee a settlement. Diplomatic discord suggested only the 
latter. Islamabad's refusal to meet Afghan officials face to face continued and Moscow 
refused to discuss the timetabling issue. For a second time the negotiations ground to a 
halt. 
Negotiating the Geneva Accords: Third Time Lucky 1986-88. 
In February 1986, frustrated by the timetabling impasse, Cordovez informed Moscow that 
his role was becoming, "pointless. "5 Between 1986 and 1988, however, a progressive 
softening of the Soviet position reinvigorated the Secretary-General's good offices. On 4 
May 1986, Moscow deposed Karmal and installed the less hard-line Said Mohammed 
Najibullah at the head of the PDPA. The change in personnel indicated a more 
accommodating negotiating stance, 6 and although the impasse was not broken at further 
rounds of proximity talks in May or August, Moscow accepted Cordovez' proposal for 
UN verification of a settlement in November. 7 Talks continued in February 1987 at 
which Pakistan and Afghanistan proposed that withdrawal should take place over seven 
and eighteen months respectively. During 1987, however, in preparation for withdrawal, 
Najibullah was given greater freedom to broaden the base of PDPA support. The USSR 
lAnnouncement made on 13 December 1985, reported in Harrison, (1988), op. cit., p. 33. 213erridge, (1991), op. cit., p. 65; see also Harrison, (1988), op. cit., pp. 32-3; & Saikal, Amin, 
"The UN and 
Afghanistan: A Case of Failed Peacemaking Intervention, " International Peacekeeping, 
Vol. 3 No. 1, 
Spring 1996, p. 26. 3Berfidge, (199 1 ), op. cit., p. 65. 4Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 355. 5Berridge, (1991), op. cit., p. 67. 6See Harrison, (1988), op. cit., p. 34 7ibid., p. 53. 
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then indicated acceptance of a PDPA-controHed coalition government before agreeing in 
principle to a non communist coalition government prior to withdrawal. In timetabling 
discussions Najibullah was then repeatedly undercut by the USSR. On 8 February a 
Soviet announcement broke the deadlock. Withdrawal would begin on 15 May and be 
completed in ten months, (later reduced to nine). Cordovez was immediately engaged in 
a final round of shuttle diplomacy and proximity talks, but the outstanding issues were 
resolved in direct talks between the US and USSR, ' before the accords were signed on 14 
April 1988. As Perez de Cuellar reported, 
"It was the first instance of the world's two most powerful states 
becoming guarantors of an agreement negotiated under the auspices of 
the Secretary-General. "2 
Just nine months after the passing of SCR 598, consensus was reached on a 
comprehensive settlement to the external dimensions of the eight year old Afghan civil 
war. The so called Geneva Accords signed on 14 April 1988 consisted of four 
agreements: 
-A bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan of "non-interference and non 
intervention in each others affairs; " 
-A "Declaration of International Guarantees, " signed by the US and the USSR assuring 
withdrawal of superpower involvement. The superpowers would also endeavour to 
discourage the involvement of other states in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; 
-A second bilateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan concerning the 
voluntary return of refugees; 
- And finally an, "Agreement on the Interrelationships for the settlement of the situation 
relating to Afghanistan and Pakistan, " which was signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
witnessed by the US and USSR, and provided for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In this 
agreement, the Secretary-General was charged with overseeing the implementation of all 
four agreements. 
The constant cajoling and probing of the Secretary-General's good offices had provided 
the catalyst for a settlement, which could only be secured with the consent ofMoscow and 
Washington. The Secretary-General's responsibilities now turned to administering the 
Geneva Accords. 
Administering the Geneva Accords. 
The United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, (UNGONLkP), is 
unusual in that, as a peacekeeping operation, it was established by extending the 
Secretary-General's existing good offices. Its mandate came not from a UN body but 
from the Geneva Accords and it was not until six months after the Accords were signed 
that it was authorised formally by the Security Council. In a letter to the Secretary- 
See pp. 260- 1. 
2Perez de Cuellar, "Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the 
Organisation, 1988, " in 
Anarchy or Order, Annual Reports 1982-1991, (New York: United Nations, 
1991)' P' 172. 
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General on 26 April 1988, however, the Security Council consented to the extension of 
the Secretary-General's responsibilities arising from the Geneva Accords, adding that the 
creation of a peacekeeping operation in this manner was not precedent setting. I 
By 15 May 1989 UNGOMAP was able to confirm that all Soviet troops had left. As 
Durch reports, 
"UNGOMAP placed a UN stamp of approval on the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The USSR could have withdrawn it forces with or without UN observation. It was simply politically necessary for it to do SO. 112 
UN verification also enabled the USSR to publicly wash its hands of Afghanistan, the 
civil war, and the consequences of its occupation and withdrawal. As a result the civil 
war raged on, and with respect to the other three accords UNGOMAP was far less 
successful in fulfilling its mandate. 3 
Negotiating the Civil Dimension: Leave it to the Secretary-General. 
The Geneva Accords addressed only the external and not the internal aspects of the 
Afghan conflict, yet in 1987 Perez de Cuellar reported, 
"For a settlement to be realised ... the Afghan's must achieve a national reconciliation that will open the way for the formation of a government 
where the voice of all Afghan's ... will be heard. "4 
However, until after the completion of the Geneva Accords, the Secretary-General was 
prevented from providing his good offices to assist an internal settlement by earlier 
decisions by the General Assembly. In 1980 the General Assembly accorded the Kabul 
Government diplomatic recognition as the rightful holder of the Afghanistan seat at the 
UN-5 In so doing the General Assembly bestowed international legitimacy on the Soviet 
puppet regime and condemned the Mujahideen opposition to secondary dissident status. 
The Kabul Goverm-nent could legitimately refuse to negotiate with an opposition seeking 
its overthrow. Their exclusion from the negotiating process encouraged the Mujahideen, 
to pursue a military solution. The negotiating process therefore addressed only the 
external dimensions of the Afghan conflict - in line also with superpower strategic 
concerns. These factors combined to insure that Cordovez's proposals for all party talks 
in 1987 were rejected by both the PDPA and the Mujahideen. Only the Secretary -General 
1 UN Doc. S/ 1983 6,26 April 198 8. 
213irgisson, Karl Th., "United Nations Good Offices Mission In Afghanistan and Pakistan, '' in Durch, 
William (Ed. ), The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, (London: Macmillan, 1993), P. 309. 3See James, (1990), op. cit., pp. 244-50, and Birgisson, op. cit., pp. 305-11. Verez de Cuellar, "Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, 1987, " in 
Anarchy or Order, Annual Reports 1982-1991, (New York: United Nations, 199 1). p. 14 1. 5GA Res. ES. 6/2 (1980). 
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could engage a diverse, multi-centric, non-governmental movement employing guerrilla 
tactics. To do so, however, required the consent of both parties. When this was not 
forthcoming the lack of an internal process was reflected implicitly in the substance of the 
four Geneva Agreements and explicitly in the, 'Memorandum of Understanding, ' which 
accompanied the Accords: 
"In performing their functions the representatives of the Secretary- 
General and his staff will act with complete impartiality. The 
representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel must not interfere in the internal affairs ofAfghanistan and Pakistan. " I 
This position did not represent the opinion of the Secretary-General and his 
representative, but was one which, until 1988, the political realities of the situation 
demanded, and one for which Article 2 (7) of the Charter provided the justification. 
Shortly after the Geneva Accords were signed, Perez de Cuellar stated that as an 
intergovernmental organisation, "it would be against our philosophy to be in touch with 
the enemies of governments. "2 
As the cold war continued to thawl however, so too did objections to the Secretary- 
General's involvement in the internal politics of a member state. The watershed came in 
November 1988, when for the first time the Assembly requested that the Secretary- 
General assist, "the establishment of a broad based coalition government in 
Afghanistan. "3 As James observes, in this resolution, the Assembly provided the 
Secretary-General and UNGOMAP with, "the [formal] right which it did not have under 
the Geneva Agreements to make official contact with the MUiahideen. N 
Why Civil Diplomacy Failed. 
Until 1991, neither the Kabul Government nor the Mujahideen demonstrated any real 
willingness to conclude a political solution. During this period, in violation of the Geneva 
Accords, the superpowers continued to furnish their respective clients with military and 
economic aid. This was due to a compromise on the second of the Accords negotiated 
between the US and USSR. Because the USSR was providing aid to the government of a 
country with which it had a Treaty of Friendship'5 it was able to argue that continued 
assistance did not fall under the provisions of the Geneva Accords. The Soviet Union 
understood the second accord as exchanging only Soviet troop withdrawal, (not assistance 
to Kabul), for an end to US assistance to the Mujahideen. This was unacceptable to the 
US, which insisted on positive symmetry - total mutual withdrawal. 
The impasse was 
'T'lie Geneva Accords, 14 April 1988, Annex: Memorandum on Understanding, (Basic Requirements), l(d). 
2UN Press Release SG/SM/4127,27 April 1988, p. 6, cited in Franck & Nolte, op. cit., P. 150. 
3General Assembly Res. 43/20 (1988). 
4Jarnes, (1990), op. cit., p. 249. 5And as a non-communist country had been receiving aid from the USSR since 
1953. 
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resolved by an expedient agreement on, 'asymmetry, ' in which, "each would assist their 
proteges as long as the other one did. "] The Mujahideen also continued to receive 
military aid from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. 2 The regional powers and the 
superpowers were interested less in fostering a peace process under the auspices of the 
Secretary-General, than in pursuing their own interests which ensured the continuance of 
the Afghan civil war. It is not a coincidence. therefore, that there was a sharp 
improvement in progress towards an internal settlement after the superpowers agreed on a 
cessation of all assistance in September 1991. 
During the Spring of 1992 Sevan secured agreement from all parties, (bar three rogue 
fundamentalist Mujahideen groups), to participate in a peace conference in Vienna. 3 The 
Conference was to provide for an interim government while preparations were made for 
national elections to a new Assembly from which a new government of national 
reconciliation would emerge. Further impetus was given to the process by Najibullah's 
March announcement of his intention to step down as President. The resignation of 
Najibullah fulfilled one of the Mujahideen's long-standing demands and in theory 
removed a key obstacle to further progress towards a settlement. 4 
Najibullah, (and Karmal before him), however, had been visible and potent symbols of 
Soviet intervention and communist oppression. The removal of this external focus and 
expression of unity exposed fractious religious, ethnic, guerrilla, and personal rivalries 
within. As the communist regime disintegrated, the army also fractured along these lines 
and any hope of national reconciliation descended once more into civil war. 
Namibia et aL 
In Namibia the UN succeeded in one crucial respect where it had failed in Afghanistan. 
The transition to independence for Namibia included settlement of both the external and 
internal dimensions of the conflict. In contrast to Afghanistan the Secretary -General did 
not play a central role in negotiating the Tripartite Agreements which provided for the 
withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia, the withdrawal of Cuba from Angola, and the 
implementation of a transitional assistance package for Namibia. 5 As head of the United 
Nations Transitional Assistance Group, (UNTAG), however, Perez de Cuellar presided 
IBirgisson, op. cit., pp. 303-4. 20n the power struggle within the Mujahideen drawing Pakistan, Iran and Saud, Arabia 
back into Pakistan 
see, Saikal, op. cit., p. 21. 3BOutros Ghali had now succeeded Perez de Cuellar. 40n the return to civil war and subsequent and as yet unsuccessful attempts by the 
UN to negotiate national 
reconciliation see the debate between Amin Saikal and George L. Sherry in, International 
Peacekeeping, 
Vol. 3 No. 2, Spring 1996. 
5A]so known asMe Angola/Namibia Accords, " signed in New York, 22 December 
1988, see UN Doc. 
S/20346,22 December 1988. 
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over the first operation in a peacekeeping revolution which saw a dramatic expansion in 
the Secretary-General's administrative duties. 
Negotiating Namibian Independence: Excluding the Secretary-General. 
The history of the dispute over Namibian independence is not only between the people of 
South Western Africa and South Africa, but between the UN and South Africa. 
originally South Western Africa was a colony of the Bismarck empire. After World War 
I it was handed over by the League of Nations to South African administration. After 
World War H South Africa claimed that its mandate, like the League of Nations was now 
defunct, and applied to the UN to annex the territory. The General Assembly refused the 
South African petition and insisted on the application of UN Trusteeship to the territory. 
From this point forward, the UN was partisan to the future of South Westem Africa and at 
loggerheads with South Africa. This unique situation in which the UN was a party to the 
dispute meant that the Secretary-General's role in the transition to independence would be 
hounded by the problem of fostering the perception of impartiality in South Aftican 
eyes. 
Moreover, as the membership of the UN was transformed by the decolonisation process, 
the General Assembly became increasingly vociferous in its condemnation of South 
Africa's defacto colonisation of the territory. In 1966 it formally revoked the South 
African League of Nations mandate. ' South Western Africa was deterrnined to be the 
direct responsibility of the UN, and the UN Council for South Western Africa was 
established as the administrative body responsible for preparing Namibia for 
independence. 2 In 1971 the General Assembly stance was upheld by an ICJ ruling 
declaring South Africa's continued presence in Namibia illegal and requiring South 
Africa's immediate and unconditional withdrawal. 3 The General Assembly also took the 
unprecedented step of according the resistance movement - South West African Peoples 
Organisation, (SWAPO) - observer status at the UN, as the representative of the people of 
South Western Africa, now renamed Namibia. 4 Rejecting all these resolutions and rulings 
South Africa continued with a process of Gleischaltung designed to present the UN with a 
fait accompli. At the same time South Africa initiated military action against SWAPO 
positions in both Namibia and Angola. 
For South Africa, the Secretary-General was an umpire provided by the opposition, 
though the Peking Formula might have been applied up until the 1971 ICJ r-uling. The 
problem, however, was less the umpire than the intransigence of South Africa. 
For this 
GA Res. 2145 (XXV) 27 October 1966. 
2GA Res. 2248 (s-v), 19 May 1967. 
31CJ Reports, 197 1, p. 16. 4Kodioe, op. cit., p. 135. 
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reason, Dag Hammarskjbld rejected a General Assembly request to pursue a negotiated 
solution through his good offices. I Kurt Waldheim later complied with a similar request 
from the Security Council, 2but could not distance himself from the ICJ ruling or the 
Security Council. To invoke the Peking Formula would have been to challenge the 
validity of the International Court's ruling and to compromise the integrity of the 
Secretary-General as the guardian of the Charter and international law. Despite this 
institutional handicap Waldheim appointed Martin Escher as his special representative. 
During Escher's negotiations it became clear that the South African and UN conceptions 
of self determination for Namibia were contradictory, and Waldheim recommended the 
tennination of his role. 3 
Perez de Cuellar, encountered a similar problem. The Secretary-General favoured and 
recommended linking Cuban withdrawal from Angola to South African withdrawal from 
Namibia. The Secretary-General's position was based on a recognition of the wider 
regional security situation. SCR 539, however, questioned why Namibian independence 
should be conditional upon Cuban withdrawal when under international law South Africa 
was required to grant that independence. 4While making his position clear Perez de 
Cuellar was careful not to impugn the Security Council's standpoint. Maintaining this 
delicate balance probably enhanced his acceptability to all sides. Perez de Cuellar's good 
offices provided a crucial link between the US mediators, SWAPO, and the Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola, (MPLA), the Soviet sponsored Angolan 
Government with whom the US had no official means of communicating. The Secretary- 
General, however, was still excluded from the negotiating table and when South African 
agreement was finally forthcoming on Namibian independence, the Secretary -General 
was obliged to sign an impartiality package regarding the execution of the peacekeeping 
mandate. 5 
UNTAG: Expanding the Secretary-General's Peacekeeping Role. 
The United Nations Transition Assistance Group, (UNTAG), was derived from a 
collection of documents, statements and resolutions beginning with SCR 385 (1976). 6 
SCR 385 was the first effort by the Security Council to lay down the principles and 
process by which, "to transfer power to the peoples of Namibia with the assistance of the 
IGAOR, II th Session, 4th Committee, 279th meeting, Dec. 20,1956, p. 152. 
2SC Res. 309,4 February 1972. 
3See UN Doc. S/10921 supp. 30 April 1973 & SC Res. 342,11 December 1973. 4SC Res. 539,28 October 1983. 
5UN Doc. S/20635,16 May 1989, see also S/20412,23 January 1989. NB. the exclusion of the 
Secretary- 
General from the negotiating table had near catastrophic consequences for the transition of 
Namibia to 
independence. See pp. 267-73. 6Peter Manning has identified 26 "essential documents which contain the UN election plan envisaged in 
Security Council 435 (1978). " see Manning Peter, The UN Planfor Elections in Namibia in 
UN Security, 
Council Resolution 435 (1978), Southscan Occasional Paper, June, 1989, pp. 25-6. 
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UN-" It also provided for the drafting of a resolution imposing sanctions against South 
Africa should South Africa fail to comply. This thinly veiled threat only served to 
embarrass the Western permanent members who were not prepared to endorse the move 
to enforcement when South Africa called the Security Council's bluff. This diplomatic 
gaff induced France, Britain, and the US, (along with the non permanent members of the 
Security Council, Canada and West Germany) to create and entrust the, 'Contact Group, ' 
with achieving an operational implementation of SCR 385. 
Negotiations between the Contact Group, South Africa, and SWAPO began in April 1977 
and within a year agreement was reached on proposals for a settlement. ' On the basis of 
these proposals the Secretary-General also submitted to the Security Council a report on 
the creation of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group for Namibia. 2These two 
documents were the basis on which SCR 435 was drafted and which provided for 
agreement on the transition of Namibia to independence. It was a further ten years before 
agreement on the implementation of SCR 435 was secured and UNTAG deployed. In the 
course of negotiations the UNTAG mandate has been subject to amendment, supplement 
and addendum but the formal framework, structure, functions, and objectives have 
remained as originally set out in SCR 435. From the outset it was clear that UNTAG 
would not be a typical case of UN supervised decolonisation. It was to be the first 
occasion on which the UN assumed responsibility for the administration of a non-self- 
governing territory and its transition to self government. The UN would be able to draw 
on its substantial experience of election supervision and troop withdrawal, but creating 
the conditions for free and fair elections to a constituent assembly extended far beyond 
the remit of any previous peacekeeping operation. The UNTAG mandate represented 
unprecedented levels of involvement in the building of a nation, even to the extent of 
laying down the principles on which the constituent assembly would create a constitution 
for an independent Namibia. 3 The details were left to be worked out by the constituent 
assembly but, in the preparation for self government, the UN went as far as to set up the 
Institute of Namibia which ran three year courses in Public Administration, "to prepare 
black Africans for power. ' '4 The management of the transition process was divided 
between civilian, police and military contingents responsible for election monitoring, 
police monitoring and overseeing the cease-fire respectively. 
Election Monitoring. 
SCR 435 provided that elections to the constituent assembly were to be run 
by the South 
African Administrator General under UN supervision and control. In order for Ahtisaari 
'UN Doc. S/ 12636,10 April 1978. 
2UN Doc. S/ 12827,29 August 1978. 
3See UN Doc. S/ 15287 Annexe, 12 July 1982. 
4Economist, 25 March 1989, p. 84. 
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to verify that the elections had been free and fair, and crucially, to ensure that the results 
were accepted by all sides, UNTAG had to be intensively involved in election 
preparations. Given the nature of the regime that was to be replaced the responsibilities 
of the civilian component had to be extensive and intrusive. Principally they involved: 
the repeal of discriminatory laws or regulations restricting the conduct of free and fair 
elections; the release of all political prisoners and the return of refugees; and a massive 
programme of voter education and registration. 
Without the media, education infrastructure, or literacy levels of the developed world this 
was no mean task, not least because the Namibian population of 1.5 million was spread 
over a territory the size of Britain and France combined. ' Regional centres and district 
sub-centres throughout Namibia were manned by four hundred and fifty staff, "to explain 
what was going on and assist in the much need process of national reconciliation. IQ Once 
the special representative was satisfied that the preparation of the electoral rolls, the 
electoral system and procedures, and the dates for the beginning of the campaign and the 
elections were all compatible with free and fair elections, a further eight hundred and fifty 
civilians were called in to monitor the electoral process itself. 3 At three hundred and fifty 
eight polling stations UNTAG monitored the South African conduct of an election in 
which ninety-seven percent of those enfranchised by UNTAG registered their first vote. -' 
Police Monitoring. 
UNTAG monitoring of the election process was necessary to guard against and counteract 
allegations of intimidation. To monitor the South African controlled South Western 
Africa Police Force, (SWAPOL), specifically, five hundred professional police monitors 
were charged with, 
"Taking measures against any intimidation or interference in the electoral 
process, accompanying the police force and assisting in ensuring the good 
conduct of the existing police forces. "5 
The UN Civilian Police Force, (CIVPOL), was also required to assess, "the suitability for 
continued employment"16 of SWAPOL after the elections and up until independent 
Namibia had developed its own authorities for maintaining law and order. The presence 
of former Koevoets members and their activities in SWAPOL created, "an atmosphere of 
fear and intimidation'17 in northern Namibia and was a constant threat to the conduct of 
IJames, (1990), op. cit., p. 260. 
2ibid. 
30f which three hundred and fifty were 'borrowed' from the military. 
tarlin, "Swapo Wins Namibian Poll with 57% of Vote, " The Independent, 15 November 
1989. 
5Manning, op. cit., pp. II- 12. 6ibid. 
7Ahtisaari, quoted by Carlin, John, "Quiet Test of Wills in Pre-Independent 
Windhoek, " The Independent, 
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free and fair elections. It was a major source of tension between the special representative 
and the South African Administrator but Ahtisaari did enjoy some success in securing 
their removal. ' 
Monitoring the Cease-fire. 
The role of the military component of UNTAG conformed in large part to the traditional 
functions of peacekeeping. A total of 4650 troops were employed to monitor: the cease- 
fire which came into effect on I April 1989; the demilitarisation of Namibia; the 
restriction of the SADF to base and its reduction to fifteen hundred men; the restriction to 
base of PLAN in Angola and Zambia; 2and to monitor the Namibia-Angola border. The 
military contingent also performed the non specific functions common to all 
peacekeeping operations of stabilising and legitimising the peace process. Additionally, 
however, UNTAG troops provided services that were not formally part of the mandate 
including the supply of water and medical assistance. Also, parallel to UNTAG ran the 
first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM 1). In accordance with the 
Geneva Protocol, this operation was charged with the comparatively straightforward and 
classical peacekeeping task of overseeing the withdrawal of Cuba fTom Angola. 3 
The division of peacekeeping responsibilities between civilian and military components is 
not in itself unusual. The appointment of a civilian as the head of UNTAG, however, as 
opposed to a force commander, was indicative of the unprecedented size of the non- 
rnilitary components and the scale of their duties. 4 It was the first "multi -component "5 
UN peacekeeping operation. The beginning of the post cold war expansion in 
peacekeeping responsibilities began in Namibia with UNTAG. Firstly, as the UN reports 
itself, 
"The practicability of physically putting a solution in place through the 
management of the UN given the requisite support of member states need 
no longer be in question. " 
Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, the new functions taken on by UNTAG, 
"foreshadowed new UN activities that would intrude more into the affairs of independent 
states rather than being part of decolonisation. 'r7 
22 June 1989. 
I ibid, see also, Brittain, Victoria, "UN Chief Attacks Namibian Police, " The Guardian, 26 June 1989. 213ut with no instructions as to their responsibilities regarding PLAN members Iin Namibia at the time of the 
cease-fire, see pp. 267-73 
Z! D 3See James, (1990), op. cit., pp. 255-6; Morphet, op. cit., pp. 214-5; & Fortna, "United Nations 
Angola 
Verification Mission I, " in Durch, op. cit., pp. 376-87. 40NUC was the first and last occasion on which a civilian headed a UN operation. 5Fortna, op. cit., p. 353. 6UN Doc. A/45/1,16 September 1990. 
7Weiss, The United Nations and Changing World Politics, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), p. 
65. see also 
Morphet, op. cit., pp. 216-9. 
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Central America: Peacekeeping Expansion Continues. 
This trend continued in Central America where Alvaro de Soto, the former special 
representative of Perez de Cuellar has observed, 
"Beyond military activities, such combined operations can encompass 
socio-economic, human rights, electoral, and institutional reform as well as humanitarian assistance. "' 
The United Nations Observer Group in Central America, (ONUCA), represented the first 
occasion in which UN supervision of demilitarisation incorporated, "the physical 
collection and destruction of armaments. "2 In Nicaragua the United Nations Observer 
NEssion to verify the election process, (ONUVEN), provided an election supervision 
service for the first time in an established nation-state, rather than as part of the 
decolonisation process. And finally, the United Nations Observer mission in El Salvador, 
(ONUSAL), was the first occasion on which UN institutional, economic, and social 
reconstruction of a nation extended to monitoring human rights within a nation. 
ONUSAL was also called on to oversee the reduction of armed forces, the training of a 
new police force and assisting in land transfers. 3 
April Fools Day Massacre: The Consequences of Exclusion. 
On I April 1989 the whole Namibian peace process came perilously close to derailment. 
On the day set by the Tripartite Agreements for the beginning of the implementation of 
SCR 435, fighting broke out between the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the 
Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN - the military wing of SWAPO). SWAPO 
forces, 'supposed, ' to be confined to base camps north of the sixteenth parallel inside 
Angola had entered Namibia, apparently in violation of the cease-fire which had been in 
effect since the agreement of the Geneva Protocol the previous August. At this stage only 
a handful of UNTAG representatives were in place. The special sepresentative, Martti 
Ahtisaari, authorised the SADF to repel the incursion. In the resultant fighting three 
hundred SWAPO soldiers were killed. 
This massacre was the product of decisions taken in negotiations which did not include 
SWAPO or the Secretary-General. On 8 August the Geneva Protocol was drawn up by 
the Contact Group, South Africa, Cuba and Angola under American mediation. That 
document states, 
Ide Soto, Alvaro, & del Castillo, Graciana, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding, " Foreign Policy, 1994. p. 7 1. 
2Morphet, op. cit., p. 219.1 1 3Weiss, op. cit., p. 66. see also de Soto & del Castillo, op. cit., i 
pp. 69-83; & Co eman, Chr s C. The 
Salvadorean Peace Process: A Preliminary Enquiry, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
Research 
Report No. 173, December 1993, pp. 19-23. 
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"Angola and Cuba shall use their good offices so that once the total 
withdrawal of South African troops from Angola is completed, and within the context also of the cessation of hostilities in Namibia, SWAPO's forces 
will be deployed north of the 16th parallel. " 
That document was not published until 4 April 1989, in a letter sent by South Africa to 
the Secretary-General. What is not clear, is the extent of either the S ecretary- General's or 
SWAPO's knowledge of the details of that agreement. The explanation for Ahtisaari's 
decision given by his spokesman, Cedric Thornberry, is instructive in this respect, 
"We have been informed by the parties to these accords that a Geneva 
Agreement of August last year provided for the return to base north of the 
16th parallel of various troops and my understanding is from the 
information which has been given by the parties to those agreements, that 
those troops were intended to include SWAPO. But I ought to say that we 
have no official knowledge. I am sorry to be diplomatic about this, but it 
really is the case we have no official knowledge of that treaty and so far as 
I know it has never been published. "' 
Correspondence between the SWAPO President, Sam Nujoma, and the Secretary -General 
is also revealing. On August 12, Nujoma wrote to Perez de Cuellar to confirm SWAPO's 
commitment to the peace process and acceptance of a cease-fire. 2 Significantly no 
mention was made of the sixteenth parallel. This letter was interpreted by the South 
African's, however, as acceptance of the Geneva terms and conditions - that Namibian 
members of SWAPO had no right to be there. The Secretary-General's subsequent report 
did little to clarify the situation, 
"On August 12 1988, the President of SWAPO informed me that SWAPO 
had agreed to comply with the commencement of the cessation of hostile 
acts in accordance with the Geneva agreement. He also stated that 
SWAPO would be ready to abide by that agreement until the formal cease- 
fire under resolution 435. " (emphasis added) 
It is not clear whether by mentioning, 'that agreement, ' Nujoma and the Secretary -General 
were referring to the Geneva Protocol per se or merely a cease-fire. Moreover, the issue 
of the status of SWAPO guerrillas is conspicuous by its absence from all other related 
agreements. Yet this issue was a long standing bone of contention between South Africa 
and SWAPO. 
Both the Secretary-General and the Contact Group came up against this stumbling 
block 
during 1979 and 1980 in the first efforts to secure the implementation of 
SCR 435. 
These early negotiations are important for two reasons. Firstly, the 
South African and 
lReported by Beresford, David, "SWAPO'Did Not Sign Accord' to Stay North of Angolan 
Border, " The 
Guardian, 6 April 1989. 
2UN Doc. S/20129,12 August 1989. 
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SWAPO positions were left unreconciled. Secondly, the failure to reconcile these 
differences, (among others), restructured the negotiating framework for the rest of the 
decade. That negotiating structure, in turn, ensured that these particular differences 
would not be reconciled. 
SWAPO insisted that as Nan-libians, their guerrillas had every right to be in Namibia. The 
UN also put forward proposals that, at the moment a cease-fire came into operation, 
PLAN members in Namibia would be confined to base. ' South Africa, however, refused 
to accept the presence of SWAPO forces in Namibia in any form, and told the Secretary- 
General of its, "extreme concern regarding the impartiality of the UN, a pre-requisite for 
free and fair elections. "2 The contact group conceded to the South Africans on this point 
and when Waldheim followed suit, the Secretary-General succeeded only in incurring the 
wrath of SWAPO. As Urquhart recalls, 
"SWAPO was not to be outdone by the South Africans. Its President Sam 
Nujorna announced from Addis Ababa that he would no longer co-operate 
with the Secretary-General ... and that he 
disagreed with a number of the 
Secretary-General's interpretations. `3 
Against this background, the January 1981 Geneva Pre-Implementation Meeting (PIM), 
organised and chaired by the UN, made no further progress. By this stage it had become 
apparent that South Africa, encouraged by the change of administration in the US, was 
procrastinating and pursuing Namibian independence on its own terms. 4 The meeting 
was unusual, however, in that it permitted the attendance of internal parties - "in what 
other international meeting were the individual political parties of a country invited to 
take part? "5 After SCR 435 was passed, and until the PIM collapse, the Secretary- 
General and his representatives operated in tandem with the Contact Group in mediating 
between all the parties involved. From this point onward, however, the US assumed 
responsibility for mediating Namibian independence. The US approach was to 
link the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, to South African withdrawal 
from Namibia. 
Under this format, the US could afford to exclude SWAPO from the negotiating table. 
Greater progress could be made with its South African ally in SWAPO's absence. 
Moreover, it was expected SWAPO would accept the situation 
because it would get its 
desired goal in Namibian independence. Although SWAPO was excluded its views were 
represented through the new Secretary-General. Though in consultation with all parties 
Perez de Cuellar was also excluded from the negotiating table. 
Perez de Cuellar actually 
lUrquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 309. 2Letter to the Secretary -General quoted in "Namibia: 
'I'lle Elusive Search for Independence, " ACR Vol. 13. 
1980/81, p. B717. 
3Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 3 10. 
4ibid., pp. 318-21. 
5ibid., p. 318. 
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concurred with the US on the, 'linkage theory, " but in 1983 the Security Council decreed, 
with the US abstaining, that, "the independence of Namibia cannot be held hostage to the 
resolution of issues that are alien to SCR 435. "2 This statement effectively set in stone 
the mediatory structure outlined above. After such a ruling the Secretary -General could 
not negotiate the simultaneous withdrawal of Cuba from Angola and South Africa from 
Namibia. To do so would not only be to flaunt the ruling of the Security Council, but to 
flaunt international law and the rulings of other UN organs as well. 3 The reality of the 
situation on the ground, however, was that the Angolan government could not accept 
Cuban withdrawal unless the SADF withdrew from Namibia, and Southern Angola, 
(where it supported UNITA4resistance to the MPLA). Equally, South Africa could not 
withdraw from Namibia without the security of simultaneous Cuban withdrawal 
It was, therefore, with good reason that the US took the lead role, and when the emerging 
entente between the US and USSR created new possibilities for a Namibian settlement 
this mediatory structure was still in place. With changing circumstances at the regional 
level, the local parties were also becoming more disposed to a diplomatic solution. A 
new round of talks was initiated in May 1988 focusing on the link between South African 
withdrawal from Namibia and Cuban withdrawal from Angola. In that the disarming and 
return to Namibia of SWAPO guerrillas was central to South African withdrawal, these 
talks also addressed a significant internal dimension of the transition process. The 
framework within which they were conducted clearly favoured South Africa and 
permitted private, (but not public), concessions to South Africa over the stationing of 
SWAPO guerrillas. In what might be read as a subtle but public admission that the issue 
remained formally unresolved, the Brazzaville Protocol, (13 December 1988), created the 
Joint Commission as a, 'diplomatic mechaniSM"5 to address any problems arising from 
South African and Cuban withdrawal from the region. Again, however, membership of 
the Joint Commission was limited to South Africa, Angola, and Cuba. As guarantors of 
the settlement, the US and USSR were accorded observer status, but not the Secretary- 
General or SWAPO. This effectively formalised the Angolan and Cuban good offices 
roles provided for in the Geneva Protocol. 
It is not unusual to leave specific issues hanging in the interest of securing a wider 
agreement. The solutions are left to be hammered out in practice on the ground. This 
was certainly the case regarding post independence jurisdiction over the port of Walvis 
Bay. It seems that the positioning of SWAPO soldiers must also be viewed in this way. 
I UN Docs. S/ 15776,19 May 1983 & S/ 15493,18 November 1982. 
2SC Res. 539,28 October 1983. 
3See pp. 263-4. 
4National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. 
5James, (1990), op. cit., p. 259. 
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With UNTAG peacekeepers in place, the likelihood of a SWAPO incursion would be 
diminished. If SWAPO soldiers were to enter Namibia from Angola, UNTAG and not 
the SADF would be on hand to diffuse the situation. The Joint Commission would also be 
available to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on SWAPO, and with the process of 
transition initiated SWAPO was unlikely to throw away the realisation of its raison d'etre. 
The reality, however, was that on I April 1988 only one hundred troops and nine police 
officers were in the area. I UNTAG deployment had been delayed by wrangling in the 
Security Council over the operation's size. Ironically, on the grounds that a SWAPO 
incursion would be unlikely, (and for reasons of finance), the permanent five, led by the 
US had insisted that the operation's size be cut. Resistance came from the non permanent 
members and a vociferous African contingent in the General Assembly who feared the 
ability of UNTAG to monitor the South Africans would be circumscribed. Agreement in 
the Security Council was delayed until mid February and secured only by a fudge 
proposed by the Secretary-General. Of the 7,500 peacekeepers provided for by SCR 435 
only 4,650 would be deployed and the remainder held on stand-by. The budget was not 
then approved by the General Assembly until 1 March, so delaying preparation and 
deployment of UNTAG by two weeks. 2 The decision to authorise the expulsion of PLAN 
by the SADF was a decision that the Secretary-General and his representative should 
never have had to make. That decision was taken after a six hour meeting between 
Ahtisaari, Prem. Chand, (UN Force Commander), R. F. Botha (South African Foreign 
Minister), and General Louis Pienaar, (the South African Administrator). Not only did 
the Secretary-General have an incomplete copy of the agreement, but he was reliant on 
only one of the parties for its interpretation. 
That the Secretary-General and his representative are fully informed, however, is their 
responsibility too. From the history of the conflict, Ahtisaari, in particular should have 
been aware of the SWAPO stance. What had suddenly changed? What should have been 
apparent, even before Perez de Cuellar received the Geneva Protocol in a letter that was 
little more than an attempt to justify SADF brutality, was that South Africa and SWAPO 
both had very different understandings of the cease-fire arrangements. According to the 
Geneva Protocol, SWAPO presence in Namibia, was a violation of the cease-fire. 
SWAPO guerrillas did not enter Namibia with hostile intent and their presence even in 
violation of Geneva did not warrant the heavy handed and over zealous response of the 
SADF. 3 Rather, in accordance with their original stance, SWAPO soldiers aimed to set 
'Carlin, John & Dowden, Richard, "UN Blamed for Namibian Battle, " The Independent, 4 April 1989. 
2FOrtna, Virginia Page, "United Nations Transition Group in Namibia, " in Durch op. cit., pp. 362-3. 
3 Somewhat ominously the SADF membership included a considerable representation 
from the disbanded 
Koevoets 'crowbar' police. 
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up camps where they would be monitored by UNTAG. If anything had changed then as 
Leonard Doyle observed at the time, 
"Appointed UN special representative in 1978, Ahtisaari is the only person in a position to challenge or support the opposing claims of SWAPO and South Africa on the agreements which have been reached down the years. Only he can say with authority whether SWAPO ever dropped its claim to have bases inside Namibia. "' 
If history was not a guide, then according to SWAPO a last minute request was lodged 
with the Secretary-General to resolve this issue before the tripartite agreement came into 
effect. 2 The lengths to which Perez de Cuellar went behind the scenes to avert this 
impending crisis lie unrecorded. 3 
Both South Africa and SWAPO were intent on a de facto resolution of their differences 
over this point. The cost of their respective efforts to achieve a fait accompli could have 
been averted, not least if UNTAG had been in place. The reliance on UNTAG, however, 
was to treat the symptom not the cause. Diplomacy between state and non state actors is 
inherently problematical, especially where the latter is considered insurgent. If it was not 
possible for SWAPO to sit at the negotiating table, then a representative of the Secretary- 
General could have been accorded observer status at the very least. This could have 
ensured against double standards. The Secretary-General's representation might also be 
considered imperative if the Secretary-General is ultimately to be called upon to 
implement any agreements. 4 The Secretary-General's exclusion, and the reliance on the 
Joint Commission and its participants left a political vacuum in the diplomatic process 
between SWAPO and South Africa which permitted the issue of SWAPO guerrillas to go 
unresolved and each party to seek resolution of this difference unilaterally. 
The diplomatic success of the Joint Commission in getting Namibian Independence back 
on track is testament to the commitment of the parties and guarantors of Namibian peace 
to that process. It is also noticeable that in the aftermath of personal criticism, and 
heightened tensions on the ground, Perez de Cuellar assumed a much higher profile in the 
resolution of problems related to Namibian independence. 5 Concern at the disruption of 
'Doyle, Leonard, "UN Resists SWAPO calls for Ahtisaari's dismissal, " The Independent, 8 April 1989. 
213fittain, Victoria, "Colonial Power Pattern Repeats Itself, " The Guardian, 14 May 1989. 
31t is possible that ignorance was used as an ex postfacto justification for the debacle of I April. 
This is 
speculative conjecture. 
4Such an arrangement had already been made in Central America by the Esquipulas Agreements, see pp. 
273-5. 
5The decision to support SADF intent was described variously by SWAPO and the non-aligned as, 
"a 
license to go on a turkey shoot, " authorisation of "murder squads", "ill conceived and a violation of 
Security Council Resolution 435, " and accompanied by demands for Ahtisaari's dismissal. see 
John Carlin, 
"South Africa and UN in Trial of Strength, " The Independent, 14 April 1989, 
& Doyle, Leonard, "UN 
Resists SWAPO Calls for Ahtisaari's Dismissal, " The Independent, 8 April 1989. The permanent five were 
extremely quick to jump to the Secretary -General's defence. This might conceivably considered 
indicative 
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the independence process was reflected in a July visit. Originally it had not been intended 
that the Secretary -General would visit before independence was complete. Now the 
Secretary -General threw the weight of his office - with the support and backing of the 
Security Council - behind Ahtisaari in the growing stand-off between UNTAG and the 
South African implementation of SCR 435 and the administration of the territory in the 
transition period. I 
Practising Inclusion in Central America. 
UNTAG demonstrated the potential dangers of not fully involving the Secretary-General 
in the negotiations leading to a peacekeeping operation or in negotiations to a settlement 
that run in tandem to a peacekeeping operation. The Secretaries-General of the OAS and 
UN jointly played a central role in concluding the agreement on a procedure for 
establishing a long and lasting peace in Central America. 2 One of the provisions of 
Esquipulas H was the establishment of an International Verification and Follow Up 
Commission to which the two Secretaries-General were made full members. It was the 
first time the UN Secretary-General had been accorded such status in what otherwise 
remained an entirely intergovernmental body. Carvinos and Lavalle observe that, "it gave 
rise to a relationship between the Secretaries-General and Governments that is entirely 
novel. "3 While membership undoubtedly reflected the extent of the Secretary-General's 
diplomatic involvement - in contrast with Namibia - it also ensured that the Secretary- 
General was fully informed of the agreements which he would later be called on to help 
implement through ONUCA, ONUSAL and ONUVEN. 4 It also ensured that the views 
and positions of the non governmental parties to peace in Central America - the Contras 
in Nicaragua and the Salvadorean Rebels - could not easily be discounted. Pellicer 
summarises perfectly the role played by Perez de Cuellar, 
"First, the Secretary-General called attention to the need for verification 
and outlined specific ways to establish it. This prompted the Executive 
Committee ... to request 
him to establish an'impartial mechanism'to 
perform verification. The Secretary-General replied, explaining the nature 
and parameters of peacekeeping operations, the role of the Security 
Council, and the required commitments of the parties. "5 
of where blame lies. 
IDifferences were particularly acute over the removal of discriminatory legislation and allegations of 
assault, intimidation, misconduct, and the spread of mis/dis-information directed at 
fostering a "docile" post 
independent neighbour. 2UN Doc. A/42/521 - S/ 19085, Annex , 31 August 
1987, this is the official formal title of Esquipulas 11. 
3Ca. rvinos, Hugo, & Lavalle, Roberto, "New Departures in the Exercise of Inherent 
Powers by the UN & 
OAS Secre taries- General: The Central American Situation, " American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 
83, No. 2, April 1989, p. 401. 
40n the Secretary-General's good offices in Central America see, Coleman, op. cit., pp. 
17-23. 
5Pellicer, op. cit., p. 182. 
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Six months later, on the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Security Council 
authorised the creation of ONUCA. 
In El Salvador, the Secretary-General's diplomatic contribution was even more telling. In 
1989 the Presidents of the Contadora Group requested that the Secretary-General, "help 
bring about a resumption of dialogue between the government of El Salvador and the 
FMLN guerrillas. " I Franck and Nolte note that this was a rare occasion on which the 
remit of the Secretary -General's good offices was made public, 
"The Secretary -General was to participate actively as an inten-nediary in 
the negotiations, have the exclusive right to provide public information 
about progress made and was permitted at his discretion, to maintain 
confidential contacts for purposes of consultations with any state outside 
the negotiations and also individual Salvadoreans. "2 
These terms of reference effectively gave the Secretary-General a free hand, and they 
illustrate the advantage that the Secretary-General enjoys as a third party because he is 
not limited as who he can engage diplomatically. 3 The Secretary-General and his 
representative secured agreements encompassing a cease-fire and dernobilisation of the 
FMLN; reduction and reform of the FAES, (El Salvador Federal Army); land transfers to 
former combatants and squatters in the combat zones; a new broadly representative and 
well trained civilian police force; electoral and judicial reforms; and human rights 
protection. 4 During the course of negotiations, discussion had also focused on other 
issues including constitutional reform and economic and social issues. In rebuilding El 
Salvador the Secretary -General was far more intimately involved than in Namibia and the 
settlement which was agreed, and which the Secretary-General was than called upon to 
implement was far more extensive, explicit and intricate than the UNTAG mandate. 
Such was the extent of Perez de Cuellar's personal involvement that when an impasse was 
reached he was able to remind the parties that his mediation would end when his term as 
Secretary-General came to an end. Ultimately this was not strictly speaking true. Perez 
de Cuellar remained in office, literally, until 6.00am on January 1992 when the last 
remaining obstacles to democratising and restructuring El Salvador were finally 
resolved. 5 On 14 January the Security Council authorised the creation of ONUSAL6 and 
I Nolte & Franck, op. cit., p. 153, see also Declaration of San Isidrio UN Doc. S/21019,12 
December 1989. 
2ibid., pp. 153-4, see also UN Doc. S/23218,9 October 199 1; UN El Salvador Agreements: 
The Paths to 
Peace, (New York: UN DPI, July 1992), p. ii; & Coleman, op. cit., P. 18. 
3For the further development of this argument see the section on the Secretary -General and 
Gulf Hostages. 
4Coleman, op. cit., p. 23. 5See Pellicer, op. ci . t., pp. 182-8. 6SC Res. 729 (1992). N. B. the human rights component of ONUSAL had been deployed 
6 months earlier 
on I August 1991. t> 
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two days later Boutros Ghali reported that Perez de Cuellar's efforts had led to, "a 
revolution by negotiation. "' 
Expelline Irau from Kuwait. 
Saddam Hussein's attempt to annex Kuwait was a textbook case of unprovoked 
aggression against a member state of the UN. 2 It constituted a violation of Articles 2 (3) 
and 2 (4) of the Charter and represented exactly the sort of security breach which the UN 
was conceived to address. Also at stake was the security of the Middle East oil supply. 
There existed a rare coincidence of a matter of principle which demanded a swift and 
decisive response, with an issue of economic security for the developed world which 
compelled such a response. 
In the Iran- Iraq War it took seven months to agree a resolution threatening enforcement 
action, and the Security Council could not then agree its implementation. This time the 
immediacy and conviction of the Security Council's response was remarkable. At 
10.00pm on I August 1990, Thomas Pickering, the US permanent representative, 
received notification from the Under Secretary for State that Iraq had invaded Kuwait. 
Pickering located the President of the Security Council, Aurel Dragos Munteanu of 
Romania, as well as Mohammed Abulhasan and Sir Crispin Tickell, (the Kuwaiti and 
British permanent representatives respectively), and informal consultations of the whole 
were set for 1.30am. Incredibly, by 6.00arn SCR 660 had been adopted condemning the 
invasion and demanding the unconditional and immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troopS. 3 
This was followed on 6 August by SCR 662 imposing sanctions and establishing a 
sanctions committee to monitor compliance with the resolution. The Secretary-General 
was asked to provide assistance to the committee and report its findings to the Security 
Council. By 25 August, the Security Council had moved to a total trade embargo and a 
naval blockade empowering states with a naval presence in the area to, "disable shipS, "4 
refusing to stop and pen-nit inspection of their carriage. 5 Member states were requested to 
liaise with the Secretary-General in reporting and implementing the resolution. 
1Press release SG/SNV4685,16 January 1992, quoted in Franck & Nolte, op. cit., p. 155. 
2Saddam Hussein's quarrel with the Crown Prince was over oil rich territory and compensation 
for the Iran- 
Iraq War. The escalation of this dispute might be seen as a failure for UN preventive 
Diplomacy. This 
argument, however, is based on an inaccurate reading of the facts. Saddam's decisions to 
invade was an 
impulsive one. The US Ambassador had obtained assurances on 29,30 and 
31 of July that Hussein would 
not seek a military solution. At the UN Avakov argues, "the feeling was that the 
differences between Iraq 
and Kuwait would best be handled by the Arab League and that actual resort to 
force was unlikely. " 
Avakov, op. cit., p. 166. This argument was confirmed in interviews in the 
Secretariat. On why Saddam 
went to war, Simpson, John, From the House of War, (London: Hutchinson, 
1991); Kaufmann, Johan et al, 
The World in Turmoil: Testing the UN's Capacity, ACUNS Reports 1991, pp. 1-3. 
3For a full and first hand recollection of the immediacy of the UN response see 
Hume, op. cit., Chs. 14 & 
15. 
4Doyle, Leonard, "UN Blockade Decision Heralded as Historic, " The Independent, 27 August 1990. 
5SC Res. 665,25 August, 1990. 
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Throughout September, October and November the Security Council continued to tighten 
its stranglehold on Iraq, before resorting to the ultimate sanction on November 29. In 
SCR 678 member states were authorised, 
"To use all necessary means to secure implementation of resolution 660 
and subsequent resolutions and to restore international peace and security to the area. " 
operation Desert Storm was launched in the early hours of 17 January after the expiry on 
15 January of the deadline for compliance with the Security Council's demands. The 
expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait was completed by 28 February 199 1. 
The Secretary-General's Role. 
In total, the Security Council passed twelve resolutions during this period. In five of 
these the Secretary-General received no mention whatsoever. ' In five resolutions the 
Secretary-General was charged with administrative tasks. 2 In two resolutions the 
Secretary-General was accorded low level and highly specific diplomatic responsibilities: 
SCR 664 on 18 August, "welcomed the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue urgent 
consultations with Iraq on the problems of foreign hostages; " and in SCR 666 on 13 
September the Secretary-General was called on to, "use his good offices to facilitate the 
delivery of food stuffs to Kuwait and Iraq. " Perez de Cuellar immediately appointed 
Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan as his personal representative but his mandate was limited 
only to negotiating the supply of humanitarian assistance. Only in SCRs 670 and 674 was 
the Secretary -General mandated to bring about an end to the crisis by diplomacy. 
Resolution 670 and the August Mission. 
SCR 670 passed on 25 September, "welcomed the Secretary-General's use of his good 
offices to advance a peaceful solution, " and was a retrospective authorisation of the 
initiative undertaken by Perez de Cuellar in late August. Acting on the basis of the 
Secretary-General's independent prerogatives, Perez de Cuellar appeared to be at the 
forefront of UN efforts to undo the invasion of Kuwait. 
Having called for all sides to act with, "maximum restraint, '13 Perez de Cuellar offered to 
meet with Iraqi representatives in either New York or Geneva. Saddarn Hussein preferred 
a meeting on home territory and without ruling out that possibility Perez de Cuellar met 
with Tariq Aziz in Amman, (Jordan), on 31 August. Early hopes and indications were 
that basking in recent UN successes the Secretary-General might succeed where the Arab 
lResolutions 660,662,667,669 & 678. 
2Resolutions 661,665,666,674 & 677. 
3Reported, by Doyle Leonard, "Tough test for Perez de Cuellar, " Independent, 24 August 1990. 
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League, US and Security Council had not. During the Iran-Iraq war the Secretary- 
General had struck up a personal rapport with the personalities involved, and the Iraqi 
Foreign minister added to the promise surrounding the Secretary-General's visit by 
complimenting Perez de Cuellar's handling of the Iran-Iraq War, 
"When the situation looked stalled the Secretary-General presented documents to the two governments. This method allowed the two parties to 
maintain discussions in spite of everything else. " I 
The high profile of the Secretary-General's mission, however, is misleading and 
overplayed the significance of the Secretary-General's role. Press reports at the time 
suggested that issues likely to be on the secret agenda included, "the possibility of a UN 
peacekeeping force, " and even, "the question of autonomy for Kuwait under a federated 
system. "2 Yet regardless of whether the Secretary-General engaged Saddam Hussein or 
his representatives in dialogue independently, or at the direction of the Security Council, 
the Secretary-General had very little room for manoeuvre. Firstly, the Secretary-General 
could not compromise on Kuwaiti sovereignty. Saddam Hussein had violated the Charter, 
and international law was not up for negotiation. Secondly, Perez de Cuellar remained 
tightly bound by the resolutions of the Security Council. In one sense the Secretary- 
General's hand was strengthened by the passing of SCR 665 immediately prior to his 
departure. The move to a total trade ban, enforced by a naval blockade should have 
impressed upon Saddam that, "his [Perez de Cuellar's] personal initiative may be the last 
real opportunity to solve the Gulf crisis through dialogue. ' '3 On the other hand the 
Secretary -General had no flexibility in playing the cards the Security Council had dealt. 
Whatever the Secretary-General could deliver, nothing other than the total and 
unconditional withdrawal of Iraq was acceptable to the Security Council. The 
international community was stacked against Saddam and as Avakov observes, 
"The tough and uncompromising demands of 660 left practically no room 
for anybody, including the Secretary-General to negotiate with Iraq on 
conditions for withdrawal of its forces. "4 
Perez de Cuellar's August mission must be viewed in this light. At most the Secretary- 
General sought to provide Saddam Hussein with a face-saving formula that would permit 
an Iraqi withdrawal. Otherwise, the Secretary-General could merely reiterate that should 
Saddam fail to withdraw, "Iraq faced the very real prospect of being defeated in a bloody 
war led by the US. "5 As Saddarn Hussein's intransigence persisted there was little Perez 
'Quoted by Reeves, Phil, "Ray of Hope from Perez de Cuellar talks with Aziz, " Independent, I September 
1990. 
2ibid. 
3Doyle, Leonard, "Perez de Cuellar to Meet Iraq, Foreign Minister, " The Independent, 27 August 1990. 
4Avakov, op. cit., p. 168. 5Friedman, Lawrence, 'The UN's Last Chance to Comer Saddarn, " The Independent, 30 August 1990. 
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de Cuellar could do other than remain in the background until such a point as his 
diplomatic services were required. The Security Council acknowledged and formalised 
the efforts undertaken by Perez de Cuellar in SCR 670, but as Franck and Nolte report, 
"If the Charter had left him in any doubt on the score, it was resolved by 
unambiguous private communications from permanent members of the Council. "' 
Resolution 674 and the Gang of Four. 
This view of the respective roles of the Secretary -General and the Security Council in the 
Gulf Crisis was not universally held. As the prospect of a military solution became 
increasingly likely, a minority of member states became increasingly critical of an 
approach that was all stick and no carrot. Cuba, Columbia, Malaysia, and Yemen led a 
campaign to wrestle control over the direction of UN policy away from the permanent 
members, and, "halt the drift to war. ' Q The so called, 'Gang of Four, ' wanted the Security 
Council to make concessions to Saddarn Hussein providing an incentive to withdraw, and 
giving the Secretary-General a wider negotiating framework. As a concession to the 
Gang of Four, the Security Council, "reposed its trust in the Secretary-General to make 
available his good offices and, as he considered appropriate, to pursue them and 
undertake diplomatic efforts in order to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis. "3 The role 
of the Secretary-General, however, had not changed in any meaningful sense, and with 
good reason. Lawrence Friedman explains, 
"If Saddam is able to secure sufficient concessions to make the effort 
worthwhile then the fundamental principle that aggression must not pay 
has been undermined, while if the concessions are trivial they will not 
prevent his humiliation. ' 4 
The Gang of Four won little support. The Gulf War brought together the permanent 
members and the non-aligned alike, as Malaysia made clear in a statement accompanying 
its agreement to co-sponsor SCR 660 at the very beginning of the crisis, 
"We are against acts of external influence, aggression and the use of force 
and the threat of force in inter-state relations without exception. This is 
particularly important to protect the sovereignty of small states. 115 
Resolution 678 and January's Mission. 
The demise of the Gang of Four initiative did not mark the end of Perez de Cuellar's role 
in the Gulf Crisis. SCR 678 did not mention the Secretary-General specifically, but on 
'Franck & Nolte, op. cit., p. 163. 21-lume, op. cit., p. 207. 3SC Res. 674,29 October 1990. 
4Friedman, op. cit. 5UN Doc. S/P. V. 2932 2 August 1990, cited in Hume, OP. cit., p- 252. 
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Russian insistence SCR 678 included a forty-five day, "grace for diplomacy. "' January 
15 was set as the absolute deadline for withdrawal but it was not until that deadline was 
about to expire that the Secretary-General was engaged. On 14 January Perez de Cuellar 
flew to Baghdad, but as before, only as the spokesman of the international community. 
Perez de Cuellar reported that his talks were, "polite but unsuccessful, I'2and Operation 
Desert Storm swung into action. 
Throughout the crisis, negotiations were led by the US Secretary of State not the 
Secretary-General. The US held all the cards and James Baker, more than Perez de 
Cuellar, "represented the Security Council and the anti Iraq military coalition. "3 James 
Baker had himself flown to Baghdad just a few days prior to Perez de Cuellar's trip and 
Franck and Nolte report, "according to several of his staff, " Perez de Cuellar was, 
11actively discouraged, " from visiting Baghdad until Baker's mission had failed. 4When 
James Baker's efforts came to nothing it was unlikely that Perez de Cuellar would fair any 
better. It was imperative for the legitimacy of Operation Desert Storm, however, that 
every last avenue available be pursued before resorting to force. As the, "letter carrier, "5 
of the Security Council the Secretary-General gave Saddam Hussein one final opportunity 
to climb down. The Secretary-General's diplomatic involvement ended much as it had 
begun. 
The Gulf Hostaee Crisis. 
By contrast, the Secretary-General played the lead role in procuring the safe release of the 
Gulf Hostages in 1991. Between March 1985 and 1989 Islamic and Arab groups 
aggrieved at the roles played by the UN and the US in the Middle East kidnapped at least 
twelve Westerners. 6 In August 1991 John McCarthy was the first Western hostage to be 
released by Islamic Jihad. He carried with him a letter from his kidnappers to Perez de 
Cuellar. 7 In this letter Islamic Rhad demonstrated an extremely astute understanding of 
that part of the Secretary-General's role which depends on the perception of independence 
from the Security Council. 
lHume, op. cit., p 212. 2UN Doc. DE/805, cited in Avakov, p. 169. 3Avakov, op. cit., p. 170. 4Franck & Nolte, op. cit., p. 162. 5ibid., p. 163. 6To my knowledge these include; Terry Anderson (US), Joseph James Cicippio (US), Brian 
Keenan 
(Ireland), 'I'liornas Kemptner (Germany), Jack Mann (UK), John McCarthy (UK), Alberto Molinari (Italy), 
Allan Steen (US), Henrich Struebig (Germany), Edward Tracey (US), Jessie Turner (US), & Terry Waite 
(UK). 
7Translation of this letter and the following quotes are taken from The Independent, 
"Free Us From the 
'Yoke of Tyrants' Plea to Perez, " August 199 1. 
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Firstly, in a vitriolic tirade against the US and the UN, Islamic Jihad, denounced the UN 
as, "merely a cover to protect the interest of the of world imperialism. " The role of the 
UN and US in the Gulf War was specifically cited as one of those issues which, "give us 
[Islamic Jihad] an extremely unfavourable impression of the United Nations, which has 
become a plaything of the superpowers, particularly the US. " At the same time the 
message carried by John McCarthy began, "you are well aware of the great importance of 
your role and position as Secretary-General of the UN in the eyes of the people of the 
world, particularly the oppressed and downtrodden. " The Secretary -General was then 
called upon, "to make a personal endeavour within the framework of a comprehensive 
solution to secure the release of all detainees around the world. " According to Fisk, the 
demands of Islamic Jihad were, "basic and familiar: " the release of Sheikh Abdul Karim 
Obeid, the Shia Hizbollah cleric kidnapped by Israel in July 1989; the liberation of three 
hundred and fifty Shia Muslims held in Israeli prisons in South Lebanon; and freedom for 
Islamic Palestinians held in Israel. ' 
Fisk reported that according to one Hizbollah advisor, "If Mr Perez de Cuellar agrees to 
be the mediator and the Americans accept this, then all the rest of the hostages can be 
freed and can go home to their families. ' QAccording to that advisor the hostage exchange 
had already been agreed in principle with the US and Israel. The Secretary -General was 
being engaged, "to make sure all promises are kept on both sides. ' '3 As Franck and Nolte 
observe, the acceptability of the Secretary-General to both Islamic Jihad and the US was 
testament, "to the trust that the different sides had in him [and] was an important 
ingredient in securing a favourable outcome. "4 
Despite their grievances with the Security Council and one of the permanent members in 
particular, Islamic Jihad were still prepared to engage the Secretary-General's good 
offices. Writing in 1952 Stephen Schwebel explains why, 
"A prime element of the Secretary-General's influence is his relatively 
detached position, his opportunity and obligations, as a spokesman 
for the 
interests of the UN as a whole, to avoid party identification with any 
particular power or group of powers. '15 
In the eyes of Islamic Jihad Perez de Cuellar clearly fulfilled this role. 
The Secretary- 
General's institutional independence and the incumbent's personal integrity 
had not been 
compromised by the Gulf War. The importance of this distinction could not 
have been 
demonstrated in more stark terms than the first hand experience of 
the Secretary -General's 
Tisk, Robert, "Kidnappers Look to United Nations, " The Independent, August 1991. 
2QUoted in Fisk, ibid. 
3ibid. 
4Franck & Nolte, op. cit., p. 159. 
5Schwebel, op. cit., p. I 11. 
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personal representative. Giandomenico Picco was despatched by Perez de Cuellar to 
negotiate with the hostage takers and has reported that on his arrival in the Lebanon, 
"One of the first questions asked me was whether I was an emissary of the Secretary-General or the Security Council. I gave the right answer. Had I 
said, 'the Security Council' as I was subsequently informed, I would have been killed. " I 
The kidnappers were prepared to accept only the good offices of the Secretary-General 
and did not kill Picco because he came with, "credibility and no vested interests. "2 The 
acceptability to the US, UK, and Israel of the Secretary-General's good offices, however, 
points to another comparative advantage the Secretary-General's institutional 
independence holds over the Security Council. The Secretary-General can engage in 
dialogue with parties to disputes and conflicts with whom it is difficult for governments to 
justify contact. Perez de Cuellar had therefore been able to open a private and indirect 
dialogue with the kidnappers through the Iranian Government as early as 1989, (following 
the capture and murder of Colonel William R. Higgins -a UNIFIL peacekeeper). 
The Post War Settlement. 
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, responsibility for securing a political settlement in the 
region remained with the Security Council. As a part of the Security Council package to 
maintain peace and security in the region, SCR 687 had established a demilitarised zone 
along the 1963 Iraq-Kuwaiti border, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five 
kilometres into Kuwait. On the Secretary-General's recommendation3 the Security 
Council created the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission, (UNIKOM), to 
monitor the withdrawal of armed forces, and the maintenance of the demilitarised zone 
thereafter. 4 In peacekeeping terms this operation was full of contradictions and has been 
described by Durch as, "a traditional operation in an untraditional drama. ' '5 
The Secretary-General and UNIKOM. 
In the best peacekeeping traditions UNIKOM operated as a UN presence in a buffer zone, 
stabilising a volatile situation and serving as a deterrent to the (re)escalation of conflict, or 
a trip-wire to the resumption of conflict. UNIKOM had no authority to enforce the cease- 
fire or maintain the demilitarised zone. The mandate did not permit the peacekeepers to 
prevent Iraqi or Kuwaiti troops entering the demilitarised zone, or military equipment 
from being stationed there. Nor did the peacekeepers have the capability to do so. 
'Picco, Giandomenico, "The UN and the Use of Force, " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 5, (1994), p. 
16. 
2ibid. 
3See UN Doc. S/22452,15 April 1991. 
4SC Res. 689,9 April 1991. 
5Durch, William J., "Ile Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission, " in Durch (ed. ) The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping, (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994). p. 269. 
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UNIKOM officers carried sidearms for use only in self-defence. The successful 
completion of a monitoring role depended on the co-operation of the parties and the 
perception that the Secretary-General's peacekeepers would carry out their tasks 
impartially. To foster and protect this perception Perez de Cuellar fought to limit the role 
of UNIKOM. According to Durch, Perez de Cuellar insisted that responsibility for 
administration of the demilitarised zone lay with Iraq and Kuwait. The Secretary -General 
was keen to avoid the, 'slippage, ' into peace enforcement that has since become endemic 
in humanitarian peacekeeping operations. Fearing that UNIKOM's presence could 
quickly become part of the problem rather than part of the solution, the Secretary -General 
objected to providing the peacekeepers with a civilian or humanitarian mandate. Durch 
explains, 
"The UN Secretariat did not wish to make UNIKOM a magnet for refugees 
... A UN controlled 
Demilitarised Zone would have been an attractive 
haven to thousands of unhappy Iraqi's of various stripes, unwelcome in 
their homeland and equally unwelcome in Kuwait, -a new population of 
dependants. Although UN peacekeeping is not usually thought of in such 
hard edged terms, UNIKOM's mandate was carefully limited to avoid 
humanitarian entanglements and to tightly constrain the operations 
geographic scope. " I 
The position adopted by Perez de Cuellar vis-a-vis UNIKOM was in stark contrast to the 
gradual aggrandisement of peacekeeping functions in UNTAG et al which the Secretary- 
General actively encouraged. The Secretary-General's concerns, unique to UNIKOM 
during this period, were indicative of the unique situation in which UNIKOM was 
operating. While formally UNIKOM was a limited and impartial operation to which 
Saddam Hussein had consented, from Iraq's perspective all UN operations in Iraq were 
little less than an extension of the Gulf War, and consent to UNIKOM's presence was at 
best, grudging. 
Firstly, UNIKOM had a Chapter VII mandate and non compliance carried with it the 
threat of a return to the use of force. Secondly, in SCR 689 the Security 
Council had 
determined that UNIKOM could only be terminated by a decision of the Security 
Council. 
This unusual provision meant that, as th host state Iraq could not request 
UNIKOM's 
withdrawal, as Nasser had done with UNEF in 1967. Moreover, the renewal of 
UNIKOM's mandate could not be subject to a veto, whereas any 
draft proposal for its 
withdrawal could. UNIKOM stayed until the Security Council and the permanent 
members decided otherwise. Thirdly, UNIKOM was the first operation to which all 
the 
permanent members provided troops and the first time ever that 
Chinese troops 
Participated in a peacekeeping operation. As Sune Persson observed, 
p. 268. 
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"It cannot be easy for Iraqis to discriminate between Americans in US 
army uniform under a US flag and Americans in US army uniform but 
with UN insignia, [blue berets], and a UN flag. "' 
Finally, UNIKOM came as part of an imposed, draconian settlement package analogous 
to that signed by Germany at Versailles. Admirable as Perez de Cuellar's efforts to 
disentangle and protect UNIKOM from the Iraqi confrontation with the UN were, the 
roles undertaken by the Secretary-General and UNIKOM cannot be separated from the 
whole package imposed upon Iraq at the end of the war. The detail of SCR 687 and the 
intervention it mandates is unprecedented in UN history and in UN quarters it has become 
widely referred to as, "the mother of all resolutions. 112 
Firstly, this UN diktat required the establishment of a United Nations Special 
Commission, (UNSCOM), which along with the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
JAEA), was charged with dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. To enforce 
compliance with UNSCOM and the IAEA, SCR 687 imposed econorrfic sanctions which 
would continue until the Security Council was satisfied that Iraq had met the requirements 
of this resolution. 
Secondly, SCR 687 created the UN Iraq-Kuwait Demarcation Commission, (IKBDC), 
which was charged with demarcating, "the precise co-ordinates of the international 
boundary between Iraq and Kuwait for the first time. `3 SCR 687 then committed the 
Security Council to, "guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international 
boundary. " The imposition of a boundary line through disputed territory of historic, 
cultural, and economic, 4 significance was a sensitive task that would inevitably fuel Iraqi 
resentment against the UN. Furthermore, the erection of boundary markers by UNIKOM 
personnel linked UNIKOM with the settlement package being dictated to the Iraqis. 
Thirdly, SCR 687 included a war guilt clause holding Iraq, "liable under international law 
for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural 
resources, or injury to Foreign Governments, nationals, and corporations, as a result of 
Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. " The Security Council then 
established a UN Compensation Fund, administered by a Compensation 
Commission, to 
fund reparationS. 5 SCR 692 determined that this fund would be financed out of revenue 
from Iraqi oil exports, the conditions for which were laid down in 
SCR 706 on 15 August 
IPersson, Sune, UNIK: United Nations Operations in Iraq and Kuwait, 1991-1992, Sweden, FOA 
Report A 
10041-1.4, The GEMS Project, March 1993. (A Report by National Defence Research Establishment 
S- 172 
90 SUNDBYBERG. ). 
21nterviews, New York, November 1994. 
31KBDC, Press Release 9,24 July 1992, quoted in Persson, op. cit., P. 14. 
40il rich territory and port and sea access were at stake. 5SC Res. 692,20 May 199 1. 
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199 1. That resolution permitted member states to import no more than a combined 
aggregate of $1.6 billion of Iraq oil over a six month period. The export of Iraqi oil 
would be limited and regulated by payment into a Special UN account administered by 
the Secretary-General. In accordance with SCR 705, thirty percent of that revenue would 
be transferred to the Compensation Fund. The remainder was placed at the Secretary- 
General's disposal to finance UNSCOM, IKBDC, and humanitarian aid to Iraqi civilians. 
At the time of writing Saddam Hussein was still refusing to export any oil under the ten-ns 
and conditions of 678,705, and 706. In 1992 the Security Council responded by 
authorising the seizure of Iraqi assets and stocks held abroad for the Secretary -General's 
account. ' Never before had the UN seized the foreign assets of a member state. Against 
this background it is patently clear that at least two of the principles of peacekeeping, as 
enunciated in a UNIKOM backgrounder2were not applicable to UNIKOM, 
(b) The peacekeeping operation must have the co-operation of the parties 
to the conflict in question; 
(e) The operation maintains an attitude of complete impartiality between 
the parties to the conflict. " 
As far as Iraq was concerned the Secretary-General and the Security Council had become 
indistinguishable partners in the oppression of Iraq. In executing Security Council 
mandates the Secretary-General was guilty of enforcement by association. The blurring 
of their roles continued with the allied and the Secretary-General's interventions in 
northern Iraq to protect the Kurds. 
The Safe Havens and the UN Guard. 
Perez de Cuellar's efforts to limit the UNIKOM's mandate, and his insistence, as far as 
possible, upon the application of traditional peacekeeping principles contributed to the 
concoction and execution by Britain, France and the US of the, 'Safe Havens, 'policy 
outside the UN framework. The safe havens were an even greater infringement of Iraqi 
sovereignty than any intrusion authorised in SCR 687 or subsequent resolutions. In turn 
this policy led to the placement, by Perez de Cuellar, of a UN Police Guard in the safe 
havens to replace the outgoing allied troops. Ironically, the Secretary-General now found 
himself administering precisely the sort of humanitarian and intrusive operation which 
he 
had sought to avoid at the outset. 
The defeat of Saddam Hussein provided the opportunity for the long oppressed sections 
of Iraqi society - principally the Kurds in northern 
Iraq and the Shias in Southern Iraq - to 
reassert claims for greater autonomy and independence within Iraq. 
Conversely, a 
'SC Res. 778,8 October, 1992. 
2UNIKOM, Backgrounder to UN Peacekeeping, cited in Persson, op. cit., p. 61. 
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defeated Saddarn Hussein needed to reassert his authority at home and was ruthless in his 
suppression of dissent. With nowhere to go - at Perez de Cuellar's insistence the 
demilitarised zone offered no protection - two million Kurdish refugees sought sanctuary 
from the brutality of the Republican Guard in the mountains, and in Turkey and Iran. 
Given the recent history of Iran-Iraq relations and the existence of a large separatist 
Kurdish minority in Southern Turkey, the refugees easily constituted a threat to 
international peace and security. Accordingly, the Security Council responded on 5 April 
by, "condemning the Iraqi repression of its own people and demanded access for 
international humanitarian organisations to assist the Kurds and other groups inside 
Iraq. "' For Britain and France this was not enough. On 8 April, the British Prime 
Minister won support from the EU for the establishment of militarily protected safe 
havens for the Kurds inside northern Iraq. Support from the Americans, however, "who 
would be doing the lions share of protecting, '12was not immediately forthcoming. Bush 
stated on 13 April, "I do not want one single soldier or airman shoved into a civil war in 
Iraq that has been going on for ages. "3 The preferred American option was to airlift in 
supplies. This approach was foiled by the weather and by 15 April Bush committed 
American troops alongside the British, French, and soldiers from five other NATO 
countries to establishing the enclaves, transferring the refugeqs to them, and protecting 
them once they were there. Bush also placed on standby NATO air support based in 
nearby Turkey. The UN High Conunissioner for Refugees was then free to get on with 
the business of delivering humanitarian aid. 
The British, French, and US cited SCR 688 as justification for their unprecedented 
intrusion within the domestic jurisdiction of a member state. SCR 688, however, was 
passed under chapter VI and had no provision for enforcement if Iraq failed to comply. It 
might spuriously and controversially be argued that the actions of the three permanent 
members could be justified by the provision in SCR 688 for the Secretary-General, "to 
use all the resources at his disposal, " to alleviate the plight of the Kurds. This would be 
tantamount to the Secretary-General authorising the use of force and violating the 
domestic jurisdiction of a member state without the Security Council's approval. Bush 
even requested that the Secretary-General legitimise the Western action by publicly 
stating that their military incursion complied with SCR 688. Perez de Cuellar, however, 
refused this request and argued that any further actions should be sanctioned by the UN. 
4 
1SC Res. 688,5 April 1991. 
2Economist, "Cavalry to the Rescue, " 20 April 199 1, p. 69 
3ibid. 
4ibid; & Perez de Cuellar, Javier, "Reflecting on the Past and Contemplanng the Future, 
" Global 
Governance, Vol. 1, No. 2, May-Aug. 1995, p. 167. 
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The British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd explained that, "not every action that an 
American government, a British government or a French government takes has to be 
underwritten by a specific provision in a UN resolution. "' Britain, however, hoped that 
the coalition of troops would either become or be superseded by a peacekeeping force. At 
the outset Bush had also insisted that, "we won't become an occupying power. "2 A 
peacekeeping operation, however, was never a realistic option. As Reisman and 
McDougal contend the safe havens policy represented, 
"An extraordinary remedy, an exception to the postulates of state 
sovereignty and territorial inviolability that are fundamental to the 
traditional theory if not actual practice of international law. '13 
For this reason the three permanent members would not have been able to get Security 
Council authorisation for their actions. As it was, Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe had 
voted against SCR 688, while China and India abstained. Each of these third world states 
has domestic problems with insurgent minorities and were wary of setting a precedent for 
intervention by a Western dominated Security Council. Moreover, the prospect of setting 
a precedent for Western intervention in the Baltics would probably have provoked a 
Soviet veto to a successor force. Perez de Cuellar's solution was to apply the concept of 
a UN Presence conceived by Harnmarskj6ld in Lebanon (1958). A UN Presence is not a 
peacekeeping operation but performs the same deterrent and trip-wire functions and 
requires the consent of the host nation. Perez de Cuellar's humanitarian representative in 
Baghdad, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, secured from Saddam. Hussein a, memorandum of 
understanding on April 18, and an annex to that memorandum on 25 April which 
pern-fitted foreign assistance to the Kurds and the deployment of up to five hundred UN 
Guards in the safe havens. The Economist reported at the time, "this extra bit of paper 
followed the hallowed rule that all parties to a dispute must agree to UN involvement. "4 
The UN Guards were not peacekeeping troops but merely a civilian police contingent 
dealing only with humanitarian issues, the presence of which would deter further overt 
repression of the Kurds while the UN Guards remained. While formally the UN Guard 
was authorised by the consent of Iraq, that consent was again spurious. To Iraq a small 
deployment of unarmed police guards was infinitely preferable to the continued presence 
of NATO battalions. Moreover, the omnipresence of NATO planes based in Turkey 
added menace to the Secretary-General's UN Guard. 
'Simons, Geoff, UN Malaise: Power, Problems and Realpolitik, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995), p. 
65. 
2The Economist, op. cit., p. 69. 3Reisman, Michael and McDougal, Myra S., "Humanitarian Intervention to 
Protect IGOs, " in Lillich, 
Richard (ed. ), Humanitarian Intervention and the UN, (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 1993), 
P. 165, quoted in Weiss, Thomas G., Forsythe, David P., and Coate, Roger A., 
The United Nations and 
Changing World Politics, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), p. 72. 
4The Economist, The Nations Unite for a Safer Haven, " 22 June 199 1, p. 74. 
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Other Developments: Rainbow Warrior &-ORC1. 
The Rainbow Warrior Dispute. 
The Secretary-General's involvement in the dispute between France and New Zealand 
after the sinking of the Greenpeace ship., the Rainbow Warrior, once again emphasised 
the, 'unimpeachable, ' nature of the Secretary-General's office. ' It also served to highlight 
once more the weakness of the Secretary-General's good offices role. The Rainbow 
Warrior dispute, however, was most significant because it was the first time since 
Bahrain, (1970), that the Secretary-General assumed quasi-judicial functions by serving 
as an arbiter between the two states. 
The Rainbow Warrior was intended for use by Greenpeace to protest against and disrupt 
nuclear tests by the French Government in the Pacific. While moored in Auckland 
harbour, however, the Rainbow Warrior was sunk by French agents. A Dutch 
photographer was killed in the incident. Two French agents were arrested and sentenced 
by the New Zealand courts to ten years imprisonment for manslaughter. The incident 
forced the resignation of the responsible French Minister but did not deter the French 
Government from threatening retaliatory action against New Zealand agricultural 
products in European Community markets. When bilateral negotiations failed to resolve 
the differences between the two states, the Dutch government proposed the disputants 
engage the Secretary-General's good offices. Both governments provided the Secretary- 
General with details of their differences and of the negotiations undertaken, and agreed to 
accept unconditionally the adjudication of the Secretary-General. On 6 July 1986 Perez 
de Cuellar ruled that France should make a formal apology and pay compensation of US$ 
seven million. In return the French agents would be turned over to the French authorities 
on the undertaking that they would serve out at least a three year term at the isolated 
French outpost of Hao in Polynesia. France would also undertake not to discriminate 
against New Zealand produce in the EC. As agreed, both sides accepted and immediately 
put into effect the Secretary-General's ruling. As soon as the exchange was completed, 
however, the French Government reneged on its commitments. The French agents were 
freed and allowed to return home. This action by the French Government once again 
emphasised the weakness of the Secretary-General's position in the international political 
system. The Secretary-General has unique qualities as a potential third party in the 
pacific settlement of disputes but if governments engage the Secretary-General's services 
without ever intending to honour them they risk undermining the institution and 
its value, 
and there is little the Secretary-General can do. As Boudreau explains, 
Trank T. & Nolte G., "The Good offices Function of the UN Secretary-General, " in Roberts A. 
& 
Kingsbury B., United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations, 2nd Ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 164. 
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"He [the Secretary-General] has no power to impose penalties or sanctions on those that flagrantly disregard international agreements. He can only hope that parties use his good offices to negotiate in good faith and honour the outcome. This is a frail vulnerable hope in cases such as the Rainbow Warrior, where even a country's honour is readily sacrificed for political 
expediency. "' 
For Perez de Cuellar the adoption of quasi-judicial functions by the Secretary -General 
raised institutional issues and gave impetus to his call, since taken up by Boutros Ghali, 
for the authority to seek advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice(ICJ). 2 
The consequences of such institutional reforms are double edged, and discussed in greater 
detail in chapter eight. 3 
The Office for the Research and Collection of Information. 
In his first annual report Perez de Cuellar stated, 
"To avoid the Security Council from becoming involved too late in critical 
situations, it may well be that the Secretary-General should play a more 
forthright role iný bringing potentially dangerous situations to the 
attentions of the Security Council within the general framework of Article 
99 the Charter... I intend to develop a wider and more systematic capacity 
for fact-finding in potential conflict areas. 114 
This was not merely a new Secretary-General promising a new approach for it has long 
been a popular lament of Secretaries-General that the UN lacks independent sources of 
information. As Perez de Cuellar stated in the 1988 Cyril Foster Lecture, 
"Its means of obtaining up-to-date information are primitive to judge 
whether a matter may threaten international peace and security, the 
Secretary-General needs more than news reports and analyses made by 
outside experts, he needs full and impartial data, and he needs to be able to 
monitor developments world-wide. "5 
Dag Hammarskj6ld was the first Secretary -General to develop an early warning capacity 
for the practice of his conception of preventive diplomacy. Hammarskj6ld's early- 
warning practices were based on stationing a UN Presence and/or personal representative 
in, 11potentially dangerous areas. "6 Thereafter, the various agencies of the UN began to 
IBoudreau, op. cit., p. 94 2Javier Perez de Cuellar, Anarchy or Order: Annual Reports 1982-1991, (New York: United 
Nations, 
1991), p. 288 (1990) & p. 339 (1991), & Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, (New 
York: United 
Nations, 1992), UN Doc. DPI/1247, p. 22, para. 38. 
3For further consideration of the wider impact of the extension of this authority to the 
Secretary -General see 
pp. 349-53. 
4 Perez de Cuellar, Anarchy or Order, Annual Reports 1982-1991, (New York UN 
DPI, 1991), p. 12. 
5Perez de Cuellar, Javier, "The Cyril Foster Lecture, " quoted in Franck, Thomas M., "The Good 
Offices 
Role of the Secretary-General, " in Roberts, Adam, & Kingsbury, Benedict, United 
Nations Divided Vý I orld, 
First Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 91. 
6Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., p. 258. 
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develop early warning capabilities in, "less politically sensitive areas. "' The UN 
Presence, however, was an ad hoc measure and agency coverage piecemeal and 
uncoordinated. By the time Perez de Cuellar came to office there existed no 
comprehensive information gathering mechanisms for the purposes of conflict prevention 
and no stipulated early warning target in the Secretary-General's office. Perez de Cuellar 
first moved to remedy this deficiency by installing, in the Department of Political and 
Security Affairs, a special unit to monitor the daily output of news agencies world-wide 
and produce briefs for the Secretary-General. 2 In 1984 the Secretary-General also 
announced, "in order to establish a [humanitarian] early-warning system I have requested 
the heads of the various agencies of the United Nations as well as those of my field 
offices to inform me, on an urgent basis of any situation which within their view could 
give rise to a humanitarian crisis. ' '3 It was not until 1987, however, that for the first time 
a concerted effort was made to give the Secretary-General a comprehensive information 
gathering and early-warning mechanism. 
In 1986 two groups appointed by the General Assembly reported their recommendations 
giving new impetus to the early-waming at the UN. Firstly, the Group of Eighteen put 
forward its proposals for rationalising the Secretariat. 4 Inter alia, the report 
recommended a review of the nine political departments where it identified, "a 
duplication of work, dispersion of responsibility and blurred lines of authority, 
accountability and communication. '15 The report specifically highlighted the 
dissemination of news and political analysis as a case in point, carried out as it was by 
four different departments or offices. 6 Secondly, the Group of Governmental Experts to 
Arrest New Refugee Flows called on the Secretary-General, "to ensure timely fuller 
information on potential refugee situations. "7 Together with the Secretary -General's own 
lDrUke, Luise, "ne United Nations in Conflict Prevention, " in Brauwens, Wemer, & Reychler, Luc, The 
Art of Conflict Prevention, Brasseys Atlantic Commentaries No. 7, (London: Brasseys, 1994), pp. 33-34. 
Examples of databases for identifying reporting and forecasting economic, social and environmental 
indicators during this period included the United Nations Statistical Offices (UNSO), the Department of 
International and Economic and Social Affairs (DIESA), the United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP) which established Earthwatch, and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) which set up the 
Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS). 
20ne of the striking features of the Secretary- General's records in the UN archives is the huge number of 
newspaper cuttings and articles which have been sent to the Secretary -General direct, 
from and enormously 
wide variety of sources. Yet until 1982 there was no systematic monitoring of media and news services, 
and no office singularly responsible for filtering and disseminating the information received 
by the 
secretary-General on a random basis. 3Perez de Cuellar, op. cit., (1984), p. 64. 
4The Group of High Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the 
Administrative and 
Financial Functioning of the UN, UN Doc. A/41/49 15 August 1986. 5ibid., para. 36, p. 12. 6ne Office for Field Operational and External Support Activities, The Department of 
Political and Security 
Council Affairs, The Department of Political Affairs Trusteeship and Decolonisation, and 
the Department of 
Public Inormation. 
7The Report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Avert New Refugee 
Flows, UN Doc. A/41/324 13 
May 1986. 
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well publicised grievances these two reports provided the catalyst for the creation of the 
office for Research and Collection of Information, (ORCI), in March 1987. In ORCI, 
Perez de Cuellar reported, "the collection and dissemination of information of publicly 
available data previously performed in various offices have been consolidated to take full 
advantage of the secretariats capacity to identify threats to peace and act and early stage. 
its mandate had eight objectives: 2 
" to assess global trends; 
" to prepare country, regional, subregional and issue related profiles in close consultation 
with those officers dealing with negotiation and conflict resolution functions in the 
secretariat; 
- to provide early warning of developing situations requiring the Secretary -General's 
attention; 
- to maintain current information in data systems, consulting with inside and outside data 
banks, as appropriate; 
" to monitor factors related to possible refugee flows and comparable emergencies; 
" to carry out ad hoc research and assessments for the immediate needs of the Secretary- 
General; 
- to receive, consolidate and distribute political information from the media and from the 
United Nations Information Centres (UNICs) on developments related to peace and 
security, for use by the Secretary-General and his senior staff; 
- to prepare and edit drafts of the Secretary-General's public statements, messages and 
reports. 
ORCI was part of the Secretary-General's Executive Office staffed initially by twenty 
specifically recruited professionals and twenty research assistants and secretarieS. 3 It was 
headed by an assistant-secretary-general reporting directly to the Secretary-General and 
provided a UN system wide target for early-warning, a focus for inter agency co- 
operation and co-ordination, and embraced the resources of the burgeoning field of non 
governmental organisations, (NGOs). Its aim was to marry the traditional qualitative 
approach to foreign policy analysis with the computer generated quantitative statistical 
analysis of social, economic, environmental, and demographic trends. The Charter 
framework for such machinery lay within the purview of Article 99 and the role of the 
Secretary-General as the chief administrative officer of the organisation. In addition, 
Perez de Cuellar alsb requested that the directors of the global network of UN 
Information Centres submit weekly reports on regional peace and security. 
The development of an early warning machinery, however, is not an end 
in itself. 
Enhancing the, 'inputs, ' is merely administrative tinkering unless UN, 
loutputs, ' are 
similarly augmented. The expected benefits mirrored the rights and responsibilities of 
the 
Secretary-General under Articles 99 and 98 respectively. Firstly, 
it was expected that 
'UN Doc. A/42/234, Para. 19, p. 9. 
2UN Doc. ST/SGB/Organisation: Section ORCI, 3 October 1988. 
3The fullest account of the structure and responsibilities of ORCI is 
in Ramcharan, B. G., The International 
Law and Practice of Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy: 
The Emerging Global Watch, (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), Ch. 4. 
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ORCI would enable the Secretary-General to play a more effective role in conflict 
prevention and management, or where he considered appropriate, in facilitating Security 
Council action. As Rupesinghe observes, "given timely early-waming and early enough 
alert information, the UN and the Secretary-General could be able to provide their good 
offices to facilitate frameworks in which disputes can be resolved in a peaceful manner. " 
if this information is also communicated to the Security Council, early-waming becomes 
a tool of, "preparedness. "2Secondly, it was anticipated that ORCI would facilitate more 
discerning planning and implementation of Security Council mandates, which themselves 
should be more discriminating. More than that, however, the creation of ORCI 
represented an implicit recognition of the Secretary-General's rights of initiative and 
discretion falling within the ambit of Article 99, and an acknowledgement of the 
Secretary-General's right to exercise these prerogatives on an ongoing rather than ad hoc 
basis. 
'Rupesinghe, Kumar, in Rupesinghe & Kuroada, Michoko (eds. ), Early Warning and 
Conflict Resolution, 
(London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1992), pp. xv-xvii. 
2Kuroda, Michoko, "Early Warning Capacity of the United Nations System: 
Prospects for the Future, " in 
Rupesinghe & Kuroda, op. cit. p. 215. 
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CHAPTER 7 
I The S ecretary- General During a -Period of 
Transition 
-EXDlored. 
The case histories considered in chapter six have been chosen because they highlight the 
evolution of the Secretary-General's role through two main phases between 1982 and 
1992.1 These two phases dovetail with Perez de Cuellar's first and second terms in office. 
During his first term, the Secretary-General was active but sidelined. His was the office of 
last resort through which the UN attempted to maintain international peace and security. By 
contrast, Perez de Cuellar's second term encompasses a dramatic turnabout in the fortunes 
of the UN and its Secretary-General. A new UN paradigm for maintaining international 
peace and security begins to emerge as the Secretary-General and Security Council begin to 
operate in tandem to resolve a series of long-running regional conflicts. The UN handling 
of the Gulf War and the Hostage Crisis highlighted in stark terms the division and 
specialisation of labour on which an emerging, 'partnership for peace, ' rested. In 
UNIKOM and the creation of a UN Guard, however, the UN peace and security system, 
and the Secretary-General's role within that system began to enter a third phase. 
Perez de Cuellar's First Term. 
During Perez de Cuellar's first term in office, the Secretary-General's good offices were 
applied not because they offered the best chance of settling an international dispute or 
conflict, but because they offered the next best to UN torpor. If Security Council inaction 
is an act in itself, during Perez de Cuellar's first term Security Council action was 
repeatedly at cross purposes with a negotiated political settlement through the Secretary- 
General's good offices. In different ways this was graphically demonstrated in the 
Falklands, and Iran-Iraq conflicts. 
In both cases one party was responsible for breaching the peace in a flagrant disregard of a 
UN member's undertaking to, "refrain in their international relations from threat or use of 
force. "' Both cases fell within the remit of the Security Council rather than that of the 
Secretary-General. In the Falklands, the Security Council, (mobilised by British 
diplomacy), began by condemning Argentinean aggression in SCR 502. Any prospect of 
ftIrther measures by the Security Council to repel Argentina was quickly eliminated 
by 
subsequent British policy, in conjunction with the US and various non aligned states. 
After 
Haig abandoned his shuttle diplomacy, crisis management passed to the 
Secretary-General. 
lObvious omissions are the Middle East and UNIFIL, Western Sahara, 
Kampuchea, Angola, and Cyprus. 
2Article 2 (3). 
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If the intransigence of the parties was not problematic enough, Perez de Cuellar also had to 
contend with the obstacles erected by SCR 502. 
Firstly, having passed SCR 502, the Security Council was unable to press the Junta harder 
to negotiate a face-saving withdrawal through Haig or Perez de Cuellar. Secondly, SCR 
502's censure of Argentina relieved international pressure on the UK to negotiate a 
solution. The Security Council had implicitly authorised a military solution as a last resort, 
but its inability to apply any of the measures the Charter provides on the sliding scale to 
enforcement afforded the LTK a government a choice: compromise British sovereignty over 
the islands in negotiations; or stall until a return to the status quo ante could be enforced 
unilaterally and legitimately. 
By contrast, in the Iran-Iraq conflict, the intransigence of one party was promoted by the 
Security Council's inability to identify the aggressor. The Security Council failed to 
demand a cease-fire, failed to insist on a withdrawal of Iraqi troops to internationally 
recognised boundaries, failed to instigate measures to promote these ends - trade and arms 
embargoes for example, and failed to consider the situation again for another two years. 
The Security Council thus tacitly endorsed Iraqi actions and isolated Iran, as Urquhart 
observes, "ensuring that Iran would not take the Security Council seriously in the future. "' 
Thereafter Iran boycotted all meetings of the Security Council in which the Iran-Iraq War 
was on the agenda. In reporting back to the Security Council on the failure of his eight 
point peace plan, Perez de Cuellar placed these views on record in unequivocal terms, 
"Iran felt that since the beginning of the conflict the Security Council had not 
acted impartially or justly, particularly in failing to condemn Iraq as the 
aggressor and to counter violations of international law, especially Iraq's use 
of chemical weapons. In order to start a process towards peace the Security 
Council should rectify its past positions. 112 
Furthermore, the members of the Security Council continued to feed the conflict by 
exploiting the financial gain to be made from the Gulf market in armaments. The 
adversaries were given little incentive to compromise. 
In both these cases, the Secretary-General was engaged in crisis management. 'Me 
Secretary-General, however, is best employed to negotiate a political settlement either in a 
preventive capacity before a situation reaches crisis point, or once a cease-fire 
has been 
agreed and all parties have conuiiitted themselves to making peace. The 
Secretary-General 
cannot impose a cease-fire or settlement, and it is immensely difficult to negotiate a solution 
until violence has ceased. That responsibility lies with the Security 
Council and the parties 
'Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 325. 2Yearbook of the United Nations, 1985, p. 242, & UN Doc. S/ 17097,1 
Apffl, 1985. 
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to a conflict, but in these two cases Security Council action did nothing to avert the 
immediate crisis and compounded the restrictions on the Secretary-General's good offices. 
The case of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a little different. Firstly, Soviet 
intervention was not such a clear cut violation of the Charter. Legally, the USSR had been 
invited in by the Afghan government to aid resistance to covert intervention from the US 
and Pakistan. Secondly, the Charter system of collective security was not designed to be 
applied against one of the permanent members. They were meant to be the keepers not the 
breachers of the peace, which could only be maintained with their mutual agreement. For 
this very reason the General Assembly was not empowered to command action where the 
Security Council could not. If the Security Council was to play a meaningful role it would 
be because the veto required the permanent members to resolve their differences in Security 
Council chambers rather than on the battlefield. This left the Secretary-General. On behalf 
of Perez de Cuellar, Cordovez was the facilitator of twelve rounds of talks between Kabul 
and Islamabad. The Security Council professed its support for the Secretary-General's 
efforts, but its members did not match rhetoric with action, and a settlement was twice 
censured by the predominance of cold war strategic concerns. The actions of Security 
Council members, (rather than the Security Council per se), were at cross purposes with a 
negotiated settlement under the auspices of the Secretary-General. It was not until the 
changing international climate, that characterised Perez de Cuellar's second terin, enabled a 
softening of superpower positions that substantial progress was possible. In the meantime 
the Secretary-General's good offices kept alive, and, "maintained the dynamics of the 
negotiating process. "' Perez de Cuellar, however, was prevented from addressing the 
internal dynamics of the Afghan conflict. The failure to accommodate the domestic situation 
allowed the civil war to fester and made his task more onerous once Soviet withdrawal was 
secured. 
By contrast, after the collapse of the Geneva Pre-implementation Meeting in 198 1, the 
Secretary-General was excluded from negotiating South African withdrawal from Namibia. 
Given UN partiality, it was with good reason that the Secretary-General did not take the 
lead role. The US instead took the lead in negotiations concerning a South Africa's 
withdrawal from Namibia, and the Soviet withdrawal from Angola. The consequences of 
excluding the Secretary-General became apparent when the agreement was reached enabling 
the implementation of SCR 435.2 
In Afghanistan and Namibia the controversy which could not be resolved related to the 
external aspects of the conflicts. The outcome was two very different roles 
for the 
lAvakov, op. cit., p. 155. 2See pp. 267-73. 
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Secretary-General. In both cases the role undertaken was shaped by Security Council, and 
the Security Council and Secretary-General were operating at cross purposes. 
Perez de Cuellar's Second Term. 
During Perez de Cuellar's second tenn, beginning with the Iran-Iraq War, UN peacemaking 
changed. With the passing of SCR 582 the Security Council and the Secretary -General 
began to pull in the same direction. The Secretary-General was able to provide the impetus 
for a concerted consideration of the conflict by the permanent members from which 
emerged the, 'twin track, ' approach. SCR 598 was designed to raise the opportunity cost 
of war. The Secretary-General was mandated to negotiate a cease-fire, and in so doing, his 
hand was strengthened by the threat of enforcement measures by the Security Council if the 
adversaries failed to comply. The Secretary-General's good offices were accepted because 
Perez de Cuellar was perceived as impartial. This was in part due to the humanitarian 
diplomacy by which he had established his integrity and the adversaries' trust. Thus SCR 
598 was about facilitating a process of reconciliation and providing the support to 
encourage that process, rather than imposing peace on recalcitrants. A crude, 'carrot and 
stick' approach was applied to conflict resolution. Once the cease-fire was agreed the 
Security Council switched to providing positive reinforcement to the peace process. 
UNIEIMOG was authorised to observe the cease-fire and deter further violence while the 
Secretary-General actively pursued a political settlement. 
Just nine months later the conclusion of the Geneva Accords also demonstrated the potential 
of the Secretary-General's office when employed in conjunction with the political support 
of the most influential world powers. Not only did superpower rapprochement facilitate 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but as Perez de Cuellar reported, "it was the first 
instance of the world's two most powerful states becoming guarantors of an agreement 
negotiated under the auspices of the Secretary-General. "' 
The dual track approach was not ultimately responsible for securing the Iran-Iraq cease-fire, 
or a political settlement, but it did provide the framework for a cease-fire and settlement. 
Moreover, the complimentarity of the Secretary-General, Security Council and Security 
Council members actions in both Iran-Iraq and Afghanistan suggested an evolving UN 
system for maintaining international peace and security. In both cases the Secretary- 
General and the Security Council brought very different qualities and capabilities to conflict 
resolution. The emerging division of labour meant the Secretary-General and Security 
Council could each do things which the other organ could not. This emerging 
division and 
IPerez de Cuellar, op. cit., (1989) p. 172. 
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specialisation of labour was demonstrated graphically in the Gulf War and Gulf Hostage 
crisis. 
When Saddam Hussein invaded Iraq on 2 August 1990, the Security Council operated for 
the first time as the Charter envisaged. The collective action to repel the Iraqi aggression 
demonstrated the capabilities of the new collegiality in the Security Council and left the 
Secretary-General with only an ancillary role to play. This whole episode might be 
interpreted as a downgrading of the Secretary-General's role and position. With the 
Security Council directing UN policy there was little or no room for the leadership from the 
Secretary-General to which the world had become accustomed. But the Charter never 
intended the Secretary-General to play a role beyond the realms of Chapter VI, and Saddam 
Hussein was not interested in the pacific settlement of his quarrel with Kuwait. A clear 
breach of international peace and security had taken place, and according to the Charter, this 
is the exclusive preserve of the Security Council. For the first time in the UN's history the 
Security Council responded efficiently, effectively, and as Chapter VII decreed. The 
Secretary-General's exclusion from any substantive role may have been given greater 
emphasis by the American desire to maintain control over the course of events, but it also 
served one vital purpose. Perez de Cuellar remained available to assist translating a military 
victory, completed by 18 February, into an eventual political settlement. Crucially, Perez 
de Cuellar had not been involved in the formulation and implementation of decisions 
involving the use of force. Moreover, Perez de Cuellar was never faced with the 
predicament that confronted Lie in Korea. Desert Storm may not have come under UN 
command but it was a multilateral operation authorised by the Security Council and backed 
by all the permanent members of the Security Council, with whom high levels of 
consultation were maintained throughout. I Unlike Trygve Lie, Perez de Cuellar was not 
obliged to give the operation UN credibility by overtly trying to, 'rein in, ' the US, and 
publicly aligning his office with the operation. Thus, the Secretary-General's value as a 
third party in international relations remained undiminished. This was demonstrated in the 
Gulf hostage crisis where the Secretary-General was singularly responsible for a resolution. 
Perez de Cuellar was able to open a private and indirect dialogue with the kidnappers 
through the Iranian Government as early as 1989, (following the capture and murder of 
Colonel William R. Higgins -a UN1FIL peacekeeper). The member states could not 
be 
seen to be dealing with hostage takers. Where civil wars with an international dimension 
are concerned, the Secretary-General is in a position to conduct negotiations with the 
perpetrators such as Nujoma of SWAPO, Savimbi of UNITA or Pol Pot of the Khymer 
Rouge. The moral authority and independence of office of the Secretm-y-General give the 
lAs in Korea a defunct MSC and the absence of Article 43 agreements meant that the Council could only 
authorise member states to enforce its decisions. Tie military advisors of the permanent members instead 
met under the framework of the 'P5 consensus mechanism' in an institutional innovation which substituted 
for the MSC. 
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Secretary-General a comparative advantage in this respect. Even if the members states 
could open a private dialogue, diplomacy would most likely be hampered by mutual 
distrust. The Security Council is ill-equipped to bring pressure to bear on non state actors 
and even if it could members were reluctant to risk the lives of hostages by doing so. The 
Secretary-General, however, is not concerned by domestic polls. Moreover the Secretary- 
General's good offices were acceptable to the hostage takers because the Secretary-General 
was both neutral and perceived to be so. All the actors concerned could save face because 
they would be dealing with each other only indirectly. The Secretary-General's 
involvement also reassured both sides. By engaging the Secretary-General each was 
partaking in a legitimate process, and, was not succumbing to anybody's demands. 
In expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, the Security Council did what the Secretary- 
General could not and cannot do. In securing the release of the Western hostages held by 
Islamic Rhad the Secretary-General did what the Security Council could not and cannot do. 
The Gulf War and hostage crises demonstrate the value of distinguishing between the 
different capabilities of the Secretary-General and Security Council, and ensuring that these 
distinctions are retained. It was not until 1995 that the post cold war Security Council and 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali began to demonstrate the same appreciation for the merits of a clear 
demarcation between their respective roles. I In responding to intra-state conflicts, 
however, Perez de Cuellar and the Security Council continued to observe the differentiation 
between the Secretary-General's and Security Council's capabilities as the application of an 
emerging, 'partnership for peace, ' became increasingly sophisticated. 
The evolution of the UN response to intra-state conflict can be traced through UN 
responses to the civil dimensions of conflicts in Afghanistan, Namibia and Central America. 
From these emerge the importance of the Secretary-General's involvement to ensure a just 
and equitable settlement; the inter-relatedness of the Secretary-General's peacemaking and 
peacekeeping roles; and the importance of applying old principles to new practices. Firstly, 
in Afghanistan, only the Secretary-General could engage both a diverse, multi-centric non 
governmental movement employing guerrilla tactics, and a state government of dubious 
legitimacy. In a conflict which polarised world opinion, only the Secretary-General was 
immune to charges of appeasement. Secondly, until UNGOMAP's mandate was allowed 
to expire in March 1990 there was a clear overlap between the peacekeeping and mediatory 
responsibilities of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General's representative, 
(COrdovez then Sevan), headed UNGOMAP and when the Secretary-General was 
formally 
authorised to pursue an internal settlement, James reports, 'lie turned to 
UNGOMAP's top 
civilian and military officials for the undertaking of this task. "2 The peacekeeping 
functions 
'See pp. 378. 
2James, (1990), op. cit., p. 249. 
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delegated to the Secretary-General did not clash with those of the Secretary-General's good 
offices. Critically, both were founded on the principle of consent, but more specifically, 
the peacekeeping mandate was clear and limited only to the external dimensions of the civil 
war into which UNGOMAP had been thrust. Most of UNGOMAP's peacekeeping work 
was concerned with Afghanistan-Pakistan relations and not the civil war per se-I Inthis 
way the peacekeepers were protected from direct confrontation with the warring parties on 
the ground, and kept out of what James describes as, "a vigorous and well funded civil 
war. 112Moreover, the mandate was not renewed once it became clear that UNGOMAP had 
achieved all that the ongoing civil war would allow. Paradoxically, the Security Council's 
decision to discontinue UNGOMAP reinforced the potential of the Secretary-General's 
good offices. In the eyes of the adversaries, the impartiality and credibility of UN 
peacekeepers in Afghanistan was undiminished. By association so too was the Secretary- 
General's good offices role. At no stage were the peacekeepers asked to keep a peace that 
did not exist. The possibility of a UN return to supervise a settlement was not precluded, 
and the potential for an internal settlement negotiated under the auspices of the Secretary- 
General was not sacrificed. 
In the civil phase of the UN's involvement in Afghanistan, for the first time outside the 
constraints of the cold war, the UN began to address and grapple with the issues and 
dilemmas this type of conflict raises for an intergovernmental organisation. From 1997, 
post-Bosnia and Somalia the decisions taken and the roles assumed by the organs of the 
UN are instructive for the UN today. Progress in fundamental clashes between ethnic or 
religious groups is always fragile. Compromise by political leaders is not easily articulated 
to volatile and more radical dissident elements, and there is a high risk of isolated incidents 
escalating. The reluctance of other states to intervene in the internal affairs of other states is 
therefore understandable, even if the humanitarian imperative is compelling. While not 
necessarily satisfactory, the refusal of states to risk injecting peacekeeping troops 
into a civil 
war where there is no peace to keep, preserved the full potential of the Secretary-General's 
good offices to facilitate an internal settlement when the Mujahideen and Kabul 
Government 
permitted. After March 1990 Perez de Cuellar was therefore able to replace UNGOMAP 
with the office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(OSGAP), which 
continued to keep the Secretary-General informed and his good offices available. 
In so 
doing, it represented what Birgisson describes as, "the first of a new class 
UN field 
missions established for purposes of maintaining UN political contacts after peacekeeping 
'Afghanistan tabled with UNGOMAP 7545 allegations of Pakistan, violations of 
the Geneva Accords. 
Pakistan tabled with UNGOMAP 1317 allegations of Afghanistan violation of 
the Geneva Accords. 
UNGOMAP made 102 reports and held 15 meetings with the parties 
in response. BirgIsson, op. c1t., p. 
308. 
2Jarnes, (1990), op. cit., p. 249. 
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operations depart. "' As such OSGAP was the forerunner to the Interim Offices that would 
later be proposed by Boutros Ghali to extend the Post conflict early-waming and preventive 
diplomacy capacity of the UN and its Secretary-General. In Afghanistan, however, for a 
long time the Secretary-General was prevented from addressing the internal aspects of the 
conflict. When that bar was lifted the asymmetrical flow of funds and arsenal from the 
superpowers discouraged the protagonists from accepting the Secretary-General's 
diplomatic alternative. The US and USSR were not yet pursuing bilateral policies which 
reinforced the Secretary-General's good offices. 
In Namibia and Central America an internal settlement was sealed. Excluding the Secretary- 
General from negotiating South African withdrawal, however, had near catastrophic 
consequences for Namibian independence. It revealed the importance of involving the 
Secretary-General more closely in negotiations affecting non state actors, and negotiations 
leading to agreements which the Secretary-General might later be required to implement. 
The Secretary-General's room for manoeuvre was limited by the positions and rulings of 
the Security Council, General Assembly, and ICJ. Perez de Cuellar trod a fine line between 
respecting this straitjacket and voicing his own opinions, demonstrating to all parties his 
impartiality. On this basis he was able to link American mediation of South African 
withdrawal from Namibia, and Cuban withdrawal from Angola to SWAPO and the MPLA. 
Nevertheless he remained formally outside the negotiating framework and was required to 
sip an impartiality agreement before UNTAG was deployed. In Central America, the 
omnipresence of the Secretary-General throughout the negotiating process ensured that all 
parties were represented, leaving less scope for accusations that all interests had not been 
accounted for in the final agreement. Moreover, the Secretary-General had access to a 
complete copy of those agreements and in implementing those agreements could make 
informed decisions understanding the likely consequences of his actions. 
The peace process was also reinforced by the willingness of the Security Council and the 
wider UN membership to authorise, support, finance, resource, and provide troops for 
peacekeeping operations undertaking, "municipal functions. "2 As Grenier and Daudelin 
demonstrate in El Salvador, "the resourceful external player can greatly facilitate 
peacebuilding and democratic transition by providing the extra resources [economic and 
Politicall needed to make trades possible. ' 13Municipal functions are the responsibility of the 
state and government. The assumption of such responsibilities by any body other than the 
government of that state would normally constitute an infringement of Article 
2 (7) which 
guards against intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of a member state. Given that the 
113irgisson, op. cit., p. 309. 2Diehl, Paul F. E., International Peacekeeping, (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1993), Ch. V1. 
3See Grenier, Yvon & Daudelin, Jean, "Foreign Assistance and the Market Place of Peacemaking: Lesson., -, 
from El Salvador, " International Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 3, Autumn 1995. 
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objective in Namibia was in fact state-creation, and the mandate was approved and accepted 
by all parties with a stake in Namibian independence, UNTAG represented a new departure 
in UN peacekeeping. In Central America, state rebuilding and restructuring was taken to 
new lengths. In these operations the traditional distinctions between the Secretary- 
General's good offices and peacekeeping associated with inter-state conflict were no longer 
immediately obvious. In 1990, Perez de Cuellar reported that these operations, 
"Have so combined elements of peacekeeping and peacemaking as to have 
radically altered traditional concepts of the arrangement between the two. Formally, peacekeeping was understood to mean essentially to control or 
contain conflicts while peacemaking was meant to resolve them. A deeper 
and more active involvement of the UN has over time, increasingly shown 
that peacemaking itself determines as it should, the size, scope and duration 
of peacekeeping as conventionally understood and that it is often by a fusion 
of the two in an integral undertaking that peace can genuinely be brought to 
troubled areas. "' 
In other words, peacekeeping became peacemaking in two senses. Firstly, the operations 
were involved in more than keeping adversaries apart, they were engaged in the very real 
process of building or restructuring a system to facilitate stable and harmonious relations 
between diverse parties. Secondly, the agreements - in this case Esquipulas 11 and the 
Brazzaville Protocol - provided frameworks for peace, not definitive solutions. Successful 
implementation required an ongoing process of negotiation involving the peacekeepers on 
the ground, the commanders in the field, the special or personal representative and the 
Secretary-General at UN HQ. In practical terms it might no longer be possible to separate 
peacekeeping and peacemaking under the auspices of the Secretary-General but 
conceptually at least it remained imperative to do so. The Secretary-General may head a 
peacekeeping operation but the Security Council remains the parent body. The Secretary- 
General may have considerable input into the negotiating, planning and deployment of an 
operation but ultimately he is administrating a mandate that is determined by the Security 
Council. This distinction remained relatively clear in interstate conflicts, but not so in the 
intra state operations that emerged in Namibia and Central America. Just as the boundary 
where peacekeeping ends and peacemaking starts (or vice versa) was no longer clear, it was 
not clear where the Secretary-General's remit ended and the Security Council's remit began. 
Peacekeeping and the Secretary-General's good offices were mutually reinforcing but also 
becoming inextricably intertwined. This compatibility was only possible because in the 
application of the new peacekeeping practices, old principles were observed. At the 
1991 
Singapore Symposium on the changing role of the UN in conflict resolution and 
peacekeeping Alvaro de Soto, commented, 
IPerez de Cuellar, op. cit., (1990). 
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'The new electoral component[s], the democratisation component[s] the fact that we are dealing with internal proposals with a certain international dimension and where there is a certain clamour for the UN to be involved, to 
waiver the normal requirements of Article 2 (7) of the Charter. " I 
Central to the success of UNTAG, ONUCA, ONUVEN and ONUSAL, and the 
willingness of the members of the UN to interpret Article 2 (7) less strictly, was the firm 
adherence to the principles on which peacekeeping is traditionally founded. Adherence to 
these principles was not only essential to the success of those operations but was also 
essential to the Secretary-General's diplomacy. The principles of consent, the non-use of 
force and impartiality are those on which the Secretary-General's good offices are also 
founded. This complementarity enabled the Secretary-General to perform diplomatic 
functions central to the success of peacekeeping operations. 
It took ten years of negotiating and planning to secure the agreement of South Africa to the 
deployment of UNTAG. Once again, impartiality was central to the deployment of the 
operation. To protect that impartiality it was imperative that the use of force be limited to 
self-defence. Accordingly, UN troops were allowed to carry only self defence weapons 
and only where authorised by the force commander. Fortna has observed, "the force 
[UNTAG], was never intended to have any combat role to compel adherence to the peace 
plan, ' '2and according to James only one round was fired by UN peacekeepers and that was 
only when Kenyan troops disturbed an armed robbery. 3 
The demilitarisation of Nicaragua was a task which involved intervention in the domestic 
affairs of an established state which potentially placed peacekeepers - and by implication the 
Secretary-General - in direct confrontation with the combatants. ONUCA's mandate 
originated from the Esquipulas II Agreements between the five Central American States. 
The five Presidents of the Contadora Group had requested that the Secretary-General 
establish an, "impartial mechanism [ONUCA] for verification, control and monitoring" 14 in 
compliance with Esquipulas II. In March 1990 the Executive Commission of Central 
American Foreign Ministers requested the deployment of ONUCA. Perez de Cuellar, 
however, refused until compliance from all parties was forthcoming. Honduras refused to 
fulfil its responsibilities under Esquipulas R unless Nicaragua dropped charges brought to 
the ICJ that Honduras was harbouring Nicaraguan Contras. When the two countries 
reached a temporary compromise in the Executive Commission the Secretary-General 
ceeded to the Contadoran request. Perez de Cuellar, however, refused to sanction the 
'The Singapore Symposium: The Changing Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution 
& 
Peacekeeping, 13 - 15 March 1991, (New York: UNDPI, 
September 199 1), p. 25. 
217ortna op. cit., p. 361. See also UN Docs. S/20883,6 October 1989 
& S/12636,10 April 1978. 
3James 
' 
'op. 
cit., p. 263. 4Letter to the Secretary-General, 30 November 1989, quoted in Pellicer, Olga, 
ne United Nations in 
Central America: The Role of the Secretary-General, " Rivlin & Gordenker, op. cit., p. 
180. 
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collection and destruction of war materials until the Contra rebels made public their 
willingness to demobilise. This agreement was secured in negotiations with ONUCA 
officials. I 
By contrast the humanitarian component of ONUCA was deployed, at the parties request, 
six months before a settlement had actually been reached facilitating the full deployment of 
ONUCA in 1992. The decision to deploy peacekeepers prior to the completion of a 
settlement in an intra state conflict, (in marked contrast to Afghanistan), reflected the 
confidence held by the Secretary-General and Security Council in the ongoing peace 
process and the commitment to it of the parties concerned. In turn the successful 
completion of the humanitarian mandate fostered the confidence of the parties in the UN and 
its Secretary-General to deliver, reinforcing what then became a self fulfilling process. 
In these conflicts the Secretary-General took on a wide variety of roles simultaneously. 'Me 
precise capacity in which the Secretary-General was operating was not always clear. 
The Secretary-General's involvement at whatever level, (fact-finding, humanitarian 
diplomacy, good offices or at the head of a peacekeeping operation), depended on the 
parties themselves, and the assistance provided by external sponsors of the peace 
processes. As the peacekeeping remit expanded, therefore, it was imperative that the 
peacekeeping principles were not sacrificed. In 1991 Perez de Cuellar therefore decreed, 
"such operations are to be distinguished from measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. "2 
In this context, the promise of assistance and action through the Security Council and 
bilaterally encouraged rather than forced the parties to negotiate. The Security Council, not 
the Secretary-General has the resources at its disposal to finance, man, and equip operations 
to assist in the transitory and restructuring phases. Compatible foreign assistance 
empowered the parties, with the Secretary-General's assistance, to reconcile their 
differences and begin the process of rebuilding their state. 
A New Paradigm: Towards a Partnership for Peace. 
During Perez de Cuellar's second term in office a new approach began to emerge which is 
conceptualised here as A Partnership For Peace. In his 1990 Report Perez de Cuellar 
asked, 'bow best a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression can be 
countered. ' 13 One year earlier, Perez de Cuellar had reported that a combination of, 
11 political and moral suasion, ' 14lay at the heart of recent UN achievements. A division and 
specialisation of labour was being realised in which the Secretary-General brought moral 
suasion to a dispute or conflict, and the Security Council provided political suasion - 
"a 
'On ONUCA see Durch, op. cit., pp. 436-463. 2Perez de Cuellar, op. cit., (1990), p. 280. 3ibid-, (1990), pp. 286-7. 4ibid., (1989), p. 232. 
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judicious use of leverage, "' or the resources, finance, logistics and personnel which are a 
tangible demonstration of international support for a peace process. A Partnershipfor 
Peace conceptualises this distribution of competence between the two organs in UN action 
to maintain international peace and security. 
Figure 1: A PartnershiD for Peace 
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This model can be approached in two main ways. Firstly, the chapter breakdown of the 
Charter broadly parallels the respective capabilities of the Secretary-General and Security 
Council. Reading from left to right, chapters six, six and a half, and seven are matched by 
the Secretary-General's good offices, peacekeeping, and enforcement respectively. In the 
multilateral UN forum the Secretary-General provides what Waldheim described as, "the 
necessity for an objective third party responsible to the UN as a whole but not to the 
authority of any single member or group of member states. "2 The Security Council on the 
other hand has at its disposal what Perez de Cuellar describes as, "the resources of 
persuasion, influence or concerted pressure. "3 These attributes can be applied either 
individually, or in tandem, maximising the range and potential of the means by which the 
UN responds to matters of peace and security. 
The Secretary-General's moral suasion can be applied independently and distinctly from the 
Security Council, as in the Hostage crisis. Conversely, the Security Council can apply 
'ibid. 
It' 2 Waldheim, Kurt, 'Dag Hammarskj6ld and the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General, inJordan, 
R. S., Dag Hammarskjdld Revisited, (Durham N. C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1982), pp 15-25. 
3Perez de Cuellar, op. cit., (1989), p. 232. 
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enforcement measures to repel aggression, ejecting Iraqi troops from Kuwait for example. 
Thirdly, these capacities can be applied in tandem. The Secretary -General's strength, his 
moral authority, is also a weakness which the Security Council can redress. As Perez de 
Cuellar explains, "peacemaking would lack the firmness of authority it needs if the Security 
Council were not in a position to issue salutary and credible warnings of enforcement 
measures if its warnings went unheeded. "' Alternatively, the attributes of the Secretary- 
General and Security Council can be applied in a very different sense on the sliding scale of 
measures between chapters six and seven. Between the Secretary-General's good offices 
and enforcement a variety of UN operations can be applied requiring progressively greater 
Security Council involvement. Thus: 
Secretary-General Security Council 
UN Presence - Observer Mission - Peacekeeping - Nation building. 
A UN Presence is a prerogative of the Secretary-General not requiring fon-nal Security 
Council authority. The next three in the linear progression are the different forms of 
peacekeeping operations. An observer mission, as its title suggests, merely monitors 
compliance with an agreement already reached. A peacekeeping force is stationed between 
states, is a much more visible and substantial presence with greater emphasis on deterrent 
and stabilising functions. The last category of peacekeeping is the type which emerged in 
UNTAG, ONUVEN and taken to even greater lengths in UNTAC. These operations 
engage in nation building, are highly intrusive and political, require the resources and 
authority that only the Security Council can provide, and the impartiality, planning and 
administration that only the Secretary-General can provide. 
This overview of A Partnership for Peace builds on the exploration of Perez de Cuellar's 
second term but does not account for the complexities of the Secretary -General's role within 
this system. Not least, the above is only a brief consideration of the different outputs, and 
combinations of outputs, of the Secretary-General and Security Council. These outputs do 
not allow for the interdependency of the Secretary-General and the Security Council or the 
interaction between the Security Council and the Secretary-General. 
A matter of international peace and security can be brought to the attention of the Security 
Council in one of two ways: by a member state or by the Secretary-General. Article 
99 
gives the Secretary-General the right to convene the Security Council if in his opinion a 
threat to international peace and security exists (SGA99-10-SC). From Article 
99 also flows 
the right to choose the most appropriate course of action; whether the prevention and 
'ibid. 
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resolution of conflict is best served by the independent and impartial diplomatic tack which 
the Secretary-General can offer, (SGA99 & A33 -*good offices), or by the progressively 
tougher sanctions which the Security Council can authorise, including the use of force, 
(SC-o- Enforcement). During the cold war the latter was rarely available, blocking the 
Secretary-General's Security Council option. It has already been demonstrated that the 
Secretary-General's and Security Council's capabilities are not mutually exclusive. If, 
however, the respective capabilities of the Secretary-General and Security Council are to be 
applied in tandem, and if it is assumed that the Security Council is not yet addressing a 
given conflict there are good reasons for not invoking Article 99. 
Firstly, the formal invocation of Article 99 involves the Secretary-General making a 
judgement on a situation or event which may then make him unacceptable to one or more of 
the parties to a dispute or conflict. However, where there has been a clear violation of the 
Charter the Secretary-General should not shy away from stating so. The Secretary-General 
is impartial between parties, but neutral in terms of the Charter. 'Me maintenance of the 
former cannot be at the expense of the latter. The provision of the Secretary -General's 
impartial good offices is based in large part on his moral authority as, 'guardian of the 
Charter. ' If to protect his impartiality, the Secretary-General does not uphold these 
principles unreservedly, he is in fact undermining his own credibility and authority to act as 
a third party. 
Secondly, the formal invocation of Article 99 passes full responsibility for addressing the 
dispute or conflict to the Security Council. 'Me Secretary-General forsakes his right to act 
independently of the Security Council, and any role thereafter comes only from Security 
Council mandates, (SG4. A98SC). In theory, in the execution of the mandate, the 
Secretary-General now benefits from the support of the Security Council which may take 
the form of a peacekeeping operation, the threat of sanctions, the use of force, and 
complimentary bi-lateral action by the members. The Secretary-General, however, may 
find his acceptability to the parties has diminished. The Secretary-General becomes the 
executor of Security Council decisions which will not necessarily be perceived as 
fair or 
just by one or more of the parties. Even if the Secretary-General's mandate 
includes the 
provision of good offices, in their application the Secretary-General's room 
for manoeuvre 
is constrained by the remit of the resolution. The Secretary-General might therefore 
be 
viewed as the agent of the Security Council, or the groups within 
it identified as the moving 
force behind the resolution. This is the importance of distinguishing 
between the two good 
offices channels, (SGA99 & A33 -1o. Good Offices; and SGA98 -00. 
Good Offices), and between 
the Secretary-General's personal and special representatives. 
' 
I See pp. 120-1. 
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Given the limits which convening the Security Council places on the role of the Secretary- 
General can play, the courses of action available to the UN are maxirnýised when a dispute 
or conflict is brought to the attention of the Security Council by a means other than the 
formal invocation of Article 99. The most obvious of these is for a member state to raise 
the issue. The Secretary-General, however, can circumvent the limitations of his 
independent capabilities outlined above, by invoking Article 99 informally. Article 99 is 
informally invoked when the Security Council President calls a meeting at the Secretary- 
General's request. This norm developed during the cold war to avoid the publicity which 
the formal invocation of Article 99 entails. I The pressure on the Security Council to act was 
alleviated and the possibility that Security Council inaction might undermine the Secretary- 
General's role in the conflict was diminished. In A Partnership for Peace, if the Security 
Council is convened in this manner, (or by a member state), the Secretary-General has not 
forsaken the right to act on his own initiative. Because the Secretary-General retains his 
independence he is more likely to perceived as impartial even if it is unusual for the 
Secretary-General to act outside the boundaries or context of Security Council resolutions, 
statements, and positions. To do so is to apply the Peking Formula. Whether operating 
within the remit of Security Council positions or applying the Peking Formula, the 
diplomacy of the Secretary-General is bolstered by the prospect that the failure of diplomacy 
may prompt stronger and less compromising action from the Security Council, or that 
success might be reinforced by an assistance package. As Berridge has also observed, the 
reactivation of the Security Council gives the Secretary-General greater leverage in his 
diplomatic initiatives. 
"UN Mediation whether under Article 99 or 98, backed by the permanent 
five carries the promise of big power guarantees, perhaps the most important 
resource any mediator can bring to an international dispute. When backed 
by the permanent five command their military and economic resources. 
Although the Secretary-General has no flexibility in the use of these forces, 
the impression of power, as well as the ever present threat of sanctions is 
persuasive. 112 
An important postscript must also be added here. The focus of this thesis and the structure 
of this paradigm might easily create the impression that the Security Council has little or no 
role to play in the reahn of Chapter VI. This is not in fact the case at all. The Security 
Council has a whole range of options at its disposal for seeking the pacific settlement of 
disputes, only one of which is to call on the Secretary-General's good offices through the 
Article 98 channel. The linear structure of the paradigm might not be a wholly satisfactory 
one in this sense, but is designed to demonstrate with clarity the comparative strengths of 
the Secretary-General and Security Council and their interaction, because it 
is in the context 
'See pp. 77-9. 
2Berfidge 
, op. cit., p. 108. 
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of Security Council revival that the Secretary-General's role developed in the second half of 
Perez de Cuellar's tenure. 
The paradigm has so far been considered only in terms of the inputs and outputs of A 
Partnership for Peace. A Partnership for Peace can only be realised, however, if the 
different approaches to the maintenance of international peace and security offered by the 
Security Council and Secretary-General are accompanied by a co-ordinated, cooperative and 
systematic approach between the Security Council and Secretary-General. This dynan-& is 
represented graphically by SG 4- consultation jo. SC. 
An emergingPartnership for Peace was only possible because of developments in the 
Security Council decision-making process, and by the emergence of a highly collaborative 
relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council, in particular with the 
permanent members. In the Iran-Iraq war the informal application of Article 99 was taken 
to new lengths. As George Shultz acknowledged on the passing of SCR 598, 
"The Secretary-General played a crucial role in catalysing the unprecedented 
process that led to the adoption of this resolution under the terms of chapter 
VIE[ of the Charter. "' 
Perez de Cuellar, however, was more than the facilitator of a Security Council response to 
the Iran-Iraq conflict. Perez de Cuellar was the catalyst for a fundamental institutional 
change in Security Council decision-making. In the words of one participant, the 
Secretary-General induced, "the kind of diplomatic process that on their own they had never 
managed to initiate, " and which, "later would become the standard operating procedure for 
the permanent members: private and infon-nal meetings, unrestricted talks to find a meeting 
of the minds and no prior commitments except to the process of making the effort. ' 
Q Very 
rapidly the Security Council was transformed from a forum for public confrontation into 
one of private diplomacy capable of setting in motion a process of reappraisal in the national 
capitals towards both the specific conflicts, and the UN itself. As Hume emphasises, this 
was an initiative only the Secretary-General could take, 
"Only Perez de Cuellar, as Secretary-General was in a position to be the 
catalyst for realising this idea. Had the invitation to act been made 
by one of 
the five ambassadors. It would not have appeared impartial; 
for the same 
reason the talks could not be located in one of the five capitals. 
113 
After the Iran-Iraq conflict this new, If consensus mechanism, ' 14between the permanent 
members continued to develop. In September 1987 the Secretary-General met with 
the 
1UN Doc. S/PV. 2750,20 July 1988. 
2Hume, op. cit., pp. 90-91. 3ibid. 
4Groom AIR., & Taylor, Paul, "Beyond the Agenda for Peace: the Future of 
UN arrangements for the 
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Foreign Ministers of the permanent members, (in New York for the opening of the General 
Assembly), to discuss the Iran-Iraq war. In 1988, they met again and for the first time the 
five foreign ministers issued a formal, detailed communique. The text emphasised, 
"regional issues, the improved international atmosphere, and the role of the United 
Nations... Namibia and Cambodia would now be put on the agenda of their ambassadors in 
the coming months. "' Henceforth, the Secretary-General has met every September with the 
foreign ministers of the permanent members to discuss the prevailing issues of international 
peace and security. These meetings served to reinforce support for the UN and the 
Secretary-General, and to reinforce co-operation between the governments of the permanent 
members at the highest level as opposed to just through their permanent missions. More 
regular counsellor and ambassador level meetings were formally institutionalised in 1990 by 
the decision to rotate their chairmanship and location between the permanent members every 
quarter. ]Previously, Britain had hosted the meetings held at ambassador level, and the US 
had hosted the counsellor meetings. These meetings have also been supplemented by ad 
hoc periodic meetings between senior officials from the capital administrations of the 
permanent members. 
A more candid discourse has the benefit of increasing what Suedfeld and Tetlock 
conceptualise as the 'integrative complexity of communication: ' 
"A dimension of information processing characterised at one pole by simple 
responses, gross distinctions, rigidity and restricted information usage, and 
at the other end by complexity, fine distinctions, flexibility and extensive 
information search and usage. "2 
Suedfeld and Tetlock's research found that, "the complexity of the messages produced by 
governmental leaders was significantly lower in crises that ended in war. "3Boudreau cites 
this research as justification for intensifying the Secretary-General's involvement 
quantitatively in conflict prevention and resolution. In theory the Secretary-General is in 
this way a catalyst for increasing the integrative complexity of communications and by 
implication the potential for a pacific settlement. 4 Boudreau argues that, 
"Interactions between experienced diplomats and a primary mediator, such 
as the Secretary-General can create can help broaden the base of negotiations 
by increasing the number of alternatives considered ... ensure that all 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, " paper presented to ECPR Joint sessions, 
Workshop 12, 
The United Nations: Towards the Half Century, Leiden University, Tle Netherlands, 2-7 April 1993. p. 
lHume, op. cit., pp. 173-4. ti 2Suedfeld, Peter & Tetlock, Peter, "Integrative Complexity of Communications in Interna lonal Crises, " 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 1977, cited in Boudreau, op. cit., P. 
140. 
3Suedfeld & Tetlock, op. cit., p. 169 quoted in Boudreau, op. cit., P. 141. 
I t*on. 
It cannot be 4This approach assumes that a favourable outcome is the result of deeper levels of 
interac i 
discounted that the parties or a conflict are more predisposed to a pacific settlement, in which case 
a higher 
calculation of the integrative complexity is the effect no the cause - the proverbial chicken and 
egg. 
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po it cal and diplomatic perspectives are considered during crises when time is very short, and ensure that all possible solutions are explored. "' 
On this basis Boudreau recommended inter alia the creation of a, "United Nations 
Framework for International Negotiations" (UNFIN). 2 The benefits Boudreau envisages in 
UNFIN are those emerging from the discourse within the Security Council and between the 
Security Council and Secretary-General. His recommendation was first made in 1983 and 
predates these developments, but included the Security Council only implicitly. Only when 
a dispute or conflict involved a Security Council member or a Security Council member's 
ally would a Security Council member be incorporated into the Secretary-General's 
negotiating framework. This is not a criticism of Boudreau's proposal, merely a reflection 
of the narrower focus of his study - the diplomatic role of the Secretary-General. 
Increasing the integrative complexity of communication, however, both within the Secunity 
Council and between Security Council and Secretary-General extends beyond enhancing the 
good offices potential of the Secretary-General. 
Trygve Lie established the right of the Secretary-General to report the Security Council on a 
procedural basis but the emergence of a consensus mechanism and the growing habit of 
Security Council private meetings which Perez de Cuellar attended, "daily and religiously, "3 
improved the decision-making process on political matters. In theory a more informed and 
co-ordinated decision making process is enabled, in closer accordance with the needs of a 
given conflict. In the conduct of independent initiatives away from public debate the 
Secretary-General has a private source of advice on delicate consultations, and assurances 
of what support the Security Council can provide. Security Council members are also well 
informed and prepared to address a given issue if it comes to the Security Council formally 
at a later date. Alternatively, in the event of more vigorous Security Council action the 
Secretary-General can delay the provision of his diplomatic services until such a time as 
circumstances permit. As a catalyst for Security Council action the Secretary-General can 
explore proposals before submitting formal reports and recommendations to the Security 
Council and is in a better position to marry the needs of a conflict to what is possible in the 
Security Council. In implementing Security Council mandates or peacekeeping operations 
the Secretary-General was afforded a clearer understanding of where the limits to those 
mandates lie, mandates which the Secretary-General would quite probably have played a 
central role in planning and shaping. 
In theory the advent of ORCI also meant the Secretary-General was better equipped to apply 
independent initiatives, to facilitate multilateral and collective actions by the 
Security 
'Boudreau, op. cit., p. 146. 2ibid., 143-6. 
31nterview New York, November 1994. 
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Council, or to implement the decisions of the Security Council. ORCI was conceived 
principally as an early warning mechanism but the provision of, "more timely, accurate and 
unbiased information, " I (ORCI-lo-SG), could only assist the Secretary-General in all these 
functions. By enhancing the inputs, ORCI was to raise the integrative complexity of 
communication through the channels discussed above. 
UNIKOM and A Partnership for Peace. 
In the post conflict settlement imposed on Iraq, however, the important distinctions upon 
which A Partnershipfor Peace rested were not obvious. The Secretary-General ships of 
Perez de Cuellar and Boutros Boutros-Ghali are linked by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 
Observer Mission, (UNIKOM), and the Secretary-General's UN Police Guard of the 
Kurdish, 'safe havens, ' in Northern Iraq. Events and policy towards Iraq in 1991 marked 
the beginning of an emerging and controversial, "new customary legal framework of 
interventionist behaviour. "2 The increasing willingness to intervene in the domestic 
jurisdiction of a member state began to blur the distinction between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement. The roles of the Secretary-General, (as head of peacekeeping), and the 
Security Council, (the only organ empowered by the Charter to authorise the use of force), 
were therefore also becoming blurred. 
The UN is an institution that was designed to protect state sovereignty from external not 
internal threats, but the Charter also commits the UN to the protection of human fights and 
to uphold the fight to self determination. This contradiction is at its most obvious in the 
provisions of Article 2 (7). Article 2 (7) precludes interference within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a member state but also stipulates, 'this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under chapter VH. ' If consent for intervention is not 
forthcoming the Security Council can only intervene in a member state's internal affairs by 
applying the enforcement provisions of chapter VIE[, and only where a threat to international 
peace and security is perceived. Although not sanctioned by the UN the large scale military 
intervention to create the safe-havens represented, "a vigorous step towards establishing a 
way to enforce human rights protection, " and, "granting the Security Council, 
dominated 
by Western foreign policy interests, the authority of chapter VII to intervene 
for 
humanitarian reasons. 113 While the cold war prevailed, the sensitivity of member states 
to 
interference in the domestic jurisdiction of other nation states meant that the UN could not 
normally become involved in internal crises unless assistance was requested, and even 
then, 
only when a military, (as opposed to humanitarian), threat to peace and security could 
be 
IPerez de Cuellar, op. cit, (1989), p. 228. 
2Ero, Comfort & Long, Suzanne, "Humanitarian Intervention: A New Role for the United 
Nations? " 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1995, p. 148. 
3Weiss, Thomas G., Forsythe, David P., and Coate, Roger A., The United Nations and 
Changing World 
Politics, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), p. 72. 
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identified. Thus, in 1963, when the USSR brought to the Security Council's attention the 
Iraqi policy of genocide against the Kurds, the matter was not pursued because it was 
considered an internal rather than international matter. Similarly, the arms embargo that 
was passed against South Africa in 1977 was justified by the threat to neighbouring states 
of arms acquisition by South Africa rather than apartheid itself. I These principles were 
observed in the political settlement imposed upon Iraq, though the simultaneous creation of 
UNIKOM, as well as its composition began to blur the distinctions between peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement. In creating safe havens for the Kurds, however, Britain, France, 
and the US indicated a new willingness in the international community, (not yet reflected 
in the Security Council), to forego the principle of non interference in the domestic 
jurisdiction of a member state on humanitarian grounds. 2 The safe havens policy and the 
creation of a UN Guard by the Secretary-General, never authorised by the Security 
Council, blurred the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement further, and 
set the tone and agenda for Boutros-Ghali's Secretary-Generalship and subsequent 
interventions in Yugoslavia and Somalia. 
The safe havens policy and the UN Guard, however, were conceived in unique 
circumstances. After Saddarn Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War 
the international community was united against Iraq. That victory was in part responsible 
for Saddarn Hussein's onslaught against the Kurds. In Somalia and Yugoslavia the issues 
were never so clear cut. There were no accepted international borders along which 
peacekeepers could stand, and in civil, ethnic, and clan wars, there is not one but several 
miscreants whose consent would be required for the presence of peacekeepers or the 
delivery of humanitarian aid. Action against a defeated Saddam Hussein was not a good 
model on which to base future operations. Yet as Morphet points out, events here, "had a 
strong impact on subsequent thinking, ' '3and less than a year later Boutros Ghali was 
advocating that Peace Enforcement Units be placed permanently at the Secretary-General's 
disposal. 4 
Under Perez de Cuellar a new paradigm for peace had begun to emerge, not a panacea for 
peace, but a guide as to how the relative strengths of the Secretary-General and Security 
Council could be applied most efficiently and effectively. As Perez de Cuellar's tenure 
drew to a close the foundations of that paradigm were already being tested. 
I See Theo Van Boven, 'The Security Council: The New Frontier, " ICJ Review, Vol. 48, June 1992. 
2See Weiss, Thomas G., "Military-Civilian Humanitarianism: The'Age of Innocence' is Over, " 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1995; and Chopra, J. & Weiss, Thomas G., 
"Sovereignty is no Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention, 
" Ethics & International 
Affairs, Vol. 6,1992. 
3Morphet, op. cit., pp. 219-220. 4See p. 370- 1. 
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CHAPTER 8 
The Role of the Secretarl- General During a Period of 
Transition EXDlained. 
I The Systemic Explanation. 
The prevailing systemic conditions during Perez de Cuellar's first term in o ic were ffi e 
characterise. d by three distinguishing and interrelated features. These systemic factors are 
considered briefly before explaining how they impacted on the role of the Secretary-General 
prior to the emergence of A Partnershipfor Peace. '111ese factors are also essential 
background to understanding the seismic changes in international relations which the end of 
the cold war engendered, and to explaining the emergence of A Partnership for Peace 
thereafter. 
The pervading feature of the international system between 1980 and 1985 was the'new'or 
'second' cold war. To write off this period and explain the Secretary-General's role solely 
in terms of intensified superpower rivalries, however, is to ignore the nuances of cold war 
relations which also had profound implications for the UN and its Secretary-General. 
Within the general context of this bipolarity the impact of greater fluidity in the Atlantic 
Alliance and widening divisions between the first and third worlds must also be accounted 
for. 
When Perez de Cuellar assumed office in 1982 a, 'new, 'cold war dominated international 
relations. Thirteen months earlier Ronald Reagan had become the new US President. 
Reagan's election represented widespread public sensitivity to an American, "crisis of 
power and purpose. "] In foreign policy strong arm tactics were reintroduced to halt, "a 
Soviet Union on the march. ' Q This approach was based on the assumption that during the 
1970s the US had, "remained a virtual spectator, 113 in global politics while the map turned 
red. The decade of Kissinger, Carter and detente was considered a "decade of neglect, "4in 
which US power and influence was, 'sold out. ' The whole of South East Asia was, 'lost, ' 
to the communists. In Africa, Triendly, ' govenunents, were overturned and replaced by 
Soviet and Cuban surrogates. The Iranian fundamentalist revolution was a blow to 
American influence in the NEddle East. To compound matters, in Central America the 
'Cox, Michael, "Whatever Happened to the'Second'Cold War? Soviet-American Relations 1980-88, '' 
Review o International Studies, 1990, No. 16, p. 157. !f 
pr*1 1987), P. 213aker, James, Powerfor Good: American Foreign Policy in the New Era, (Washington, Ai 
cited in Cox p. 156. 3Reagan, Ronald, Realism, Strength, Negotiation: Key Foreign Policy Statements of the Reagan 
Administration, (Washington, May 1984), p. 11, cited in Cox, p. 155. 
4ibid. 
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USSR, through Cuba, began intervening in a region traditionally the exclusive preserve of 
the US - If detente was considered to have achieved anything it was to reveal the true 
expansionist face of communism, "if the Soviets could not be domesticated - as Kissinger 
had assumed - or ignored as Carter had hoped, they would have to be disciplined. "' To this 
realist assessment of superpower relations was added a highly moral/ideological crusade. 
Reagan went on to make repeated and bellicose denunciations of the, 'evil empire, 'behind 
the iron curtain. The Truman Doctrine was revised and expanded to promote freedom the 
world over. The new Reagan Doctrine entailed assistance for, 'freedom fighters, ' in 
Afghanistan, Africa, and Central America - where direct unilateral interventions were also 
employed to sweep away quasi-communist governments. The Reagan Doctrine was 
accompanied by an escalation in the arms race and investment in new and fantastic military 
technologies. Between 1980 and 1985 the US deficit rose to $143.2b, and the US debt by 
$908.8b. 2 Reagan's objective was uncomplicated. He hoped that raising the stakes of 
competition, and the costs of the Soviet Union's third world forays, would force a Soviet 
retreat, and maybe even domestic reform. 
A global US retreat had not been limited to the politico-strategic field. The collapse of the 
Bretton Woods System, two OPEC oil crises, and the rise of Japan and Gennany, all 
contributed to, and were indicative of, a much wider decline in American power and 
influence. The relative decline of the US had contributed to a more self confident and 
assertive USSR which for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis identified, "the 
correlation of forces, "3 running to its advantage. The USSR exploited the opportunities 
afforded by US weaknesses to expand its own global power and influence. To a more 
assertive US the USSR had little choice but to respond in kind. Imperial overstretch, 
however, was already exacting a heavy toll on an economy weakened by the internal 
contradictions of the communist state. Soviet external commitments during the early 1980s 
were running at $15-20 billion per annum. 4 The 1970s energy crises coupled with falling 
world grain prices belied the depth of the Soviet economic malaise and its ability to maintain 
subsidies of this magnitude. The culture of enforced social discipline on which the Soviet 
system was managed - nomanklatura - was corrupt, and 
its central planning created an 
economy which was inefficient and inflexible. In the absence of a sophisticated consumer 
market demanding an adaptive industry and workforce, the USSR was ill-equipped to 
compete in the new technologies. As Gorbachev reported, 
"A lag ensued in the material base of science and education, health 
protection, culture and everyday sciences, ... [There remain] serious 
lags in 
lCox, OP. cit. 
2Walker, op. cit., p. 280. 3Nieze, Paul, quoted in Walker, op. cit., p. 241. 
4Walker, op. cit., p. 280. 
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the engineering, oil and coal industries, in ferrous metal and chemicals, capital construction, ... and people's standards of living. "' 
A Soviet reappraisal of domestic and foreign policy had to follow. with the benefit of 
hindsight the beginning of that reappraisal can be identified as early as 1983. At a Warsaw 
Pact meeting in January 1983, Andropov proposed that the superpowers stop arming their 
cold war proxies in the third world and instead invested the savings on development aid. 
Andropov also suggested a non aggression pact which committed the superpowers not to 
use force against members of other blocs, third nations, or their own allies. This proposal 
was tantamount to a repudiation of the Brezhnev doctrine, but was delivered to the Warsaw 
Pact wrapped in the language of the cold war. It cut little ice with the American 
administration which assumed that Soviet overtures were just a different tactic and Soviet 
strategy remained unchanged. Moreover, during 1983 superpower tensions escalated to 
levels not known since the Cuban Missile Crisis: Cruise and Pershing missiles were 
deployed in Europe; in March Reagan launched the Strategic Defence Initiative; on I 
September, unnerved by Reagan's "outrageous military psychosiS, "2 Soviet Military 
officials mistakenly shot down a Korean civilian airliner; and on 23 October the US invaded 
Grenada to reverse communist progress. The KGB then became convinced that NATO 
command and co-ordination exercises between 2 and 11 November were in fact 
preparations for a pre-emptive nuclear attack. 3 Shortly afterwards CIA reports revealed the 
extent of Soviet insecurity and the inherent dangers of the Reagan Doctrine, and offer some 
explanation as to why Reagan was able to take the olive branch offered by Gorbachev after 
1985. Superpower relations began to stabilise once more and from this point begins the 
transition from cold war to post cold war world. 
The escalation of the arms race and the descent of superpower relations to their lowest ebb 
since the Cuban Missile Crisis was a source of division and unity in the Atlantic Alliance, 
which like the superpower rivalries also impacted on the UN. During the 1970s the ability 
of the US to lead the Atlantic Alliance was challenged by the collapse of Bretton Woods, 
Watergate, Vietnam, and the Yom Kippur War. At the same time the process of European 
integration in the economic and political fields was advancing, albeit slowly. Moreover, 
detente in Europe took a very different shape and form to detente between the superpowers. 
Europe was less inclined to accept US leadership and developments in Europe even 
began 
setting the superpower agenda, (the Treaty of Moscow, (1970), the Treaty of 
Warsaw, 
(1970), the Berlin Accord, (1971), and Brandt's Ostpolitik). The resumption of a 
'Gorbachev, "Excerpts from Gorbachev's Speech to the Party, " The New York Times, quoted in Kennedy, 
Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (London: Harper Collins, 
1988), p. 632. On the internal 
contradictions of the Soviet Communist state see Kennedy pp. 631-64. 2Andropov, in Andrew, C. & Gordievsky, 0., KGB: The Inside Story, (London, 1990), p. 
501, cited in 
Walker, op. cit., p. 275. 3See Walker, op cit., p. 276-7. 
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confrontation with the USSR exposed the different tacks on which the US and Europe had 
embarked, and cracks in the Atlantic Alliance began to widen. 
in Thatcher, however, Reagan found a transatlantic ally. Before Reagan came to office 
Thatcher had already been nicknamed the, 'Iron Lady, ' for her abrasive stance towards the 
USSR. The British and European public, however, were less convinced by the merits of 
nuclear deterrence, and the massive campaigns of the rejuvenated peace movements were 
not easily dismissed. The possibility that Europe could be the epicentre for a limited nuclear 
confrontation, coupled with the outflow of investment caused by the huge American 
deficits, fuelled European resentments that they were paying a high price for US foreign 
policy. With detente far more entrenched, European strategic, political, economic, and 
cultural interests were best served by the continued normalisation of pan-European 
relations. In some US quarters Europeans were characterised as ungrateful appeasers 
unwilling to pay the price of US nuclear support upon which their security ultimately 
rested. It was a Soviet ploy to exploit these divisions and de-legitimise Reagan's strategy, 
but right wing victories in European elections, an Atlanticist French President, and the 
omnipresence of Soviet SS-20s in Eastern Europe papered over these cracks. 
Finally, given the 1970s maturation of the non-aligned movement, the US forinally began 
to reassess its relationship with the UN. The US found little support for its own national 
goals, had little influence over the escalating social and economic budget and agenda of a 
third world controlled Assembly; and was tired of financing an organisation where it had 
become the whipping boy. I 
The Cold War Security Council. 
In a 1986 review of the Secretary-General's, role Perez de Cuellar offered some instructive 
comments on the impact of systemic conditions. 
"In the present state of affairs the Security Council is often unable to adopt a 
resolution because of division among its permanent members. Equally often 
it makes a recommendation which is rejected by one of the parties or it 
adopts a resolution which is not supported or is perceived as not being 
supported by some important states directly or indirectly involved. 
In all 
such cases the Secretary-General has to act as the main intermediary 
between 
the parties and to help pave the way, if he can for an eventual 
accommodation or agreement between them. In 1986 the Secretary-General 
remained the only channel of communication in questions relating to 
Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, Cyprus and South Lebanon.. "2 (emphasis 
added). 
'See pp. 162-7. 
2Perez de Cuellar, "The Role of the UN Secretary-General, " in Roberts & 
Kingsbury, OP. cit., P. 132. 
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The 'state of affairs' to which the Secretary-General referred was the cold war. The 
polarisation of international relations meant that a multilateral middleway was not possible 
through the UN, and that cold war interests were pursued unilaterally or through regional 
alliances. Chapter seven highlights the defining feature of Perez de Cuellar's first term in 
office as the alienation of the Secretary-General in his diplomatic role, and the tendency of 
the Security Council to act in a way that was contrary to that role. Why did the Security 
Council behave in this way? The Security Council is a forurn that reflects the interplay of 
the competing systemic factors. In different ways their interaction prevented the 
development of a concerted approach related in any meaningful way to the needs of the 
given conflict, and an alienated Secretary-General's efforts to resolve that conflict. 
In 1990 Morphet argued that, "over the past forty-three years the Council has increasingly 
become the main political organ and legal focus of the growing international community 
when it has been able to reach agreement on its approach to intractable political issues. "' 
Morphet cites SCR 435, (Namibia), and, SCR 598, (Iran/Iraq), as examples which reflect, 
"the maximum possible international agreement [and] often then become indispensable 
landmarks in the context of the further solution of the problem. ' Q In the nine years between 
these two resolutions, however, the new cold war drastically lowered 'the maximum 
possible level of agreement, ' and the prospect or frequency of the 'when. ' The Security 
Council operated not as a forum for seeking agreement but as arena for playing out the cold 
war confrontation. Between 1980 and 1986 fifty-two vetoes were cast, more than in any 
other period during the UN's history. 3 Of course, not all vetoes can be attributed to the 
cold war, and in explaining the relevance and significance of Council vetoes between 1949 
and 1989 Morphet identifies four main reasons for the assumption of a "negative stance; "4 
East-West rivalry; self protection; protection of allies; and the bringing to an end of 
expressions of frustration, (sometimes called confrontation by veto). 5 Nevertheless the 
latter three are in some sense sensitive to the East-West rivalry and that sensitivity was 
heightened by an escalation in the tensions between the two blocs. The Soviet veto of 
Security Council action against its Afghan invasion was an act of self protection but cannot 
be separated from the cold war context. The USSR entered Afghanistan to prop up a 
crumbling pro Soviet communist regime and counter fears of a reappraisal in Afghan 
regional relations by the new leader Hafizullah Amin. At the heart of these fears were the 
interrelated destabilising effects of the Iranian fundamentalist revolution, expansion of 
US 
'Morphet, Sally, "Resolutions and Vetoes in the UN Security Council: their Relevance and 
Significance. " 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 16,1990. p. 341. 2ibid. 
3See Table 1: Vetoes in the Security Council 1946-1989, in Morphet, op. cit., p. 
347. 
4Morphet uses the phrase, "negative stance, " as a surrogate for'veto. ' 
The term is used here in a much wider 
and literal sense. 5Morphet, op. cit., p. 346. 
-316- 
influence in the region, and "Moscow's endemic fear of China, "' and its close relationship 
with Pakistan, whom Amin was courting. The non aligned states proposed an immediate 
condemnation of Soviet intervention but the Security Council was never intended for use 
against the direct interests of one of the permanent members. A Soviet veto was inevitable 
and matched by American obstruction of resolutions condemning its own intervention in 
Grenada, (1983), and Nicaragua (1984). 
The Afghanistan crisis also brought to the fore divisions in the Atlantic Alliance. 
Brezinski's identification of, "a two pronged offensive strategy, one pointing through 
Afghanistan at the Persian Gulf and one through Cambodia at the Strait of Malacca, "" was 
indicative of the US attitudes under Reagan. The European view was markedly less 
reactionary. Afghanistan was considered to be within the Soviet sphere of influence and 
Soviet intervention perceived as an attempt to salvage an ailing communist regime whose 
demise was a precursor to the import of an anti Soviet Islamic revolution already 
unravelling in I=. The Kremlin records today reveal that the USSR was in fact sensitive 
to US perceptions and was a reluctant intruder, responding only in the manner predicated 
by the cold war. 3 The refusal of the Europeans to follow American unilateral action against 
the USSR might not have had any bearing on Security Council consideration but was 
indicative of the different course on which the allies had embarked. These came to a head in 
Central America. Backed by five NATO members and all EC members, (except the UK), 
France and Mexico initiated a resolution calling for a negotiated settlement to conflict in El 
Salvador. An American veto was delivered by Kirkpatrick with a stinging admonition, 
"Obviously, Europe cannot insist on American support against the Soviet 
Union in Europe while at the same time supporting pro Soviet forces from 
outside Europe that may endanger US security. "4 
It was not until 1986 that the Secretary-General became involved in earnest. On Perez de 
Cuellar's initiative the UN and OAS Secretary-General's sent a joint memorandum offering 
their services to the five Central American states, the Contadora Group, and the US. The 
offer was a timely one bringing UN legitimacy and credibility and a new impetus to the 
faltering regional self help initiated in Esquipulas I, and at a time when the influence of US 
'hawks' was beginning to recede. 
Over Iran-Iraq the Security Council's lame stance against an unambiguous act of aggression 
meriting action under Chapter VII, directly reflected the cold war systemic 
backdrop. The 
'Walker, op. cit., p. 254. 2QUoted in Walker, op. cit., p. 257. 3Walker, op. cit., pp. 253-8. zn 4Kirkpatrick, Jeane, Troblems of the Alliance, " speech to the Committee for the 
Free World, Washinaton 
DC, 23 Jan. 1982, reproduced in Kirkpatrick, The Reagan Phenomenon, 
(Washington DC, 1983, ) quoted in 
Walker, p. 265. 
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Soviet veto of a US draft resolution imposing sanctions against Iran during the hostage 
crisis, coupled with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, meant that in 1979 the Gulf 
region had already become a focus of the cold war. The oil rich Gulf region on the 
Southern doorstep of the USSR was an area of extremely important economic and strategic 
significance. Stability in the region had been secured by the existence of tensions between 
US sponsored Iran and Soviet supported Iraq, but the Iranian Islamic revolution and the 
Iraqi invasion of Iran now threatened to destabilise the balance of power in the Gulf. 
Neither the US nor the USSR wanted a confrontation yet neither was in a position to broker 
a cease-fire or settlement. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis 
precluded the USSR and the US respectively from a mediatory role. The first priority for 
both the US, (having secured the free flow of oil form the Gulf), and the USSR was to 
circumvent an increase in the others influence in the region by seeking to redevelop its own. 
In a climate where their respective actions were viewed competitively and with mutual 
suspicion, however, the superpowers were sidelined. If anything US rapprochement with 
Iraq and Soviet efforts to court both Iran and Iraq were most notable for the lack of 
influence each was able to develop. Mutual suspicion and a lack of leverage, however, 
only partly explain Security Council indifference. Uverage was being sought by the 
superpowers for economic and strategic gain and not to bring pressure to bear on the 
combatants for a cease-fire and a pacific resolution of their differences. All out victory for 
Iraq or Iran suited neither of the superpowers and as James explains, 
'The continuation of this neighbourhood quarrel was rather convenient. 
Iran in the full flush of her 1979 Islamic revolution had presented an 
alarming prospect. Her local preoccupation in the 1980s was therefore not 
without benefit and the fact that Iraq was also being discouraged from 
mischief was not seen as a bad thing. "' 
The superpowers were not only sidelined but prepared to sit on the sidelines and the 
Security Council was necessarily benched. 
Over Namibia, the Security Council succeeded in providing the framework for 
independence but only after South African repudiation of SCR 385 and before the 1980s 
cold war freeze began. South Africa was fully aware that a cold war split meant the threat 
of sanctions would not be pursued, especially given bilateral ties with both the US and the 
UK. The subsequent formation of the Contact Group formally outside the UN 
framework 
also reflected the growing influence of the non-aligned. Durch explains, 
'The Contact Group feared a violent liberation struggle would ftwther Soviet 
influence in the region. They were also concerned that if South Africa went 
ahead with its own multilateral plan for independence the General 
Assembly 
IJames, A., Peacekeeping in International Politics, (London: Macmillan, 1990), P. 170. 
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would call for sanctions, a move Western nations wanted neither to appease nor veto. "' 
Encouraged by the Contact Group, the 1980 Pre-Implementation Meeting continued the 
search for a negotiated implementation of SCR 435 under the auspices of the Secretary- 
General. For a new US President, however, Namibia took on a new strategic significance. 
South Africa was now an ally in combating the possible emergence of a Soviet puppet 
regime in Namibia like that which had been in place in neighbouring Angola since the 
withdrawal of Portugal in 1975. The initial conflict in Namibia was between SWAPO and 
the South African occupying forces. In their resistance against the Angolan MPLA 
Government, UNITA received support from South Africa, (where the ANC was also 
receiving funding from the Soviets). A mutual enemy forced an unlikely alliance between 
the MPLA and SWAPO and exacerbated American fears that South African withdrawal 
would merely preempt the entrenchment of a pro Soviet regime in Nan-fibia. Urquhart 
reports that, "any possibility of a breakthrough [at PIM] ... effectively vanished soon after 
US election day. ' Q Cuban withdrawal from Angola now became a pre-requisite for 
Namibian independence and the negotiating process from this point was US led. In this 
respect SCR 539, (sponsored by the non-aligned), preventing the Secretary -General from 
pursuing the linkage theory, suited US interests. A settlement would now revolve around 
US mediation and depend on an American-Soviet rapprochement. 
The inherent danger of the above analysis is to make the cold war the scapegoat for all the 
Security Council's problems. The logical extension of this conclusion is that the end of the 
cold war would mend all those ills. This assertion is too simplistic and convenient. In all 
the preceding cases the cold war was an omnipresent systemic force. Removing the top 
layer merely freed the Security Council and Secretary-General from the cold war shackles 
so they could address the conflict itself. In this sense Fukyama's end of history does not 
follow. Rather, 'the state of affairs, ' to which Perez de Cuellar was referring must be 
considered in a much broader sense. That state of affairs must be the fundamental nature of 
the international system in which the Security Council and Secretary-General operate. In 
this sense, although the first case in which Perez de Cuellar tested his diplomatic skills, the 
Falklands crisis is a useful analytical link with the post cold war world. 
The Falklands war was not a cold war conflict, nor did it become one. The non-aligned 
sympathised with Argentinean grievances but refused to condone their method, and North- 
South divisions did not cloud the debate. As a conflict outside of the cold war framework 
IDurch, op. cit., p. 355. 2 Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 318, see pp. 317-20 for Urquhart's view of the Amencan 
factor. 
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it was not formally an issue for the Atlantic Alliance. I With the benefit of hindsight, it 
might be interpreted as pointing to the systemic direction of the post cold war world where 
an end to the bipolar structure of international relations brings to an end, 'the age of 
alliances. '2 The Falkdands crisis demonstrated that so long as the basic unit of the 
international system remained the nation-state and the international system hierarchically 
structured, states of unequal strength and integrity will avail themselves of the Security 
Council, General Assembly, and-or Secretary-General, as and when their perception of 
national interest suits. Paradoxically, this is the pretext on which the UN was conceived 
and on which A Partnership for Peace operates. To a great power concert and the 
Secretary-General the permanent members bring military, political, and economic leverage. 
That is not to say that leverage will be applied with integrity and consistency or that the 
Secretary-General good-offices will be accepted in good faith. As Calcovoressi succinctly 
and candidly explains, 
"The war for the Falklands was a setback for the UN as an organisation and 
for those aspirations to world order it embodied ... demonstrating that in a crisis a powerful state will not welcome UN diplomacy and win subordinate 
the rule of law and its treaty obligations under the Charter to its own 
advantage and prestige. This was in 1982 no surprise but not what the 
generations of 1945 had hoped for. "3 
During this time period, however, almost without exception every issue of international 
peace, security, and national interest was conceived in terms of the cold war. Between 
1980 and 1985 cold war differences were not played out in the Security Council in a 
constructive sense. The Security Council was a forum for propaganda where the 
superpowers campaigned for the rights of their positions and bleated about the wrongs of 
their rivals, rather than co-operate constructively in the joint search for a multilateral 
middleway. 
Go it Alone Politics. 
For Perez de Cuellar, the ramifications of the cold war were twofold. First, Perez de 
Cuellar was alienated by a Security Council which provided inadequate support and whose 
actions were often contrary to a negotiated settlement under the auspices of the Secretary- 
General. Second, in their unilateral actions, bilateral relations, and regional alliances, 
superpower interests either limited the role of the Secretary-General directly, and/or 
indirectly, by aggravating those conflicts which the Secretary-General was attempting to 
resolve. Go it alone politics even extended to abandoning one of the successes of the cold 
war UN - peacekeeping. 
lGiven the difference in the European and American responses, however and the state of superpower rivalries 
it is difficult to separate this division from the general trend in transatlantic relations. 2Discussions with Geoffrey Smith. This is his proposed title for a forthcoming 
book. 
3Calcovoressi, op. cit., p. 133. 
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Outside the UN framework the superpowers pursued those polices which would either be 
frustrated at the UN or would not get UN authorisation. In their most extreme form these 
included the US invasions of Grenada and Nicaragua where the Security Council and the 
Secretary-General were necessarily excluded. In Afghanistan and to a lesser extent 
Namibia, superpower strategic concerns shaped the Secretary-General's negotiating remit 
directly. 
In Afghanistan, Soviet objectives were to guarantee the security of a, Triendly, ' regime in 
the corridor to the Middle East. Conversely the US championed self-detern-ýination for the 
Afghan people, a peoples revolution which it tried to foster through aid to the Mujahideen in 
Pakistan. The USSR and Kabul therefore refused to accept the Mujahideen at the 
negotiating table and Cordovez was permitted only to address the issue of Soviet 
withdrawal and the cessation of external aid to the Mujahideen. Perez de Cuellar was not 
free to address the root causes of the domestic conflict. In Namibia the converse was true. 
The Secretary-General was excluded from negotiating the external dimension because of 
UN partisanship to the outcome. Furthermore SCR 539 prevented the Secretary-General 
from linking regional security to Namibian independence, and reflected a combination of 
non-aligned resentment to the cold war hijack of a decolonisation case, and American 
leadership. 
The pre-requisite for a solution to most regional conflicts was superpower disengagement. 
In Afghanistan, Namibia, Iran/Iraq, Central America and Cambodia the peace process had 
to wait until the superpowers had withdraw. In each case the remit of the Secretary-General 
was also limited indirectly by the superpowers bilateral relations with the parties. 
Reagan's, 'constructive engagement, ' was most visibly demonstrated by the 19 85 
provision of Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen. At a time of sensitive negotiations this was 
not an attempt to derail the diplomatic process, but indicative of American efforts to raise the 
cost of war and force agreements on US terms. In 1986, $15m of military aid including 
Stingers and anti-tank weaponry was also provided to UNITA. I In this sense Reagan's 
supporters were later able to claim that Soviet withdrawal had been forced and that 
America 
had 'won' the cold war. Where the Secretary-General was free to negotiate a solution, the 
parties were given little incentive to compromise by the seemingly unlimited supply of 
armaments from cold war sponsors. Around the world the US and UNITA, 
South Africa, 
Pakistan, FAES, the Contras and the Mujahideen lined up against the USSR and the 
MEPLA, FMLN, the Sadinistas, Kabul and Cuba. Superpower rivalries fed those conflicts 
Tortna, Virginia Page, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission I, " in Durch, op. cit., p. 
377. 
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in which the Secretary-General was extending his good offices. As Perez de Cuellar 
observed in his 1988 report, 
"When the tensions between the major or middle powers are drafted on to a conflict that would otherwise be confined to those immediately involved, the conflcit is not only widened, it becomes intractable as one or other party feels encouraged in its obduracy and neither feels any incentive to explore the possibilities of compromise. "' 
Passing responsibility to the Secretary-General had in many cases become a token gesture 
and an excuse for Security Council inaction. An unwritten and unspoken understanding 
seemed to have been reached between the superpowers whereby they paid lip service to the 
UN by backing Security Council declarations of support for the Secretary-General, while 
pursuing the resolution of their differences outside the UN framework unencumbered by 
the pressures of the UN members. Even peacekeeping functions were pursued outside the 
UN framework. 
The creation of the Multinational Forces I and lE1 reflected the combination of non-aligned 
support for the PLO and the persistent anti-Israeli pitch of the General Assembly, with cold 
war systemic variables. In Morphet's terms this case is as much a product of self protection 
and protection of an ally as a product of the East-West rivalry. Reagan's confrontation with 
the USSR involved the, "systematic exclusion, ' '2of the USSR from Middle East business. 
This necessarily involved keeping the Middle East out of the UN where the, "very special 
relationship, ' '3between the US and Israel had also provoked a conflict with the non- 
aligned. 4 
On 12 June 1982 Israeli troops swept straight through the UNIFI1L buffer zone in Southern 
Lebanon and advanced to Beirut determined to drive out the PLO. Urquhart negotiated with 
the PLO, (Soviet backed), and the US with Israel. Urquhart, Perez de Cuellar, and Tueni, 
(Lebanese Ambassador), also made preparations for the deployment of a large observer 
mission pending agreement on a cease-fire. Israel, however, continued to advance and 
rejected a UN operation, instead announcing on 27 June its willingness to accept US good 
offices and proposing the unification of Beirut under the existing Christian Lebanese 
Government, along with the total withdrawal of all foreign troops. 
Initially, the US was in favour of a UN operation but swayed by Israeli distrust of the 
UN, 
and the prospect of securing a greater influence in the region, the US turned coat. 
On 26 
'Perez de Cuellar, op. sit., (1988), p. 185. 2Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 359. 3James, (1990), op. cit., p. 358. 4Between 1980 and 1986 fourteen of thirty-three American vetoes were over the 
Middle East, see Table 1: 
Vetoes in the Security Council 1946-1989, in Morphet, op. cit., p. 347. 
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June, a French proposal for the simultaneous withdrawal of the PLO and Israel, and the 
deployment of UN Observers to monitor a cease-fire was obstructed by the US. Lebanon 
would probably have accepted a UN contingent but the Christian Government was swayed 
by the prospect of US intervention and the greater likelihood it perceived of regaining 
authority over Arab controlled areas. Consequently, Tueni never filed the request for a UN 
deployment which had been carefully drawn up with Perez de Cuellar and Urquhart. Israeli 
bombardment of Arab positions continued and on 6 August the PLO agreed to withdraw. 
On 10 August the US presented plans for a Multinational Force comprising US, Italian, and 
French contingents. 'Me departure of the PLO and Israel was quickly and efficiently 
completed, and their job completed, the Multinationals returned home on 10 September. 
Just four days later, the assassination of the Christian Lebanese President provoked the 
immediate return of Israeli forces. The Israeli troops turned a blind eye to the retaliatory 
slaughter of Muslim refugees in Palestinian camps by Christian militias, and as fighting 
escalated the Lebanese Government requested the return of NV-4F. Initially, NINF H 
conformed to classic peacekeeping criteria. In the provision of humanitarian assistance 
MNF II enjoyed considerable success, ' which coupled with the success of NE*4F 1, and the 
preference for non UN operations had important ramifications for the UN. Urquhart recalls, 
'There began to add to our frustrations a flood of comment to the effect that 
the UN peacekeeping role and indeed the whole concept of UN 
peacekeeping had been discredited and superseded by the superior skills, 
force and wisdom of the US and NATO allies. "2 
Like Perez de Cuellar, Urquhart argued the Security Council's inaction was deplorable and 
lamented that thirty years of peacekeeping experience and values had been forgotten all too 
easily. 3 Within a matter of months Urquhart's and Perez de Cuellar's reservations were 
vindicated. The fortunes of MNF 111, like ONUC, are instructive for UN peacekeeping in 
the 1990s. The dual roles of separating the Israeli and Muslim forces in Beirut and 
simultaneously assisting the Lebanese Government restore law and order were hardly 
compatible. This apparent contradiction was compounded because the nature of that 
assistance was never fully or clearly articulated. James explains that, "those who set up the 
MNF II hoped that some political alchemy would enable the Lebanon Government with the 
aid of force to be accepted as representatives of the host state. "4 The political 
circumstances, however, and the composition of MNF H were not compatible with such a 
fme balancing act. The provision of assistance to the Lebanese government 
by a, "close 
associate of Israel [US], "5 and, "the traditional protector of the Lebanese 
Christians 
'See James, (1990), op. cit., p. 358. 2Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 347.7 & PP- 358-9. 3See Perez de Cuellar, (1982), op. cit., P. 14; & Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., P. 
34 
4James, (1990), op. cit., p. 359. 5ibid., p. 358. 
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[France], "' inspired little trust in those who denied the legitimacy of the Lebanese 
Government. On August 29 and 30, two US Marines and four French soldiers became the 
first MNF casualties. Retaliation against Arab factions was initiated on 16 September. The 
MNF had sided with the Lebanese Government with whom a deal was struck in May 
whereby Southern Lebanon would come under the joint sovereignty of Lebanon and Israel. 
None of the regional Arab players, nor the USSR had been consulted. Retaliation and 
recrimination continued culminating in the kamikaze attack on a US base killing two 
hundred and forty-one American troops and fifty-eight French soldiers. In early 1984 the 
withdrawal of MNF II began. The Arab Muslim militias had forced an embarrassing climb 
down, which was compounded by the Soviet veto on 29 February of the UN operation 
Lebanon that Israel and the US were now requesting. The whole episode was indicative of 
a more fundamental withdrawal from the UN, but the American experience might also be 
interpreted as an important contributory factor in an, 'American reprieve"2 for the UN. 
American withdrawal. 
Since the Congo, the USSR had systematically withheld funds from those operations which 
it did not support. The prospect of further withdrawals by the second largest contributor 
was problematic enough but not as consequential as a US disengagement, because as 
Puchala notes, "little of substance can happen in the UN system without American co- 
operation. 113 
A growing disenchantment with the UN and a reappraisal of US-UN relations came to a 
head in 1985. Decolonisation had long since swept away the US majority in the Assembly 
and the, 'hidden veto, 'in the Security Council. The combination of the non-aligned's 
political development and the use of the UN for its own ends increased the influence of 
powerful right wing lobbies in the US, reflected principally in the 1985 Kassebaurn 
Amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorisation Act. Congress unilaterally cut US 
contributions to the UN regular budget from twenty-five percent to twenty percent unless 
weighted voting was introduced in budgetary matters. These cuts were also extended to the 
Specialised Agencies. 4 The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Reductions Act, which had a self 
evident domestic objective, also, "had the effect of squeezing contributions to international 
organisations. 115 Reaganomics also justified cuts to a bloated and inefficient international 
bureaucracy. 
I ibid. 
213erridge, op. cit., chapter 4 heading. 3pUchala, Donald, (1983) quoted in Kegley, Charles W. Jr. & Wittkopf, Eugene 
R., World Politics: Trend 
and transformation, (London: Macmillan, 1989) 3rd Ed., p. 155. 
41n 1984 the US had also withdrawn from UNESCO (along with the UK) on the grounds of Its 
third world 
I ? oliticisation. ' 
Taylor, Paul, Me United Nations System Under Stress: Financial pressures and their 
Consequences, " 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, no. 4, p. 370. 
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US withholdings were the extreme manifestation of a system wide malaise. Between 1976 
and 1986 unpaid assessments had risen from $120.9m to $504m. 1 Berridge reports Perez 
de Cuellar, "ordered a $30m reduction in spending and persuaded a special session of the 
General Assembly to agree an additional $30mof CUtS. "2 Conferences were cancelled, 
recruitment frozen and the 41 st session of the Assembly reduced by three weeks at an 
approximate savingof $I. IM. 3 In the first instance the Secretary-General was distracted 
from his diplomatic role by the worst financial crisis in the UN's history. According to 
James Sutterlin, before and after the crisis Perez de Cuellar spent only one-fifth of his time 
on administrative matters, compared with one-third during the crisis. Secondly, the US 
forced a long overdue process of self-examination and reform .4 Thirdly, swathing cuts 
raised questions about the ability of the UN Secretariat to fulfil the mandates delegated by 
other organs. 5 Finally, in the systemic context, the UN's reply coupled with a more 
moderate General Assembly gave the US good reasons for a return to the UN when 
challenged to by Gorbachev. 
The Return to the UN. 
A return to the UN did not happen overnight. The process of reform in Soviet foreign 
policy that induced a return to the UN can be traced back to Andropov in 1983. Arguably, 
it is most evident in the Soviet concessions over Afghanistan which were repeatedly 
confounded by a US administration reluctant to remove its cold war blinkers. The scale and 
comprehensive nature of Gorbachev's concessions, however, gave the US little choice but 
to embrace the latest Soviet promises. 
Gorbachev., 'new thinking, ' and the UN. 
The Brezhnev doctrine, the support of third world communist movements, and the arrns 
race on top of an ailing system had crippled the USSR. To initiate economic reform, 
restructure and recovery at home, (Perestroika ), required a, 'new thinking, ' (Glasnost), in 
external relations. Gorbachev recognised that, "national security is as much a political and 
economic as a military problem, "6 and required a much more interdependent outlook 
in 
Soviet international relations. The new thinking in Soviet foreign policy was 
first in 
evidence in the disannaments field: On 7 April 1985 Gorbachev announced a moratorium 
on missile deployment in Europe; in November 1985 at the Geneva Summit with 
Reagan, 
Gorbachev proposed a complete nuclear disarmament by the year 
2000; and in October 
ITaylor, op. cit., p. 365. 2Benidge, op. cit., p. 18. 
3ibid. 
4See pp. 329 & 345. 
5ibid. 
6Berridge, op. cit., p. 31. 
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1986 at the Reykjavik Summit these issues were discussed further and a new personal and 
political discourse emerged which paved the way for agreement on the INF Treaty at the 
Washington Summit in December 1987, (where regional conflicts were also discussed). 
While disarmament matters could be dealt with bilaterally, withdrawal from third world 
commitments required a multilateral approach. The USSR feared unilateral withdrawal 
would leave a political vacuum into which either the US might step or in which civil conflict 
might erupt destabilising regional peace and security. Withdrawal fostered through the UN, 
however, could provide, "face saving ways to get out of foreign quick sands, "' while at the 
same time enable the USSR to retain an influence in the region, and restrain, (perceived), 
US unilateral tendencies. 
At the heart of Gorbachev's new thinking in foreign policy, therefore, was a resurrection of 
the UN. During 1985 the new Soviet Premier, the Politburo, and the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry began making references to, "the great significance, ' Q ofthe UN, "as an effective 
instrument for peace, "3 and, "as an important factor in the formation of the world political 
climate and public opinion. "4 On 27 February 1986 Gorbachev presented to the twenty- 
seventh Party Congress his proposals for, "the creation of a comprehensive system of 
international peace and security, " also presented to the General Assembly on 26 November. 
Until that date the rhetoric lacked substance, but coinciding with a US withdrawal from the 
UN had substantial propaganda value. During 1986, however, the USSR also paid its 
outstanding contributions to UNIFEL. This was the first concrete indication that Soviet 
posturing was real. In May 1987, Gorbachev emphasised, "the need for a powerful and 
legal mechanism with which to regulate international relations, "5 and in the Moscow press 
on 17 September, "emphasised the role of the UN as a mechanism for dealing with 
problems of an interdependent world. "6 On 17 October the USSR announced that payment 
of all its UN debts would follow, 7 with a challenge to the US, 
"Any attempt to create financial difficulties in the United Nations and use 
them to exert political pressure on the organisation and bind its activities are 
inconsistent with realism and responsibility in politics ... 
It would be 
difficult to give any other interpretation to the arbitrary reduction by one of 
the states of its contribution to the UN budget, which resulted in the present 
crisis. 118 
'Berridge, op. cit., p. 3 1, quoted from, The New York Times, 17 October 1987. 2Pravda, "V. Politburo TsK KpSS, " 23 August 1985, quoted in Haslam, Jonathan, "The UN and the 
Soviet 
Union: New Thinking? " International Affairs, Vol. 65, Autumn 1989. p. 680. 
3ibid. 
4Petrovskii, V. "OON-instrument sovmestnykh deistvii gosudarstv v interesakh mira, 
" 
Mezhdunarodnayazhizn, No. 9,21 August 1985, p. 9, quoted in Haslam, op. cit., p. p. 
680. 
51-laslam, op. cit., p. 681. 6ibid. 
7$197m for peacekeeping operations dating back to 1973 and $28m to the regular 
budget. 
8New York Times, 16 October 1987, quoted in Haslam, op. cit., p. 681. 
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During 1988 and 1989 the UN was bombarded with ad hoc Soviet proposals including the 
revival of the MSC, the creation of a UN naval peacekeeping force and strengthening the 
10. In September 1988, the USSR introduced a document expanding on these and earlier 
proposals, the key elements of which included: 'wider use'of UN military observers and 
peacekeeping forces in regional conflicts; 'extensive use'of procedures promoting pacific 
settlement of disputes including quiet diplomacy and mediation; the permanent members of 
the Security Council should become guarantors of regional security. An accepted corollary 
of this was the necessity of a more independent role for the Secretary-General. I 
The Soviet embrace was completed on 7 December 1988 by a Gorbachev speech before the 
General Assembly unprecedented in its commitment to the UN, international law and the 
principle of collective security, 
"[The Soviet] concept of all embracing international security is based in the 
principle of the UN Charter, and proceeds from the obligatory nature of 
international law for all states ... Our ideal is a world community of states based on the rule of law, which also make their foreign policy subordinate to 
the law. The attainment of this would be facilitated by an accord within the 
UN framework as a uniform understanding of the principles and norms of 
international law and their codification taking account of legal norms for new 
spheres of co-operation, ' 12 
The logic of Gorbachev's conunitment to reshaping the UN as a primary actor in his 
conception of the post cold war world reflected not only the process of domestic reform but 
Soviet fears of US unilateralism, especially in the Middle East, and is perhaps best 
enunciated by one of Gorbachev's oldest hands. In his memoirs, Eduard Shevardnadze 
explains, 
"Today many claim that after the Persian Gulf Crisis a Pax Americana or 
'American Century' will begin, and from now on the US exclusivity will 
keep order in the world. If this is undeniable (and it is) then all the more 
imperative to create the appropriate UN mechanims as rapidly as possible to 
elevate the role of the UN and make it a real centre for collective actions. ' 13 
In the West, attitudes were also changing towards the UN. In many Western quarters the 
initial reaction to a Soviet rapprochement was, (understandably), circumspect, but as 
it 
became clear that the new Soviet rhetoric was bona fide the West warmed to 
Gorbachev and 
the UN. The logic of cold war politics was difficult to set-a-side but the US 
had its own 
good reasons for a return to the UN. 
'UN Doc. A/43/629- 
2QUoted in Kull, S., Burying Lenin: The Revolution in Soviet Ideology and Foreign Policy, 
(Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1992), p. 166. 
3Shevardnadze, Eduard, The Future Belongs to Freedom, (New York: Free Press, 199 
1 ), p. 107. 
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The UN, the West, and China. 
The US was not without its own economic problems. Kennedy argues that the burgeoning 
federal debt and the 1987 Wall Street Crash were symptoms of an American imperial 
overstretch. ' To withdraw, however, like Moscow the US needed a deal. In 1985 Reagan 
had in fact made more than tentative steps in that direction by committing the US to a, 'fresh 
start, ' in superpower relations. The President proposed the superpowers should: urge 
warring parties to negotiate; consult on how to reinforce/complement existing peacemaking 
efforts; offer guarantees or jointly endorse the withdrawal of foreign troops and limits on 
the flow of arms; and assist with economic rehabilitation once peace had been achieved. 2 
Reagan's suggestions, however, were not as comprehensive and well formulated as the 
proposals put forward by Gorbachev; the rhetoric was not matched by action in anyway 
near the Soviet manner; and although made at the UN, were not specifically directed at 
reviving the UN. While history will record that it was really Gorbachev who, 'bounced, ' 
the US back into the UN, the extent to which the US also needed the UN to disengage from 
foreign entanglements must not be overlooked. By going through the UN, like the USSR, 
the US could maintain a regional influence and at the same time share the political and 
financial burden of withdrawal. 3Moreover, the UN brings to settlements an 
indispensable, 'aura of legitimacy. ' As Morphet observes, 
"It is difficult to envisage an agreement between Cuba, Angola, and South 
Africa mediated by a permanent member without the legitimising focus 
provided by UN Security Council Resolutions and the UN Security Council 
as well, of course, as the UN Secretary-General. ' '4 
The legitimising function of the UN was particularly important for the US. After the 
debacle of MNF 11 and the Irangate revelations, the UN provided much needed multilateral 
credibility for US unilateral policy objectives. The Iran Contra scandal is also an interesting 
case in the study of the Secretary-General's role. It demonstrates once more the difficulties 
state governments have in dealing with subversive, insurgent, or terrorist organisations. 
While the Administration fostered a moral public perception that the US did not deal with 
terrorists, arms were covertly supplied to Iran via Israel, in an attempt to secure the release 
of American hostages held in the Middle East. 
Paradoxically, while the US was undergoing a crisis of legitimacy in its 
foreign policY, it 
was also in two senses the victim of its own success. Firstly, the Soviet retrenchment and 
domestic reform fostered the impression of an American victory in the 
'second, cold war. 
In the absence of a perceptible threat, continuation of the, 'one world approach, 
' would be 
'See Kennedy, op. cit., p. 665. 
2Berridge, op. cit., p. 40. 3MOst visibly played out in the delay of UNTAG because of wranglIng 
between the paymasters and non- 
aligned over the size of the operation. 
4Morphet, op. cit., p. 358. 
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difficult to justify to the domestic audience that would fund it, and to the international 
audience now sensitive to American hegemony. Secondly, the penury inflicted by US 
budgetary withholdings was now inducing those reforms at the UN which the US had 
campaigned for, not least in the budgetary process. I Traditionally the Advisory Committee 
on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, (ACABQ), appointed by the Assembly was 
the primary body exercising budgetary scrutiny and control. On 18 December 1986, 
however, a new budgetary procedure was adopted making the Committee for Programme 
and Co-ordination, (CPC), "the principal 'advisory' and 'intergovernmental' committee 
with regard to the budget. "2 The membership of the smaller CPC is elected by the General 
Assembly upon the nomination of the Security Council. Of thirty-four seats only seven are 
provided for Western European and other states but the requirement of decision-making by 
consenSUS, 3 introduced weighted voting by the back door. The CPC remained just one cog 
in the budgetary machine, but as Taylor argues, these refonns had the affect of, "tipping the 
balance of probabilities in favour of the richer states, of making it a lot easier for them to 
lead and making it more difficult for the poorer states to folloW. "4 Kassebaum friendly 
reform added to the growing number of reasons for a UN reprieve. The US could not avail 
itself of UN services and at the same time refuse to pay for them. Already non payment 
was proving, "a handicap to American diplomacy in the third world, ' '5especially as the 
financial crisis encouraged the wider UN membership (including persistent defaulters like 
China and the USSR), to replenish UN coffers, heightening the sense of American 
responsibility for UN insolvency. 
Britain and France also stood to gain from participating in a process which, "would enhance 
the value of their positions as permanent members and perhaps rein in the risk of US 
unilateral actions taken with little regard for the interest of allies. "6 Further-more, in 1981 
the Chinese tradition of non-participation in the Security Council had come to an end. 
Continued non-payment of its peacekeeping assessments risked the application of Article 19 
and the withdrawal of General Assembly voting rights. After, "complex negotiations, "' in 
the General Assembly, China agreed to pay its arrears and having chosen this course, 
11 would almost inevitably consider that they should put more input into the system in order 
to ensure their interests are served as well as possible. "8 A modernising China seeking 
value for money was a double edged sword. A more active fifth veto wielder was another 
potentially divisive factor to account for. Closer ties with the non-aligned also increased 
ISee pp. 345. 
2Taylor, Paul, "Reforming the UN System: Value for Money, " World TodaY, July 1988, P- 
125. 
3UN Doc. A/41/49, Section I. 
4Taylor, op. cit., p. 125. 5Beffidge, op. cit., p. 40. 6Hume 
, op. cit., P. 9 1. 7Morphet, op. cit., p. 349. 8ibid. 
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their influence in Security Council chambers. The corollary, however, was that agreement 
in which China had participated added greater legitimacy to Security Council decisions. A 
Sino-Soviet as well as an East-West rapprochement to some extent removed the potential 
for discord and after Tiananmen Square in 1989 the process of rebuilding its international 
reputation enhanced the prospects for permanent member concord further. Furthermore, 
according to Urquhart, "on top of all this the countries of the third world, after all the 
rhetoric and radicalism of the 1970s and early 1980s have become pragmatic, unideological, 
co-operative, mature and constructively self-critical. "' Systemic conditions reflected in the 
security Council were clearly becoming more conducive for a collective and concerted 
effort to address matters on international peace and security. 
The Security Council between World Orders. 
As superpower relations began to improve the USSR and US remained dangerously 
exposed around the world. As Jones observes, however, "the growing amity between East 
and West created a unique international configuration of power and purpose. "2 The 
superpowers now turned from undermining each other's influence in regional conflicts to 
promoting a peaceful settlement. No longer was the resolution of conflict subordinated to 
superpower rivalry. Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Namibia, and Central America were 
transformed from, "issue[s] that the US and USSR used to play out their zero sum rivalry 
to a positive sum opportunity for co-operation. ' '3 As confrontation gave way to co- 
operation the Security Council became the forum through which the superpowers could 
manage their withdrawal from foreign fields negotiated and administered under the trusted 
eye of the Secretary-General. An end to the ritual of confrontation removed the major 
persistent cause of Security Council paresis. The Security Council began to provide and 
endorse workable frameworks for peace with adequate backup, politically, militarily, and 
financially. UN operations, especially those within independent nation states could now be 
viewed with considerably less scepticism and paranoia by the cold war adversaries. 
Between 1988 and 1992, thirteen new peacekeeping operations were launched. None had 
been created since the deployment of UNUM, in 1978 and only thirteen between 1946 and 
1988. In his 1988 Perez de Cuellar was able to report, 
"On matters of international peace and security, the principle organs of the 
UN have increasingly functioned in the manner envisioned in the Charter. 
The working relationship of the Security Council and Secretary-General had 
rarely been closer. I am thankful for this and also for the recent 
'Urquhart, Brian, "The United Nations System and the Future, " International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 
2, 
Spring 1989, p. 226. 2jones, R. J. Barry, "The United Nations and the International Political System, " in Bourantonis, 
Dirnitris, 
and Weinar, Jarrod, The United Nations in the New World Order: The World Organisation at 50, (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd., p. 34. 3Fortna, op. cit., p. 357. 
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improvement in international relations at the global level that had opened new possibilities for successful action by the world body. "' 
The Secretary -General between World Orders. 
The Security Council began to provide the, 'political suasion, ' and leverage the Secretary- 
General lacked. At the same time the parties themselves were increasingly willing to engage 
the Secretary-General's good offices. In most cases conflict had only been perpetuated by 
the superpower rivalry. As Voronkov observes, "old conflicts born in the epoch of East- 
West confrontation were losing their momentum and gradually exhausting themselves. "2 
The end of the cold war spelt an end to those bilateral policies which encouraged the 
continued fighting rather than the Secretary-General's good offices. The regional 
adversaries now had to sustain their resistance without the assistance of the superior 
economic and military might of their cold war sponsors. Even the release of the Western 
hostages mirrored the changing systemic conditions. Arab and Islamic sponsorship of the, 
"most virulent strain of anti-Western activity, "3was counterproductive in a new political 
environment. The end of the cold war, Saddam Hussein's defeat, the new military and 
diplomatic supremacy of the US, and the Madrid Peace Conference demanded a, "tactical 
adjustment. "4 To rebuild a war ravaged economy Iran needed Western credit and 
technology. President Rafsanjani, however, was also hostage to, "those who campaign as 
the true inheritors of Ayatollah Khomonei's spiritual mantle and for whom the export of the 
revolution matters as much as the saleof oil. "5 These competing forces were reconciled by 
supporting the release of the Western hostages through the Secretary-General, and 
simultaneously hosting a rival conference for those opposed to the Madrid process. During 
this period the Secretary-General was taking the lead as the superpowers discovered new 
norms of co-operation in the changing world order. 
The UN and the Post Cold War Order. 
The reinvigoration of the Security Council was completed by its first authorisation of force 
to repel aggression since Korea in 1950. This time the USSR was present in the Security 
Council, and backed every move taken by the Security Council from the introduction of 
sanctions to the launch of Desert Storm. In authorising the Iraqi expulsion from Kuwait the 
Security Council became more than, "a useful broom to clear up the mess left by the 
superpowers in the different parts of the world when they decided to abandon their policy 
IPerez de Cuellar, (1988), op. cit., p. 171. 
2Voronkov, Lev, "International Peace and Security: New Challenges to the UN, " in Bourantonis, 
Dimitris, 
and Weinar, Jarrod, The United Nations in the New World order: The World Organisation at 
50, (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd., p. 11. 3Matthews, Roger, "Extremists in Mideast Adapt to New Climate, " The Financial Times, 19 
November 
1991. 
4ibid. 
Sibid. 
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of global confrontation. "' Security Council unity affirmed in unequivocal terms, "the 
sustained co-operation and a notably increased commonality of interests among the major 
powers, "2already demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq, and Namibia/Angola. Die Gulf 
War victory gave greater credibility to Security Council action, threat of action, 
peacekeeping operations and support for the Secretary-General, and heralded the beginning 
of a new era. 
The US commitment to the multilateral processes of the Security Council in responding to 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait served a dual purpose. Firstly, as a former UN delegate Bush 
understood the legitimising potential of the Security Council. As the Wall Street Journal 
explained, 
'Without the prospect of UN support he might not have been able to 
persuade Saudi Arabia to accept US troops. Without UN action it would have been more difficult for an Islamic state such as Turkey to close its oil 
pipelines. Without the UN the likelihood of Soviet implementation of international action was slim; from the outset Moscow made it clear that it 
would not move without the UN. ' 13 
Secondly, Bush recognised the opportunity to cement great power unity and develop his 
concept of a New World Order and the UN's role in that post cold war order. Again the 
Wall Street Journal explained, 
"The Administration has at some points in the current crisis moved at a 
slower pace or shown more caution than officials would have preferred - 
specifically in order to keep the P5 members of the Council moving in 
unison. Mr Bush held off on unilaterally enforcing the embargo. That was 
a deliberate strategy chosen in hope that the crisis could set a precedent in 
which the Security Council showed it would take concerted action against 
international aggressors, something it has seldom done in the past. 114 
In April 199 1, Bush went on to articulate his vision of a New World Order with the UN at 
its heart. In the post Gulf War euphoria this was followed by a G7 Summit in London 
during July, at which the participants agreed a political communique committed to 
strengthening the UN. Inter alia the G7 made preventive diplomacy a top priority. 5 The G7 
also announced commitments to strengthening peacekeeping and, "strengthening the 
powers of the UN to intervene where humanitarian crises occur. ' '6 The first two necessarily 
involved expanding the Secretary-General's role. The latter, was an immediate bi-product 
lGott, Richard, "Mr. Fixit Seeks a New Role, " The Guardian, 27 December 1991. 2The Guardian, `[be First Days of Euphoria, " 25 February, 1991, quoted in Weinar, Jarrod, Leadership, 
the United Nations, and New World Order, " in Bourantonis, Dimitris, and Weinar, Jarrod, The 
United 
Nations in the new World Order: The World Organisation at 50, London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd., p. 4 1. 
3The Wall Street Journal, 30 August 1990, quoted in Hume, op. cit., p. 200. 
4ibid. 
5Excerpts from the communiqu6 were printed in The Independent, 'We Must Build on this 
Spint, " 17 July 
1991. 
6ibid. 
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of allied action outside the UN framework to support the Kurds in Iraq. Intervention by the 
Security Council in the domestic jurisdiction of a nation state could only be justified on the 
grounds that human rights violations constituted a threat to international peace and security, 
a point clarified in London, 
"Violation of human rights - such as the persecution of the Kurds - does constitute a threat to international peace and security, not only because of 
what it says about the govennnent concerned but because of the implications for stability. "' 
Neither the USSR nor China were present in London. The USSR later indicated its support 
for redefining the sovereignty conCept, 2 but the development of such a policy on any 
consistent basis through the UN framework would be difficult given the human fights 
record of China, and non-aligned opposition to any precedents weakening national 
sovereignty - many harboured reservations about the integrity and intent of Western motives 
in this respect. 
Gorbachev's reforms, Bush's New World Order, and the G7 Summit were the modem day 
equivalent of the Atlantic Charter, Yalta, and Dumbarton Oaks. The great powers of the 
time, (the G7 included Japan and Germany), were collectively attempting to shape and 
structure a new political order, only this time the structural change was not the result of the 
military defeat of an emerging hegemon. The UN had survived a global confrontation 
where its predecessor had not. Moreover, the end of the cold war had been brought about 
in part through, and by, the UN and its Secretary-General. The new international order, 
whatever form or shape it took, would therefore inherit the international organisation of its 
antecedent. Instead of drafting a new international organisation to maintain international 
peace and security, Gorbachev, Bush, and the G7 were engaged in reinventing the existing 
one. Obviously this process was not on the same scale as post World War H but the 
essential questions remained the same, and among them, what role for the Secretary- 
General? 
Gorbachev and Bush envisioned a New World Order based on, "the rule of law and the 
principle of collective security, '13 in which, "the bipolar stability of the cold war would 
be 
replaced by a great power consensus supported by American leadership. "4 As 
Weinar 
explained, 
IHelm, Sarah, "Seven Seek a Tougher United Nations, " The Independent, 16 July 
1991. 
2Petrovsky stated in August 1991, "Me principle of non interference does not apply to 
the cause of 
protecting human rights and democracy ... democracy and observance 
of human rights in the USSR should 
have not only national but also international guarantees. " quoted in Kull, OP. cit., p. 
167. 
3Russett, Bruce & Sutterlin, James S., "The UN in a New World Order, " Foreign Affairs, 
Spring 1991, P- 
69. 
4Weinar, op. cit., p. 41. 
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'What President Bush had done in espousing the principles of the New World Order at Andrew's Air Force Base in April 1991 was not to create a new organisation, but to signal the US re-engagement in it, and the renewal of the original assumption of the UN that the great power would co-operate 
... under US leadership. "' 
Bush's New World order was an affirmation of the emerging Partnership for Peace. A 
Partnershipfor Peace rested not on a change in essence of the respective powers of the 
Secretary-General and Security Council, but a commitment by the major member states to 
use those institutions. If the Security Council is strengthened so too is the Secretary- 
General, but with an important proviso; only so long as the division and specialisation of 
labour between the Security Council and its Secretary-General is respected. In this, 
however, there were no guarantees and some fundamental questions regarding the 
Secretary-General's role went unanswered. 
What seemed to be emerging in Bush's New World Order and the London G7 meeting was 
an expanded concept of the collective security. Peacekeeping in its old and new guises, as 
well as, 'strengthened, ' peacekeeping in the humanitarian realm would now form part of an 
expanded concept of collective security. The notion of a great power protectorate was being 
extended beyond the provisions of chapter VII to deter and repel aggression against a nation 
state, to include protection of peoples. Peacekeeping would no longer be an alternative to, 
but part of the collective security concept. An expanded concept of collective security, 
however, was not automatically compatible with the Secretary-General's diplomatic role. 
Would, 'strengthened, ' peacekeeping involve the use of force? If so would it come under 
the command of the Secretary-General, a revived MSC or contracted out? If the former, the 
most likely consequence would be to blur further the division and specialisation of labour 
between the Secretary-General and Security Council, and in so doing compromise the good 
offices potential of the Secretary-General. In this case a strengthened Security Council 
would not necessarily equate with a strengthened Secretary-General. This is not to deny the 
need for a re-evaluation of the role of the UN in the post cold war world. In his 1991 
Report, Perez de Cuellar acknowledged the need to broaden the concept of sovereignty to 
account for human rights, 
"It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non interference within the 
essential domestic jurisdiction of states cannot be regarded as a protective 
barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically 
violated with impunity. The fact that, in diverse situations, the 
UN has not 
been able to prevent atrocities cannot be cited as an argument, 
legal or moral, 
against the necessary corrective action, especially where peace 
is also 
threatened... 'Me case for not impinging on the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of states is undoubtedly strong. 
But it 
p. 50. 
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would only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty even in this day and age includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the name of civil strife or insurrection. "' 
At the same time, however, UNIKOM and the UN Guard are testament to the Secretary- 
General's conviction that the Secretary-General should not head more muscular intervention 
to protect human rights. Saksena explains the consequences for the Secretary-General of 
fulfilling such tasks. 
"What is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of United Nations actions since the Gulf war which is bound to undermine the non-partisan character of the 
organisations and its credibility is the choice of personnel acting in its name [read Secretary-General members of the secretariat and peacekeepers] ... never before have the objectivity and non partisan role of the United Nations 
personnel been questioned as in the case of missions in Iraq' 12. 
As an alternative the revival of the Military Staff Committee moribund since 1948 was 
mooted. Article 47 of the Charter in fact provided the MSC, 'shall be responsible under the 
Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the 
Security Council. ' Implicit in reviving the MSC, however, was a potential down-grading 
of the Secretary-General's role. Peacekeeping forces were a development not foreseen by 
the Charter. The Secretaries-General have been central to the conception and management 
of peacekeeping forces but Article 47 places, 'any armed forces, ' under the, 'strategic 
direction, ' of the MSC. Would the MSC also assume responsibility for peacekeeping 
forces? Not all peacekeeping operations involve armed forces, (observer missions). Given 
that the mandates of such operations might be strengthened at a later stage and that the 
unique demands of different crises blur the already shady boundaries between chapters six, 
six and a half, and seven, it might be argued these operations should be answerable to the 
Security Council via the MSC as opposed to via the Secretary-General. The novelty of new 
operations, however, was the high civilian content which relies heavily on the perception of 
impartiality. Berridge therefore warned against the politicisation of peacekeeping, 
"Revival of the Nfilitary Staff Committee ... might provide 
for a veto over 
the day-to-day running of peacekeeping operations in relation to which the 
Secretary-General presently has considerable autonomy ... which could 
mean the United Nations response would be curtailed when the Security 
Council is deadlocked"3. 
Yet for the Secretary-General to remain in control of strengthened operations risked 
politicising the Secretary-General. This paradox, was itself a product of cold war closure. 
The new emphasis on human rights and the limits of sovereignty reflected environmental 
IPerez de Cuellar, op. cit., (1991), p. 341. 2Saksena, op. cit., p. 191. 3Berridge, op. cit., p. 32. 
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trends in a post cold war world. The collapse of communism, the Eastern bloc, the USSR 
and the cold war structure of international relations unleashed long surpressed tensions 
within states where the cold war had structured political, social, cultural and religious life. 
The resurgent and competing national, ethnic, and religious groups would provide the 
threats to international peace and security by which the UN would be challenged in the 
1990s. As Cox observed, even during the cold war, "neither the US nor the USSR 
controlled all or even the majority of agents capable of upsetting the status quo. "' Freed 
from cold war constraints, "in the coming period there could easily be much greater turmoil 
than before ... with nationalist agitation and worker militancy on the increase. "2 
The potential clash of the Secretary-General's good-offices and peacekeeping roles was 
exacerbated in a second sense by the collapse of the cold war structure of international 
relations. The cold war itself was officially closed by Bush and Gorbachev in Paris In 
December 1990. The cold war structure of international relations survived, just, until the 
end of Perez de Cuellar's tenure. In August 1991 Gorbachev survived an attempted coup 
but one by one the Soviet Socialist Republics declared independence. On 9 December 
Yeltsin announced the creation of a Slav Commonwealth between Russia, Belarus and the 
Ukraine, later to become the Commonwealth of Independent States, (CIS). On 24 
December 1991, Gorbachev resigned as the President of the USSR, a state which had 
ceased to exist, and the Soviet UN seat and obligations passed over to the Russian 
Federation. Bush's New World Order, however, had in fact effectively collapsed before 
Iraq invaded Kuwait. The so called, 'Year of Miracles, ' in Eastern Europe was followed in 
1990 by German unification. The disintegration of the Eastern bloc pointed the way for the 
states of the USSR where perestroika, permitted the expression, by over one hundred 
nationalities, of deep-seated and long held resentments against Russian centrism. These 
grievances were also fed by the poverty of transition. 
For Lie the prospect of a great power concert had been superseded by the bipolafisation of 
international relations and the paralysis of the collective security principle. For Perez de 
Cuellar's successor, the prospect of a great power concert was superseded by the collapse 
of the USSR. Bush's New World Order was an attempt to institutional ise the norms of co- 
operation that had emerged at the UN, but co-operation with whom, and for what reason? 
Bush's vision of New World Order rested on the continuation of the cold war structure of 
international relations, but that collapsed with the disintegration of the USSR. The new 
incumbent would inherit a unipolar world. In the absence of the USSR, the notion of co- 
operating to prevent a recurrence of the bipolarisation of the world was redundant. 
The 
hold of both the cold war and then the cold war structure over foreign policy was removed, 
'Cox, op. cit., P. 17 1. 2ibid. 
-336- 
giving domestic politics a greater say in the conduct of foreign policy. While the end of the 
cold war meant that agreement between the permanent members was more readily attained, 
differences between them also remained, and greater expression would now be given to 
these differences. Given the demise of the USSR, Tiananmen Square, and Chinese 
traditions of UN participation, in the short term, at least, initiatives for Security Council 
action would come predominantly from the Western permanent three, and rely ever more on 
the support of the US. Informal discussions would be about bringing the other permanent 
members and the non-aligned on board. Security Council initiatives would not only reflect 
a WestenVUS agenda but probably lack consistency, prompted singularly where Western 
conceptions of national interests determined. For the Secretary-General the ramifications 
would be profound. 
Firstly, the prospect of a Western dominated Security Council redefining the notion of 
sovereignty and expanding collective security to include human rights smacked of neo- 
imperialism, however well intentioned. The Secretary-General's administration of resultant 
Security Council mandates would exacerbate further the tensions between the roles of the 
Secretary-General as the administrator of Security Council decisions and as an independent 
third party in the prevention and resolution of conflict. Secondly, the capture of the Security 
Council by the permanent members would/could create tensions between the Secretary- 
General, (the guardian of the Charter demanding consistency), and the Security Council. 
The developments between 1987 and 1992 elevated the public profile, and with that the 
expectations of the UN and the Secretary-General. In the 1980s the UN was revived, and 
under Perez de Cuellar's successor would celebrate its half century. A sense of great 
expectation hung over the organisation in a new, "world in need of leadership. "2 In the 
wake of the Gulf War and the renewed optimism in the effectiveness and future role of the 
UN, amongst the proliferation of reform proposals were repeated calls for a new style of 
Secretary-General. Demands for a Secretary-General to, 'lead, ' the UN into the post cold 
war world even went so far as to call for the consideration of eminent international 
statesmen and women. Margaret Thatcher, Eduard Shevardnadze and Jimmy 
Carter were 
among the names banded about. The idea of appointing a successor of such 
high public 
profile used to exercising political clout, however, is an anathema to the role of the 
Secretary-General. It represented a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
basis on which 
the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace and security 
has 
evolved. Quiet diplomacy and the Secretary-General's good offices rest on impartiality and 
the lack of the attributes of statehood. Without those attributes 
it is doubtful whether such 
ISee Conclusions. 
2See Urquhart, Brian, & Childers, Erskine, A World in Need of Leadership, (Uppsala, 
Sweden: Dag 
Hammarskj6ld Foundation, 1990). 
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personalities would be any more, (and probably less), effective than a Secretary -General 
employing the Perez de Cuellar approach. 
Perez de Cuellar's tenure was one of transition and extremes. It encompassed the 
inclemency of the cold war, the end of the cold war, and the collapse of the cold war 
structure of international relations. With these transitions the Secretary-General's fortunes 
oscillated. His successor faced a world no more certain than the one which greeted Trygve 
Lie forty-five years earlier and considerably less certain than the world of 1982. By the 
time Perez de Cuellar left office, the interaction of systemic forces and false expectations 
already seemed to be conspiring against his successor. 
11 (a) The Organisational -Institutional Explanation: Perez de Cuellar and the 
Security Council. 
The emergence of A Partnership for Peace hinged in no small part on new developments in 
Security Council decision-making instigated by the Secretary-General. During the 1960s 
and 1970s the process and practice of informal consultations of the Security Council 
developed, in theory permitting greater candour and more productive diplomacy. The 
'darkside' of secrecy, however, was all too evident in a 'new' cold war, and informal 
consultations became, as Urquhart observed in 1981, "an increasingly expedient and 
evasive approach to world problems, " denying the Secretary-General's office, "the strong 
and consistent backing necessary for its effectiveness. "' On the basis of the article in which 
these comments were made Urquhart was encouraged by Perez de Cuellar to draft the new 
Secretary-General's first Report on the Work of the Organisation. In that Perez de Cuellar 
stated, 
"In recent years the Security Council has increasingly resorted to the 
valuable process of informal consultations. However, there is sometimes a 
risk that this process may become a substitute for action by the Security 
Council or even an excuse for inaction. "2 
As Perez de Cuellar went on to observe, "adequate working relations between the 
permanent members of the Security Council are a sine qua non of the Council's 
effectiveness. 1 '3 Five years later, as the cold war was beginning to thaw, Perez 
de Cuellar 
was the catalyst for an institutional innovation that would provide for adequate working 
relations on a consistent basis. 
'Urquhart, Brian, "International Peace and Security: Thoughts on the 12th Anniversary of 
Dag 
Hammarskj6ld's Death, " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1, Fall 1981, pp. 14-15. 
2Perez de Cuellar, op. cit., (1982), p. 10. 
3ibid. 
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Invigoration of the Security Council began in 1986 with a non-aligned draft resolution 
attributing responsibility for the Iran-Iraq War to Saddam. Hussein. The permanent 
m embers responded with a draft of their own, which after further consultation with the non- 
aligned became SCR 582 on 24 February 1986. This was the earliest indication of new 
departures in the Security Council decision-making which would have profound 
implications for the ability of the Security Council and Secretary-General to address the 
Iran-Iraq war, and for the roles of the Security Council and the Secretary-General per se. 
Co-operation and co-ordination between the permanent members was not repeated in the 
Security Council until consideration was being given to the (re)appointment of the 
Secretary-General later that year. Initially Perez de Cuellar had made clear his intentions to 
serve only one ten-n but in an unprecedented show of support for a Secretary -General, the 
permanent five joined together in late 1986 to request Perez de Cuellar stand for re-election. 
Hume notes that it was rare enough for the USSR to join Britain, France, and the US in 
making joint demarches but this was the first time China also came on board. I 
Significantly, this time the permanent members needed no prompting and were acting on 
their own initiative. 
Before accepting, Perez de Cuellar demanded greater unity from the Security Council, and 
that the US clear its UN debts. It would be unusual for a new or re-elected Secretary- 
General not to mark his appointment by making demands of the international community to 
make and facilitate a more effective use of the UN. In the changing climate of international 
relations and the manner of his re-appointment, however, Perez de Cuellar observed and 
seized a, "creative opportunity for renewal and reform. "2 Less than a month into his second 
term, in the now faffious press conference and office 'tea party' Perez de Cuellar made his 
call for a "meeting of minds" between the permanent members on the Iran-Iraq war. 3 To 
this end the Secretary-General suggested the permanent five meet informally and in private 
until they come up with a concerted approach worthy of Security Council attention. Once 
the ambassadors received the go ahead from their national capitals Perez de Cuellar outlined 
some broad principles by which their meetings should be governed: 4 
- meetings should be 'private and informal; ' 
- within the broad framework of respective foreign policy positions discussions should be 
open and 'unrestricted; ' 
- discussions and actions should not be swayed by conditions put for-ward by Iran and Iraq; 
the objective is to find common ground on which 'concrete action' could be taken and 
backed up in bilateral actions; 
lHume, op. cit., p. 81. N. B. unity in the reappointment of a Secretary-General often reflects the reluctance 
of the permanent members to embark on the arduous and protracted task of finding and agree ing on a 
successor. 
2The Times, II October 1986, cited in Hume, op. cit., p. 82. 
3With the exception of Hume's first hand recollection and analysis the Secretary-General's role in 
these 
developments is not well documented. 4ibid., p. 88. 
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-, the permanent members should not return to the Security Council until a unified position had been agreed. 
in 1987 Perez de Cuellar saw not only an opportunity to bring an end to the Iran-Iraq war 
but an opportunity to revive the Security Council. For the Secretary -General the resolution 
of the Iran-Iraq war was both an end in itself and a means to an end. Out of the Secretary- 
General's proposal emerged new behavioural and institutional norms governing relations 
between the permanent members in New York, and Security Council decision-making. 
From this point forward the permanent members met regularly at ambassador and 
counsellor levels. The counsellor's of the permanent missions first met in February at the 
US mission and thereafter once or twice weekly. Their meetings were governed by the 
following rules: I 
-, counsellors lacked the power to commit their governments, (ambassadors had authority to 
commit on questions of process but not substance, capitals retained the power to commit on 
substance); 
" discussions were either on the basis of nonpapers'2or drafts presented by a counsellor; 
" the counsellors did their drafting work by modifying a single text, not by trying to 
reconcile competing drafts; 
- the draft nonpapers would then be advanced to the ambassadors. 
The first of these principles was crucial in determining the character of these meetings 
which is again described by Hume, 
"Mey would share information form capitals and from their other contacts in 
New York. Then in successive tours de table they sought answers to their 
ambassadors' questions ... operating at the technical 
level they could 
'brainstorm, ' that is explore options without any implication of 
commitment. 113 
The ambassadors, (accompanied by a counsellor), would meet less regularly at the 
residence of the British Ambassador, then Sir John Thompson. At these meetings the 
ambassadors: 4 
- received the work being done by the counsellors group; 
- framed questions on which to seek guidance from capitals and to share the responses 
received; 
- renewed the mandate of the counsellors group; 
* determined what questions to raise with the Secretary-General; 
- determined the procedure for consulting the other delegations; 
What emerged, Groom and Taylor describe as a, "consensus mechanism, 
115 which became 
b siness prior to the basis upon which the permanent five addressed Security 
Council u 
libid. 
If 2"A diplomatic working paper without attribution or commitment, produced 
by and for informal 
discussions, ibid., p. 95. 
3ibid., p. 95. 
4ibid., p. 94. 
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informal and formal meetings of the Security Council. The institutional isation of this 
process was formalised in September 1989 when the foreign secretaries of the permanent 
members met at the UN for non-specific discussions on the role of the UN and the conflicts 
to which the international organisation was seeking a negotiated solution. The occasion 
was marked by a joint statement, in which the permanent five announced, "their 
commitment to seek positive changes in the international political climate from 
confrontations to the relaxation of tensions and reiterated that the UN had a central role to 
play in the maintenance of international peace and security. "' Henceforth, the permanent 
members have met annually in September at foreign minister level. 'Periodic' high level 
meetings of the Security Council have long been advocated as a means of developing a 
more concerted approach in the Security Council to specific cases. 2 'Me first took place in 
1970 on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the UN, the second in 1985 on the fortieth 
anniversary. As Berridge observes, however, 
"Unfortunately, despite the first hints of East-West detente in late 1970 there 
remained insufficient common ground among the permanent members to 
make it likely that a periodic meeting would produce anything other than set- 
piece speeches and banal pronouncements ... the sterility of the 1970 meeting was undoubtedly responsible for the failure to repeat the experiment 
until fifteen years later and then the meeting whichwas this time public, was 
largely ceremonial. 113 
Given more conducive climatic conditions, Berridge identifies the advantages of regular 
high level meetings as fourfold: a tool of preparedness; high level dialogue between all 
members of the Security Council; enhancing the public profile of the Security Council; and 
a facilitator of candid discussion without the fear of returning home empty-handed .4 Of 
these only the first and fourth are pertinent to the annual meetings of the foreign ministers of 
the permanent members but that does not devalue the development of the consensus 
mechanism, of which this meeting is the most public expression. The greatest value of this 
meeting is to reinforce the consensus process between the permanent members. While this 
process might be criticised for its lack of transparency, it was both the secrecy and the 
exclusivity of its functioning which enabled it to work. Irrespective of those arguments 
which challenge the entitlement of the current veto-wielders to their privileged position, and 
outsiders claims to the permanent members club, the fact remains that the first obstacle to 
Security Council action is the veto. As chapter two makes clear, the veto was designed as 
5Groom, A. J. R. & Taylor, Paul, "Beyond the Agenda for Peace: the Future of UN Arrangements for the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, " paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, 
Workshop 
12, The United Nations: Towards the half Century, Leiden University, The Netherlands, 2-7 April 1993. p. 
I. 
'Saksena, K. P., Reforming the United Nations, the Challenge of Relevance, (London: Sage Publications, 
1993), p. 17 1. 
2See Bailey, Sydney, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 197ý). 
ý 35-37. 
Bpe'rridge, op. cit., p. 11. see also, Bailey, op. cit., pp. 37-8. 4Berridge, op. cit., p. 11. 
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much to encourage the permanent members to find common positions and act as a great 
power concert, as to obstruct Security Council action altogether. It was precisely to this 
end that the consensus mechanism was conceived, and continues to operate. Of course 
there still remained no guarantee that a common position will be reached but the consensus 
mechanism enabled the permanent members both to, 'brainstorm, ' and begin the process of 
horse-trading which consensus demands. Moreover, the permanent five still faced a 
collective veto in the non-permanent membership, if not the non aligned membership of the 
Security Council, and the informal consultations of the whole provided the forum where 
diplomacy continued in private to build unity and comn-dtment to a common approach. This 
process for which Perez de Cuellar was the catalyst meant that when Saddam Hussein 
invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 there was already in place an institutional mechanism 
through which the permanent members could effect a swift and decisive response. The 
impulse of the Gulf War gave even greater momentum to the idea that the Security Council 
could work much more effectively. A considerable amount of coalition building was 
required both within and outside the permanent members club but the forum in which that 
trading could be done now existed. A new collegiality built up not only between nations at 
the end of the cold war but between the personalities involved. The ambassadors and 
counsellors of the permanent members were finding their way and developing new norms 
of international engagement in a new era, as much as their respective state departments. 
Only, the ambassadors and counsellor's at the UN were doing so together in a new 
environment of growing trust and collegiality. In this forum the permanent representatives 
at the UN were less the voice piece for the Foreign Office or State Department, but players 
shaping thinking and policy in their respective governments- I In turn, faith in the UN 
escalated to levels unknown since the era of, 'leave it to Dag. ' For Perez de Cuellar the 
impact of this rejuvenation was profound. 
Institutionally the Secretary-General was the main benefactor of the cold war Security 
Council malaise. The re-vitalisation of the Security Council it might be argued would 
crowd out the Secretary-General. Certainly, the balance of power shifted from the non- 
aligned to the permanent members, from the General Assembly to the Security 
Council. In 
terms of A Partnership for Peace, however, as a rule, the prospects of the 
Secretary- 
General's good offices and UN peacekeeping were bolstered, not relegated. 
The full array 
of options by which the UN could respond to a given conflict were now available 
to the 
Secretary-General and Security Council. Moreover, the prospect of the most appropriate 
approach being applied was enhanced by improvements in UN 
decision-making brought 
about by the channels of communication that opened up between the 
Secretary-General and 
the Security Council, its individual and permanent members. 
'ibid. 
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Perez de Cuellar provided the first meetings of the counsellor and ambassador groups w1th 
six, 'talking points, ' and for the counsellor group added a resume of the Security Council 
resolutions addressing the Iran-Iraq war. This would not become the norm, however, and 
Perez de Cuellar attended a meeting of the permanent members only once, by invitation. I 
instead, the, 'integrative complexity of communication, ' was enhanced though very close 
links behind the scenes. The Secretary-General and his staff were consulted regularly at a 
technical level by the counsellor's group and by the ambassadors for his opinion and 
advice. The importance of the collaboration between the Secretary-General and the 
permanent members is indicated in a March nonpaper which included two questions for the 
ambassadors to ask the Secretary-General: "Did he [the Secretary-General] prefer support 
by Security Council members for his mediation efforts to be private or public? And, if 
public should the Security Council's statement or resolution be comprehensive and include 
other elements. ' Q The Secretary-General's answers to questions such as these if not 
provided bi-laterally were provided in informal consultations of the whole which Perez de 
Cuellar attended "religiously. ' '3 Informal consultations of the whole were no longer 
predictably tiresome bi-polarised and unproductive vitriolic affairs but instead provided a 
very real multilateral forum for securing agreement amongst the rest of the Security Council 
membership. 
The Secretary-General was now better placed to decide whether to convene the Security 
Council or not to convene, whether a member state or the Security Council might be better 
placed to address a given situation, or whether to apply the Secretary-General's 
discretionary independent prerogatives. Once the question of approach was resolved the 
Secretary-General was better placed to keep the Security Council and members informed of 
developments whether acting independently or at the behest of the Security Council. In 
theory the Security Council was better informed of developments in the field and the 
Secretary-General was left with a clearer picture of the probable, possible, and acceptable 
in Security Council decision-making and implementation of Security Council mandates. 
In initiating the consensus mechanism which would enable the Security Council to function 
in the manner envisioned by the framers of the Charter, the Secretary-General was acting 
very much in keeping with the temper of Article 99. Moreover, as Hume argues, 
"Only Perez de Cuellar as Secretary-General was in a position to be the 
catalyst for realising this idea. Had the invitation been made by one of the 
five ambassadors, it would not have appeared impartial; for the same reason 
the talks could not be located in one of the five capitals. ' 14 
I Interviews, New York, November 1994. 
21-lume, op. cit., p. 96. 31nterviews, New York, November 1994. 
41-lume, op. cit., p. 90. 
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The Secretary-General's other institutional innovation of this period also had its foundations 
in Article 99 and was conceived to much the same end. 
11 (bý The Organisational-Bureaucratic Explanation: Perez de Cuellar and 
ORCI. 
ORCI was founded on the assumption that an advanced information structure could make 
the Secretary-General a better servant and partner of the Security Council. In 1983 Perez de 
Cuellar had stated, "no organisation can survive if its administrative system is inarticulate or 
unresponsive to its real needs. "' Anecdotal evidence of the impending crisis Perez de 
Cuellar foresaw abounds. In 1982, as the Falklands crisis was breaking it has been alleged 
the UN had no maps of the disputed British oUtpoSt. 2 During the 1980s the UN remained 
functionally closed at weekends and after 5.00pm on weekdays, inconveniently for disputes 
escalating outside normal working hours. 3 Also indicative of UN working practices in a 
bygone era are the comments of the director of the secretariat staff on the completion of 
SCR 661 on Sunday 16 August 1990, "this is the first time we have skipped lunch certainly 
in the last fifteen years. ' 14Restructuring the secretariat to enhance the, 'integrative 
complexity of information, ' could only improve the efficiency and effectiveness of A 
Partnershipfor Peace by bringing crises to the attention of the Secretary-General and 
Security Council at the earliest possible stages. Writing in 1992, however, just prior to the 
disbanding of ORCL Gordenker observed, "no reliable machinery to produce early- 
warning yet exists. "5 Like earlier early-warning and administrative re-structuring 
proposals, ORCI was undermined by systemic constraints and problems familiar to 
students of international bureaucracy. 
The Secretary-General's first efforts to develop early-waming mechanisms reflected the 
omnipresence of the cold war. Perez de Cuellar's commitment to develop a, 'wider and 
more systematic capacity for fact-finding in potential conflict areas, ' was not well received 
in either the USSR or the US. At the height of cold war the superpowers were 
supersensitive to the development of an independent information capacity in an era and 
arena where espionage, (fact and fiction), were legend. Latent McCarthyism fuelled by 
Schevchenko's defection, 6 fostered American opposition to strengthening this aspect of the 
Secretary -General's role especially in a department run 
by a Soviet. Conversely, the USSR 
viewed the delegation of such functions to a body outside the Department of Political and 
Security Council Affairs, (DPSCA), with equal suspicion. Early-waming at this stage was 
IPerez de Cuellar, (1983), op. cit., p. 36. 
21nterviews, November/December, 1994. 
3ibid. 
4QUoted in the New York Times, 7 August 1990, quoted in Hume, p. 191. 5Gordenker, Leon, "Early-Warning: Conceptual and Environmental issues, " in RupesInghe and 
Kuroda, 
Early-Warning and Conflict Resolution, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1992), pp. 1- 15. 
6Schevchenko, Arkady N., Breaking with Moscow, (New York, Random House, 1985). 
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therefore limited to uncontentious monitoring of press reports within the DPSCA, and to the 
relatively apolitical humanitarian field. 
The Bertrand Report of 1984 on the supply of information' and the 1985 report on 
institutional arrangementS2 both recommended a streamlining of the Secretariat to improve 
efficiency, minimise duplication and enhance the internal coherence of information. But it 
was only the near insolvency induced by American withholdings that provided the catalyst 
for the Group of Eighteen Report, budgetary reform and the secretariat restructuring of 
which ORCI was a part. Nevertheless, as the cold war began to thaw, sensitivity to the 
secretary-General's ideas remained strong, and in accordance with tradition, a Soviet 
remained at the head of the DPSCA. The early-warning remit was once again limited to the 
humanitarian field: to gathering data on population movements, crop production, disease, 
and other demographic indicators from the UN agencies. As one senior member of the 
secretariat pointed out, "even the name was a political compromise to the political war 
because the Soviets could not stand even to have the world 'political' in it, let alone 
lanalysis. "13 For the first time, however, the Secretary-General had provided the UN 
Organisation with a system wide early warning target. Within these limitations 
restructuring of the secretariat and the operationalisation of ORCI also had to contend with 
classic problems of intemational. bureaucracy. 
A primary constraint, related to the systemic level, was that of penury. The financial crisis 
of 1985/6/7 was temporarily alleviated by the dept pay offs of the US and USSR. This 
only enabled the UN to clear debts and any possibility of expenditures on updating the 
antiquated UN infrastructure were quickly usurped by the massive expansion in the UN's 
commitments that accompanied the end of the cold war. Fundamental problems regarding 
the budget structure and the persistent failure of states to pay their subscriptions on time 
went largely unresolved and the secretariat remained a technological dinosaur -a paradox 
given its New York location at the heart of the information superhighway. ORCI was never 
equipped with the computer capacity or database appropriate for early-warning on the scale 
Perez de Cuellar had envisaged. Moreover, in the semi-autonomous Specialised Agencies, 
(with their own budgets), technological development had not been uniform. Different 
computer systems and the absence of an integrated network limited ORCI's access to 
valuable information resources. Perez de Cuellar's request that the UNICs around the 
world submit weekly reports to the Secretary-General was also undone by 
lack of finance 
4 
which meant that the heads of UNICs were not being replaced. T'homas 
Boudreau and 
James Sutterlin were persistent advocates of the use of satellite systems 
for the purpose of 
ITaylor, Paul, "Reforming the UN System: Value for Money, " The World Today, July 1988, p. 
123. 
2ibid. 
31nterviews, New York, December 1994. 
4See UK & Ireland UNIC Newsletter NS/1/93. 
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information gathering and early-warning but even today these remain pipe dreams. ' Thisis 
not merely a matter of funding but relates to the lack of political control (read censorship), 
independent countries would be able to exercise over the gathering of, potentially sensitive 
or damaging information, and the lack of trust in the ends to which it would be used, (i. e. 
not theirs). States jealously guard those rights and interests over which they have a 
monopoly, and while individual states may be able to do nothing about other states 
developing similar capacities, those organisations they can block they will do so. This 
problem, however, is not unique to nation-states. Within the UN system there is also a 
marked reluctance, as Taylor recognises, "to consolidate effective power in the hands of the 
Secretary-General because the question of whether the Secretary-General would prove to be 
competent or trustworthy [read a friend or a foe] is a matter of chanCe. "2 On this premise it 
is best to leave alone those quasi-independent programmes and the specialised agencies 
which themselves are reluctant to divulge their resources or dilute their authority. Inter 
agency disputes or, 'turf problems, ' compound the situation in which the Secretary- 
General, although primes inter pares, amongst the heads of the Specialised Agencies has no 
formal powers to call a meeting between them let alone issue directives. 
There were also problems related to personnel and leadership. At the general level, attempts 
to decrease the number of staff by fifteen percent as recommended by the Group of 
Eighteen were pursued by, 'attrition, ' and as Taylor observes, "meant that the older 
experienced staff were leaving. The eventual result would be that parts of the organisation 
would become urunanageable. "3 In ORCI this meant that only nine staff, (in a total of 
twenty), were spared for political analysis. These nine were divided between three regions 
but given the number of potential hotspots this hardly amounted to comprehensive cover. 
That staff were also cobbled together, "robbed, " or, "borrowed, "4 fromother departments 
and while ORCI took over a number of functions previously performed by other offices in 
the secretariat it added to a. "top-heavy bureaucracy, "5 in which thirty to forty senior 
officials already reported directly to the Secretary-General. The very access to the 
Secretary-General for which ORCI was conceived was almost immediately diluted. 
gie ISee Boudreau, op. cit., pp. 148-61; The Secretary- General and Satellite Diplomacy, 
(New York: Camegi 
Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1984); James S. Sutterlin a Director 
in the executive Office of 
the Secretary-General under Perez de Cuellar; and in his 1989 report Perez de Cuellar stated, 
"arrangements, 
for instance could be made to receive information from space-based and other technical surve I 
Ilance systems 
which would enable the Secretariat to monitor potential conflict situations 
from a clearly impartial 
standpoint, " op. cit., p. 228. 2Taylor et a], 'The Financing of the UN, " Review of International Studies, 
(1988) No. 14, p. 291. 
3ibid. 
41nterviews New York, November/December 1994. 
5The Report of the High Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the 
Efficiency and Administrative 
Functioning of the UN, UN Doc. A/41/49. 
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Finally, the new office lacked the most elusive of quantifiable factors, leadership. Alvaro 
de Soto headed ORCI but it was also Perez de Cuellar's policy to use his closest associates 
as his personal and special representatives. While this gave the Secretary-General a very 
close personal understanding and input in negotiations around the world it meant 
administration and management matters were somewhat neglected. For the entire existence 
of ORCI, de Soto was engaged in negotiating Peace in Central America, for which he has 
been widely acclaimed, but which also kept him away form headquarters most of the time. 
According to one member of the secretariat, as a result, de Soto, "never really took hold of 
ORCI and never really gave it the attention it needed. "' Other colleagues were less polite, 
"the leadership of the office was itself a critical question. Our man was basically driven by ambitions for his own career rather than focusing clearly 
and individually on the task of his new office ... and subordinated the objectives of this office to his own personal aims. Evidence for this is in the 
fact that the third year of his term was spent exclusively attaining an under- 
secretary-general post which then moved him out of ORCL 112 
The strength of such comments by one individual might indicate a mere personality clash, 
petty jealousies or personal rivalries but such comments were too frequent to be 
discounted. 3 The lack of leadership in conjunction with under staffing and a lack of 
resources undercut the conceptual power of ORCI further. The unveiling of ORCI was an 
early indication of a new UN in a new era but its contribution to A Partnership for Peace 
was largely cosmetic, and it was disbanded in 1992 variously dismissed as an, 
"embryonic, " and, "preliminary, '14attempt at fulfilling the early-waming concept. Thus 
while Perez de Cuellar noted the creation of OSGAP as a modest beginning in establishing a 
field presence, with respect to preventive diplomacy and early warning, in his final report 
on the work of the organisation Perez de Cuellar was forced to conclude, 
"Preventive diplomacy presupposes early-waming which in turn implies a 
reliable and independently acquired database. At present the pool of 
information available to the Secretary-General is wholly inadequate - lacking 
access to the technological means, such as space based and other 
surveillance systems, and without field representation commensurate with 
need, it is hard to visualise how the secretariat can monitor potential conflict 
situations from a clearly impartial standpoint. "5 
The S ecretary- General and the International Court of justice: Institutional 
Reform? 
In the Rainbow Warrior dispute the Secretary-General undertook a quasi-judicial role and 
before leaving office recommended that the Secretary-General should be authorised to seek 
'Interviews, New York, November 1994. 
21nterview, New York, November 1994. 
31nterviews, New York, November/December/January, 1994/5. 
4ibid. 
5Perez de Cuellar, op. cit., (1991), p. 336. 
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advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 1 The Charter stipulates in 
Article 96 that only the Council and Assembly are authorised to seek advisory opinions 
from the judicial branch of the UN. All other organs of the UN, including the secretariat 
(and therefore the Secretary-General), as well as the agencies of the UN may do so only on 
matters within the, 'scope"2 of their responsibilities and if authorised by the General 
Assembly. Of the principle organs of the UN only the Secretary-General had not tested this 
recourse. The process of engaging the General Assembly to obtain the advice of the ICJ is 
unnecessarily lengthy and again unnecessarily distrustful of the Secretary-General, and may 
be one reason why this avenue has not been utilised. Recourse to the ICJ via the General 
Assembly immediately reintroduces the influence of those vested interests the absence of 
which is a primary reason for engaging the Secretary-General's good offices in the first 
place. Authorising the Secretary-General to seek direct advisory opinions might enhance 
the Secretary-General's role at two levels, diplomatically and institutionally/ 
administratively. 
The advisory opinions of the ICJ are not binding but do carry, "considerable legal 
significance. ' '3 The right to seek and cite advisory legal opinions of the ICJ would add to 
the moral and political authority of the Secretary-General a legal authority which parties 
engaging the Secretary-General's good offices might find less easy to resist or ignore when 
the Secretary-General is acting in an independent capacity. As Perez de Cuellar asserts, it 
would entail expanding the Secretary-General's role in, "developing international law and 
legal norms as the basis of the activity of United Nations and or international relations. 114 
France would then have had to justify flouting international law as well as the Secretary- 
General. This is not necessarily a good example because a very salient reason for going 
through the Secretary-General was the greater flexibility and control foreseen over a 
political rather than a judicial settlement. It does, however, highlight the fact that, as Perez 
de Cuellar argues, "many international disputes are justiceable: even those which seem 
entirely political, (as the Iraq-Kuwait dispute prior to invasion have a clearly legal 
component. "5 Empowering the Secretary-General introduces the ICJ a tool of preventive 
diplomacy. If in the conduct of his good offices the Secretary-General is to assume a quasi- 
judicial role it is only appropriate he have access to the advise of legal experts. 6 
'ibid., p. 339. 
2Article 96. 
3Singh, N. (member of the ICJ 1973-88, President 1985-88), 'The UN and the Development of 
International Law, " in Roberts & Kingsbury, op. cit., p. 405. 
4Perez de Cuellar, op. cit., (1991), p. 339. 5ibid. 
6Tbe Secretariat contains a legal department but the opinions of the ICJ come 
from the worlds leading 
international lawyers and like the Secretary-General constitutionally independent 
from the deliberative 
organs, but arguable further removed from systemic constraints. 111's independence is of particular 
value 
where institutional 'struggles' are concerned. 
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Secondly, advisory opinions of the court would strengthen the Secretary -General, s 
institutional position vis-a-vis the other principal organs of the UN. As Szasz argues, in 
the conduct of independent initiatives and the execution of mandates conferred on him the 
Secretary-General is often, "subject to contradictory pressures from political organs and 
states. "' The moral authority of the Secretary-General is itself derived from the Secretary- 
General's guardianship of the Charter. The Charter in turn is a fundamental component of 
international law, yet in its interpretation and application the Secretary -General does not 
have access to the world's leading legal advisors. Trygve Lie could not access the Court 
when battling to establish the Secretary-General's procedural rights of participation in 
Security Council meetings. Dag Hammarskj6ld did not have access to the Court when the 
Security Council failed to define the limits to his mandate in the Congo. U Thant did not 
have access to the Court vis-a-vis the status of peacekeeping troops in a host nation when 
Nasser withdrew his consent for their presence and the Security Council sat silently on the 
issue. And Perez de Cuellar did not have access to the to the Court to establish the precise 
legal standing of SWAPO troops still in Namibia prior to the April Fool's Day Massacre. 
That is not to say such examples, as Schwebel argues, "would necessarily have been 
suited, politically or temporarily, to the Court's advisory processes. But they do illustrate 
that genuine and important political and legal questions do arise which are peculiarly or 
particularly within the scope of the Secretary-General's activities. ' 12Moreover, arguments 
put forward by Szasz in 1976 are even more salient today. As the Secretary -General is 
increasingly, "charged with execution of delicate and complicated arguments [increasingly] 
legal questions and disputes will inevitably arise, '13 in the execution of those mandates. 
Undoubtedly, the extension of this right to the Secretary-General would strengthen the 
Secretary-General in the execution of both his political and administrative roles. It is also a 
right to be exercised only guardedly and advisedly at both the diplomatic and 
institutional/administrative levels. 
In the first instance it is doubtful whether France would have acted any differently if the 
Secretary-General had been armed with an advisory legal opinion- The double standards of 
a hierarchically organised international system permit the greater powers greater freedom of 
action. The middle and lower ranking powers, however, may find it harder to 
flout such a 
recommendation, especially if the Secretary-General has the backing of the Security 
Council. The failure of states to observe a ruling as well as the Secretary-General's 
recommendation only bring into question the validity of the Secretary-General's good 
offices and international law as dispute settling mechanisms. One of the 
inherent strengths 
of the Secretary-General's position is that the Secretary-General can provide 
his diplomatic 
'Szasz, Paul, "Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court, " in Gross, L. 
(ed. ), The Future of 
the ICJ, 1976, Vol. II, p. 513. 
2Schwebel, op. cit., p. 523. 3Szasz, op. cit. 
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services unencumbered by the other organs of the UN. The UN was intentionally 
conceived as a political document after the failure of the more legalistic League Covenant. 
Within the broad remit of the Charter for fifty years the Secretary-General has been in the 
business of assisting political solutions to political problems based on the independence of 
the office from state interests and the resolutions that the pursuit of state interests produce in 
the deliberative organs of the UN. The ill advised use of a discretionary right to seek the 
counsel of the ICJ might invoke legal criteria or obstacles that restrict the scope of the 
Secretary-General to promote a political settlement between disputing parties in the same 
way that the mandate of the Security Council and General Assembly can be limiting. For 
instance an advisory opinion of the Court requested by the Secretary-General finding Iraq 
responsible for the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 would have compromised the 
Secretary-General in Iraqi eyes, and fuelled Iranian intransigence and insistence on a 
Security Council resolution stating as much. It would also have brought the Secretary- 
General into a clash with the Security Council. 
At the institutional level this latter point also illustrates that inherent in endorsing this fight, 
is a potentially disabling clash between the Secretary-General and the Security Council. 
The prospect that a ruling by the ICJ might be used rather than take an issue before the 
Security Council, or that that legal ruling may contradict the political judgement, (interests), 
of one or more permanent members of the Security Council not only brings the Secretary- 
General and Security Council into conflict but challenges the foundations upon which the 
Charter system for the maintenance of international peace and security is founded. The 
Secretary-General has extensive rights of participation in Security Council meetings and the 
right to convene the Security Council. In accordance with the great power concert concept, 
it is in the Security Council that issues regarding mandate should be resolved. Over zealous 
recourse to the ICJ could all too easily foster an overly legalistic and adversarial relationship 
between Security Council and Secretary-General. While there are undoubted advantages of 
empowering the Secretary-General with this right it is also clearly a double edged sword. 
At the heart of these criticisms, however, re-surface the very same reservations held by 
states which are highlighted in the failure to endow the Secretary-General with an adequate 
early-warning system. Once more it is to invest in the Secretary-General rights and 
allthority states are reluctant to commit because of an, "unjustified mistrust. "' As Schwebel 
argues, states have not made an injudicious use of Article 99 and there is therefore, "no 
reason to suggest the Secretary-General could exercise this right incautiously. ' 12 It seems 
also that the public nature of such a prerogative is at the heart of the problems of endorsing 
this right. Given much of the Secretary-General's work is quiet diplomacy behind closed 
doors, and given that the advisory opinions sought from the ICJ are just that - advisory - 
'Schwebe], op. cit., p. 529. 2ibid. 
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there seems no logical reason why such a prerogative could not also be exercised privately. 
Advice could be sought on sensitive matters and only made public if their application 
required or there was political gain to be made from doing so. In this way the Secretary- 
General could circumvent the potential dangers associated with extending the Secretary- 
General's powers in this manner. As with informal meetings of the Security Council there 
must be no official documentation of those issues put to the Court by the Secretary-General 
and the opinions returned by the Court. 
The prospects for this reform, however, remain hostage to the constraints of a state-centric 
system. The ability of the Secretary-General to apply such a discretionary right consistently 
on judicious examination of the case under consideration comes under question only 
implicitly. Instead the fear that the appropriate use of this mandate might at some time be 
applied to the disadvantage of those providing the authorisation. The end of the cold war 
has initiated an international legal debate on where sovereignty ends and human rights 
begin. The prospect of greater intervention within the domestic jurisdiction of state which 
began in Iraq, only serves to fuel latent opposition to Perez de Cuellar's proposed 
innovation. Of the great powers China and to a lesser extent Russia will represent a 
developing world deeply sceptical of any reforms which might become neo-impenalist tools 
in the hands of the already industrialised West/Northern hemisphere, post cold war. At the 
institutional level this resistance is indicative of how the institutional balance of power 
changed during Perez de Cuellar's tenure. During the cold war, if a positive institutional 
partnership existed it was between the Secretary-General and the General Assembly. This 
chapter, however, builds a picture of an emerging partnership between the Secretary- 
General and Security Council. Too close an association of the Secretary-General with the 
Security Council and the permanent members in particular risks alienating the Secretary- 
General's traditional constituency, now concerned at the growing predominance of the 
permanent five over the Organisation. At the end of Perez de Cuellar's tenure therefore, 
calls for a more independent, assertive new style of Secretary -General were advocated most 
forthrightly in the developing world and were also accompanied by demands from the 
Africans that after three Europeans, one Asian and a Central American, that, 'it is our turn 
III Perez de Cuellar: Personality and Approach. 
"First he places precisely two drops of Vennouth into a frosty ice-cold 
glass, then puts the glass into the freezing compartment of the refrigerator to 
chill further, next to a bottle of dry gin. No olive is added, no lemon peel, 
no ice to dilute the potency of the mixture. The method is meticulous, the 
attention to detail unnerving. To draw an analogy between Perez 
de 
Cuellar's dry Martinis' and his diplomacy would not be misleading. 
'Tbe Sunday Times Insight Team, op. cit., p. 171. 
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Bom 19 January 1920, Perez de Cuellar read Law at Lima University and on graduating 
entered the Peruvian diplomatic corps. He began his UN association in 1946 representing 
Peru at the inaugural General Assembly. An intellectual, as well as a diplomat, he married 
his early tours of duty with teaching at the Peruvian Diplomatic Academy and in 1964 
published Manual de Derecho Diplomatico, before taking up his first Ambassadors post in 
Switzerland. In 1966 Perez de Cuellar returned home and until 1969 served as permanent 
under-secretary to the foreign minister, a period during which he was acclaimed for, 
"promoting Peru's full membership in the non-aligned movement and normalising relations 
with Moscow. "' Subsequently, Perez de Cuellar became Peru's Ambassador in Moscow. 
As a Latin American known to Moscow and active in the non-aligned movement Perez de 
Cuellar was an unusually acceptable candidate to the first, second, and third worlds. In 
1971 Perez de Cuellar resumed his UN education as Peru's permanent representative at 
Headquarters. Between 1973 and 1975 this entailed serving on and presiding over the 
Security Council. In 1975 Perez de Cuellar crossed the house to enter the secretariat. Perez 
de Cuellar served as Waldheirn's special representative in Cyprus between 1975 and 1977, 
in 1979 he was appointed Under- Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, and was 
also deployed as Waldheirn's personal representative in Afghanistan until appointed 
Secretary-General. On his accession to office, therefore, Perez de Cuellar had served a 
unique apprenticeship providing him with first hand experience in three key areas. As a 
national delegate at the UN he acquired an intricate knowledge of Security Council 
workings and an understanding of the UN from the perception of a member state. As an 
international civil servant he gained a first hand insight into the functioning of the 
secretariat, the problems of international bureaucracy, and Secretary-General/Security 
Council relations from the Secretary-General's standpoint. And as a representative in the 
field, Perez de Cuellar was afforded the opportunity to hone his diplomatic skills as a UN 
negotiator rather than a state representative. By 1982, Perez de Cuellar was already a, 
creature of the UN and the approach taken by the Secretary-General can be considered in 
large part a product of this unique studentship. 2 
Like U Thant, Perez de Cuellar adopted the quiet approach. On his appointment the New 
York Times commented, "he is such a quiet person it's hard to assess what his performance 
will be like in a public job ... nobody 
knows whether he has a cutting edge. "3 Like 
HammarskJ61d, Perez de Cuellar succeeded a discredited incumbent in particularly 
inclement conditions, and was not encumbered by the weight of great expectation. 
As with 
HammarskJ61d the doubters would be surprised. Firstly, the so called quiet approach 
does 
not mean the Secretary-General is not active, merely that the activity of the 
Secretary- 
'The Times, 12 Dec. 198 1, quoted in Hume, op. cit., p. 78. 21nterviews, New York, November 1994. 
3New York Times, 12 December 1981, quoted in Hume, op. cit., p. 78. 
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General does not have to be seen to be effective. Or rather to be effective, the powers of the 
Secretary-General should be put into action away from the public eye, a point lost on 
Waldheim for whom Urquhart complains, "the public image rather than substance of a 
question tended to be the reality. "' Secondly, Urquhart continues, "working with Javier 
was a considerable contrast to the previous ten years. He was a quiet serious person who 
knew who he was, had no election debts and wanted to get on with the job, which he 
already knew a great deal about. He liked short and decisive conversations, and was 
uninterested, (perhaps too much), in his public image which saved a great deal of time. "" 
Here, Urquhart touches on two key points which go hand in hand and are central to 
understanding Perez de Cuellar's tenure: his lack of concern for public image and his, (then 
under-rated), strength of character. Perez de Cuellar had very firm views on the role of the 
Secretary-General which were first in evidence during the selection process. The use of, 
'selection', as opposed to, 'election, ' is very deliberate and in accordance with Perez de 
Cuellar's view that campaigning for the Secretary-Generalship was an immediate indication 
of unsuitability for the post. Perez de Cuellar refused to let his name go forward for the 
Secretary-Generalship until Waldheim and Salim Salim of Tanzania had withdrawn their 
candidacies, (both had contested office in 1977). The Sunday Times Insight Team 
recorded, "it is typical of him that when he was being canvassed as the new Secretary- 
General, he was relaxing in his beach house in Peru with a telephone, while the other 
candidates were scouting for votes in the corridors of the UN. ' '3 As Urquhart and the 
Insight Team both acknowledge, the logic behind this apparent indifference was an 
unswerving commitment to impartiality and the belief that no incoming Secretary -General 
could fulfil the responsibilities of the office in a wholly impartial manner if he had election 
debts to pay. On accession to office further expression of his strongly held views on the 
role of the UN generally and the role of the Secretary-General specifically, were permitted 
by the lack of concern for his public image, especially in respect of the major powers. 
Perez de Cuellar became only the second Secretary-General to articulate a UN, 'grand 
design, ' and the Secretary-General's role within that grand design. In that the emerging 
Partnership for Peacewas the realisation of Perez de Cuellar's ambitions for the UN and the 
Secretary-Generalship, this chapter has already enunciated the approach of the fifth 
Secretary-General. That paradigm, however, does not give full expression to Perez de 
Cuellar's perspective and personal contribution which were central to the realisation of that 
partnership. As Urquhart fondly recalls, "Perez de Cuellar had excellent ideas of his own 
and had no inhibitions about sticking his neck out. There was no trimming or watering 
down. 114Urquhart was referring specifically to the Secretary-General's 1982 report on the 
work of the organisation. Perez de Cuellar's conception of the UN and the 
Secretary- 
'Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 282. 2ibid., p. 334. 3The Sunday Times Insight Team, op. cit., p. 171. 
4Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 348. 
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General's role can be traced through all his Reports but his first was devoted entirely to this 
subject and should be read in conjunction with the Cyril Foster lecture he gave at Oxford M 1986.1 Together these two papers provide the clearest articulation of Perez de Cuel-lar's 
approach and ambitions for the UN, long before they were realised. 
The 1982 Annual Report and the Cyril Foster Lecture. 
Perez de Cuellar's first report on the work of the organisation represented a new departure 
in the fulfilment of this responsibility conferred on the Secretary-General by Article 98. 
Instead of reviewing UN activities of the previous twelve months Perez de Cuellar chose as 
his theme, "the central problem of the organisation's capacity to keep the peace and to serve 
as a forum for negotiations. "2 Perez de Cuellar dedicated his first report to reinvigorating 
the principles and purposes of the Charter which he argued had been brought into disrepute 
by: 
- governments belief that they can realise their international objectives by the use of force, 
and their willingness to do so; 
- the inability of the Security Council to take decisive action and resolve international 
conflicts; 
- the increasing regularity with which Security Council resolutions are defied or ignored by 
those considering themselves strong enough to do so; 
- the Security Council's apparent inability to generate the support and influence that ensure 
its decisions are respected, even when these are taken unanimouSly; 3 
Perez de Cuellar had identified a self-fulfilling crisis of credibility and legitimacy in the 
Security Council which also reflected on the Secretary-General; "without the continued 
diplomatic and other support of the member states the Secretary-General's efforts often 
have less chance of bearing fruit. ' '4 Not only had the principles of collective security, as 
embodied in chapter VU, become a dead duck but, "the process of peaceful settlement of 
disputes is often brushed aside. "5 The Secretary-General was the main beneficiary of the 
cold war division of the Security Council but by the time Perez de Cuellar came to office 
Security Council stasis was erecting more obstacles than opportunities for the Secretary- 
General. For Perez de Cuellar, a change in the Security Council's fortunes and renewal of 
the Secretary-General's diplomacy hinged on a return to the principles of collective security 
envisaged by the Charter framers. Otherwise, Perez de Cuellar argued, members of the 
international system would go on making their own security arrangements, "thereby 
IPerez de Cuellar, Javier, 'The Role of the UN Secretary-General, " Ile Cyril Foster Lecture, 
The 
Sheldonian Theatre, Oxford, 13 may 1986, reproduced in Roberts, Adam & Kingsbury, Benedict, 
United 
C, 
Nations Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993), pp. 125-142. 
2Perez de Cuellar, (1982), op. cit., p. . 3. 3ibid., p. 6. 
4ibid. 
5ibid. 
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increasing the general insecurity. "' To Perez de Cuellar and most UN commentators the 
solutions were obvious enough: 
- more systematic use and less last minute use of the Security Council, there has been a tendency to avoid bringing critical problems to the Council, or to do so to late for the Council to have any serious influence on their development; 
- the need to find a means of adequate working relations within the Security Council and 
among the permanent members especially; 
- the need to encourage states to use Security Council resolutions as a springboard to 
compatible bilateral action and discourage the view that resolutions are an end in 
themselves; 
- the need to ensure Security Council decisions are respected; 
* and finally to ensure the Secretary-General receives the backing of Security Council and 
members especially in actions on behalf of the Council. 2 
These criticisms were self-evident but highlighted the gulf between ideal and reality. 
Fulfilment of these hopes required an unprecedented change in state behaviour. The 1982 
Report was a bold statement setting the tone for Perez de Cuellar's tenure and the proposals 
which were to follow. Perez de Cuellar, however, held no illusions regarding the systemic 
constraints and was not an aspiring King Canute. At the institutional level this chapter has 
already considered Perez de Cuellar's vision of the Secretary-General as a, 'watchman of 
the peace, ' and his pledge to develop, "wider and more systematic capacity for fact-finding 
in potential conflict areas, "3 but crucially added, 
"Such efforts would naturally be taken in close co-ordination with the 
Council. Moreover the Council itself could devise more swift and 
responsive procedures for sending good-offices missions, military or 
civilian observers or a UN presence to areas of potential conflict. Such 
measures could inhibit the determination of conflict situations and might also 
be of real assistance to the parties in resolving important disputes by 
peaceful means. ' 14 
To be effective Perez de Cuellar was also mindful that the limits to UN diplomacy and 
peacekeeping needed to be better understood. in this respect his first and subsequent 
reports were also used to fulfil an educative function. Perez de Cuellar had placed 
responsibility for a deep-seated malaise at the feet of the UN members but also viewed 
reinvigorating the UN as a joint venture. Perez de Cuellar fulfilled his own responsibilities 
as Secretary-General by proposing workable collective approaches, the practice and 
habit of 
which he hoped, "might lead to the statesmanlike co-operation that will be essential 
in 
bringing to an end the great power divisions of our international SoCiety. 
115 In making this 
report, the new Secretary-General was attempting to set in motion a process of self 
appraisal at the UN at both the systemic and institutional levels. 
What emerged was a 
libid., p. 9. 
2ibid., p. 10. 3ibid., p. 12. 
4ibid. 
5ibid., (1983), p. 25. 
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carefully crafted dual responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secunty 
between the Secretary-General and the Security Council. The fundamentals of A 
Partnership for Peace which would later become reality began to emerge at a very earl 
stage. One former colleague even commented Perez de Cuellar perceived the possibility of 
what in fact came to pass. I At the time, however, Urquhart was extremely downbeat, 
"The report was extremely well received and was regarded as both 
constructive and audacious ... The members were so impressed by this report that they decided to review the Secretary-General's ideas in detail with a view to strengthening the Security Council's performance. They discussed the report for more than two years but could never agree on 
anything but the mildest and most vacuous comments on it. ... After this experience I concluded that only a complete change of heart among the great 
powers, which was unlikely, or a devastating international crisis, by which 
time it might already be too late, would change the Security Council ways. 112 
Urquhart then writes, 
"The end of the cold war encompassed such 'a change of heart among the 
great powers and much of what Perez de Cuellar had suggested in his annual 
report became, after 1987, the standard method of operation of the Security 
Council. "3 
In the first instance Perez de Cuellar hoped to provide the catalyst for a Security Council 
revival. While the Secretary-General clearly recognised the primacy of the Security Council 
in matters of peace and security, Perez de Cuellar was equally aware and committed to the 
Secretary-General's discretionary independent prerogatives which had evolved under his 
predecessors. To the UN system for the maintenance of international peace and security the 
Secretary-General added a revived a moral dimension which the multilateral practice of 
collective security cannot easily or consistently guarantee: 
- conducted in accordance with the principles of the Charter, the Secretary-General does not 
place the weaker party in an unfavourable position - all interests are represented; 
- the Secretary-General negotiates an objective and lasting settlement of a dispute and not 
merely one which responds to the political expediencies of the day. The Secretary- 
General's involvement is a sine-qua non for a just peace. 4 
The exercise of this prerogative, as articulated in A Partnership for Peace, and by Perez 
de 
Cuellar in the Cyril Foster Lecture required careful application. It was Perez de Cuellar's 
view that a Secretary-General must guard against the twin evils he described at 
Oxford as 
the, 'Scylla of Aggrandisement, ' and the, 'Charybdis of Extreme Caution. 
'5 Perez de 
Cuellar explained aggrandisement, (in the Congo for example), 
'Interview, New York, November 1995. 
2Urquhart, (1987), op. cit., p. 348. 3ibid. 
Verez de Cuellar, "Me Cyril Foster Lecture, " in Roberts and Kingsbury, op. cit., p. 133. 
5ibid., p. 126. 
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"Can discredit the institution of the Secretary-General and thus the organisation of the whole, because it can lead the Secretary-General into courses of action which are not realistically sustainable. "' 
Conversely, extreme caution, (manifest in Kurt Waldheim's tenure), 
"Can be equally discrediting because situations can and do arise, when the Secretary-General has to exercise his powers to the full, as the bearer of a sacred trust, and as the guardian of the, principles of the Charter. Moreover, 
... he risks through disuse, paralysis of the peacemaking and other functions the Charter rests in him. ' '2 
The exercise of this role requires the confidence of the parties to a dispute in the Secretary- 
General which rests in turn on impartiality and the perception of impartiality which the 
Secretary-General derives from being a non-governmental organ of the UN. 'Mese 
qualities are vested in the institution but how they are applied is a factor of the incumbent. 
Confidence in the Secretary-General therefore also includes a highly personal element. 
Perez de Cuellar inspired this confidence by his devout commitment to the principle of 
impartiality which at Oxford he described as, "the heart and soul of the office. ' '3 As Perez 
de Cuellar went on to explain, 
"He [the Secretary-General] must not allow his independence of judgement 
to be impaired or distorted by pressures from Governments. He should 
have no part in any diplomatic deal or undertaking which ignores the 
principles of the Charter. "4 
To his commitment to impartiality Perez de Cuellar added a natural flair for diplomacy. To 
negotiations Perez de Cuellar attempted to bring, "an understanding of the roots of 
insecurity, the fears and resentments, and the legitimate aspirations which inspire a people 
or state to take the position they do. "5 The ability to empathise and inspire trust was 
seemingly universally recognised by those who engaged the Secretary-General's good- 
offices. Even before coming to office one Pakistani Official had complemented Perez de 
Cuellar for, "his ability to go to the heart of the matter and to listen to both sideS. "6 In the 
Falklands Urquhart surmised, "the one thing that seemed generally agreed was that Perez de 
Cuellar had made an impressive and skilful effort to settle the matter before the war started 
in eamest. '17 Parsons adds, 
1 ibid. 
2ibid. 
3ibid., p. 134. 
4ibid. 
5ibid. 
6QUoted in New York Times 12 December, cited in Hume, op. cit., p. 78. 
7Urq A art, ( 19 8 7), op. cit., p-341. 
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"I was profoundly impressed by his diplomatic skills, the dedication and impartiality of the secretary-General ... the Falklands was his first and most exacting test. He did not succeed but no-one could have done more or done it with greater expertise. He passed with flying colours, and excellent augury for the future of the organisation under his stewardship. " I 
The Secretary-General had acquited himself well and established his personal respect and 
credentials. In so doing Perez de Cuellar had raised the profile and potential of the 
Secretary-Generalship. This praise was reaffirmed by the trust placed in the Secretary- 
General by the New Zealand and French governments to arbitrate in the Rainbow Wamior 
Dispute. And in Iran Iraq, Avakov argues, however unsuccessful Perez de Cuellar's 
initiatives, "the Secretary-General established good working relations with the conflicting 
participants and built up a mechanism of consultations with them, as well as between them 
and other institutions. ' QWhile events in the 1990s have questioned the value of 
intervention on humanitarian grounds where progress towards an end in fighting is not 
forthcoming, it was by humanitarian enquiry that Perez de Cuellar established the trust and 
acceptance on which he would be able to make substantive proposals and assist in the 
negotiation of a cease-fire when circumstances became more favourable. Perez de 
Cuellar's concept of humanitarian diplomacy was an innovative application of the 
commitment to finding new methods of fact-finding and expanding the Secretary -General's 
good-offices he made in the 1982 Report. 3 Berridge also argues that after 1985, "the new 
warmth for the UN in the administration [US] was probably also influenced by the growing 
reputation of the Secretary-General, ' 14and quotes Kirkpatrick, who described Perez de 
Cuellar as "a man of great intelligence, high integrity, he is an unusually fair, reasonable, 
decent man. "5 Arguably the greatest testament to Perez de Cuellar's diplomatic skill and 
personal integrity came in the Iran-Iraq war during his second term. Perez de Cuellar's 
approach ensured the, 'straitjacket, ' of SCR 598 did not create a problem for the 
independence of the Secretary-General's impartiality in the participant's eyes. While SCR 
598 may have restricted Perez de Cuellar's room for negotiating it provided a framework 
for a cease-fire and settlement which if not adhered to by the parties, the Security Council 
was prepared to enforce, (at least consider enforcing). When both parties were eventually 
prepared to comply it was to the Secretary-General they turned to to marshal negotiations. 
The Secretary-General had remained an acceptable intermediary to both parties and most 
significantly to the Iranians whom had just grievances against the pro-Iraqi tilt which had 
dominated and shaped Security Council decision-making for most of the war. 
Iran even 
praised the Secretary-General for his, "zeal and objectivity. "6 Perez de Cuellar continued to 
'Parsons, op. cit., p. 177. 2Avakov, op. cit., p. 162. 3See also U Thant and humanitarian diplomacy, pp. 104-7. 
4ibid. 
5QUoted in Berridge, op. cit., p. 39. 6Berridge, op. cit., p. 53. 
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be accepted by Iran and Iraq because of his personal credentials rather than his institutional 
position. 
In Central America, Perez de Cuellar had a close personal interest in peace and Olga peflicer 
argues, "as a Latin American brought a special sensitivity to the problems of the region. " 
The Secretary-General's commitment to peace in El Salvador was demonstrated by his 
refusal to leave office in 1992 until a peace deal was signed. Conversely, the importance of 
Perez de Cuelles personal involvement was demonstrated by the commitment of the 
parties to finding a solution before Perez de Cuellar's mandate expired. In particular, 
Pellicer argues, "the Secretary-General is credited with convincing President Christian to 
participate personally in the negotiations in September and again when Wks reached an 
impasse in December. "2 
Perez de Cuellar's close personal involvement in Iran and Iraq, and in Central America was 
not unique. His hands on approach ensured continuity in the Secretary -General's good 
offices and was reflected in his preference for appointing special and personal 
representatives from his cabinet. If there was a weakness in Perez de Cuellar's approach it 
is that administrative and in-house matters were neglected as a result. The institutional level 
of analysis has already examined the consequences for ORCI of Alvaro de Soto's role as 
the Secretary-General's envoy in Central America. As an additional office stuck on to the 
existing structure rather than part of a fundamental organisational overhaul, ORCI's 
conception is also indicative of the Secretary-General's antipathy for administrative tasks. 
Jwnes Sutterlin, Director of Political Affairs in the Secretary-General's office reports Perez 
de Cuellar preferred to delegate his administrative tasks and resented the tedium, and 
distraction of administration from the realpolitik of the Secretary-General's work, 
especially during the financial crisiS. 3 Yet it was the very commitment to corridor 
diplomacy and his religious attendance of all Security Council meetings that enabled the 
harmonious relationship with the Security Council and Security Council members at the 
heart of A Partnership for Peace. 
When he left office The Economist commented the Secretary-General was particularly astute 
at playing, 'backstage diplomacy where the big powers permit ... helping ease or end a 
string of bloody little wars between their third world friends. 4 That Perez de Cuellar was 
accorded the freedom to do so reflects not only the reputation Perez de Cuellar had 
cultivated as a skilled and dispassionate diplomat, but the approach Perez 
de Cuellar 
IPellicer, op. cit., p. 185. 2ibid. p. 185. 
3SUtterlin, James S., "I'he UN Secretary-General as Chief Administrator, ' in Rivlin and Gordenker, op. cit., 
p. 54. 
4The Economist, 27 April 1991, p. 16. 
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brought to relations with the big powers and Security Council. By identifying the scylla of 
aggrandisernent Perez de Cuellar gave explicit recognition to the supremacy of the Secunty 
Council and the limits to the Secretary-General's rights of initiative. When the systemic 
pattern permitted a reinvigoration of the Security Council these lin-fits were at first expanded 
not only because of systernic changes but because in his approach and practice Perez de 
Cuellar had provided assurances not to draw the UN into, "courses of action which are not 
realistically sustainable. "' Moreover, the practice of close and regular contact with the 
Security Council and its individual members kept the Security Council and its members 
closely informed of developments. During his second term, as a result, there emerged not 
only an unprecedented entente between the superpowers but between the Secretaiy-General 
and the Security Council. As a team player Perez de Cuellar exercised influence behind the 
scenes and as a result, like U Thant was sometimes perceived as a weak Secretary -General. 
This approach, however, belied the assertiveness of Perez de Cuellar most publicly 
demonstrated over Iraq in 1991. The creation of the Secretary-General's UN Guard and the 
qualifications which the Secretary-General insisted apply to UNIKOM demonstrated in 
practical terms Perez de Cuellar's comi-nitment to protecting the Secretary -General's 
impartiality and good-offices role. It was not the scylla of aggrandisement that highlighted 
a clash inherent in the Secretary-General's responsibilities as an independent peace broker, 
(Articles 99 and 33), and servant of the Security Council, (Article 98), but the new found 
assertiveness of the Security Council and its permanent members. 2 Perez de Cuellar held 
deep reservations as to whether the Secretary-General was the most appropriate authority 
for overseeing the implementation of Security Council decisions against Iraq, that went 
beyond the traditions of impartiality, neutrality, and consent on - those principles on which 
the Secretary-General's good offices role is founded. Before leaving office Perez de 
Cuellar voiced his concerns at the growing assertiveness of the Security Council and the 
risk of blurring the very different qualities the Security Council and Secretary-General 
brought to A Partnership for Peace, 
'The action relating to the Iraq-Kuwait situation this year has made it timely 
to express the hope that the unity of the permanent members of the Security 
Council will be complemented by a balanced constitutional relationship 
within and between the various principal organs. Moreover, it is important 
to preserve the political aquis that the office of the Secretary-General has 
accumulated over 45 years. It is an essential asset built as much on an 
incumbent's personal impartiality tact and sensitivity as on the integrity of 
the international civil service that provides the base for its functions. "3 
Had it not been for the seismic changes in the international environment the tenure of 
Perez 
de Cuellar would probably have been passed off as another where little had 
been achieved. 
IPerez de Cuellar, The Cyril Foster Lecture, op. cit., P. 126. 
2See Conclusions. 
3Source n/a. 
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The Secretary-General would have been credited for his diligent pursuit of diplomatic 
solutions, but would have made little progress in the absence of a collegial Security 
Council. As it is, the extent of the Secretary-General's role behind the scenes both at 
Headquarters and in the field has been slow in coming to light. As a facilitator of Security 
Council action and as a facilitator of negotiations between disputants Boudreau recognised 
in Perez de Cuellar, "a very energetic understanding of his [the Secretary -General's] 
responsibilities under Article 99. "1 In that fortunes of both were inextricably intertwined 
Perez de Cuellar viewed the Secretary-General as the, "collaborator, " not the, 
"competitor, ' Q of the Security Council, but only insofar as the Secretary -General's 
constitutional neutrality and personal integrity would permit. 'I'he concept of A Partnership 
for Peace, despite the obvious inequality of power between the Security Council and 
Secretary-General, is indebted to Perez de Cuelles conception of a collaborative Security 
Council decision-making process, close and collegial relations between the Security Council 
and the Secretary-General, and to Perez de Cuellar's diplomatic talent and personal integrity 
which pervade all of the above. 
'Boudreau, op. cit., p. 85. 2Perez de Cuellar, "The Cyril Foster Lecture, " in Roberts & Kingsbury, op. cit., P- 
136. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Conclusions 
The point of departure for this thesis is a statement made by Perez de Cuellar in September 
1991 attributing the revival of the UN to, "a remarkable co-ordination that had developed 
between the work of the Secretary-General and the Security Council. "' The close 
examination of the Secretary-General's role during a period of transition reveals the full 
extent of the Secretary-General's role in the UN revival, and the nature of the relationship 
between the work of the Secretary-General and the Security Council during this period. 
Moreover, in the development of A Partnership for Peace, a new system for maintaining 
international peace and security is identified. The identification and conceptualisation of this 
peace and security system is totally original, and the most significant finding of this thesis. 
After the Gulf War, the revival of the UN was widely attributed to a Security Council freed 
from the constraints of the cold war. A Partnershipfor Peace demonstrates otherwise. The 
evolution of this 'partnership' was based on a reactivation of the Charter system for 
collective security combined with the Secretary-General's prerogatives which evolved 
partly out of the cold war paresis of that system. This conclusion is only made possible by 
the examination of the evolution of the Secretary-General's role since 1946. The conceptual 
and practical limits to the Secretary-General's role within A Partnership for Peace are 
therefore those established during the cold war period. 
During the period of aggrandisement, the Secretary-General acquired new and 
unprecedented responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security. 
During Hammarskj6ld's tenure we see the development of the Secretary -General's good- 
offices and the creation of the first peacekeeping force. Both were founded on principles 
specific to the cold war context, (impartiality, consent, and the non use of force), and 
within Hammarskj6ld's conception of preventive diplomacy were inextricably intertwined. 
However, events in the Congo exposed latent tensions between the Secretary -General's 
peacekeeping role under Article 98, and the good offices role which emanates from both 
Article 98 and 99. Within the parameters set by the cold war, (excepting the extraordinary 
circumstances in Korea, and the application of sanctions against Rhodesia), there was no 
Prospect of the Security Council engaging in coercive, corrective, or enforcement action. 
The limit to Security Council action was the deployment of peacekeeping operations within 
the purview of chapter six and a half. In the command of peacekeeping operations, the 
Secretary-General's administration of Security Council and General Assembly mandates 
IPerez de Cuellar, Javier, Anarchy or Order: Annual Reports 1982-1991, New York: United 
Nations, 1992), 
p. 328. 
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was compati le with, and facilitative of the Secretary-General's good offices. 
Hammarskj6ld's conception of the'Peking Formula'enabled Secretaries -General to 
circumnavigate accusations of partiality where the good-offices tasks assigned to him 
clashed with the impartiality on which good-offices were based. Thus, with the exception 
of the Secretary-General's command of ONUC, and Lie's support for the Unified 
Command in Korea, any clash between the Secretary-General's administrative/executive 
and good-offices role was avoided, and remained largely hypothetical. Events in the 
Congo, (and Korea), however, demonstrated the Secretary-General cannot support, or 
apply enforcement measures without jeopardising his personal credibility and impartiality in 
the eyes of those between whom he might be able to offer diplomatic assistance. 
ONUC demonstrated that when the actions of the peacekeeping operations extend beyond 
impartiality, consent, and the non use of force, the Secretary-General's status changes 
qualitatively. The Secretary-General cannot be even-handed in the application of his 
mandate without repudiating that mandate, and therefore challenging the authority of the 
mandating body. This is a very great sacrifice. There are more participants in the 
international system capable of undertaking coercive or corrective action than participants 
endowed with the unique attributes on which the Secretary-General's good offices are 
provided. The legitimacy or credibility the Secreary-General's command brings to an 
operation involving the use of force is outweighed by the probability that the Secretary- 
General's capacity to assist a reconciliation is sacrificed. The exposure of these tensions 
resulted in a process of redefining preventive diplomacy and a tighter regulatory 
peacekeeping framework. The separation and 'consolidation' of the Secretary -General's 
good-offices and peacekeeping roles meant that when Perez de Cuellar entered office the 
principles governing the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace 
and security were well established. These principles were articulated by U Thant in 197 1, 
"The Secretary-General has no means of enforcement, no economic power 
at his disposal: he can only rely upon the prestige of his office and his own 
powers of persuasiveness. These are fragile instruments with which to 
tackle an international conflict, and it is important that they should be 
preserved. If a move by the Secretary-General were to give rise to the 
impression that he was intervening within the domestic jurisdiction of a 
members state, or taking a particular side in a conflict, or that he was 
abandoning his impartiality, his usefulness would be at an end, as any 
measure of success is in turn a measure of the confidence he enjoys with the 
Governments concerned. "' 
The Secretary-General's great strength has been the distinct lack of the attributes of 
statehood. On this basis, during a period of transition, the Secretary-General provided a 
complement, foil, or alternative to the Security Council's political, economic and military 
1U Thant, The Secretary- General's 25th Annual Report on the Work of the Organisation, 
197 1. 
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capacity to enforce decisions. Based on this finding, A Partnership for Peace argues that 
the specialisation and division of labour between the Secretary -General and the Securl" 
Council should be respected, whatever permutation or combination of roles are applied. 
Where there is an overlap between the Secretary-General's diplomatic roles, and the 
functions delegated to the Secretary-General, the latter should not extend beyond the 
principles on which the former are based - the Secretary-General should not engage in the 
use of force. Observation of this "critical rule"' maintains the impartiality and availability of 
the Secretary -Generals good offices. In this way, the means which the UN has available to 
maintain international peace and security are maximised. 
In that the revival of the Security Council did not entail the, 'crowding out, ' of the 
Secretary-General's role, A Partnership for Peace is a more comprehensive system for the 
maintenance of international peace and security than that envisaged by those who framed the 
Charter. This paradigm contrasts with the, 'odd couple of international affairs, ' which 
Boudreau depicts between 1946 and 1987, 
"They always work[ed] together but never seem[ed] a close or comfortable 
fit ... this relationship has been marked by periods of disagreement, open 
confrontation, and especially in the early days of the United Nations - benign neglect. "2 
It also contrasts sharply with observations made by Perez de Cuellar as late as 1986, 
"I feel compelled to express some concern over a tendency to view the 
Secretary-General in some circumstances as somehow separate and apart 
from the organisation. To express full confidence in the Secretary-General 
while failing to give the necessary support to the Secretary-General or to 
work constructively in the General Assembly to bring conflicting positions 
into greater consonance is fundamentally contradictory. Such a dichotomy 
cannot be conducive to the realisation of the full potential of the Secretary- 
General's post or, far worse, that of the organisation as a whole. ' '3 
The explanation of a historically strained relationship between the Secretary-General and 
Security Council can be found in the analysis undertaken at three different levels in chapters 
five and eight, and, in the inherent contradictions of Article 99. Chapters five and eight 
explain the evolution of the Secretary-General's role through periods of aggrandisement, 
consolidation, and transition, in terms of systemic, organisational, and personality 
factors. 
Analysis at each level has shed light on the evolution of the Secretary-General's role 
from a 
different perspective, but it is their interaction which has shaped the evolution of the 
IGiandomenico Picco argues that respecting this critical rule distinguishes the Secretary-General 
from the 
Security Council, and'saved'his life while serving as Perez de Cuellar's personal representative 
during the 
Gulf hostage crisis; see Picco, Giandomenico, Me UN and the Use of Force, 
" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, 
No. 5, Sept. /Oct., 1994, p. 15. 213oudreau, op. cit., p. 8. 3Perez de Cuellar, op. cit., (1986), p. 129. 
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Secretary-General's role. During the period of aggrandisement, Lie and Hammarskj6ld 
operated in very different systemic environments. During the period of consolidation, U 
Thant fought against a regulatory systemic environment while Waldheirn complied with the 
'demands' of that environment. Throughout the cold war period, personality and systemic 
factors at various stages facilitated and placed limits on the evolution of the Secretary- 
General's role. Significant advances only occurred in the role of the Secretary-General per 
se, and the UN's system for the maintenance of international peace and security, when the 
systemic and personality factors intertwined favourably. Hammarskj6ld was a Secretary- 
General of uncommon ability at a time of opportunity. Advances in the role of the 
Secretary-General during the second half of the 1950s were a product of a facilitating 
external environment, and the willingness and ability of the incumbent to exploit the 
opportunities that presented themselves. This is the context in which the evolution of the 
Secretary-General's role during a tenure of transition must be viewed. The revival of the 
UN in the late 1980s was not just a product of a new entente between the superpowers as 
the cold war came to a close. Perez de Cuellar, like HammarskJ61d, exploited changing 
international circumstances. Perez de Cuellar, however, concentrated his efforts on 
developing a system for the maintenance of international peace and security around the role 
of the Security Council rather than that of the Secretary-General. He facilitated institutional 
innovations which accelerated the revival of the Security Council, provided for a close and 
co-operative relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council, and 
reinforced the Secretary-General's good-offices and peacekeeping roles. The impact of 
developments at the organisational-institutional level contrasts with the impact of 
developments at the organisational-bureaucratic level. The Secretariat has been undermined 
by member states' attitudes and policy towards the Secretariat. In turn the development of 
the Secretariat has acted as a constraint upon the evolution of the Secretary-General's role. 
Questions of partiality limited Lie's scope for the development of the Secretary-General's 
good-offices and a UN Guard, and since the 1970s a bloated and inefficient bureaucracy 
was called into question the ability of the Secretariat to fulfil the tasks assigned to it. Since 
the 1980s, this perception of the Secretariat was been the symptom and cause of a perpetual 
and debilitating financial crisis. Claude argues that the crux of the problem is that the 
Secretariat operates in a 'kind of institutional vaccuum, but not in a political vacuum. I The 
UN is not a system of international government, nor does it aspire to be. Rather, the 
Charter provides for a system of international and multilateral governance, in which the 
lack 
of clear and coherent policy-making from member states in the deliberative organs 
heightens 
member states sensitivity to the functions fulfilled by the Secretariat. As 
Claude explains by 
comparing civil services in national and international contexts, the lack of a, 
"cohesive 
'Claude, op. cit., p. 176. 
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political executive, "' is an endemic feature of the wider societal context. The UN 
secretariat, Claude argues, is a bureaucracy without a government, but moreover, a 
bureaucracy without a country. Consequently, 
"It lacks not only the appropriate institutional envelopment but also the 
essential underpinnings of a community of political allegiance ... a civil service is an outgrowth of a political community; a good civil service is one 
of the rarest human social achievements reserved for societies which have 
reached an unusual degree of solidarity in respect of fundamental values and 
properties. 112 
In other words, so long as international society is anarchic, administrative and 
organisational reform will not realise the efficiency and neutrality to which Drunu-nond 
aspired. 3While the impact of systemic and personality factors has fluctuated over time, the 
problems of international civil service have been a constant drain on the Secretary-General's 
time, energy, and resources. The impetus for advances in the Secretary-General's role, 
therefore, has come primarily from the combination of a dynamic incumbent and a 
facilitating external environment. 
The levels of analysis approach helps to explain the evolution of the Secretary -General's 
role in the maintenance of international peace and security. It also enables some broad 
prescriptions regarding the continuing evolution of that role. Firstly, within the general 
trends of aggrandisement, consolidation, and transition, the evolution of the Secretary- 
General's role has been uneven, or, 'patchy, ' because it relies on a favourable constellation 
of circumstances at the systemic, personality, and to a lesser extent organisational levels. 
The organic nature of these variables suggests the continuation of this trend. A close and 
co-operative relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council cannot 
therefore be assumed. Nor can it be assumed that the principles articulated in A Partnership 
for Peace provides will be adhered to consistently. 
Secondly, given the expansion in the UN's activities, the increasing complexity of 
UN 
operations, and 'an imperial overstretch, ' developments at the organ i sational -bureaucratic 
level will become increasingly important in determining the Secretary-General's ability 
to 
fulfil the tasks assigned to him, and therefore the credibility and potential of the 
Secretary- 
General in the maintenance of international peace and security per se. 
The Secretaries- 
General have to some extent been able to circumvent the bureaucratic 
handicaps by their 
reliance for policy advice and implementation on a select group of carefully and well 
chosen 
associates. The levels of analysis approach suggests that in future 
favourable climatic 
IBailey (1964), op. cit., p. 61. 
2CIaude, op. cit., p. 176. 3See, pp. 26-7 & pp. 89-91; see also Bailey, (1964), op. cit., p. 
56; & Urquhart, (1972), op. cit., P. 526. 
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conditions and a dynamic incumbent will be less able to circumvent shortcomings at the 
organisational-bureaucratic level. 
Contradictions within the provisions of Article 99 also explain the uneven nature of the 
evolution of the Secretary-General's role, and periodic clashes between the Secretary- 
General and the Security Council. Contradictions in Article 99 also suggest that *in fact the 
Secretary-General and the Security Council are uneasy bedfellows. Article 99 makes the 
Secretary-General the facilitator of Security Council action. At the same time, the prospect 
of an intermediary role, which also derives in large part from Article 99, (in conjunction 
with Article 33), requires the Secretary-General to adopt an impartial position with respect 
to matters of international peace and security. The decision to convene a meeting of the 
Security Council, however, requires the Secretary-General to make a judgement that a threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression exists. This necessarily involves the 
identification of victim and aggressor. By its nature this decision cannot be impartial, 
especially given that Security Council action might ultimately result in coercive action 
including the use of force. As a result of this initiative, therefore, the Secretary-General 
may be viewed as part of the problem as opposed to part of a solution. The Secretary- 
General, however, is only neutral in as far as the Charter is neutral. Where a breach of the 
principles and purposes of the Charter is involved, and in the use of chapter VII in 
particular, the Charter was not intended to be neutral. Furthermore, the Secretary -General's 
subsidiary implied powers cease to exist with the act of convening the Security Council. 
Tbereafter the Secretary-General is formally limited in the provision of his good offices to a 
request by the General Assembly or Security Council. For these two reasons, it might be 
argued that Lie need not have taken such a resolute position so early in the Korean crisis; 
for these reasons Article 99 has only been invoked on three occasions, (Congo, Cyprus, 
and Iranian Hostage Crisis), and was never invoked by U Thant or Perez de Cuellar; and 
for these reasons U Thant conceived the, 'informal invocation, ' of Article 99. The purpose 
and intent of Article 99 - to prevent a recurrence of the political abstinence which 
bedevilled 
the League of Nations - has instead been fulfilled by the Secretaries-General's use of the 
office as an international soapbox or'bully pulpit. ' As Berridge argues the act of 
convening the Security Council is a redundant function in that, "the Security Council only 
fails to meet in those circumstance when one or more weighty members have good reason 
for not calling on themselves. "' Consequently there is little capital to be made by forcing on 
the Security Council an issue which it is incapable of addressing. 2 As we have seen the 
Secretaries-General, (some more than others), have thus cajoled, chastened, and chastised 
the Security Council and its members in private and in public. The Secretary-General's 
'Berridge, op. cit. p. 10. 2T11ough it has been argued that it serves and important educative function in clarifying where responsibility 
for the lack of progress through the UN, see pp. 190-1. 
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responsibility as guardian of the Charter has been fulfilled by recourse to the media, (with 
the exception of Hammarskj6ld's attempt to articulate a theory of executive action). This 
alternative means of fulfilling the primary purpose of Article 99 has also circumscribed the 
Secretary-General's potential by bringing into question the perceived partiality of the 
incumbent, (Lie in Korea and U Thant in Vietnam). While this approach erects political 
obstacles to the provision of the Secretary -General's good offices, it does not erect legal 
barriers to an intermediary role for the Secretary-General. It is an obligation, however, 
which the Secretary-General cannot abrogate or invoke informally. Failure to speak out 
where principles and purposes of the Charter are at stake is equally discrediting because it 
calls into question the incumbent's personal integrity. This paradox is represented in Perez 
de Cuellarýs reference to the scylla of aggrandisement and the charybdis of extreme caution, 
and in U Thant's assertion that, 
"One of the most important things I learned during my tenure was that the 
Secretary-General's world had two poles: at one extreme the idealism and 
global objectives of the Charter, and at the other, the pragmatic and if I may 
say so the unconnected selfish nature of national sovereignty. Working 
between these two poles he cannot afford to lose touch with either. "' 
The pious expression of the Secretary-General's moral authority can comprise the 
impartiality on which the Secretary-General's good offices rest, and risks alienating the 
Secretary-General from the political realities of the world in which he operates. 
Conversely, failure to articulate and stand up for the principles and purposes of the Charter, 
suggest the Secretary-General's diplomacy will lack substance, and that his good offices 
will be governed by compromise without direction. In other words, the tensions within 
Article 99 reflect the clash between the lofty goals of the UN Charter and the realities of 
international politics. In this respect, clashes between the Secretary-General and Security 
Council are inevitable and unavoidable. 
As we have seen, in the evolution of peacekeeping in Namibia and Central America, the 
respective roles of the Secretary-General and the Security Council became increasingly 
entwined. Perez de Cuellar went to great lengths to uphold the principles articulated in A 
Partnershipfor Peace, and prevent the re-emergence of the latent tensions in the Secretary- 
General's role. Even before Perez de Cuellar completed his second term, however, and 
despite his best efforts, in UNIKOM and the UN Guard the tensions in the Secretary- 
General's role began to surface. At the end of Perez de Cuellar's tenure, the 
UN and the 
role of the Secretary-General had arrived at a critical juncture, and in more ways than one. 
In January 1992 Boutros Boutros Ghali was appointed the first UN Secretary-General of 
the Post cold war world. Less than one month into his tenure, the first ever meeting of 
the 
1U 'n ant, A View from the UN, op. cit., p. 43. 
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Security Council at the level of heads of state requested the new Secretary-General prepare 
his recommendations for strengthening the UN's capacity for preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking and peacekeeping. ' The Security Council's request marked Ghal i's 
appointment as the beginning of a new era, and formally set in motion an In-house process 
of self-appraisal, for which the UN's 50th anniversary became an unofficial D-Day. 
Boutros Ghali's An Agendafor Peace, published in June 1992, was the product of this 
undertaking. The prospect of new developments in the role of the Secretary -General, a neýw 
style of Secretary-General, and the uncertainty of both in an emerging new world also 
elicited a number of recommendations vis-a-vis the Secretary-General's role. For the most 
part, however, these were expressed only in the vaguest terms - the need for strengthening 
the Secretary-General's role, a more independent Secretary-General, and a more 
authoritative personality. 2 The most specific recommendations regarding the UN system 
for the maintenance of international security in the post cold war world, and the Secretary- 
General's role within that system, were to be found in An Agenda for Peace. Viewed from 
within A Partnershipfor Peace, the provisions of An Agendafor Peace are ambiguous. On 
one hand this document makes proposals which confonn to traditional conceptual 
definitions of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. But by seeking out a 
role for the Secretary-General in imposing, as well as negotiating peace, and also in its 
definition of peacekeeping, An Agendafor Peace exposed the Secretary-General's role to 
the latent tensions against which A Partnership for Peace guards. It suggests, that if put 
into practice, these recommendations would compromise the imparitiality on which the 
Secretary-Generals's good offices and peacekeeping function, and will undermine rather 
than enhance the UN's capacity to maintain international peace and security. 
An Agenda for Peace identified four types of UN action in the maintenance of international 
peace and security: 3 
Preventive Diplomacy: action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent 
existing disputes form escalating into conflicts; 
Peacemaking: action to bring hostile parties to agreement essentially through such peaceful 
means as those foreseen in chapter VI of the Charter; 
Peacekeeping: the deployment of a UN presence in the field hitherto with the consent of all 
parties concerned normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and 
frequently 
that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace, 
(emphasis added); 
I Ghali, Boutros, An Agenda for Peace, (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. I- 
2The most explicit recommendation in this respect was that greater use should 
be made of the Secretary- 
General's fact-finding capability by the incumbent and the other organs of the 
UN. A joint proposal to this 
effect was made by Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, and the then 
West Germany, see UN Doc. 
A/AC. I 82/L. 60, and was discussed by the Special Committee on the Charter of the 
UN and Strengthening 
the Role of the Organisation, see Reports of, UN Docs. A/43/33, A/44/33, 
A/45/33, & A/47/33. The onlý 
other exception to this rule was Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childer's study, 
A World in Need of Leadersh'*P, 
(Uppsala, Sweden: The Dag Hammarskj6ld Foundation, 1990), recently revised as, A 
World In Need of 
Leadership: A Fresh Appraisal, (Uppsala, Sweden: The Dag Hammarskj6ld Foundation, 
1996). 
3ibid., p. 11. 
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Peacebuilding: action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. 
Ghali's approach was to defirie UN roles at the stage of intervention rather than by the 
organ or method of intervention. This approach provided conceptual clarity but 
oversimplified the complex relationship between the methods and organs by which 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding are realised. With 
respect to preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, the shortcomings of this approach were 
not immediately evident. Firstly, An Agendafor Peace completed the process of redefining 
preventive diplomacy which U Thant began. Ghali's definition did not limit preventive 
diplomacy to the Secretary-General, but when undertaken by the Secretary -General entailed 
the application of those functions which come under the purview of the Secretary -General's 
good offices. In that peacemaking also entails the application of the Secretary -General's 
good offices, preventive diplomacy and good offices could no longer be seen as 
synonymous concepts (U Thant). The end of the cold war removed the second level 
conflict which previously meant that irrespective of the stage of a conflict at which the 
Secretary-General was engaged, his good offices fulfilled preventive functions. Secondly, 
to reinforce the Secretary-General's preventive diplomacy, An Agenda for Peace made 
commitments to improve the Secretary-General's early warning and fact-finding capacities, 
and moreover, conceived of preventive deployments -a peacekeeping operation deployed 
before the outbreak of fighting, sanctioned by the Security Council, and observing the 
principles of impartiality, consent, and non use of force. The relationship between 
preventive diplomacy and preventive deployments therefore matched that between 
peacemaking and peacekeeping in bringing to a halt conflicts and preserving peace once it is 
attained. Similarly, post conflict peacebuilding can be considered as a new conceptual 
home for peacekeeping operations fulfilling 'functional' as well as 'political' objectives, and 
the implementation of which require parallel and ongoing negotiations through the 
Secretary-General's special representative. An Agenda for Peace therefore entailed a high 
level of continuity between the functions undertaken by the Secretary -General's 
representatives, force commanders and peacekeepers. The same representative who 
negotiates the cease-fire, also negotiates the political settlement and the implementation of 
the settlement. The same force commander and peacekeepers who observe and monitor the 
cease-fire, provide humanitarian assistance and assist in the rebuilding of a nation. 
If it is 
not the same representative, negotiations continue under the Secretary-General's auspices, 
and if it is not the same peacekeepers, the troops wear the same uniforms and 
blue berets, 
and answer to the Secretary-General. By examining the UN's role at each stage of a 
conflict and failing to look at the conceptual whole, however, An 
Agenda for Peace fails to 
appreciate this continuity, and the significance of these inter-relationships. 
It thus provides 
for policy prescriptions which as ends in themselves may have considerable 
merit, but as a 
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closer examination of the Secretary-General's peacemaking recommendations and definition 
of peacekeeping demonstrate, are destructive of that much greater whole. 
Secondly, with respect to peacemaking, and in accordance with the Charter distinction 
between chapters VI and VII, An Agenda for Peace distinguished between peaceful and 
coercive methods of conflict resolution and recommended resort to chapter VII methods 
only as a last resort. With respect to the pacific settlement of disputes, Ghali recognised the 
traditional weaknesses of peacemaking within the realms of chapter VI - reliance on the 
political will of the parties concerned, and the indifference of the international community. 
To strengthen the Secretary-General's good offices in this field An Agenda for Peace 
envisaged a more active role for the Security Council but at the same time noted, "the good 
offices of the Secretary-General may at times be most effectively employed when conducted 
independently of the deliberative bodies. "' Ghali also emphasised that, "close consultation 
between the Secretary-General and the Security Council is essential to ensure full awareness 
of how the Security Council's influence can best be applied and to develop a common 
strategy for the peaceful settlement of specific disputes. ' Q To reinforce the Secretary- 
General's good offices, like Perez de Cuellar before him Ghali recommended that the 
Secretary-General be granted access to thejCJ. 3With respect to a more active role for the 
Security Council and the wider UN membership and family Ghali also envisaged, 
"amelioration through assistance. " This entailed the Secretary-General, UN Agencies, and 
members, (through the deliberative organs), mobilising the resources needed for, "positive 
leverage, " and engaging, "the collective efforts of the UN system for peaceful resolution of 
a conflict. "5 These prescriptions promised continuity with, and reinforcement of A 
Partnershipfor Peace. But by involving the Secretary-General in the coercive level of 
peacemaking An Agendafor Peace departed from the strictures which for nearly fifty years 
had governed the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
In respect of the use of force, Ghali first called for the provision of armed 
forces, 
assistance, and facilities under a revived MSC, and argued, "it is my view that the role of 
the MSC should be seen in the context of chapter VII, and not that of planning or conduct 
of peacekeeping operations. "6 While this recommendation observed the 
demarcation 
between the roles of the Secretary-General and Security Council which emerged under 
Perez de Cuellar, it did not match his expanded concept of peacekeeping, 
(see below), nor 
libid., p. 22. 
2ibid. 
3See pp. 349-53. 
4ibid., p. 23. 
5ibid. 
6ibid., p. 23. 
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his proposal that the Secretary-General should have Peace Enforcement Units, (PEUs) 
placed at disposal. This was the most controversial proposal of Ghali's Agenda for Peace 
and differed markedly from Lie's campaign for a UN Guard nearly half a century earlier, in 
that PEUs were to provide, 
"Systematic standby arrangements by which governments commit themselves to hold ready, at an agreed period of notice, specially trained 
units which would enable the UN to deploy troops quickly to enforce a 
cease-fire by taking coercive action against either party- or both if they 
violate it. "' (emphasis added). 
Ghali distinguished between the role he envisaged for his PEUs and the forces made 
available at the disposal of the MSC by function and command. Forces made available to 
the MSC under Article 43, "would be to respond to outright aggression, imminent or 
actual, ' '2whereas PEU troops were to be deployed for the lesser purpose of imposing a 
cease-fire and agreement already concluded - "a task which can on occasion exceed the 
mission of peacekeeping forces and expectations of peacekeeping force contributorS. "3 The 
mandate Ghali argued would be derived from Article 40, (still within the purview of chapter 
VH), which empowers the Security Council, "to prevent aggravation of the situation ... to 
call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems 
necessary or desirable. " Like peacekeeping operations, however, Ghali insisted PEUs 
would come under the Secretary-General's command. In the breach between chapters six 
and a half and seven, Ghali was determined that the Secretary-General would become 
Vyshinsky's, 'commander in chief riding on a white horse. ' Vyshinsky's comments, 
however, were made with reference to the uniting for peace resolution which only ever 
entailed the possibility, (realised in UNEF), of commanding operations authorised within 
the remit of General Assembly's chapter VI recommendatory powers. In his campaign for 
the, "battalions of peace, ' '4Ghali was apparently oblivious to the tensions between his good 
offices and administrative/executive roles, and the value of a clear demarcation between the 
actions of the Secretary-General and the Security Council which A Partnership for Peace 
prescribes. Nowhere was this more clearly demonstrated than in his assertion that, 
"Just as diplomacy will continue across the span of all the activities 
dealt 
with in the present report so there may not be a dividing line between 
peacemaking and peacekeeping. "5 
IGhali, Boutros, 'Empowering the Untied Nations, " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 
5, (1992-1993), p. 94. 
2Ghal 1, An Agenda for Peace, op. cit., p. 26. 
3ibid. 
4See Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations, " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 
5, (1992-93)-, & "UN 
Peacekeeping in a New Era: A New Chance for Peace, 'World Today, 
Vol. 49, No. 4, April 1993, Nlorris 
Harvey, Interview with Boutros Ghali, "Give me the Battalions for 
Peace, " The Independent, 3 August 
1992. 
5Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, op. cit., p. 29. 
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Read alongside Ghali's definition of peacekeeping, I this proposal not only threatened the 
potential of the Secretary-General's good officesý but given the basis upon which 
peacekeeping traditionally operates and the inter-relationship of peacekeeping functions, it 
also undermined the positive proposals An Agendafor Peace made for reinforcing the 
Secretary-General's preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. For example the prospect of a 
Secretary-General with carte blanche over the full range of measures available between 
preventive diplomacy and peace-enforcement jeopardised the future for preventive 
deployments. Presumably, according to Ghali, UNEF would have not been withdrawn but 
PEUs deployed to prevent the cease-fire breaking. Had this been a possibility, however, 
Nasser would never have agreed to the deployment of UNEF, and conflict between Israel 
and Egypt, no doubt, would have erupted much earlier than 1967. 
As with peacemaking, in the first instance the recommendations of An Agenda for Peace 
promised the continuing development of peacekeeping with respect to the traditional 
conceptual basis of the Secretary-General's roles. Ghali commended the flexibility of 
peacekeeping and stated, 
"The basic reasons for success remain unchanged: a clear and practicable 
mandate; the co-operation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the 
continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of member states 
to contribute the military, police, and civilian personnel; effective UN 
command at UN HQ and in the field; and adequate financial and logistical 
support. ' 12 
In this statement, however, Ghali concentrated mainly on the systemic and organisational 
context of peacekeeping. Accordingly, his main proposals for the future development of 
peacekeeping focused on personnel and logistics issues and improving the organisation and 
flexibility of peacekeeping operations. But implicit in this definition was a reappraisal of 
the conceptual basis of peacekeeping. As Weiss argues, the use of, 'hitherto, ' is 
ambiguous and implied more aggressive intervention by operations under the Secretary- 
General's command. 3 It indicated the Secretary-General's willingness to command 
operations which exposed the tensions between the Secretary-General's administrative/ 
executive and good offices roles, and continued to blur the boundaries between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the Secretary-General and the Security Council. Tlis 
critique of An Agendafor Peace from within the A Partnershipfor Peace suggests that 
during Ghali's tenure the tensions in the Secretary-General's role would resurface and 
'See P. 372. 
2Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, op. cit., p. 29. 3Weiss, 'niomas, G. "Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome - "Operation Rekindle 
Hope? " Global 
Governance, Vol. 1, No. 2, May-Aug. 1995, p. 176; see also Cox, David, "An Agenda for Peace and the 
Future of Peacekeeping, " Report of the Mohonk Mountain House Workshop, Canadian 
Centre for Global 
Security; & Cox, David, Exploring An Agenda for Peace: Issues Arising from the Report of the Secrelar-) - 
General, Auora Papers 20, Canadian Centre for Global Security. 
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undermine the UN's ability to maintain international peace and security. Ile exposure ot 
these tensions in Somalia and Yugoslavia, and the subsequent revision of An Agenda for 
Peace have affirmed the conclusions of A Partnership for Peace. 
In Somalia, Ghali was determined to demonstrate in practical terms the need for the Peace 
Enforcement Units for which he had been campaigning in public. For the first time in UN 
history, and at his request the Secretary-General was delegated responsibility for the 
administration of a chapter VIII mandate. 1 This authorisation came in Section B of SCR 
814. Section A of the resolution was devoted to the Secretary-General's role in facilitating 
diplomatic and political settlement to the conflcit in Somalia. In this single document the 
Security Council, (and the Secretary-General), placed the Secretary -General between, and 
in opposition to the clan warlords. One month after its deployment a Pakistani contingent 
sent to inspect an Aideed munitions store was ambushed and twenty-five peacekeepers were 
killed. The inspection site was adjacent to Radio Mogadishu, (Aideed's main propaganda 
outlet), and in events reminiscent of the Congo, Aideed claimed it that it was the UN's 
intention to close down the radio station. 2 The following day the Security Council 
authorised the Secretary-General, "to take all necessary measures against all those 
responsible for armed attacks ... including those responsible for inciting such attacks ... 
and to secure the investigation, arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment. "' 
To restore UN credibility force was met with force. On 12,13, and 14 June air and ground 
strikes were launched on known and, 'clandestine, ' munitions targets. On 17 June a 
warrant was issued for Aideed's arrest, and a $US 20,000 bounty was also placed on his 
head. ne civilian death toll in the ensuing witch-hunt ran to four figures. UNOSOM II, at 
war with Aideed's militia, magnified rather than muted Aideed's standing, and destroyed 
rather than asserted UNOSOM's credibility. The four month war came to a close on 30 
October when two US helicopters were shot down, and in the gun battle that followed two 
hundred Somalis and eighteen US soldiers were killed who were then dragged through the 
streets of Mogadishu. The use of force by UN peacekeepers sacrificed any assistance the 
Secretary-General might render in facilitating that process of national reconciliation and 
UNOSOM H was forced into a humiliating withdrawal under the cover of US marines. 
At the end of 1992, and at the Secretary-General's suggestion, the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established in Macedonia .4 
Conflict had not yet 
broken out in this part of the Balkans. This was the first occasion on which Ghali's 
1SC Res. 814,26 March 1993. 
217or full details, see Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of SCR 
837 reproduced in full 
in Mayall, James, The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, 
fornier 
Yugoslavia and Somalia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 
212-4. 
3SC Res. 837,6 June 1993. 
4SC Res. 795,11 December 1992. 
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concept of preventive deployments was applied, and successfully provided stability and a 
"trip wire, "' in a region where the demographics and politics were sensitive to events 
unfolding elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia and susceptible to'spill over. ' In this respect 
the responsibilities delegated to UNPROFOR reinforced diplomatic processes and limited 
the conflict to the Bosnian theatre. In the Bosnian theatre, however, a creeping 
UNPROFOR mandate was at cross purposes with a political settlement, and the 
humanitarian objectives for which UNPROFOR was originally deployed. The 
UNPROFOR mandate was twofold: to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance and, 
"to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall 
settlement. "2 Despite the ambiguous wording and title, UNPROFOR was not authorised to 
use force in fulfilling these tasks. In An Agenda for Peace, Ghali had stressed that, 
"Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the pninciples 
of humanity, neutrality and impartiality; that the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance 
with the Charter of the UN; and that, in this context, humanitarian assistance 
should be provided with the consent of the affected country and, in pfinciple 
on the basis of an appeal by that country. "3 
Initially, UNPROFOR respected these classical notions of peacekeeping, and the Secretary- 
General's special representative and force commanders were able to negotiate cease-fires 
and supply routes. 4 Tensions between the basis on which UNPROFOR was deployed and 
the responsibilities it was delegated, however, were exposed by the creation of 
humanitarian safe areas. 5 To protect civilian populations in Srebrenica, Gorazde, Bihac, 
Tuzla, Sarajevo, and Zepa the Secretary-General was empowered to sanction air strikes 
against Serb positions. Force commander Wahlgren had already warned the use of force to 
impose the'no fly zone'over Bosnia would have negative consequences for UNPROFOR, 
would jeopardise the special representative's ability to negotiate cease-fires and supply 
routes, and would jeopardise the delivery of humanitarian aid and the safety of UN 
personnel. 6 Delegating to the Secretary-General the authority to call in NATO air strikes 
did not strengthen UNPROFOR's ability to fulfil the humanitarian mandate or negotiate and 
monitor cease-fires. As one senior official commented, "chapter VH does not increase their 
firepower, command and control, or protection, because retaliation is pretty 
bloody 
dangerous, ' 17and reflects, "the failure of the Security Council to play sufficient 
heed to the 
lUrquhart, Brian, "The UN in 1992: Problems and opportunities, "International Affairs, Vol. 
68, No. 2 
(1992). 
2SC Res. 743,21 February 1992, & SCR 758,8 June 1992. 
3Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, op. cit., p. 18. 
cekeeping to Europe, " International VITNESS: Introducing Pea 4See Stoltenberg, Thorvold, "EYEV 
Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 2,1995, p. 218-9. 
5SC Res. 819,16 April 1993. Tensions between the basis on which UNPROFOR was 
deployed and the 
responsibilities it was delegated first surfaced in the creation of UNPAs 
in Croatia, and Ghah's rejection of a 
expanded role for UNPROFOR in disarmament. 6UN Chronicle, Vol. XXX, No. 2, June 1993, p. 6. 
71nterview, Secretariat, New York, December 1994. 
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possible consequences for the role of peacekeeping forces on the ground and the Percemion 
of that role by the parties. "' As Akashi, (the Secretary-General's special representative), 
argued, 
"You have to always remember that the party you bomb today may be the party you have to negotiate for the safe passage of humanitarian convoys. You have to remember that you may be able to forcefully open one check point but out convoys had to go though ten to twenty other checkpoints. "- 2 
In March 1994, air support was requested for the besieged Gorazde safe area. For the first 
time NATO forces engaged Bosnian Serb positions directly, and the status of UNPROFOR 
changed qualitatively. Rather than imposing a Bosnian Serb retreat, or providing a model 
on which UN action could be based throughout Bosnia, air strikes compromised UN 
impartiality and fuelled Bosnian Serb attacks on the safe areas, humanitarian convoys, and 
UN personnel. In 1995, NATO landed direct hits on munitions sites at Pale, (the Bosnian 
Serb'capital'). The Bosnian Serbs renounced all Security Council resolutions, intensified 
their bombardment of the safe areas and took hostage UN peacekeepers as human shields. 3 
The Security Council responded by establishing a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) - an ad hoc 
variant of Ghali's PEUs. The RRF concept was initiated through French networks by force 
commander General Morillon who has described the UNPROFOR rules of engagement 
variously as a, "farce, " and, "angelism. - an illusion that the mere presence of UN soldiers 
with blue helmets and the blue flag could help prevent the explosion. ' '4Moffllon argued 
that the UNPROFOR mandate represented a, "confusion of ideas, ' '5but his solution was 
diametrically opposed to the prescriptions of A Partnershipfor Peace. The RRF provided 
an additional 12,500 troops with a ground strike capacity within peacekeeping rules of 
engagement. 6 As the mandating resolution stated, "the RRF will be an integral part of the 
existing UN peacekeeping operation and that the states of UNPROFOR and its impartiality 
will be maintained. "7 The RRF continued to blur the distinction between peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement, but by the time deployment began, Srebrenecia and Zepa had both 
fallen, with catastrophic humanitarian consequences. 
In theory at least, like the Aid Agencies, the Secretary-General's special representative, 
force commander, and peacekeepers were employed without prejudice to a political and 
military solution. In the absence of a lasting cease-fire, however, UNPROFOR 
'ibid. 
2Akashi, Yasushi, interview with SPYros, Demetriou, "ne Dilemmas of Peacekeeping, 
" The Brown 
Journal Of World Affairs, Vol. 111, Issue, 1, Winter/Spring 1996, p. 82. 
3Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia, 1991-1996: Limitd to 
Diplonzac, y and 
Force, (Clingendael, 1996), p. 63. 
Passivity is Dishonourable, " The Guardian, 4General Phillipe Morillon, interview with Ed Vulliamy, "Only 
12 January 1996. 
5ibid. 
6UN Doc. S/1995/470,9 June, 1995, see Leurdijk, op. cit., p. 72. 
7SC Res. 998 16 June 1995. 
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humanitarian functions assumed a neutrality which was partisan to the abuses of basic 
human rights and ethnic cleansing. The escalating means by which UNPROFOR provided 
humanitarian assistance extended beyond the conceptual, impartial, and consensual basis 
for its presence. UNPROFOR came to embody the type of operation which Ghali defined 
in An Agenda for Peace as, 'hitherto, ' employed with the consent of the parties. As a 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement hybrid, UNPROFOR was maligned by the sacrifices 
the use of force entails without benefiting from any of the concomitant advantages. It 
exposed the conflict between the Secretary-General's functions which rest on the perception 
of impartiality, and those which involve the use of force. It demonstrated in practical terms 
the danger of combining in the Secretary-General, roles which are conceptually 
incompatible. 
Makinda concludes the lesson to be drawn from the Somalia experience is not whether force 
should be used but how much? As Bobbio argued in 1976, "there is a very tight nexus 
between the results which have been obtained and the procedure by which they have been 
obtained. "' This observation Augelli and Murphy argues, "is more than just a 
philosophical problem. Force, if it is not used within certain limits and with caution easily 
degenerates into violence, ' Q At the heart of these observations is the question of 
legitimacy. Where is use of force legitimate and where is it not? and what degree of force is 
acceptable? Where is the Mogadishu line located, (the point at which a UN operation 
becomes part of the problem rather than part of the solution), and at what point did 
UNOSOM III or UNPROFOR cross that line. How much force is necessary or appropriate, 
and the consequences of its application, are moral, philosophical, and contextual issues, (in 
that the location of the Mogadishu line varies between conflicts and even within a conflict). 
Preoccupation with this debate, however, obfuscates the issue which the use of force in 
Somalia and Yugoslavia raised for the Secretary-General. The logic of A Partnershipfor 
Peace determines that the Mogadishu line is an institutional fact, not an operational issue. 
The question posed by A Partnership for Peace, is not whether force should be applied or 
how much, but by whom. The use of force is an anathema to the moral authority and 
impartiality on which the Secretary-General's good offices rest. The Secretary -General 
cannot simultaneously serve as a Leviathan and impartial intermediary. For A Partnership 
for Peace the Mogadishu line lies not in the degree of force applied but in the demarcation 
between good offices and peacekeeping on one hand, and peace enforcement on the other, 
between the Secretary-General and the Security Council respectively. 
'Bobbio, Noberto, Quale Socialism, (Turin: Giuli Einadi, 1976), p. 44, cited in Augelli & Murphý,. op. 
cit., p. 343. 2Augelli, Enrico, & Murphy, Craig N., "Lessons of Somalia for Future Multilateral Assistance 
Operations, " Global Governance, Vol. 1, No. 3, Sept. - Dec. 1995, p. 343. 
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Prior to intervention in Somalia Farrell argues the US distinguished between peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement only, "by the ratio of force to consent and impartial I ty. 11, Enforcement was thus seen at one end of the spectrum of functions which peacekeepers, 
and by implication the Secretary-General could undertake. In the revision of US army 
peace doctrine undertaken after Somalia the US recognised, "the critical variable of peace 
operations [consent, impartiality and the non use of force]"2are non transferable, and 
concluded, 
"Generally a contingent that has been conducting operations under a [enforcement] mandate should not be used in a [peacekeeping] role in that the same mission area because impartiality and consent divides have crossed during the enforcement operation. "3 
At the same time Ghali published a supplementary position paper on An Agenda for Peace 
which included a fundamental rewrite of the original document's definition of 
peacekeeping. The revision asserted, 
"Nothing is more dangerous for a peacekeeping operation than to ask it to 
use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so. The logic of peacekeeping flows 
from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of 
enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the 
political processes that peace-keeping is intended tojacilitate. To blur the 
distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peacekeeping 
operation and endanger its personnel ... Peacekeeping and the use offorce (other than in self defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not 
as adjacentpoints on a continuum permitting easy transmission from one to 
the other. "4(emphasis added). 
For the most powerful member of the UN and the incumbent Secretary -General, the 
"conceptual fog"5 in the "skid zone"6 between chapters six and a half and seven had begun 
to clear. For the first time the US and Ghali began to distinguish between peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement. In his position paper Ghali recognised that the Secretary-General does 
not have the capacity to deploy, direct, command, and control enforcement operations. ' 
Respect for the Secretary-General's comparative advantage in A Partnership for Peace 
leaves two altematives. 
Tarell, "Sliding into War: The Somalia Imbroglio, and US Army Peace Operations Doctrine, " Internati . onal 
Peacekeeping, Vo12, No. 2, Summer 1995, p. 206. 2DOA GM 100-23 Peace Operations, Washington DC, December 1994; see Farrell, op. cit., p. 209. 
3ibid. 
4Ghali, Boutros, Supplement to An Agendafor Peace, Position Paper of the Secretary- (ýen era 1 on the 
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, UN Doc. S/ 1995/1,3 January 1995. 517arell, op. cit., p. 211. 6Groom, A. J. R. & Taylor, Paul, "Beyond the Agenda for Peace: the Future of UN Arrangements 
for the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, " paper presented at the ECPR Joint 
Sessions, Workshop 
12, The United Nations: Towards the half Century, Leiden University, ne Netherlands, 2-7 April 
1993. 
7Ghali, Boutros, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, op. cit. 
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Firstly, in East Pakistan, U Thant established UNEPRO where there was no prospect of Security Council action, military or otherwise, to protect the delivery of life essentials. 
When the situation became too volatile to continue with the relief operation, UNEPRO was, 
withdrawn. U Thant's approach provides a controversial alternative to the 'tough love, 
which embroiled the UN in Somalia and Yugoslavia, and which compromised the potential 
for the UN and Secretary-General to assist a political settlement. U Thant might be 
considered to have applied the medical dictum, 'first do no harm. ' Through the Secretary- 
General, thousands received humanitarian assistance. Withdrawal merely recognised that in 
the prevailing climate little more could be achieved, and that attempting to do more may in 
fact have prolonged suffering by circumscribing the ability of the Secretary-General to 
facilitate a political solution when circumstances permitted. I 
In Lebanon, (1975-1990), and in Vietnam, (1965-75) the international community learned 
that, "wars of grievance fuelled by race or religious hatred and fostered by outside powers 
retain a capacity for endurance beyond logic or apparent self interest. "2 The marked 
reluctance of member states to apply enforcement actions to improse peace is 
understandable, especially if troops are not under national command. The humanitarian 
imperative fuelled by the'CNN Factor'is also compelling. If force is to be applied, either 
to impose peace or to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid, the second alternative is, 
'permissive enforcement. ' In his position paper Ghali recognised the Security Council's 
lack of an independent military capacity prevents it from undertaking this role directly. 3 In 
Yugoslavia, a final assault on Bosnian Serb positions by NATO gave impetus to US 
mediation. The Security Council then authorised 60,000 NATO troops to, "guarantee and 
where necessary impose by force, ' '4the Dayton Peace Agreement. In the former 
Yugoslavia, Black notes the major powers finally recognised that, "only a multmational 
force led by a small and well co-ordinated group of big powers can hold the ring. 1 '5 Weiss 
also identifies three decisions in 1994 respecting the division of labour between the 
Secretary-General and the Security Council in this way. 6 The Security Council first 
authorised deployment of Russian troops, (overseen by military observers), to bring an end 
to the civil war in Georgia. In Rwanda the Security Council authorised French intervention 
to halt the genocide provoked by the shooting down of a plane carrying the Hutu President. 
And in Haiti the US reversed a military coup, returned General Aristide to office and 
ISee pp. 104-7.2 
2Sheldan, Michael & Bellamy, Christopher, "Hankering Down for Long War, " The Independent 
Mav 
1995. 
3ibid. 
4SC Res. 1031,15 December 1995 & SC Res. 1035,21 December 1995. 
5Black, Iain, 'End of UN's Humiliating Road in Bosnia, " The Guardian, 
6 October 1995. 
6Weiss, Thomas G., 'The United Nations at Fifty Recent Lessons, " Current 
HistorY, May 1995, p. 227-, 
see also Weiss, Thomas, G. "Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome - "Operation 
Rekindle Hope? " Global 
Governance, Vol. 1, No. 2, May-Aug. 1995. 
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secured a peace to keep before handing over to UN peacekeepers and election monitors. In 
each case the Secretary-General's moral authority was protected and remained available for 
tasks such as negotiating a long ten-n settlement between parties, or rebuilding failed states 
once the situation on the ground had been stabilised. 
The downside of, 'contracting out, ' responsibility for the enforcement aspect of 
peacemaking is the reliance on a major power, or group of powers, willing and able to 
undertake such action. Questions regarding the benevolence and interests of these nations 
create a problem of, "getting the double standard right. "' Why Rwanda and Haiti, but not 
East Timor? Even over Rwanda, once the situation was stabilised by French intervention, 
not a single state volunteered troops for a UN successor operation, despite agreements 
concluded with thirty-four members to keep earmarked peacekeeping contingents on "stand- 
by. "2 The founders of the UN committed the Secretary-General to, "a deterniined and 
persistent effort to strike a balance between national and international interest. 113 In this 
respect, the role of the Secretary-General as facilitator of Security Council action, and 
guardian of the Charter applies, with all the attendant contradictions inherent in Article 99. 
Thus in 1992, Ghali famously accused the Western nations of conducting, 'a war of the 
rich, ' in the former Yugoslavia and ignoring the plight of Somalia. Where the Secretary- 
General's obligations as guardian of the Charter are paramount, Ghali has described the 
relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council as a "Catholic 
Marriage, " in which there can be no divorce, "one of the two will die. ' W This is the 
permanent paradox of the Secretary-General's role in the maintenance of international peace 
and security. It is the very reason for which the Secretary-General's role was strengthened 
by the UN Charter, and a contradiction A Partnershipfor Peace is not intended resolve. 
This contradiction explains why A Partnershipfor Peace is not a panacea for peace. 
Rather, A Partnershipfor Peace provides a theory to inform practice, which given systemic, 
organisation, and personality factors, protects the Secretary-General's role as an 
intermediary and peacekeeper. In so doing it maximises the potential of the UN to maintain 
international peace and security. These findings have been reaffmned by Ghali's revision 
of An Agenda for Peace and evolving practice. 
The cold war set limits on the actions of the UN within which the responsibilities of the 
UN 
organs evolved and were gradually claffied. The end of the cold war removed these 
parameters. In 1992, as when Lie entered office, the respective roles and spheres of 
responsibility for Secretary-General, Security Council, and other organs of the 
UN were 
Ilnterview, Secretariat, New York, December 1994. 
21nterview, Secretariat, New York, December 1994. 
3Perez de Cuellar, Anarchy or Order, Annual Reports 1982-1991, 
(1984). 
thali, interview with Morris, op. cit. 
(New York: United Nations, 1992, p. 67. 
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not automatically clear. A Partnership for Peace argues that in an evolving world order, the 
functions delegated to the Secretary-General cannot be divorced from the conceptual power 
base of the Secretary-General's role, and the basis on which the Secretary -General's role in 
the maintenance of international. peace and security has evolved since 1946. 
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